



**STATE COMMISSION ON RAILWAY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION**

**MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR AND ADMINISTRATION**

**ANNUAL REPORT 2024**

**ON THE ACTIVITIES**  
**OF THE STATE COMMISSION**  
**ON RAILWAY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION**

Approved by:

Tadeusz Ryś

Chairman

of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation

ul. Domaniewska 36/38, 02-672 Warszawa

telephone: +48 47 72 17 791, Fax +48 47 72 87 715

e-mail: [pkbwk@mswia.gov.pl](mailto:pkbwk@mswia.gov.pl)

duty telephone 510 126 711

<https://www.gov.pl/web/mswia/panstwowa-komisja-badania-wypadkow-kolejowych>

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section	Title	Page
1.	Introduction.....	4
1.1	The legal framework for and tasks of the Commission .....	4
1.2	Organisational structure of the Commission.....	6
2.	Activities and forms of operation of the Commission and supervision by the Chairman in 2024 8	
3.	Occurrences investigated between 1 January and 31 December 2024.....	13
3.1	Occurrences reported to the Commission by the entities mentioned in Article 28g of the Act.....	13
3.2	Breakdown of occurrences reported to the Commission by the entities mentioned in Article 28g of the Act.....	15
3.3	Occurrences for which the Commission started investigations in 2024.....	19
3.3.1	A serious railway accident which took place on 10 January 2024 at 07:58 hrs on the Rogoźno Wielkopolskie-Budzyń route, track no. 1, km 56.055, of railway line no. 354 Poznań Główny POD-Piła Główna.....	19
3.3.2	A serious railway accident which took place on 3 December 2023 at 10:06 hrs at Jaszczów station at turnout no. 1 on track 1, at km 201.000 of railway line no. 7 Warszawa Wschodnia Osobowa - Dorohusk.....	21
3.3.3	A railway accident which took place on 1 May 2024 at 10:34 hrs at Rudna Gwizdanów station, on track 1 on turnout no. 2, km 38.973 of railway line no. 289 Legnica - Rudna Gwizdanów .....	22
3.3.4	A serious railway accident which took place on 1 July 2024 at 09:19 hrs on the Ożarów Mazowiecki - Błonie route, track no. 2, Category B level crossing at km 17.211 of railway line no. 3 Warszawa Zachodnia - Kunowice .....	24
3.3.5	A railway accident which took place on 3 November 2024 at 16:30 hrs on the Spychowo - Pisz route, Category D level crossing on track no. 1, km 76.274 of railway line no. 219 Olsztyn Główny - Ełk.....	28
3.3.6	A serious railway accident which took place on 25 November 2024 at 12:30 hrs on the Sochaczew - Bednary route, Category B level crossing on track no. 1, km 61.941 of railway line no. 3 Warszawa Zachodnia - Kunowice .....	30
Article 4	Analysis of occurrences reported to PKBWK in 2024 .....	31
5.	Safety recommendations issued by the Commission in its annual report pursuant to Article 28l(6) of the Rail Transport Act of 28 March 2003.....	40
5.1	Recommendations issued in 2024 and published in September 2024 in the 2023 Annual Report.....	40
5.2	Recommendations issued by the Commission in 2025 included in the Annual Report 2024.....	44
6.	Implementation of the recommendations issued by PKBWK in 2024 (according to information provided by the President of the Office of Rail Transport).....	46
6.1	Analysis of information on implementation of the recommendations.....	47
6.2	Summary of implementation of the Commission's recommendations (according to information from the President of UTK) .....	82
7.	Other aspects related to the activities of the Commission in 2024.....	84
8.	Summary .....	85

9. PKBWK contact details as of 1 August 2025..... 90

APPENDIX "A" Information on the implementation of the PKBWK recommendations issued  
in 2024..... 91

ANNEX B Information on implementation of the PKBWK recommendations issued in 2024  
and addressed to other stakeholders (Article 28l(8) of the Rail Transport Act) .....102

ANNEX "C" Breakdown of occurrences in 2024 compared to 2023, by category .....103

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 The legal framework for and tasks of the Commission

The permanent and independent State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation, hereinafter referred to as "the Commission" or "PKBWK", has been investigating serious accidents, accidents and incidents since 17 April 2007.

The establishment of the Commission was a result of the implementation into national law of the position set out in Article 21 of Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on safety on the Community's railways repealed by Directive (EU) 2016/798 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on railway safety, -OJ L 138, 26.5.2016, p. 102, hereinafter referred to as "the Directive". In accordance with Articles 20 and 22 of the Directive, the Republic of Poland has ensured that the investigation of accidents and incidents is conducted by a permanent body which is independent in its functioning, organisation and decision-making from any safety authority, railway market regulator, railway carriers, infrastructure managers and from any other parties whose interests could conflict with the operation of the investigating body. The function of the National Investigating Body defined by the Directive is, in accordance with national law, performed by the "Commission". The Commission is fully independent in its organisation and legal framework from the entities and the European Union Railway Agency referred to in Article 22 of the Directive. At the same time, this said article empowers the National Investigating Body to supervise the investigation in the event of a serious accident, accident or incident.

The Commission acts on the basis of the provisions of Chapter 5a of the Act of 28 March 2003 on rail transport (consolidated text: Journal of Laws 2024, item 697, as amended), hereinafter referred to as "the Rail Transport Act" or "the Act", and is headed and represented externally by its Chairman in accordance with Article 28a(6a) of the Act.

Beginning on 1 November 2019, the budget of the Commission has been provided by the Minister in charge of home affairs, and support services have been provided to the Commission by the office that supports the said Minister (in accordance with Article 4 of the Act of 30 August 2019 *amending the Rail Transport Act* - Journal of Laws, item 1979).

Effective on the date of entry into force of the aforementioned *Amending Act*, the minister in charge of home affairs and administration or the office that supports their ministry shall now become a party to all contracts and agreements concerning the functioning of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation concluded by the minister in charge of transport or the office that supports their ministry, respectively.

As provided by Article 28e(1) of the Act, the primary task of the Commission is to conduct investigations following any serious accident in rail transport (occurring on railway lines with a

track gauge of not less than 300 mm, in railway networks functionally separate from the railway system, and at railway sidings that are not private) which has an obvious (negative) impact on railway safety regulation or management of railway safety.

As provided by Article 28e(2) of the Act, the Commission may also investigate accidents or incidents which under slightly modified conditions would be serious accidents leading to technical failures of the structural subsystems or interoperability constituents of the trans-European rail system. As provided by Article 28e(3a) of the Act, the decision to undertake aforementioned investigations is taken by the Chairman of the Commission within maximum 2 months from the date on which they received the notification.

The Commission may investigate accidents or incidents other than those set out above, provided that they occurred under circumstances that justify undertaking such an investigation. In such a case, the decision to undertake an investigation under Article 28e(2a) of the Rail Transport Act is made by the Chairman of the Commission, with no time limit specified.

Another premise for deciding to investigate accidents and incidents is that they occurred in repeated situations occasioned by similar causes. Any decision to establish an investigation into an accident or incident is preceded by considering:

- the seriousness of the accident or incident;
- whether the accident or incident forms a series of accidents or incidents relating to the system as a whole;
- the impact of the accident or incident on railway safety at Community level;
- motions by managers, railway carriers, users of railway sidings, the minister in charge of home affairs and the minister in charge of transport, and the President of the office of Rail Transport, hereinafter referred to as "the President of UTK", or European Union Member States.

Within one week of the decision to establish an investigation, the Commission shall inform the European Union Railway Agency thereof, stating the date, time and place of the occurrence, as well as its type and consequences as regards fatalities, injuries and material damage.

As part of its activities, the Commission conducts investigations to establish the circumstances of occurrences and contributing factors, and to identify preventive measures to improve safety in rail transport. The Commission draws up investigation reports with recommendations concerning safety improvements and the prevention of serious accidents, accidents or incidents, adopting a resolution to that effect. Investigations conducted by the Commission do not determine guilt or liability. As provided by Article 28a(3a) of the Act, members of the Commission are authorised to conduct investigations into serious accidents, accidents and incidents.

Members of the Commission hold service cards that authorising them to perform the activities referred to in Article 28h(2) of the Rail Transport Act. The model of the service card is set out in the Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of 23 October 2020 on the model of the service card of a member of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation (Journal of Laws, item 1894).

The service card is issued to a member of the Commission by the minister in charge of home affairs.

Where the investigation is established by the Commission into an accident or incident, the railway commission delegates the conduct of the investigation to the Commission. PKBWK draws up investigation reports in accordance with Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/572 of 24 April 2020 *on the reporting structure to be followed for railway accident and incident investigation reports*, hereinafter referred to as the "*Commission Implementing Regulation (EU)*", which established the reporting structure for investigations into accidents and incidents referred to in Article 20(1) and (2) of Directive (EU) 2016/798.

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/572 of 24 April 2020 (Official Journal of the European Union No. 132 of 27 April 2020) entered into force on 14 May 2020 and is binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

This Report uses the terms "rail-road crossing" and "level crossing" which mean any point where a road intersects a railway line and railway siding in one plane, other than a footpath. The term "rail-road crossing" is derived from the Regulation of the Minister of Infrastructure and Development of 20 October 2015 *on the technical conditions to be met by the intersections of railway lines and railway sidings with roads, and location thereof* (Journal of Laws 2015, item 1744, as amended) pursuant to Article 7(2)(2) and (3)(2) of the Act of 7 July 1994 on the Construction Law (Journal of Laws 2025, items 418 and 1080), whereas the term "level crossing" is defined and used in the Act of 20 June 1997 on the Road Traffic Law (consolidated text: Journal of Laws 2024, item 1251, as amended) and the Regulation of the Ministers of Infrastructure and Internal Affairs and Administration of 31 July 2002 on road signs and signals (consolidated text: Journal of Laws of 2019, item 2310, as amended).

## **1.2 Organisational structure of the Commission**

As at 31 December 2024, the Commission consisted of 10 permanent members including the Chairman, two Vice-Chairmen and the Commission Secretary.

The State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation was headquartered in the building of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration at Al. Jana Chrystiana Szucha 2/4, 00-582 Warszawa.

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 28d(4) of the Act of 28 March 2003 on rail transport (Journal of Laws of 2019, items 710, 730, 1214, 1979 and 2020), the Minister of the Interior and Administration issued Order No. 3 of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of 31 January 2020 *on the rules of procedure of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation* (hereinafter referred to as the Commission Rules), published in the Official Journal of the Minister of the Interior and Administration under item No. 2.


Annex 1 to Order No. 3 of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of 31 January 2020. (item 2) contains *the rules of procedure of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission Rules")*, which has been in force since 31 January 2020 and sets out the directions of the Commission's activities, its organisational structure and the obligations of the Office of the Minister of the Interior and Administration as regards the support for the Commission.

In accordance with the provisions of §5(1) of the Commission Rules, the Chairman coordinates execution of the Commission's tasks, ensures the proper organisation of the Commission's work and smooth operation, and represents the Commission externally.

The organisational structure of PKBWK is set out in Annex 2 to the aforementioned Order:

1. State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation headquartered in Warsaw (5 FTEs – permanent members):
  - a) Chairman,
  - b) Vice-Chairman for Research,
  - c) Vice-Chairman for Technical Matters,
  - d) Commission Secretary,
  - e) permanent member.
2. Commission Branch in Katowice (4 FTEs):
  - a) permanent member coordinating the work of the branch,
  - b) permanent members (3 FTEs).
3. Commission Branch in Poznań (3 FTEs):
  - a) permanent member coordinating the work of the branch,
  - b) permanent members (2 FTEs).





Staffing as of 31 December 2024:

- Commission headquarters in Warsaw – 4 permanent members (1 vacancy) and 1 Commission service worker\*),
- Commission Branch in Katowice – 3 permanent members (1 vacancy),
- Commission Branch in Poznań – 3 permanent members.

\*) support services are provided to the Commission by the office of the minister in charge of home affairs.

## 2. **Activities and forms of operation of the Commission and supervision by the Chairman in 2024**

In 2024, the Commission carried out operations relating to rail transport occurrences, including, but not limited to, the following activities:

1. An analysis of an immediate notification of an occurrence made by the entities mentioned in Article 28g of the Act.

The purpose of the preliminary analysis was to establish the impact of the occurrence (circumstances, causes, number of victims, estimated losses and other important data



influencing the occurrence). The said activities were carried out by members of the Commission, under the supervision of the Chairman of the Commission.

Preliminary information on the occurrence was provided to the Chairman of the Commission.

2. Decisions to send members of the Commission to the site of the occurrence to conduct an inspection was made either by the Chairman of the Commission or the designated Vice-Chairman.
3. A decision that a member(s) of the Commission should take direct part in an occurrence site inspection in the presence of the head of the railway commission was made mainly in the case of occurrences where it was suspected that the contributing factors included a poorly functioning railway safety management system that required analysis and possible corrective actions, or there were other reasons that necessitated the investigation in accordance with Article 28e(2a) and (3) of the Rail Transport Act. The inspecting members drafted memos concerning the occurrence site inspection, submitting recommendations to the Chairman of PKBWK.
4. The collected and provided preliminary information on the nature of the occurrence and its consequences including fatalities, serious injuries and material damage enabled the Chairman of the Commission to evaluate whether it was necessary to issue a decision to establish an investigation into the occurrence concerned.
5. Investigations into serious accidents, accidents or incidents were conducted by Commission Investigation Teams appointed by the Chairman of the Commission.
6. The investigation into an occurrence by a Commission Investigation Team appointed by the Chairman of the Commission is initiated by appointing the investigator in charge of the Investigation Team followed by determining the composition of the Investigation Team from among the permanent and ad hoc members of the Commission in consultation with the investigator-in-charge. The Commission Investigation Team then proceeded to establish the circumstances and contributing factors of the incident and draw up the documentation describing the investigation process that was required for the Commission to adopt a resolution closing the investigation into the serious accident, accident or incident concerned. The investigator-in-charge assigned and coordinated the activities carried out by the members of the Investigation Team, and was responsible for the correctness of the activities. The tasks and detailed scope of activities are laid down in the Commission Rules. The above activities were carried out under the supervision of the Chairman of the Commission.

The Commission issued recommendations to improve safety and prevent serious accidents, accidents or incidents in the course of investigations.

The scope of the plan of investigation conducted by the Investigation Team depended in each case on the conclusions which the Commission expected to draw in order to improve safety.

In 2024, reports were drafted by the Commission Investigation Teams on the basis of the provisions of the *Commission Implementing Regulation (EU)*.

The final version of a draft Report was adopted under a resolution of the Commission as a result of an analysis and after either accepting or rejecting the comments made by the entities mentioned in Article 28k(2) of the Act.

In 2024, the Chairman of the Commission Mr. Tadeusz Ryś decided Commission Investigation Teams should undertake investigations into the following occurrences:

- 1) a serious railway accident which took place on 10 January 2024 at 07:58 hrs on the Rogoźno Wielkopolskie-Budzyń route, track no. 1, km 56.055, of railway line no. 354, Poznań Główny POD-Piła Główna,
- 2) a serious railway accident which took place on 3 December 2023 at 10:06 hrs at Jaszczów station at turnout no. 1 on track 1, at km 201.000 of railway line no. 7 Warszawa Wschodnia Osobowa - Dorohusk;
- 3) a railway accident which took place on 1 May 2024 at 10:34 hrs at Rudna Gwizdanów station, on track 1 on turnout no. 2, km 38.973 of railway line no. 289 Legnica - Rudna Gwizdanów;
- 4) a serious railway accident which took place on 1 July 2024 at 09:19 hrs on the Ożarów Mazowiecki - Błonie route, track no. 2, Category B level crossing at km 17.211 of railway line no. 3 Warszawa Zachodnia - Kunowice;
- 5) a railway accident which took place on 3 November 2024 at 16:30 hrs on the Spychowo - Pisz route, Category D level crossing in track no. 1, km 76.274 of railway line no. 219 Olsztyn Główny - Ełk;
- 6) a serious railway accident which took place on 25 November 2024 at 12:30 hrs on the Sochaczew - Bednary route, Category B level crossing in track no. 1, km 61.941 of railway line no. 3 Warszawa Zachodnia - Kunowice.

The status of the Commission's investigations as at 31 December 2024 was as follows:

- investigations into the occurrences listed in items 1 ÷ 6 were commenced in 2024 and were continued by the Commission's Investigation Teams as at 31 December 2024,
- detailed information concerning the investigations into these occurrences is provided in further sections of the Report.

In 2024, the Commission completed one investigation concerning an occurrence that took place in 2022 and five investigations concerning occurrences that took place in 2023, and produced relevant reports which were published online. In the course of the investigations, President Tadeusz Ryś issued 14 safety recommendations addressed to entities.

The investigation reports published in 2024 and the 2023 Annual Report contain a total of 43 safety recommendations that were addressed in 2024 to various entities. Of the recommendations published, 40 were forwarded to the President of UTK, including two to be implemented by the President of UTK. Two recommendations arising from the 2023 Annual Report published in 2024 were forwarded by the Commission to the Minister of Infrastructure and one to a county road manager.

Furthermore, the Commission prepared and published 3 interim reports in 2024:

- INTERIM REPORT No. PKBWK 01/T1/2024 on the investigation of a railway occurrence which took place on 12 April 2022 at 09:22 hrs at Poznań Główny station at turnout no. 140, track no. 51, km -0.184 of railway line no. 351 Poznań Główny - Szczecin Główny;
  - INTERIM REPORT No. PKBWK 02/T1/2024 on the investigation of a serious railway accident which took place on 5 October 2023 at 07:00 hrs at Gdynia Główna station, track 5, turnout 45, km 21.522 of railway line no. 202 Gdańsk Główny - Stargard - dated 11 September 2024;
  - INTERIM REPORT No. PKBWK 03/T1/2024 on the investigation of a serious railway accident which took place on 3 December 2023 at 10:06 hrs at Jaszczów station at turnout no. 1 on track 1, at km 201.00 of railway line no. 7 Warszawa Wschodnia Osobowa - Dorohusk - dated 3 December 2024.
7. The Commission kept the entities listed in Article 28k(2) of the Act informed of the investigations and their progress, giving them the opportunity to submit opinions or information concerning the investigations and to comment on the draft reports.
  8. The Commission cooperated with competent bodies investigating serious accidents, accidents or incidents in other European Union Member States, including Drážní Inspekce, the national investigating body of Czechia, in accordance with Article 28j of the Act.
  9. Pursuant Article 28ja of the Act, the Commission participated in the peer review programme carried out as part of international cooperation among national investigating bodies of the European Union. A representative of PKBWK participated in the review of the National Investigating Body of the Netherlands as a member of the review team.
  10. The Commission monitored reported railway occurrences and maintained the Railway Occurrence Record (EwZd).
  11. In 2024, joint inspections of the reported railway occurrences were carried out by members of railway commissions and members of the Commission, including, but not limited to, measurements, tests and documentation analysis. In the course of the investigations into the causes and circumstances of the respective occurrences, the members of the Commission attended railway commission meetings and meetings with representatives of the Office of Rail

Transport (UTK). The Commission provided much guidance to clarify occurrence site inspections as regards e.g. rolling stock that did not derail in front and aft of the derailed rolling stock, as well as infrastructure.

12. In accordance with Article 28g(2) of the Act, the President of the Office of Rail Transport notified the Commission of difficulties in establishing the causes of occurrences by the railway commissions, inviting the Commission to participate in meetings with representatives of the railway commissions.

13. Important factors that influenced the functioning of the Commission included:

- Cooperation with other independent bodies, with mutual respect for each other's remits, in connection with a railway occurrence under the Agreement of 27 June 2014 between the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation and the Attorney General. The said Agreement applies also to cooperation with the Police, the Internal Security Agency (ABW), the Military Police and the Border Guard (in accordance with the definition of a body in charge of criminal proceedings provided in §1(5) of the Agreement). All provisions relating to the rights of PKBWK apply also to railway commissions.
- The Agreement of 16 December 2014 between the Commander-in-Chief of the Police and the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation concluded to define the principles of cooperation in the field of mutual support of their respective training projects.
- The Agreement on cooperation in the field of rail transport safety between the President of the Office of Railway Transport and the Chairman of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation.
- Within the framework of experience sharing, improvement in the quality of the occurrence investigation system and enhancement of rail transport safety, the permanent members of the Commission participate in external training courses, conferences, seminars, consultations, meetings, plenary sessions, working groups and workshops organised by the European Union Railway Agency and bodies that investigate serious accidents, accidents and incidents in other European Union Member States.

### 3. Occurrences investigated between 1 January and 31 December 2024

#### 3.1 Occurrences reported to the Commission by the entities mentioned in Article 28g of the Act

The obligation of infrastructure managers, railway carriers and railway siding users to immediately report serious accidents, accidents and incidents on railway lines to the Commission and to the President of UTK arose from Article 28g(1) of the Rail Transport Act. Furthermore, the obligation of the infrastructure manager or railway siding user in charge of the location concerned to report occurrences in writing arose from §7(1)-(5) of the Regulation of the Minister of Infrastructure and Construction of 16 March 2016 on serious accidents, accidents and incidents in rail transport (Journal of Laws, item 369), hereinafter referred to as "the Regulation". Under the national legislation, rail transport occurrences are divided into the following types:

- 1) **serious accident** – **any accident caused by** a collision, derailment or any other occurrences with an obvious impact on safety regulation or safety management, resulting in **the death of at least one person or serious injuries to five or more persons** (a seriously injured person means a person who suffered a bodily injury or health disorder as a result of a serious accident or accident, and who was hospitalised for more than 24 hours as a result), or extensive damage to a rail vehicle, railway infrastructure or the environment that can be immediately estimated by the accident investigation commission to be at least €2 million;
- 2) **accident** - an unintended and sudden event or sequence of events involving a rail vehicle and resulting in adverse consequences for human health, property or the environment; accidents include, in particular:
  - collisions,
  - derailments,
  - level crossing occurrences,
  - occurrences involving persons, caused by a rail vehicle in motion,
  - fire in a rail vehicle;
- 3) **incident** - any occurrence, other than an accident or a serious accident, affecting the safety of railway operations.

The aforementioned terms for the types of occurrences (serious accident, accident and incident) were defined according to the provisions of the Rail Transport Act.

Between 1 January and 31 December 2024, a total of 2493 railway occurrences were reported to the Commission and registered in the Railway Occurrence Record (EwZd) according to the immediate cause qualification under the Regulation, including : 3 serious accidents, 634 accidents and 1,856 incidents.


The number and structure of the occurrences by type are shown in the table below.

Table 1. Occurrences reported to the Commission in 2024, as compared to 2023.

Type of occurrence: (SA - serious accident, A - accident, I - incident)	2023	2024	Change 2024/2023
SA (Cat. A)	1*)	3	+200%
A (Cat. B)	676*)	634	-6.2%
I (Cat. C)	1752	1856	+5.9%
Railway occurrences total	2429	2493	+2.6%

\*) in the published Final Report, the occurrence was categorised as a serious railway accident - in the course of the investigation, the occurrence category was changed from Cat. B34 to Cat. A34 (the re-categorisation was included in Report No. PKBWK 3/2025 - 15 April 2025); the above requires updating the statistics regarding SAs (Cat. A) and As (Cat. B).

The chart below presents a summary of serious accidents, accidents and incidents that occurred in 2022, 2023 and 2024.



**Of which in 2024:**

- as regards railway sidings – a total of 169 railway occurrences were reported to the Record (EwZd) (including 131 accidents and 38 incidents),
- as regards narrow gauge railway lines, 15 railway occurrences were reported to the Record (including 14 accidents and 1 incident).



The table below shows the number of casualties (fatalities, serious injuries and injuries) in occurrences in 2024, as compared to 2023 (compiled on the basis of documents provided by the obliged entities).


Table 2. Casualties in occurrences in 2024, as compared to 2023.

Casualties <sup>*)</sup>	2023	2024	Change 2024/2023
Fatalities	160 <sup>**)</sup>	167 <sup>**)</sup>	+4.4%
Serious injuries	64 <sup>**)</sup>	51 <sup>**)</sup>	-20.3%
Injuries	106 <sup>**)</sup>	111 <sup>**)</sup>	+4.7%

<sup>\*)</sup>Casualties: fatalities, serious injuries and injuries (including at railway sidings) according to the information provided as at the date of the Report (i.e. until 15 August 2025), the casualties categorised in the prosecutor's decisions as suicides or attempted suicides were not included.

<sup>\*\*)</sup> Statistics (figures): fatalities, serious injuries and injuries as shown on the basis of *Commission Reports* and *Final Findings Reports* drawn up by railway commissions and submitted to PKBWK.

The chart below summarises the number of casualties: fatalities, serious injuries and injuries in occurrences in 2022, 2023 and 2024, based on *Commission Reports* and *Final Findings Reports* drawn up by railway commissions and submitted to PKBWK.



### 3.2 Breakdown of occurrences reported to the Commission by the entities mentioned in Article 28g of the Act

Categorisation of occurrences in 2024 in the relevant occurrence types by PKBWK is shown in the charts below:

a) **Serious accidents and accidents – 637**


A. Collisions – 85

B. Derailments – 171


C. Occurrences at level crossings – 187

D. Occurrences involving persons, caused by a rail vehicle in motion – 188

E. Fire in a rail vehicle – 6.



b) comparative chart of serious accidents and accidents in 2022 ÷ 2024



c) **incidents -1856**

A. Occurrences (incidents) related to **the operation and handling of trains and rail vehicles** (including: \*) incidents in Categories: C44 – 157; C45 – 8; C46 – 1; C47 – 8).

Number of incidents in the above categories: 174

B. Occurrences (incidents) **to persons involving a rail vehicle in motion**, without casualties or adverse consequences for property or the environment (i.e. \*) incidents in Category C65 - 63).

C. Occurrences (incidents) **at level crossings** – failure of a road vehicle to stop ahead of a closed barrier (half-barrier) and damage either to the barrier or road signals (i.e. \*) Category C66 - 53 incidents); malicious, hooligan or reckless offences, without any casualties or adverse consequences for property or the environment, endangering passengers or train staff (i.e. \*) incidents in Category C64 - 645).

Number of incidents in the above categories: 698

D. Occurrences (incidents) involving **damage to or poor technical condition of a rail vehicle** and fire (including: \*) incidents in Categories: C53 – 45; C54 – 173; C55 – 29).

Number of incidents in the above categories: 247


E. Occurrences (incidents) related to occurrences (**disruptions**) in the infrastructure ( damage, malfunction of equipment, collision with an obstacle, and fire in a facility or near the track, i.e. ) incidents in Categories: C51 – 92; C52 – 7; C57 – 4; C60 –102; C64 – 9). Number of incidents in the above categories: 214

F. Occurrences (incidents) caused by **incorrect preparation of the route for the train** (dispatching, launching, accepting a train or a rail vehicle) and preparing the train for running (i.e. \*) incidents in categories: C41 – 4; C42 – 6; C43 – 71; C48 – 5; C50 – 25). Number of incidents in the above categories: 111


**G. Other occurrences:**

Uncontrolled release of dangerous goods, natural disasters, malicious, hooligan or reckless offences etc. (throwing objects at a train, stealing cargo from a train, etc.), break-up of a train/shunting consist which did not result in a wagon runaway, and other causes or a combination of several causes at the same time (i.e. \*) incidents in Categories: C59 – 3; C61-1; C62 – 20; C64 –89; C67-1; C68 – 186; C69 – 50).

Number of incidents in the above categories: 349.



d) Comparative chart of incidents in 2022 ÷ 2024



### 3.3 Occurrences for which the Commission started investigations in 2024

#### 3.3.1 A serious railway accident which took place on 10 January 2024 at 07:58 hrs on the Rogoźno Wielkopolskie-Budzyń route, track no. 1, km 56.055, of railway line no. 354 Poznań Główny POD-Piła Główna

Consequences of the occurrence:

- as a result of the occurrence, the train inspector died on the spot, the train driver and the train manager were seriously injured, a passenger of the train was injured; the driver of a road vehicle did not sustain any injuries; the train driver died after 26 days in hospital as a result of the injuries sustained
- the semi-trailer of an IVECO lorry and an electric multiple unit EN57AL-1527 were destroyed; the train derailed with the first bogie to the right side in the direction of travel



Photograph 1 - Consequences of the occurrence - the damaged EMU EN57AL-1527 (source: own material of PKBWK)



Photograph 2 - Consequences of the occurrence - the damaged EMU EN57AL-1527 (source: own material of PKBWK)



Photograph 3 - Consequences of the occurrence - the damaged lorry with semi-trailer, scattered cargo - 10 mm thick metal sheets (source: own material of PKBWK)

Category D level crossing occurrence - a serious accident.

An occurrence on a Category D level crossing in which an IVECO lorry (a road tractor with a semi-trailer) entered the level crossing directly in front of oncoming passenger train MOJ 87940 travelling from Kołobrzeg to Poznań Główny station and driven by an EMU - EN57AL-1527, as a result of which the train ran into the semi-trailer of the lorry.

The Chairman of the State Commission on Rail Accident Investigation Mr. Tadeusz Ryś issued a decision on 23 January 2024 on establishing an investigation to explain the causes and circumstances of the serious accident at the Category D level crossing at km 56.055 of railway line

no. 354. The occurrence was reported to the European Union Railway Agency and registered in the database under number PL-10513.

In the course of the investigation, there was no need for the Chairman of the Commission to make recommendations to improve safety.

**Based on that investigation, the Commission produced Report no. PKBWK 01/2025 (3 September 2025), in which it issued the following recommendations:**

1. In view of the accidents that have occurred and the significant risk of further occurrences at the crossing, the infrastructure operator PKP PLK S.A., together with the road operator, the Head of Budzyń Municipality, will agree to implement one of the following measures to improve safety at the crossing:
  - 1) reconfiguration of the section of the access road to the railway line so that the angle of the intersection with the railway line is close to 90°
  - 2) while maintaining the current level crossing category, or
  - 3) re-categorisation of the level crossing to a higher category or decommissioning the level crossing.
2. Until either of the actions specified in recommendation 1 is executed, due to the safety risk at the crossing, the railway infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall introduce the permanent speed limit of 20 km/h for the train head at the Category D level crossing at km 56.055 of railway line 354, Poznań Główny POD-Piła Główna, in both directions.
3. The Minister of Infrastructure shall analyse the Regulation of the Minister of Infrastructure and Development of 20 October 2015 *on the technical conditions to be met by intersections of railway lines and sidings with roads, and on their positioning (Journal of Laws 2015, item 1744, as amended)* to determine if it is necessary to supplement specific requirements to check the visibility of the train head from the road and account for conditions similar to those experienced by road users (e.g., drivers of various road vehicles; See the reasons described in Chapter IV, section 3.4, of this Report).
4. Railway carriers operating powered rail vehicles shall check the installed forward-looking video recording systems to determine if the recorded footage is correct and uninterrupted. For systems with delayed video recording, the carriers shall modify the power supply systems to ensure that the recording process continues even if external power supply is lost.
5. PKP PLK S.A. will verify the results of the risk assessments of occurrences at level crossings of cat. D level crossings where the intersection angle is smaller than 60° (conducted in accordance with Section 4.2, Recommendation No. 7, in the 2020 PKBWK Annual Report), and shall take appropriate actions.



**3.3.2 A serious railway accident which took place on 3 December 2023 at 10:06 hrs at Jaszczów station at turnout no. 1 on track 1, at km 201.000 of railway line no. 7 Warszawa Wschodnia Osobowa - Dorohusk**

Consequences of the occurrence:

- one person died on the spot and one was seriously injured and taken to hospital where he died as a result of the injuries sustained



Photograph 4 - The SA134-019 front camera view of the working group (source: materials provided by POLREGIO S.A.).



Photograph 5 - The SA134-019 front camera view of the working group immediately prior to the accident (source: materials provided by POLREGIO S.A.)

An occurrence involving persons caused by a railway vehicle in motion - category: a serious accident.

A serious accident involving two workers clearing a turnout of snow being fatally hit by a train. Two workers of PKP PLK S.A., Railway Line Plant in Lublin, Operations Section in Lublin, were hit by train ROM 22401 operated by the railway carrier POLREGIO S.A. on the Lublin Główny - Zamość Szopinek route while the train was leaving plain line track no. 1 Minkowice - Jaszów and entering onto track one of Jaszczów station. The said workers were clearing snow of turnout no. 1 in track one using a diesel blower, among other things.

The Chairman of the State Commission on Rail Accident Investigation Mr. Tadeusz Ryś issued a decision on 2 February 2024 on establishing an investigation to explain the causes and circumstances of the serious accident at turnout no. 1 on track 1, km 201,000 of railway line no. 7.

The occurrence was reported to the European Union Railway Agency and registered in the database under number PL-10517.

In the course of the investigation, there was no need for the Chairman of the Commission to make recommendations to improve safety.

**Based on that investigation, the Commission produced Report no. PKBWK 03/2025 (15 April 2025), in which it issued the following recommendations:**

1. PKP PLK S.A. shall carry out a risk assessment regarding the use of backpack blowers for snow clearing work.
2. PKP PLK S.A. shall promptly develop and communicate to its subordinate organisational units that use backpack blowers for works on or at railway tracks, a set of requirements concerning safety conditions at work with this type of equipment, and shall enhance supervision of compliance with those requirements.
3. PKP PLK S.A. Railway Line Plant in Lublin shall reposition the end-of-train determination (Skp) camera so that it covers the signal site and, at the same time, turnouts no. 1 and no. 2 at Jaszczów station.
4. Operators of powered rail vehicles shall carry out internal checks on the correctness of recording of train driving parameters by the electronic data recorders installed in rail vehicles in operation.

### 3.3.3 A railway accident which took place on 1 May 2024 at 10:34 hrs at Rudna Gwizdanów station, on track 1 on turnout no. 2, km 38.973 of railway line no. 289 Legnica - Rudna Gwizdanów



Consequences of the occurrence:

- the fractured wheelset axle led to derailment of the following wagons: 9, 10, 14, 15, 16 and 17 behind the locomotive
- furthermore, the train was torn apart between the fourteenth and fifteenth wagon behind the locomotive
- turnouts no. 3 and 7, including turnout elements and track sections in the path of the train, were damaged



Photograph 7 - **Consequences** of the occurrence - a view of the fractured axle (source: own material of PKBWK)



<p>Photograph 6 - A view of the wagon with the fractured axle following the accident (source: materials provided by the railway commission)</p> 	<p>Photograph 8 - Consequences of the occurrence - a view of the fractured axle (source: own material of PKBWK)</p> 
---	--

Wagon derailment - category: an accident.

When freight train TME 664015 operated by railway carrier POL-MIEDŹ TRANS Sp. z o.o. on the route between the line siding Lubin Kghm and Głogów Wróblin was passing from the single-track route at junction Koźlice - Rudna Gwizdanów onto track 1 of Rudna Gwizdanów station on railway line no. 289, on turnout no. 2, an axle of the second wheel set of the first bogie in the ninth wagon behind the locomotive fractured, causing the derailment of six freight wagons with dangerous goods according to RID classification 90UN3077 (copper ore concentrate), i.e. the 9th, 10th, 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th wagons behind the locomotive.

The Chairman of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation, Mr Tadeusz Ryś, issued a decision on 16 May 2024 to undertake an investigation to explain the causes and circumstances of the accident that took place at junction no. 2 of railway line no. 289 of Rudna Gwizdanów station. The occurrence was reported to the European Union Railway Agency and registered in the database under number PL-10550.

The entity in charge of maintenance of the wagons, POL-MIEDŹ TRANS Sp. z o.o., in order to prevent similar occurrences in their wagons, pursuant to the request of the Commission sent in letter no. PKBWK.590.3.4.2024 of 3 June 2024, took measures by conducting a detailed analysis of the wheelsets purchased from P.W. "Inter-KomTrans" Sylwester Komisarek and subsequently put into service as regards maintenance activities performed on them, in particular non-destructive tests, damage (defects) found and decommissioning.

**Based on that investigation, the Commission produced Report no. PKBWK 04/2025 (2 April 2025), in which it issued the following recommendations:**

1. Entities in charge of maintenance (ECMs) of freight wagons shall update their maintenance system documentation (MSD) as regards the model document (report) for non-destructive testing (NDT) to identify the area covered by the axle test, in accordance with Appendix 1 to the Recommendation of the President of UTK of 29 December 2024 regarding NDT testing of axles of wheel sets in freight wagons.
2. Entities in charge of maintenance (ECMs) of freight wagons shall make it obligatory from now on to carry out detailed documented non-destructive tests of axles of wheelsets before they are put back into service in accordance with Recommendation No. 6 in PKBWK Report no. 02/2024.
3. Entities in charge of maintenance (ECMs) of freight wagons shall identify and subsequently carry out detailed documented non-destructive tests of all reusable wheel set axles placed on the market and/or put into service in the last five years for which there is no documented operation and maintenance history.

### 3.3.4 A serious railway accident which took place on 1 July 2024 at 09:19 hrs on the Ożarów Mazowiecki - Błonie route, track no. 2, Category B level crossing at km 17.211 of railway line no. 3 Warszawa Zachodnia - Kunowice

Consequences of the occurrence:

- as a result of the occurrence, the driver of passenger train ROJ 91448 died on the spot
- the driver's cab was completely destroyed, the first section of rail vehicle ER75-001 was damaged
- a KOEGEL semi-trailer of a DAF road tractor with the transported load (construction materials) was destroyed



Photograph 9 - A view of the lorry's semi-trailer at the crossing approx. 0.5 s before the occurrence (source: material provided by PKP PLK S.A.).



Photograph 10 - A view of the collision of the KM passenger train with the semi-trailer (source: material provided by PKP PLK S.A.)



Photograph 11 - Consequences of the occurrence - a view of the destroyed driver's cab of rail vehicle ER75-001 (source: material provided by KM)



Category B level crossing occurrence - a serious railway accident.

Passenger train ROJ 91448, driven by rail vehicle ER75-001, ran into the rear of the semi-trailer of a lorry (consisting of a DAF road tractor and a KOEGEL semi-trailer) which was stationary at a Category B crossing. The lorry remained at the crossing without being able to continue due to the "congestion" of road vehicles in front of it.

The Chairman of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation Mr. Tadeusz Ryś issued a decision on 3 July 2024 on establishing an investigation to explain the causes and circumstances of the serious accident at the Category B level crossing on the Ożarów Mazowiecki - Ożarów route, km 17.211 of railway line no. 3. The occurrence was reported to the European Union Railway Agency and registered in the database under number PL-10574.

In the course of the investigation, in order to improve safety, the Chairman of the Commission, acting pursuant to Article 28l(1a) of the Rail Transport Act of 28 March 2003 (consolidated text: Polish Journal of Laws 2024. item 697), recommended that the respective entities take actions to improve railway and road safety in at the crossing, i.e.

**A. Mazovian Voivodeship Roads Authority (Polish: Mazowiecki Zarząd Dróg Wojewódzkich) shall:**

1. complete the signage on voivodeship road DW 718 by adding P-4 lines along the entire section from the level crossing at km.17.211 of railway line No. 3 to national road DK92;
2. extend the cycle of traffic lights for traffic to/from DW 718 at the junction with DK92 to improve the traffic flow to the level crossing, in cooperation with the General Directorate of National Roads and Motorways as the manager of DK92;
3. relocate the signs indicating the beginning (D-42) and end (D-43) of the built-up area on DW718 to the left side of the crossing, i.e. in the direction of Pruszków, so that the speed limit on approach to the crossing is 50 km/h;
4. complete the P-14 lines on both sides of the crossing;
5. introduce no-left turn into the roads parallel to the tracks (horizontal and vertical signage) and introduce right-turn only from the four roads reaching DW718 parallel to the railway tracks within the crossing area;
6. separate the traffic lanes by installing traffic separators within the crossing area to prevent, among other things, turning after the crossing and bypassing closed barriers;
7. position B-20 "Stop" signs at the inlets of the four internal roads parallel to the tracks to DW718;
8. check, complete or make legible the signage from the internal roads parallel to the railway line within the crossing area informing of the crossing (refers to the situation of turning right into the crossing) by adding F6a signs - currently, the signs are missing on one of the aforementioned roads, whereas on the other two roads they are rotated and not legible to road users.

**B. General Directorate for National Roads and Motorways shall:**

1. extend the cycle of traffic lights for traffic from/to DW 718 at the junction of national road DK92 with voivodeship road DW718 to improve the traffic flow between the level crossing and DK92, in cooperation with the Mazovian Road Authority in Warsaw as the manager of DW718.

**C. PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. shall:**

1. Having analysed the circumstances of the occurrence at the crossing concerned, the Commission and the Commission's Investigation Team explicitly state that the accident occurred due to a permanent obstruction in the area of the crossing which poses a constant risk to the safety of the traffic of trains, road vehicles and pedestrians due to poor organisation of the traffic of road vehicles and pedestrians within the area. Given the fact that such circumstances are not provided for in the implementing regulations of the Construction Law, the rule of the railway infrastructure manager concerning the existing safety risk from § 84 of Ir-1 "Instruction on operating railway traffic" Ir-1 other instructions of the manager must be applied.

Consequently, there should be a 20 km/h speed limit for the head of the train on all tracks in both directions for the length equal to the length of the crossing and, where there is an obstacle, the train crew must stop the train in front of it. The speed limit must be put in place immediately until the recommendations have been implemented.

2. Carry out the emergency procedure to calculate the traffic ratio on the crossing, in cooperation with the voivodeship road manager, on the basis of Point to the Regulation (requested by the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation);
3. relocate the crossing light pole from the right side of the crossing so that it does not obscure the barrier for crossing users travelling from the direction of national road 92.

**D. Mazovian Voivodeship Roads Authority, Ożarów Mazowiecki City Council and railway infrastructure manager PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. shall:**

1. the Mazovian Voivodeship Roads Authority in Warsaw, the manager of voivodeship road DW718, and the railway infrastructure manager PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. and the Ożarów Mazowiecki City Council shall speed up the work on building a viaduct over railway line no. 1 to eventually replace the crossing in the course of and the Ożarów Mazowiecki City Council shall speed up the work on building a viaduct over railway line no. 1 to eventually replace the crossing in the course of Ceramiczna Street in Ołtarzew.
2. Since it is impossible to ensure a safe left turn at the exit from the railway crossing into Południowa Street, the Ożarów Mazowiecki City Council is requested to take urgent measures to enable safe access for long road vehicles, in particular lorries and agricultural tractors with trailers, to properties located along Brzegowa Street in Ołtarzew, including, inter alia, urgently pave the current dirt road on the section from the property at 2 Brzegowa Street to the turn of Brzegowa Street running through parcels no. 437/4 and 437/5 and along parcel no. 436/4, while making the turn angle less sharp (437/4). In the course of the investigation, the City Council of Ożarów Mazowiecki had the aforementioned dirt road paved.



At the same time, the chairman of PKBWK required that works be carried out by the managers of voivodeship and national roads in consultation with PKP PLK S.A. Railway Line Plant in Warsaw as the manager of the railway infrastructure at the crossing.

The above recommendations were based on the facts established by permanent members of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation and, inter alia, on the conclusions of several inspections carried out at the crossing in connection with the occurrence that took place at the crossing on 1 July 2024. One of the inspections was carried out with the participation of, inter alia, representatives of the Police, the railway infrastructure manager, the manager of voivodeship road DW718 and members of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation.

Based on that investigation, the Commission produced Report no. **PKBWK 05/2025** (25 June 2025), in which it issued the following recommendations:

1. The entities in charge of management of railway infrastructure shall - on the basis of reports from railway carriers, level crossing users and other reports on road traffic organisation concerning traffic jams at level crossings - carry out emergency inspections of these level crossings together with road managers, and shall take immediate measures to improve the safety of railway and road traffic at these crossings.
2. Infrastructure manager PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. Railway Line Plant in Warsaw shall include in the Technical Regulations of the Traffic Control Post equipped with the remote control device (UZK) for the level crossing at km 17.211 of railway line no. 3, the obligation for the signaller to use the "Alarm" signal by means of the RADIOSTOP system in the event of a defect in the Cat. I automatic crossing system (SSP) when a train is approaching the crossing concerned. The above shall apply until either of the solutions included in Recommendation no. 7 of this Report is implemented.
3. The railway infrastructure manager PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. shall take measures to implement systems to detect the presence of road vehicles between closed barriers on level crossings which will alert train drivers and signallers to the danger, including at the crossing at km 17.211 of railway line no. 3.
4. The voivodeship road manager Mazovian Voivodeship Roads Authority in Warsaw shall, in cooperation with railway infrastructure manager PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. and the City and Municipality Council of Ożarów Mazowiecki, continue actions to implement the provisions of Agreement No. 25/MZDW/2018 signed on 22 May 2018, including to build a viaduct over railway line no. 3 to ultimately replace the level crossing at km 17.211 of this line.
5. Operators of powered rail vehicles with front-view monitoring shall ensure that the said equipment ensures continuous video and audio recording capability, particularly in the event of railway occurrences. Consideration should be given to relocating the monitoring recorder to a secure place within the rail vehicles to ensure continuity of recording in the event of railway occurrences.
6. Railway infrastructure manager PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. shall clarify its internal regulations as regards the procedure to be followed by signallers in the event that a defect of Cat. I SSP is signalled by the UZK equipment when a train is approaching (in particular Section 18 of Ie-119 and Section 25(6)(1) of Ir-7).
7. Until Recommendation no. 4 of this Report is implemented, the voivodeship roads manager

Mazovian Voivodeship Roads Authority in Warsaw shall, in cooperation with the manager of access roads - the City and Municipality Council of Ożarów Mazowiecki, consider (on the basis of the agreement with PKP S.A.) either of the following solutions to improve safety at the crossing:

- a) conversion of the junctions of the voivodeship road with roads parallel to the railway line, so that the continuity of the access road is ensured and there are no junctions of these roads with the voivodeship road on either side of the crossing and on each side of the voivodeship road over the distance of 30 m from the crossing barrier devices, or
- b) application of the design solution referred to in Section 21(2) of the Regulation of the Minister of Infrastructure of 20 October 2015 on the technical conditions to be met by crossings of railway lines and sidings with roads, and on their positioning (design solutions within the crossing to ensure efficient exit of road vehicles from the crossing (Journal of Laws, item 1744, as amended), which provides that: *"The design solutions applied within a level crossing should ensure that road vehicles can exit the level crossing smoothly and join the traffic flow adjacent to the level crossing, in particular by making the operation of the crossing systems dependent on (linked to) the road traffic control systems"*.

8. Authorised railway infrastructure managers, users of railway sidings, operators of narrow gauge railways and infrastructure managers that are exempt from the obligation to obtain a safety authorisation and authorised to operate under a safety certificate (hereinafter referred to as "railway managers") shall - in the event of receiving notification from a road manager of the intention to carry out traffic volume measurements at a level crossing - request feedback from the road manager concerning the traffic characteristics within the crossing, including in particular the likelihood of road traffic jams. Where the formation of traffic jams within a level crossing is identified, the railway managers shall analyse the resulting risks and implement appropriate safety measures.

### **3.3.5 A railway accident which took place on 3 November 2024 at 16:30 hrs on the Spychowo - Pisz route, Category D level crossing on track no. 1, km 76.274 of railway line no. 219 Olsztyn Główny - Ełk**

Consequences of the occurrence:

- The driver of the passenger car and four passengers died on the spot
- the passenger car (Volvo) was completely destroyed
- the locomotive leading train SU160-009 was damaged (no derailment)



Photograph 12 - A view of the level crossing from the direction of the passenger car's travel (source: railway commission)



Photograph 13 - A view of the technical condition of the level crossing from the direction of passenger car's travel (source: materials provided by the railway commission)



Photograph 14 - Consequences of the occurrence - damaged locomotive ET22-1062 (source: materials provided by the railway commission)

A Category D level crossing occurrence - a railway accident.

Passenger train no. MPS 15102, led by an SU160 locomotive, ran into a road vehicle (a Volvo passenger car) which entered the level crossing directly in front of the head of the train without stopping at the B-20 "Stop" sign. The visibility of the level crossing from the road, as seen from the direction of the car's travel, was correct. There are isolated trees and shrubs in the visibility triangles of the train head from the direction of the car's travel in the immediate vicinity of the track. There are B-20 "Stop" road signs positioned and P-12 absolute stop lines painted ahead of the level crossing on both sides of the road.

The Chairman of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation Mr. Tadeusz Ryś issued a decision on 15 November 2024 on establishing an investigation to explain the causes and circumstances of the accident at the Category D level crossing on the Sychowo-Pisz route, km 76.274 of railway line no. 219. The occurrence was reported to the European Union Railway Agency and registered in the database under number PL-10628.

The Chairman of the Commission did not issue any recommendations to improve safety while the investigation was still in progress.



As of August 2025, the investigation was in the phase of clarifying the contributing factors and formulating the recommendations. The investigation report is now at the final stage of development.

**3.3.6 A serious railway accident which took place on 25 November 2024 at 12:30 hrs on the Sochaczew - Bednary route, Category B level crossing on track no. 1, km 61.941 of railway line no. 3 Warszawa Zachodnia - Kunowice**

Consequences of the occurrence:

- Three passengers of train EIJ 5220 were injured as a result of the occurrence
- the first bogie the electric multiple unit ED161-004 was derailed on the right-hand side in the direction of travel, the head section of the ED161-004a cab was damaged
- a lorry (MAN) was thrown away and turned by 180° by the moving train
- U11 fencing was crushed, a container with internal crossing signalling equipment was destroyed, a power supply cabinet and container with telecommunication equipment were destroyed



Photograph 15 - Consequences of the occurrence at the level crossing (source: materials provided by the railway commission)



Photograph 16 - Consequences of the occurrence at the level crossing (source: materials provided by the railway commission)



Photograph 17 - Consequences of the occurrence - the interior of ED161-004a (source: own material of PKBWK)



Photograph 18 - Consequences of the occurrence - the damaged ED161-004a cab (source: materials of the railway commission)

Category B level crossing occurrence - a serious railway accident.

Rail vehicle no. ED161-004 leading train no. 5220 of the carrier PKP Intercity S.A. ran into a MAN road vehicle which was stationary and abandoned at the N3 exit barrier in the gauge of track no. 1 on the Cat. B level crossing at km 61.941; the level crossing was equipped with an automatic crossing system with traffic lights and barriers - functioning properly. Entering the Cat. B level crossing, the lorry damaged the N2 barrier bar and then stopped in front of the closed N3 barrier bar on the inside of the level crossing on track no. 1. The driver of the MAN lorry abandoned the vehicle making nervous movements, running in the level crossing zone, and waving his hands at the oncoming IC train no. 5220.

The Chairman of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation Mr. Tadeusz Ryś issued a decision on 2 December 2024 on establishing an investigation to explain the causes and circumstances of the serious accident at the Category B level crossing on the Sochaczew - Bednary route, track no. 1, km 61.941 of railway line no. 3. The occurrence was reported to the European Union Railway Agency and registered in the database under number PL-10628.

The Chairman of the Commission did not issue any recommendations to improve safety while the investigation was still in progress.

The investigation is (as at August 2025) at the final stage of preparation of the Report.

## **Article 4 Analysis of occurrences reported to PKBWK in 2024**

### **Increase in the total number of occurrences**

In 2024, the total number of occurrences reported to the Commission by relevant infrastructure managers and railway siding users increased by 2.6% compared to 2023, of which:

- there were three serious accidents reported, with respect to which the Commission conducted investigations (in 2023, one serious railway accident was reported),
- there was a decrease in the number of accidents - by 6.2% (from 676 in 2023 to 634 in 2024),
- the number of incidents increased by 5.9% (from 1752 in 2023 to 1856 in 2024).

### **Railway sidings**

An analysis of the occurrences reported to PKBWK in 2024 shows that the total number of railway occurrences at railway sidings decreased by 6.1% compared to 2023.

In 2024, there were 169 occurrences at railway sidings, of which 131 were categorised as railway accidents and 38 as railway incidents, whereas in 2023, there were 180 railway occurrences in total, of which 146 were categorised as railway accidents and 34 as railway incidents.

### **Narrow-gauge railways**

Furthermore, 15 narrow-gauge railway lines reported 15 railway occurrences in 2024, including 14 accidents (Category B) and 1 incident (Category C), compared to 8 Category B accidents and no incidents reported in 2023.

The breakdown of occurrences in 2024 compared to 2023 by category (including immediate cause qualification) is shown on page 96 of Annex "C" to this report.

### **Accidents**

**A decrease** in the number of accidents compared to the previous year was recorded in 16 categories\*) (out of all 40 Category B occurrences), i.e. B01 - 0; B03 - 39; B07 - 0; B09 - 32; B11 - 10; B12 - 2; B16 -3; B17 - 12; B18 - 2; B19 - 6; B21 - 116; B23 - 7; B31 - 2; B35 - 10; B39 - 0, and one in an undetermined category.

**A slight increase** in the number of accidents was recorded in 11 categories ), i.e. B02 - 1; B04 - 39; B08 - 19; B13 - 51; B20 - 32; B22 - 3; B24 - 5; B30 - 6; B32 - 9; B33 - 14; B34 -175.

**The largest decrease** in the number of accidents was recorded in the following categories:

**B09** - a decrease by 18 - occurrences due to damage or poor maintenance of structures, including inappropriate execution of works, leaving materials and equipment on the track or in the gauge of a rail vehicle, or a rail vehicle running into structure elements - 50 occurrences took place in 2023, compared to 32 in 2024;

**B21** - a decrease by 15 - occurrences at Category D level crossings - 131 in 2023, compared to 116 in 2024;

**B17** - a decrease by 12 - improper loading, unloading, irregularities in securing the cargo or other irregularities in cargo operations, or improper formation of a train or shunting consist - 24 occurrences in 2023, compared to 12 in 2024;

**B35** - a decrease by 8 - occurrences to persons involving a rail vehicle in motion (jumping in/falling out of a train/rail vehicle, strong approach or sudden braking of a rail vehicle) - 18 occurrences in 2023, compared to 10 in 2024;

**B23** - a decrease by 6 - occurrences caused by a rail vehicle running into a road vehicle (other road machinery, agricultural machinery) or vice versa outside level crossings at stations and routes or on communication and access track to railway sidings - 13 occurrences in 2023, compared to - 7 in 2024.

### **Incidents**

Compared to the previous year, there was a 5.9% increase (up by 104), in the number of incidents reported in 2024 (1,752 incidents in 2023, compared to 1,856 in 2024).



**An increase** in the number of incidents was recorded in 16 categories\*) (out of 27 category C incidents in total), i.e.: C41 – 4; C42 – 6; C44 – 157; C47 - 8; C48 - 5; C50 – 25; C51 – 92; C52 – 7; C53 – 45; C55 – 29; C57 – 4; C60 – 102; C62 – 20; C64 – 743; C67 – 1; C69 – 50).

**A slight decrease** in the number of incidents was recorded in 7 categories\*), i.e. C43 – 71; C45 – 8; C54 – 173; C59 – 3; C65 – 63; C66 – 53; C68 – 186, with no occurrence reported (complete decrease) in categories: C49 – 0; C61 – 0; C63 – 0.

**The largest increase** in the number of incidents was recorded in the following categories:

- **C60** – from 60 in 2023 to 102 in 2024 (+42) – a rail vehicle running into an obstacle (e.g. a brake skid, luggage trolley, postal trolley, etc.) without derailment or casualties;
- **C51** - an increase from 58 recorded in 2023 to 92 in 2024 (+34) – damage to the surface, bridge or overpass, overhead contact line, including also improper execution of works, e.g. improper unloading of materials, leaving materials and equipment (including road machinery) on the track or within the clearance of a rail vehicle;
- **C44** - an increase from 129 in 2023 to 157 in 2024 (+28) - failure of a rail vehicle to stop before a "Stop" signal aspect or where it was supposed to stop, or starting a rail vehicle without the required authorisation;
- **C64** - an increase from 721 in 2023 to 743 in 2024 (+22) – in the category: malicious, hooligan or reckless offences (e.g. throwing stones at a train, stealing cargo from a train or shunting consist in motion, placing an obstruction on the track, vandalising power, communication or rail traffic control equipment or track surface, and interfering with such equipment), with no casualties or adverse consequences for property or the environment, posing a risk to passengers or train staff;
- **C69** - an increase from 28 in 2023 to 50 in 2024 (+22) - in the category: other causes or a combination of several equivalent causes at the same time;
- **C53** - an increase from 31 in 2023 to 45 in 2024 (+14) - in the category: damage to or poor technical condition of a powered rail vehicle/special-purpose rail vehicle leading to the necessity to put it out of service as a result of indications shown by rolling stock malfunction detection equipment, confirmed in workshop conditions (hot axle boxes, hot brake resulting in a displaced rim), as well as other defects on rail vehicles in motion observed by the operating staff (e.g. a broken spring).

The analysis of the accidents and serious accidents (by type of occurrence) shows that there was a decrease in the number of accidents on railway lines, railway sidings and narrow-gauge lines:

- **collisions** – a decrease from 92 in 2023 to 85 in 2024; collisions accounted for 13.3% of all accidents (i.e. 637);

- **derailments** – a decrease from 193 in 2023 to 171 in 2024; derailments accounted for 26.8% of all accidents (i.e. 637);
- **level crossing occurrences** – a decrease from 204 in 2023 to 187 in 2024 (including Categories B18, B19, B20, B21, B22, B31, B32, B33); level crossing occurrences accounted for 29.4% of all accidents (i.e. 637);
- **occurrences to persons involving a rail vehicle in motion** – up from 185 in 2023 to 188 in 2024 (i.e. Categories B34 and B35); these incidents accounted for 29.5% of all accidents (i.e. 637).

Furthermore, the record shows an increase in occurrences in the **fire** category - from 3 in 2023 to 6 in 2024 (5 in Category B24 and one categorised in Category B30); these occurrences accounted for approximately 1% of all accidents (i.e. 637).

### **Level crossing accidents**


In 2024, the total number of occurrences categorised as serious accidents and accidents at Category A, B, C, D level crossings **decreased by 10.2%**, or **18 accidents**, compared to 2023 (177 accidents in 2023, 159 accidents in 2024), of which:

- there was a **decrease** by 3 accidents at Category A level crossings,
- at Category B level crossings there was a **decrease** by 3 accidents,
- there was an **increase** by 2 accidents at category C level crossings,
- there was a **decrease** by 14 accidents at Category D level crossings.

The above statistics include also accidents at Category D level crossings that involved railway siding users (7 accidents) or occurred on narrow-gauge railway lines (6 accidents).

A comparative summary of serious accidents and accidents at level crossings of respective categories involving road and rail vehicles in 2022 ÷ 2024 is shown in the chart below.

Chart 7. **Serious incidents and accidents at level crossings of respective categories involving road and rail vehicles in 2022 ÷ 2024**



As previously, the main causes of occurrences at level crossings include, in particular:

- failure to comply with the prohibition of entry to a level crossing beyond a road signal displaying the prohibition in the form of two alternately flashing red lights,
- failure to stop ahead of a "Stop" sign, and failure by drivers of road vehicles to exercise due care,
- passing under closing barriers,
- bypassing semi-barriers,
- absence of the required visibility triangle,
- failure to take special precautions at a level crossing with closed barriers and properly functioning traffic lights, and failure of the driver of a road vehicle to react to the sound signal "Attention" given by the train driver,
- a level crossing being blocked by road vehicles that enter on the tracks without the possibility of exiting,
- failure to adjust the speed to the prevailing road conditions, leading to either running into the side of a train at a Cat. D level crossing or barriers at a Cat. B level crossing,
- failure to observe road signs and other traffic signals,
- inappropriate behaviour when a road vehicle is immobilised on the tracks,
- failure of the driver of a road vehicle to react to the "Attention" signals given by the train driver when traversing a level crossing, resulting in entering the level crossing in front of the oncoming train,

- road vehicle failing to stop before an activated road signal with sound signals prohibiting entry, resulting in entry directly in front of an oncoming train at a properly secured and signalised Category C level crossing,
- a road vehicle entering a level crossing despite activated road signals - failure by the driver to exercise caution at a Category B crossing and stopping the road vehicle inside the level crossing area at the barrier closing the exit,
- a road vehicle failing to stop before road signals despite not being able to continue due to traffic congestion and being stuck at a level crossing after the barriers are closed.

According to records kept by PKBWK, there were 39 railway occurrences in which a road vehicle at a crossing drove into the side of a railway vehicle being part of the train formation present at that crossing.

The main causes of these accidents and incidents at Category A level crossings included:

- premature opening of crossing barriers at a crossing operated remotely by a crossing keeper, inadequate observation of the equipment monitoring the traffic at a level crossing by the crossing keeper,
- a road vehicle running into the side of a passing train at a Category A level crossing, with the crossing barriers not closed by a pointsman who was not notified by a signaller of the train's passing,
- failure of the driver of a road vehicle to exercise caution when driving across a crossing.

At Category B level crossings, one can still observe a **mass phenomenon of road vehicles entering** the crossings (when the barriers are being closed) and consequently being confined between the barriers. An analysis of the *Final Findings Reports* (PUK) submitted by railway commissions shows that more than 698 occurrences (incidents) were recorded at level crossings in 2024, including failure of a road vehicle to stop ahead of a closed barrier (half-barrier) and damage either to the barrier or road signals (i.e. 53 Category C66 incidents), and malicious, hooligan or reckless offences, without any casualties or adverse consequences to property or the environment, endangering passengers or train staff – vehicles confined between the barriers (i.e. 645 category C64 incidents).

In 2024, there was an increase in Category C64 incidents (from 721 in 2023 to 743 in 2024), and a significant decrease in Category C66 incidents (from 82 in 2023 to 53 in 2024). It should be noted that the incidents concerned did not involve collisions between road vehicles and rail vehicles.

The still high number of such incidents (Categories C64 and C66) is indicative of the reckless behaviour of road vehicle drivers or their failure to exercise caution when approaching and traversing level crossings, as well as their ignorance of the provisions of Article 28 of the Road Traffic Code and the related implementing regulations under §98(5) of *the Regulation of the*

*Ministers of Infrastructure and of the Interior and Administration of 31 July 2002 on road signs and signals (consolidated text: Journal of Laws of Laws 2019, item 2310, as amended).*

**Circumstances and causes of incidents should be thoroughly analysed by railway commissions and railway infrastructure managers, and appropriate measures should be taken to prevent future occurrences.**

On a positive note, there was a decrease in the number of accidents at Category B level crossings (11 accidents in 2023 and 8 in 2024). However, there was a serious train accident in 2024 in which a train driver was killed. The continually high number of C64 incidents in the past three years (Chart 6) is also a negative development for the future.

In 2024, there were 32 accidents at Category C level crossings, compared to 30 in 2023, an increase by 6.7% (+2).

In 2024, number of railway accidents at category D level crossings decreased by 10.7% (-14), i.e. from 131 in 2023 to 117 in 2024), which should be assessed as a positive development. Nevertheless, there was a serious railway accident in which a train driver and a train inspector were killed. Drivers of road vehicles have a significant impact on the number and incidence of occurrences at Category B, C and D level crossings.

In total, there were 159 railway accidents at level crossings (Categories A, B, C and D) in 2024, accounting for 25.0% of all accidents in 2024 (637), compared to 177 accidents in 2023, accounting for 26.1% of all in 2023.

There were 27 fatalities and 11 serious injuries in accidents at level crossings in 2024, compared to 20 fatalities and 21 serious injuries in 2023. Furthermore, at level crossings and passages with pedestrian traffic in 2024, overall in Categories B18, B19, B20, B21, B22 and B31, B32 and B33, 45 people were killed and 17 seriously injured, compared to 2023, when 39 people were killed and 24 seriously injured.

Despite a significant decrease in the number of Category B18, B19, B20, B21, B22, B31, B32, B33 accidents (from 204 in 2023 to 187 in 2024) at Category A, B, C and D level crossings, the number of fatalities grew significantly in 2024, while the number of serious injuries decreased in 2024 compared to 2023.

Safety has been improved by the deployment and improvement of additional signage (used by the manager PKP PLK S.A.) of level crossings/pathways **with stickers showing a unique identification number and an emergency telephone number, used by railway infrastructure managers** under the so-called "Yellow Sticker" project. The additional signage enables road users who are either involved in or witness an emergency or occurrence to contact the emergency

services quickly. The database of unique identification numbers has been integrated into the information system used by the operators of the 112 emergency number.

In the event of an emergency or occurrence at a level crossing, after dialling 112 (for accidents or imminent accidents) or the emergency number (for emergencies), the reporting person provides the unique identification number of the level crossing from the yellow sticker.

The information allows the 112 operator or railway employee to determine the exact location of the level crossing, which reduces the response time in the event of an emergency. How effectively the project will be implemented will depend on reaching as many users of level crossings and pedestrian passages as possible with the information about the "Yellow Sticker".

Furthermore, since 2019, PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. (PLK SA) has been involved in a pilot project carried out by the Centre for Automatic Road Traffic Supervision (CANARD), a unit of the Chief Road Transport Inspector, established for the purpose of centralisation and automation of road traffic surveillance. The project involves implementation of a system for the automatic monitoring and recording of offences at level crossings. Its main objective is to enhance railway and road safety.

The system includes installation of equipment to record the passage of vehicles through level crossings when a red light signal is on.

The RedLight system, which has been in operation at selected level crossings, registered traffic offences in 2024, resulting in financial penalties in the form of fines for the offending drivers.

**Based on information provided by PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.:**

Between 1 June 2018 and 31 December 2024, emergency number 112 operators received 42,057 calls regarding potential hazards at level crossings and on railway premises.

**In 2024, a total of 8,560 potential hazards were recorded.** Thanks to the emergency calls to 112, the following actions were taken:

- in 764 cases, a train speed limit was introduced to ensure the safety of passengers and persons using level crossings,
- in 402 cases, train traffic on the railway line concerned was halted and assistance was summoned.

In view of the impact of accidents and incidents at level crossings, it is necessary to accelerate the implementation of projects for occurrence monitoring and analysis systems to improve safety at category B, C and D level crossings, including ones that determine compliance with applicable road traffic regulations.

Furthermore, prevention of railway accidents in 2024 involved also the use the "Alarm" signal transmitted in the Radio-Stop system.

Overall, PKP PLK S.A. recorded 1033 instances of transmission of the "Alarm" signal in 2024, of which:

- 806 were transmitted from outside the railway system (unjustified);
- 227 were transmitted within the railway system, of which:
  - 63 were legitimate - preventing railway incidents,
  - 164 were unjustified - given by the driver or signaller.

Compared to 2023, the number of cases where the "Alarm" signal was used in 2024 increased by 20.7% (from 856 to 1,033 cases), and the number of the cases of legitimate use within the railway system (preventing railway occurrences) decreased by 10.0% (down from 70 in 2023 to 63 in 2024). The number of cases of unjustified use of the "Alarm" signal within the railway system increased from 110 in 2023 to 164 in 2024 (i.e. an increase by 49.1%).

Out of a total of 1033 cases of use of the "Alarm" signal, unjustified use from outside the railway system accounted for 78.0% (i.e. 806 cases).

### **Casualties in occurrences**

In 2024, compared to 2023, the number of fatalities in railway occurrences increased by 4.4 %, while the number of serious injuries decreased by 20.3 % (see Table 2). Among the casualties (fatalities and serious injuries), the vast majority consisted of people crossing the tracks in prohibited places or at level passages, people hit by rail vehicles, people jumping on and off rail vehicles in motion, and users of level crossings. There was a slight increase in the number of injuries, from 106 in 2023 to 111 in 2024.

Table 3. Casualties in occurrences in 2024

Casualty categories in incidents in 2024	Fatalities	Serious injuries	Injuries
a) passengers	-	1	26
b) personnel, including at subcontractors	6	2	11
c) level crossing or passage users	42	16	46
d) persons not authorised to stay in a railway area	119	31	26
e) other	-	1	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>111</b>



## **5. Safety recommendations issued by the Commission in its annual report pursuant to Article 28l(6) of the Rail Transport Act of 28 March 2003**

### **5.1 Recommendations issued in 2024 and published in September 2024 in the 2023 Annual Report**

Pursuant to Article 28l(6) of the Rail Transport Act, the Commission issued the following safety recommendations in 2024.

According to the *"Information on the implementation of the recommendations issued by the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation in 2024"* provided to the Commission, the President of UTK in his letter no. DPN-WDZK.24.2024.2.KG of 22 October 2024, – pursuant to Article 28l(8b) of the Rail Transport Act, transmitted the recommendations in 2024 to entities whose activities affect the safety of railway traffic and the safety of railway operations. Furthermore, the President of UTK, as the entity supervising the implementation of the recommendations, analysed the planned course of action and the information provided by the entities concerned, including, but not limited to, the stage and manner of implementation of these recommendations.

The Commission's recommendations communicated to the railway market entities by the President of the UTK are summarised below in the table below entitled "Recommendations issued by PKBWK in 2024 in the 2023 Annual Report".

<b>Recommendations issued by PKBWK in 2024 included in the Annual Report 2023</b>	
<b>Recommendations issued by PKBWK in the 2023 Annual Report and forwarded to the President of UTK in accordance with Article 281(8) of the Rail Transport Act of 28 March 2003</b>	<b>Recommendations forwarded for implementation to railway market entities by the President of UTK under letter no. DPN-WDZK.24.2024.2.KG of 22 October 2021.</b>
1. The Minister of Infrastructure shall amend the national regulations( <i>§21 of the Regulation on general conditions for rail traffic operation and signalling</i> ) restoring two-person traction staffing for trains travelling at speeds above 130 km/h where the railway line or rail vehicle is not equipped with ETCS devices.	This recommendation does not apply to the President of the Office of Railway Transport who exercises statutory supervision of infrastructure managers and railway carriers.
2. The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall analyse cases of vehicles stopping between the barriers that occurred in 2023 at Category B level crossings. If the number of occurrences at a given level crossing exceeds 5 per year, measures must be taken to reduce the risk of occurrences, in particular: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) conduct a detailed analysis of why vehicles tend to remain within the zone during the passage of a train,</li> <li>b) in cooperation with road managers (and other stakeholders), develop measures to reduce the risk of occurrences at level crossings by changing the organisation of road traffic, introducing additional traffic restrictions for road vehicles, introducing speed limits for trains,</li> <li>c) eliminate exit barriers - as recommended by PKBWK in the Annual Report 2018,</li> <li>d) introduce the rule of switching on/off lights on barrier bars in the open state (vertical) concurrently with showing the prohibition on the road signals.</li> </ul>	<b>Annual Report 2023_1</b> The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall analyse cases of vehicles stopping between the barriers that occurred in 2023 at Category B level crossings. If the number of occurrences at a given level crossing exceeds 1 per year, measures must be taken to reduce the risk of occurrences; the infrastructure manager shall, in particular: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) conduct a detailed analysis of why vehicles tend to remain within the zone during the passage of a train,</li> <li>b) in cooperation with road managers (and other stakeholders), develop measures to reduce the risk of occurrences at level crossings by changing the organisation of road traffic, introducing additional traffic restrictions for road vehicles, introducing speed limits for trains,</li> <li>c) eliminate exit barriers - as recommended by PKBWK in the 2018 Annual Report,</li> <li>d) introduce the rule of switching on/off lights on barrier bars in the open state (vertical) concurrently with showing the prohibition on the road signals.</li> </ul>
3. Railway carriers which recorded Category B04 and C44 railway occurrences shall, within the framework of their safety management systems or internal rules, take measures to prevent SPADs ( <i>Signal Passed At Danger</i> ), and supplement their recurrent driver training programmes by adding methods	<b>Annual Report_2023_2</b> Certified railway carriers and railway carriers exempt from the obligation to obtain a safety certificate, authorised to operate under a safety attestation, which recorded Category B2 and C44 railway occurrences in 2023 shall, within the framework of their safety management systems or

<p>of deal with stress, psychological burden, lack of concentration and fatigue as fundamental factors in these categories of occurrences.</p>	<p>internal arrangements, take measures to prevent SPADs (Signal Passed At Danger), and supplement their recurrent train driver training programmes by adding methods of dealing with stress, psychological burden, lack of concentration and fatigue as fundamental factors in these categories of occurrences.</p>
<p>4. Railway carriers shall supplement their recurrent driver training programmes, including simulator training, by adding the rules of dealing with situations of imminent collision with another rail and/or road vehicle, including in particular the reaction of traction teams and the need for them to leave the cab of the traction vehicle immediately (to a safer location).</p>	<p><b>Annual Report 2023_3</b> Certified railway carriers and railway carriers exempt from the obligation to obtain a safety certificate, authorised to operate under a safety attestation, shall include in their recurrent train driver training programmes, including simulator training, the rules of dealing with situations of imminent collision with another rail and/or road vehicle, including in particular the reaction of traction teams and the need for them to leave the cab of the traction vehicle immediately (to a safer location).</p>
<p>5. The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall develop guidelines concerning the construction of multi-level crossings to replace level crossings with heavy traffic, taking into account in particular: the speed of the railway line concerned, the traffic ratio and other conditions relating to the location of the crossing.</p>	<p><b>Annual Report 2023_4</b> The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall develop guidelines concerning the construction of multi-level crossings to replace level crossings with heavy traffic, taking into account in particular: the speed of the railway line concerned, the traffic ratio and other conditions relating to the location of the crossing.</p>
<p>6. PKP PLK S.A. and other infrastructure managers shall take measures concerning detection of obstacles at and within level crossings by means of intelligent detection systems that allow informing relevant personnel of the infrastructure manager and railway carrier of the danger where an obstacles is detected, warning motorists that they are approaching a level crossing, and recording the motorists' behaviour and compliance with road traffic regulations.</p>	<p><b>Annual Report for 2023_5</b> Authorised railway infrastructure managers, users of railway sidings, operators of narrow gauge railways and infrastructure managers that are exempt from the obligation to obtain a safety authorisation and authorised to operate under a safety attestation shall take measures concerning detection of obstacles at and within level crossings by means of intelligent detection systems that allow informing relevant personnel of the infrastructure manager and railway carrier of the danger where an obstacles is detected, warning motorists that they are approaching a level crossing, and recording the motorists' behaviour and compliance with road traffic regulations</p>

<p>7. The Minister of Infrastructure shall lay down, in the Regulation on the technical conditions to be met by crossings of railway lines and sidings with roads, and on their positioning, the guidelines concerning the construction of multi-level crossings replacing level crossings and the maximum traffic ratio threshold for Category B level crossings that necessitates the construction of a multi-level crossing.</p>	<p>This recommendation does not apply to the President of the Office of Railway Transport who exercises statutory supervision of infrastructure managers and railway carriers.</p>
<p>8. Railway infrastructure managers together with local government bodies and road managers shall implement a procedure whereby - prior to the revitalisation and modernisation of a railway line, in <b>order to reduce the number of level crossings and the related distant signals (TOP)</b> on the line - they will analyse the existing communication routes (roads) so that they could be channelled into a single level crossing, maintaining the 3 km spacing, and possibly replace the decommissioned level crossings with pedestrian routes as Category pedestrian crossings.</p>	<p><b>Annual Report 2023_6</b> authorised railway infrastructure managers and infrastructure managers exempt from the obligation to obtain a safety authorisation, authorised to operate on the basis of a safety attestation, together with local authorities and road managers, shall implement a procedure whereby - prior to the revitalisation and modernisation of a railway line, in order to reduce the number of level crossings and the related distant signals (TOP) on the line - they will analyse the existing communication routes (roads) so that they could be channelled into a single level crossing, maintaining the 3 km spacing, and possibly replace the decommissioned level crossings with pedestrian routes as Category pedestrian crossings.</p>

## 5.2 Recommendations issued by the Commission in 2025 included in the Annual Report 2024

Pursuant to Article 281(6) of the Rail Transport Act of 28 March 2003, the Commission has issued the following safety recommendations:

1. Certified railway carriers and infrastructure managers operating powered rail vehicles, as well as entities providing training for train driver candidates shall take appropriate measures to reduce the number of Category B04 accidents and Category C44 incidents, i.e. occurrences involving "A rail vehicle failing to stop before a "Stop" signal aspect or where it was supposed to stop, or starting a rail vehicle without the required authorisation".

*In 2024, the record showed an increase in SPAD (Signal Passed at Danger) occurrences - Category C44 incidents (129 in 2023, compared to 157 in 2024) and Category B04 accidents (36 in 2023, compared to 39 in 2024).*

*The number of SPADs has been on the rise in the last three years. Tasks to be undertaken may include, among others: enhancing the instructor supervision; practical exercises involving stopping the train at the W4 indicator or ahead of the S1 signal; additional elements of training and assessment of candidate train drivers and train drivers as regards proper observation of indicators and signals; periodic analyses of occurrences during practical training, appropriate selection of train drivers for practical vocational training, etc. The purpose of taking appropriate actions is to prevent the trend (number of incidents) to escalate, which may lead to an increase in the number of accidents. This is a continuation of the subject range contained in Recommendation no. 1 from Annual Report 2017.*

2. Entities in charge of maintenance (ECMs) and entities certified in the maintenance function (maintenance service providers) - as part of their Maintenance Management Systems - shall implement the recommendations of the President of UTK of 29 December 2024 as regards NDTs (*non-destructive tests*) of wheelset axles in freight wagons, including wheelset axles older than 40 years.

*The above recommendation is a continuation of the subject range contained in Recommendation No. 7 from Report No. PKBWK 02/2024 on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 7 February 2023 at 02:00 hrs at Wrocław Brochów station, km 1.701 of track No. 1N of railway line No. 349 Św. Katarzyna – Wrocław Kuźniki. This recommendation is a product of the work of the Team appointed by the President of UTK to define additional tests for axles of wheelsets in service in freight wagons for more than 40 years.*

3. In order to enhance safety of road and rail traffic, authorised infrastructure managers and shall step up the implementation of systems for monitoring danger zones analysis of occurrences at Category D level crossings (detection of an approaching road vehicle, warning drivers that a

vehicle is approaching a level crossing, recording the behaviour of the road vehicle at level crossings), as well as identifying compliance with the traffic regulations in force.

*The above recommendation is a continuation of the subject range contained in GDPWK Report No. 02/2021. Level crossings are an area with an increased risk of situations that pose threat to the safety of rail and road users alike. The above arises also from the need to reduce the number of irregularities and occurrences caused by road vehicle drivers.*

4. Authorised infrastructure managers shall, as part of their scheduled workstation inspections at traffic posts and crossing keepers, check for the availability of proper continuous observation of rail vehicles and railway routes so that this remains compliant with applicable regulations and the technical regulations of the post concerned. They shall take appropriate actions if any irregularities are detected.

*The analysis of occurrences that have taken place shows that it is necessary to verify the provisions in the Technical Regulations of the respective posts that impose duties on the personnel in terms of the actual ability of the personnel to implement the duties. Inadequate ergonomics of workstations held by level crossing personnel can prevent proper observation of trains and shunting operations in progress.*

5. Certified railway carriers shall, as part of their management systems, take actions to eliminate occurrences caused by a rail vehicle running into another rail vehicle or other obstacle (e.g. brake skid, luggage trolley, mail trolley, etc.), i.e. Cat. B13 collisions and derailments and Cat. C60 incidents caused by a rail vehicle running into an obstacle (e.g. a brake skid, a luggage trolley, a mail trolley, etc.) without derailment or casualties.

*The record of occurrences shows a significant increase in the number of Category B13 occurrences (51 occurrences in 2024, compared to 34 in 2023 - caused by a railway vehicle running into a railway vehicle or other obstacle, e.g. a brake skid, etc.) and Category C60 incidents (102 occurrences in 2024, compared to 60 in 2023 - caused by a railway vehicle running into an obstacle, e.g. a brake skid) without derailment or casualties.*

6. Railway infrastructure managers shall undertake documented preventive actions relating to the development of proactive attitudes among their personnel (at all stages from the commencement to the completion of investment and modernisation works) with the aim to address rail traffic safety risks, with the participation (inclusion) and involvement of company managements (including contractors and subcontractors), in accordance with the principles of Safety Culture at all levels of railway infrastructure management. In particular, infrastructure managers shall take into account in their actions: all stages of investment and modernisation works, preliminary and internal acceptance procedures, technical acceptance procedures, final acceptance procedures, commissioning and decommissioning (of routes and railway line section, other equipment and railway infrastructure, etc.), interruptions during the works and securing of decommissioned infrastructure.

*This recommendation echoes Recommendation no. 4 from the Annual Report 2019.*

*The purpose of the recommendation is to take further actions to minimise the number of occurrences related to execution of investment or modernisation works and infrastructure repairs and maintenance, categorised into different occurrence categories.*

## **6. Implementation of the recommendations issued by PKBWK in 2024 (according to information provided by the President of the Office of Rail Transport)**

On 29 April 2025, the Commission was provided by the President of the Office of Rail Transport, hereinafter referred to as "UTK", with information on the implementation of the recommendations issued by the Commission in 2024.

In 2024, PKBWK submitted to the President of UTK six reports on investigations completed in 2024 concerning railway occurrences that had taken place in 2022 and 2023, and the Annual Report 2023 on the activities of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation (with recommendations):

- 1) REPORT No. PKBWK 01/2024 on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 19 January 2023 at 18:37 hrs on the Szczecin Podjuchy – Szczecin Port Centralny SPA route, km 349.520 of track no. 1, railway line no. 273 Wrocław Główny – Szczecin Główny;
- 2) REPORT No. PKBWK 02/2024 on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 7 February 2023 at 02:00 hrs at Wrocław Brochów station, km 1.701 of track no. 1N of railway line no. 349 Św. Katarzyna – Wrocław Kuźniki;
- 3) REPORT No. PKBWK 03/2024 on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 19 May 2023 at 09:51 hrs on the Komorów – Podkowa Leśna Główna route, track no. 1, Cat. D level crossing at km 18.805 of railway line no. 47 Warszawa Śródmieście WKD – Grodzisk Mazowiecki Radońska;
- 4) REPORT No. PKBWK 04/2024 on the investigation of a railway incident which took place on 8 May 2023 at 07:26 hrs on the Góra Włodowska – Zawiercie route, track no. 1, km 212.400 of railway line no. 4 Grodzisk Mazowiecki – Zawiercie;
- 5) REPORT No. PKBWK 05/2024 on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 12 April 2022 at 09:22 hrs at Poznań Główny station, at turnout no. 140 on track 51, km -0.181 of railway line no. 351 Poznań Główny - Szczecin Główny;
- 6) REPORT No. PKBWK 06/2024 on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 24 August 2023 at 12:05 hrs at Skierniewice station, turnout no. 13, km 64.282 of railway line no. 1 Warszawa Zachodnia - Katowice;
- 7) Annual Report 2023 on the activities of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation.

As part of supervision of the implementation of the PKBWK recommendations by railway market entities, the President of UTK analysed the recommendations submitted to him and, after making changes to their content, forwarded them for implementation to infrastructure managers, railway carriers, entities in charge of maintenance of rail vehicles and entities operating special vehicles.



The addressees of the recommendations which do not have a safety/maintenance management system in place should implement the recommendations on the basis of their existing internal regulations.

Recommendations arising from the above reports were forwarded by the President of UTK to relevant entities together with safety sheets that summarised the course of the occurrence, provided a description of the causal factors, and specified the addressees and content of the safety recommendations.

The recommendations made by PKBWK in 2024 were forwarded for implementation by the President of UTK on a regular basis. Each time, all materials and information on the forwarded recommendations from a given report were posted on the UTK website.

UTK developed a questionnaire for the entities concerned to provide information on the progress in implementation of the recommendations received from the President of UTK.

### **6.1 Analysis of information on implementation of the recommendations**

The President of UTK analysed the recommendations submitted to him, taking into account the need to ensure a systemic approach to safety management and risk minimisation in rail transport.

The President of UTK may consider the recommendations and accept them for implementation, or forward them in whole or in part for implementation to managers, railway carriers or other entities whose activities affect the safety of railway traffic and the safety of railway operations which are subject to regulation under the provisions of the Rail Transport Act.

In 2024, the Commission published 43 recommendations in the 6 aforementioned reports and in the Annual Report 2023.

The Commission addressed 40 recommendations to the President of UTK, 38 of which concerned railway market entities subject to statutory supervision by the President of UTK, and two were addressed directly to the President of UTK. The two recommendations addressed directly to the President of UTK were accepted by the Authority for implementation, while the remaining 38, after modifications, were forwarded to railway market entities. Furthermore, the reports included two recommendations addressed to the central authority (the Minister of Infrastructure) and one recommendation addressed to a county road manager.

The President of UTK forwarded 38 recommendations for implementation, i.e. to authorised infrastructure managers, certified railway carriers, railway siding users, managers of narrow-gauge railways, managers of railway networks which are functionally separate from the Union railway system and intended for voivodeship or local transport (operating on the basis of safety certificates), and to operators of special vehicles.

Based on the information provided by the market entities, UTK analysed and assessed the implementation of the recommendations issued by PKBWK.

In 2024, a total of 1,175 addressees were provided with PKBWK recommendations. The term "addressee" means any entity to which the recommendations from a specific report were forwarded. Addressees represent the total number of entities to which the recommendations from all 7 reports issued in 2024 were forwarded. Responses concerning implementation of the recommendations were provided by 1,060 addressees, or 90.2%; 6.0% of the addressees did not provide any response despite notices sent, and 45 addressees (3.8%) ceased their operations during the reporting period.

The following is an analysis of the data on how the PKBWK recommendations were implemented by the entities to which they were addressed, and the UTK President's assessment of the responses received.

A "**Positive assessment**" means that the proposed way of implementing the recommendations was accepted and that the declared activities are leading to the proper the PKBWK recommendations. Positive assessment was given to 89% of all responses. In the cases identified as "**incomplete response**", the information provided was found to be incomplete or no statement of reasons was provided. Furthermore, the entities which failed to provide information on the implementation of the recommendations ("No response") are subject to administrative action, including requests for information, written warnings and, in the case of gross negligence, possible procedures to revoke documents authorising the entities concerned to operate.

Furthermore, the presented averaged stage of implementation of the recommendations (hereinafter **the average percent implemented**) was determined on the basis of the data submitted to and received by the President of UTK in the reporting period. Where the implementation timetable presented by an entity concerned did not raise any doubts, the lack of 100% implementation of the recommendation did not negatively affect the assessment of the actions presented.

According to the information provided by the President of UTK, the analysis of the responses concerning implementation of the recommendations is as follows:

<b>Re. 1)</b> <b>REPORT No. PKBWK 01/2024 on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 19 January 2024 at 18:37 hrs on the Szczecin Podjuchy - Szczecin Port Centralny SPA route, km 349.520 of track no. 1, railway line no. 273 Wrocław Główny - Szczecin Główny</b>	
<b>Recommendations of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation communicated in the report</b>	<b>Recommendations forwarded for implementation to railway market entities by the President of UTK under letter no. DPN-WDZK.464.6.2024.2.MF of 23 February 2024</b>
<p>1. The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall, within the framework of its periodic and additional training and courses for signallers, place particular emphasis on the prescribed use of telephone signalling messages provided while managing traffic on the basis of train signalling by telephone, as prescribed in Instruction Ir-1.</p>	<p><b>PKBWK 01/2024_1</b>The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall, within the framework of its periodic and additional training and courses for signallers, place particular emphasis on the prescribed use of telephone signalling messages provided while managing traffic on the basis of train signalling by telephone, as prescribed in Instruction Ir-01.</p>
<p>2. The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall extend particular supervision to workers directly involved in rail traffic management (traffic officers, point operators) with less than two years of employment.</p>	<p><b>PKBWK 01/2024_1</b> The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall extend particular supervision to workers directly involved in rail traffic management (traffic officers, point operators) with less than two years of employment.</p>
<p>3. The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall enhance actions concerning periodic replays of recorded conversations from traffic operation posts, in particular under restriction in force (signalling by telephone, issuing orders and reporting readiness of routes).</p>	<p><b>PKBWK 01/2024_3</b> The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall enhance actions concerning periodic replays of recorded conversations from traffic operation posts, in particular under restriction in force (signalling by telephone, issuing orders and reporting readiness of routes).</p>
<p>4. The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall introduce permanent supervision of the correct use of telephone signalling messages when managing traffic on the basis of train signalling by telephone, in accordance with templates contained in Instruction Ir-1.</p>	<p><b>PKBWK 01/2024_4</b> The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall introduce permanent supervision of the correct use of telephone signalling messages when managing traffic on the basis of train signalling by telephone, in accordance with templates contained in Instruction Ir-01.</p>
<p>5. The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall verify the presence, in the railway network under its management, of the W28 "Radio channel indicators" at the locations of change of the prescribed train radio</p>	<p><b>PKBWK 01/2024_5</b> The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall verify the presence, in the railway network under its management, of the W01 "Radio channel indicators" at the locations of change of the prescribed train radio communication channel.</p>

communication channel.	
6. In order to ensure good visibility of the return reflection from Pc 5 signal disks (daylight) on curves, the railway carriers shall implement the obligation to use Pc 5 signal disks "Marking of the end of a train or another rail vehicle" in accordance with the technical requirements laid down in Part II of Instruction Ie-102 "Technical requirements for indicators and signal discs" on freight trains operating on railway lines managed by PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.	<b>PKBWK 01/2024_6</b> In order to ensure good visibility of the return reflection from Pc 01 signal disks (daylight) on curves, the railway carriers shall implement the obligation to use Pc 2024 signal disks "Marking of the end of a train or another rail vehicle" in accordance with the technical requirements laid down in Part II of Instruction Ie-6 "Technical requirements for indicators and signal discs" on freight trains operating on railway lines managed by PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.
7. The railway carrier CTL Logistics Sp. z o.o. shall ensure supervision of the correct setting of the real time in traction vehicle recorders.	<b>PKBWK 01/2024_7</b> The railway carrier CTL Logistics Sp. z o.o. shall ensure supervision of the correct setting of the real time in traction vehicle recorders.
8. The infrastructure managers shall procure that works contractors eliminate visibility of sources of light illuminating their construction sites in the area of active railway tracks which dazzle drivers of rail vehicles.	<b>PKBWK 01/2024_8</b> Authorised railway infrastructure managers and infrastructure managers exempt from the obligation to obtain a safety authorisation shall procure that works contractors eliminate visibility of sources of light illuminating their construction sites in the area of active railway tracks which dazzle drivers of rail vehicles.
Recommendations No. 1÷8 , adopted under a PKBWK resolution, were included in the report published online and forwarded to the President of UTK in accordance with Article 28l(8) of the Rail Transport Act of 5 March 2003.	

Table 4. **Analysis of the information provided concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 01/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities** (according to information from the President of UTK)

Statistical analysis of information concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report PKBWK 01/2024	
Number of recommendation addressees	<b>147</b>
Responses given in time	<b>115</b>
Failure to respond in time	<b>31</b>
Number of notices issued to entities	<b>31</b>
Number of responses given after notice	<b>23</b>
No response to notice	<b>8</b>
Number of entities that ceased operations in the reporting period	<b>1</b>

Category	Percentage
udzielono odpowiedzi	78%
odpowiedzi po wezwaniu	16%
brak odpowiedzi	5%
zaprzestanie prowadzenia działalności	1%

Table 5. **Assessment of the information provided concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 01/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities** (according to information from the President of UTK)

Assessment of information concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report PKBWK 01/2024								
Recommendations	PKBWK 01/2024_1	PKBWK 01/2024_2	PKBWK 01/2024_3	PKBWK 01/2024_4	PKBWK 01/2024_5	PKBWK 01/2024_6	PKBWK 01/2024_7	PKBWK 01/2024_8
Positive assessment	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	112	<b>1</b>	18
Incomplete response	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	6
Average percent implemented:	<b>100</b>	100	100	100	100	84	100	97

Figure 8. **Average percentage level of implementation of respective recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 01/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK** (according to information from the President of UTK)







Figure 9. Average percentage level of implementation of the recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 01/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK (according to information from the President of UTK)



The average percentage level of implementation of the recommendations was determined by UTK on the basis of declarations made by the addressees of the respective recommendations. Absence of a recommendation with the implementation level of 100% is due to the entity's timetable of actions aimed at full implementation of the PKBWK recommendations.

Table 6. **Implementation of the recommendations by the entities listed by the Commission in Report No. PKBWK 01/2024** – based on the information provided to PKBWK in March 2025.

Recommendations arising from Report No. PKBWK 01/2024 (issued in 2024)	Recommendation addressees	Recommendation implementation date	Average percentage level (%) of implementation of the recommendation by the entities listed in column 2/(implementation stage)
1	2	3	4
Recommendation 1	1) PKP PLK S.A.	31/12/2024	<b>100</b> (% – implemented by – PKP PLK)
Recommendation 2	PKP PLK	31/12/2024	<b>100</b> (% – implemented by – PKP PLK)

Recommendation 3	PKP PLK	31/12/2024	<b>100</b> (% - implemented by - PKP PLK)
Recommendation 4	PKP PLK	31/12/2024	<b>100</b> (% - implemented by - PKP PLK)
Recommendation 5	PKP PLK	2025-01-15	<b>100</b> (% - implemented by - PKP PLK)
Recommendation 6	<sup>3)</sup> PKpt	..... 31/12/2024	<b>84</b> (% - under implementation by - PKpt) <sup>*)</sup>
Recommendation 7	<sup>2)</sup> CTL Logistics Sp. z o.o.	2024-01-02	<b>100</b> (% - implemented by - CTL)
Recommendation 8	<sup>4)</sup> ZI	..... 23/01/2025	<b>97</b> (% - implemented by - IM) <sup>*)</sup> of which: <b>100</b> (% - implemented by PKP PLK)

<sup>\*)</sup> according to the "Information on the implementation of the recommendations issued by the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation in 2024" provided from UTK in letter no. DPN-WDZK.464.5.2024.1.KG of 30 April 2025 (applies to implementation of the recommendations forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities)

<sup>1)</sup> PKP PLK S.A. - means: PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. - hereinafter referred to as "PKP PLK"

<sup>2)</sup> CTL Logistics Sp. z o.o. - means the railway carrier hereinafter referred to as "CTL"

<sup>3)</sup> PKpt - means railway carriers holding a licence to transport goods

<sup>4)</sup> ZI - means: authorised railway infrastructure manager

<b>Re 2)</b> <b>REPORT No. PKBWK 02/2024 on the investigation of a railway accident</b> <b>which took place on 7 February 2023 at 02:00 hrs at Wrocław Brochów station, km 1.701 of track no. 1N of railway line no. 349 Św. Katarzyna – Wrocław Kuźniki</b>	
<b>Recommendations of the State Commission on Railway Accident</b> <b>Investigation communicated in the report</b>	<b>Recommendations forwarded for implementation to railway market entities</b> <b>by the President of UTK under letter no. DPN-WDZK.464.8.2024.2.KG of 15</b> <b>March 2021</b>
<p>1. The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall ensure oversight of the quality of the Company's investment and diagnostic processes.</p>	<p><b>PKBWK 02/2-24_1</b> Entities in charge of maintenance (ECMs) of freight wagons shall strengthen supervision of the process of repairs of wheelsets during replacement of wheels and P4 and P5 maintenance.</p>
<p>2. Entities in charge of maintenance (ECMs) of freight wagons shall check their Maintenance Management Systems (MMSs) for factors contributing to the occurrence, and shall consider inclusion of the following elements in those systems:</p> <p>a) detailed requirements regarding contractors that perform P4 and P5 maintenance activities,</p> <p>b) inclusion in the freight wagon Maintenance Management System (MMS) of competence requirements and detailed tasks for workers authorised to perform commissioning, in particular as regards in-process commissioning.</p>	<p><b>PKBWK 02/2024_2</b> Entities in charge of maintenance (ECMs) of freight wagons shall check their Maintenance Management Systems (MMSs) for factors contributing to the occurrence, and shall consider inclusion of the following elements in those systems:</p> <p>a) detailed requirements regarding contractors that perform P4 and P5 maintenance activities,</p> <p>b) inclusion in the freight wagon Maintenance Management System (MMS) of competence requirements and detailed tasks for workers authorised to perform commissioning, in particular as regards in-process commissioning.</p>
<p>3. As part of its Maintenance Management System, TORPOL S.A. shall take actions relating to:</p> <p>a) increasing the supervision of compliance with the Maintenance Management System procedures,</p> <p>b) ensuring detailed supervision of rail vehicle maintenance service providers, in particular as regards tests of running gear.</p>	<p><b>PKBWK 02/2024_3</b> As part of its Maintenance Management System, TORPOL S.A. shall take actions relating to:</p> <p>a) increasing the supervision of compliance with the Maintenance Management System procedures,</p> <p>b) ensuring detailed supervision of rail vehicle maintenance service providers, in particular as regards tests of running gear.</p>

<p>4. MEGA-MET Sp. z o.o. Sp.k. in Łazy shall take actions to strengthen the supervision of its P4 and P5 maintenance activities, including enhanced quality control of repair activities provided, in particular ones that are outsourced.</p>	<p><b>PKBWK 02/2024_4</b> MEGA-MET sp. z o.o. sp.k. in Łazy shall take actions to strengthen the supervision of its P4 and P5 maintenance activities, including enhanced quality control of repair activities provided, in particular ones that are outsourced.</p>
<p>5. The President of the Office of Rail Transport shall finalise the actions commenced in 2020 to introduce <i>the obligation regarding traceability of wheelsets for freight wagon axles</i> in accordance with the <i>Implementation guide for the European Wheelset Traceability (EWT) for freight wagon axles</i> made in Brussels on 26 July 2010 by the <i>Joint Sector Group for ERA Task Force on wagon/axle maintenance</i> and agreed with the National Safety Authorities.</p>	<p>Recommendation under implementation by the President of UTK.</p>
<p>6. Entities in charge of maintenance (ECMs) of freight wagons shall immediately implement the obligation to carry out detailed documented<sup>1)</sup> non-destructive tests of wheelset axles prior to their re-introduction to service.</p> <p><sup>1)</sup> <i>The scope of a detailed non-destructive test of freight wagon wheelset axles, as used in the Report, includes inter alia disassembly of wheelsets from under a freight wagon, disassembly of bearings and exposure of the centre section of the axle, external examination. The test must be carried out with the ultrasonic testing (UT) and magnetic particle testing (MT) methods following removal of the protection coating from the side surface of axle journals and from the centre section of the axles.</i></p>	<p><b>PKBWK 02/2024_5</b> Entities in charge of maintenance (ECMs) of freight wagons shall immediately implement the obligation to carry out detailed documented<sup>1)</sup> non-destructive tests of wheelset axles prior to their re-introduction to service.</p> <p><sup>1)</sup> <i>The scope of a detailed non-destructive test of freight wagon wheelset axles, as used in the Report, includes inter alia disassembly of wheelsets from under a freight wagon, disassembly of bearings and exposure of the centre section of the axle, external examination. The test must be carried out with the ultrasonic testing (UT) and magnetic particle testing (MT) methods following removal of the protection coating from the side surface of axle journals and from the centre section of the axles.</i></p>
<p>7. The President of the Rail Transport Office shall consider appointing a team of experts to obtain opinions and knowledge to define the scope of additional tests of wheelset axles in service in freight wagons for longer than 40 years.</p>	<p>Recommendation implemented by the President of UTK.</p>
<p>The above recommendations, adopted under a PKBWK resolution, were included in the report published online and forwarded to the President of UTK in accordance with Article 28l(8) of the Rail Transport Act of 28 March 2003.</p>	

Table 7. **Analysis of the information provided concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 02/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities** (according to information from the President of UTK)

Statistical analysis of information concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report PKBWK 02/2024	
Number of recommendation addressees	<b>101</b>
Responses given in time	<b>80</b>
Failure to respond in time	<b>17</b>
Number of notices issued to entities	<b>17</b>
Number of responses given after notice	<b>14</b>
No response to notice	<b>3</b>
Number of entities that ceased operations in the reporting period	<b>4</b>

Recommendations	PKBWK 02/2024_1	PKBWK 02/2024_2	PKBWK 02/2024_3	PKBWK 02/2024_4	PKBWK 02/2024_5
Positive assessment	87	85	1	1	85
Incomplete response	7	8	0	0	7
Average percent implemented:	71	81	80	100	72

Table 8. **Assessment of the information provided concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 02/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities** (according to information from the President of UTK)

Assessment of information concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report PKBWK 02/2024					
Recommendations	PKBWK 02/2024_1	PKBWK 02/2024_2	PKBWK 02/2024_3	PKBWK 02/2024_4	PKBWK 02/2024_5
Positive assessment	87	85	1	1	85
Incomplete response	7	8	0	0	7
Average percent implemented:	71	81	80	100	72

Figure 10. **Average percentage level of implementation of respective recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 02/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK** (according to information from the President of UTK)







Chart 11. **Average percentage level of implementation of the recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 02/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK** (according to information from the President of UTK)



The average percentage level of implementation of the recommendations was determined by UTK on the basis of declarations made by the addressees of the respective recommendations. Absence of a recommendation with the implementation level of 100% is due to the entity's timetable of actions aimed at full implementation of the PKBWK recommendations.

Table 9. **Implementation of the recommendations by the entities listed by the Commission in Report No. PKBWK 02/2024** – based on the information provided to PKBWK in March 2025.

Recommendations arising from Report No. PKBWK 02/2024 (issued in 2024)	Recommendation addressees	Recommendation implementation date	Average percentage level (%) of implementation of the recommendation by the entities listed in column 2/(implementation stage)
1	2	3	4
Recommendation 1	5) ECM	..... 31/12/2024	<b>71</b> (% – under implementation by ECM) *)

Recommendation 2	ECM	..... 31/12/2024	<b>81</b> (% - under implementation by ECM) *)
Recommendation 3	6) TORPOL S.A.	31/12/2024	<b>80</b> (% - under implementation by - TORPOL)
Recommendation 4	7) MEGA-MET	2024-03-26	<b>100</b> (% - implemented by MEGA-MET)
Recommendation 5	President of UTK	..... 31/12/2024	under implementation by the President of UTK
Recommendation 6	ECM	31/12/2024	<b>72</b> (% - under implementation by ECM) *)
Recommendation 7	President of UTK	31/12/2024	<b>100</b> (% - implemented by the President of UTK)

\*) according to the "Information on the implementation of the recommendations issued by the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation in 2024" provided from UTK in letter no. DPN-WDZK.464.5.2024.1.KG of 30 April 2025 (applies to implementation of the recommendations forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities)

5) ECM - means entities in charge of maintenance of freight wagons

6) TORPOL S.A. - means the railway carrier hereinafter referred to as "TORPOL"

7) MEGA-MET - means MEGA- MET sp. z o.o. in Łazy, hereinafter referred to as "MEGA\_MET"

<b>Re 3)</b> <b>REPORT No. PKBWK 03/2024 on the investigation of a railway accident</b> <b>on 19 May 2023 at 09:51 hrs on the Komorów - Podkowa Leśna Główna route, on track no. 1, Category D level crossing,</b> <b>km 18.805 of railway line no. 47 Warszawa Śródmieście WKD - Grodzisk Mazowiecki Radońska</b>	
<b>Recommendations of the State Commission on Railway Accident</b> <b>Investigation communicated in the report</b>	<b>Recommendations forwarded for implementation to railway market</b> <b>entities by the President of UTK under letter no. DPN-</b> <b>WDZK.464.9.2024.2.KG of 16 February 2024</b>
<p>1. The infrastructure manager Warszawska Kolej Dojazdowa sp. z o.o. and the County Governor's Office in Pruszków shall implement the recommendations issued during the investigation and set forth in Section V.2 of this Report.</p>	<p><b>PKBWK 03/2024_1</b> The infrastructure manager Warszawska Kolej Dojazdowa sp. z o.o. shall implement the recommendations issued during the investigation and set forth in Section V.2 of this Report, i.e.</p> <p>1.1 Adjust – move the apparatus cabinets to ensure visibility of the head of trains approaching the level crossing.</p> <p>1.2 Install additional devices at the level crossing to record transgressions committed by road vehicle drivers where the B-20 sign is placed, and install light panels with the message "Caution. Train" to inform road vehicle drivers about the level crossing.</p> <p>1.3 Considering the exposure factor, the manager of the railway line shall take action to re-classify the level crossing from Category D to a higher category "C" (it is not possible to install Cat. B devices due to terrain limitations) and to install additional devices to warn/record transgressions of road vehicle drivers when signals are given by roadside signalling devices.</p>
<p>The infrastructure manager Warszawska Kolej Dojazdowa sp. z o.o. and the County Governor's Office in Pruszków shall implement the recommendations issued during the investigation and set forth in Section V.2 of this Report.</p>	<p>1.4 Implementation of the recommendation issued in the course of the investigation and specified in Section V.2 of this Report (as regards the road) - by the County Governor's Office in Pruszków.</p>
<p>2. The manager of the county road, i.e. the County Governor's Office in Pruszków, shall ensure supervision and control mechanisms for the appropriate visibility of the level crossing from the road, and of the road</p>	<p>2. This recommendation does not apply to the President of the Office of Railway Transport who exercises statutory supervision of infrastructure managers and railway carriers.</p>

<p>signs informing about the level crossing, including actions to ensure regular removal of vegetation that obstructs the visibility of the road signs.</p>	
<p>3. The infrastructure manager, i.e. Warszawska Kolej Dojazdowa sp. z o. o., shall re-analyse the risk of accidents at level crossings and, where necessary, shall take measures to mitigate the risk.</p>	<p><b>PKBWK 03/2024_2</b> The infrastructure manager, i.e. Warszawska Kolej Dojazdowa sp. z o. o., shall re-analyse the risk of accidents at level crossings and, where necessary, shall take measures to mitigate the risk.</p>
<p>Recommendations no. 1 and 3 above, adopted under a PKBWK resolution, were included in the report published online and forwarded to the President of UTK in accordance with Article 28l(8) of the Rail Transport Act of 28 March 2003.</p> <p>Recommendation no. 2, adopted under a PKBWK resolution, were included in the report published online and forwarded to the county road manager, i.e. the County Governor's Office in Pruszków, in accordance with Article 28l(8) of the Rail Transport Act of 28 March 2003.</p>	

Table 10. **Analysis of the information provided concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 03/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities** (according to information from the President of UTK)


Statistical analysis of information concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report PKBWK 03/2024		
Number of recommendation addressees	1	
Responses given in time	1	
Failure to respond in time	0	

Table 11. **Assessment of the information provided concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 03/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK** (according to information from the President of UTK)

Assessment of information concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report PKBWK 03/2024				
Recommendations	PKBWK 03/2024_1.1	PKBWK 03/2024_1.2	PKBWK 03/2024_1.3	PKBWK 03/2024_2
Positive assessment	1	1	1	1
Incomplete response	0	0	0	0
Average percent implemented:	100	10	10	10

Figure 12. **Average percentage level of implementation of respective recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 03/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK** (according to information from the President of UTK)





Chart 13. **Average percentage level of implementation of the recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 03/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK** (according to information from the President of UTK)



The average percentage level of implementation of the recommendations was determined by UTK on the basis of declarations made by the addressees of the respective recommendations. Absence of a recommendation with the implementation level of 100% is due to the entity's timetable of actions aimed at full implementation of the PKBWK recommendations.

Table 12. **Implementation of the recommendations by the entities listed by the Commission in Report No. PKBWK 03/2024** – based on the information provided to PKBWK in March 2025.

Recommendations arising from Report No. PKBWK 03/2024 (issued in 2024)	Recommendation addressees	Recommendation implementation date	Average percentage level (%) of implementation of the recommendation by the entities listed in column 2/(implementation stage)
1	2	3	4
Recommendation 1.1	8) WKD Sp. z o.o.	.....	<b>100</b> (% – implemented by – WKD)*)



Recommendation 1.2	WKD	.....	<b>10</b> (% - under implementation by WKD) *)
Recommendation 1.3	WKD	.....	<b>10</b> (% - under implementation by WKD) *)
Recommendation 1.4	9) (IM - county road)	**)	<b>100</b> (% - realised by IMcr)**)
Recommendation 2	IMcr	**)	(implemented by (IMcr) **)
Recommendation 3	10) WKD_IM	.....	<b>10</b> (% - under implementation by IM)*)

\*) according to the "Information on the implementation of the recommendations issued by the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation in 2024" provided from UTK in letter no. DPN-WDZK.464.5.2024.1.KG of 30 April 2025 (applies to implementation of the recommendations forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities)

8) WKD Sp. z o.o. - means the railway carrier Warszawska Kolej Dojazdowa sp. z o.o., - hereinafter referred to as "WKD"

9) "IM - county road" - means the manager of the county road - the County Governor's Office in Pruszków - hereinafter referred to as "IMcr"

10) WKD Sp. z o.o. - means the infrastructure manager Warszawska Kolej Dojazdowa sp. z o.o., hereinafter referred to as "WKD\_IM"

\*\*\*) in letter no. PKBWK.590.6.16.2024 of 9 February 2024, the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation forwarded Report No. PKBWK 03/2024 to the County Governor's Office in Pruszków along with information on the recommendation contained in Chapter VI of the Report concerning the improvement in railway traffic safety, as well as on the preventive measures taken and actions aimed at implementing these recommendations.

<b>Re 4)</b> <b>REPORT No. PKBWK 04/2024 on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 4 May 2023 at 07:26 hrs on the Góra Włodowska – Zawiercie route, track no. 1, km 212.400 of railway line no. 4 Grodzisk Mazowiecki – Zawiercie</b>	
<b>Recommendations of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation communicated in the report</b>	<b>Recommendations forwarded for implementation to railway market entities by the President of UTK under letter no. DPN-WDZK.464.13.2024.2.KG of 9 April 2024.</b>
1. PKP PLK S.A. shall enforce the rules of admission of workers with required authorisations and permits to works and supervision.	<b>PKBWK 04/2024_1</b> PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. shall enforce the rules of admission of workers with required authorisations and permits to carry out works and exercise supervision.
2. PKP PLK S.A. shall enforce the rules of admission of outsourced company workers with access cards to perform work on the managed infrastructure.	<b>PKBWK 04/2024_2</b> PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. shall enforce the rules of admission of outsourced company workers with access cards to carry out works on the managed infrastructure.
3. PKP PLK S.A. shall standardise the work of contract managers and supervision inspectors on line investments in terms of the ability to fulfil tasks arising under the provisions of the Construction Law and internal procedures, and shall take appropriate actions based on the said standardisation.	<b>PKBWK 04/2024_3</b> PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. shall standardise the work of contract managers and supervision inspectors on line investments in terms of the ability to fulfil tasks arising under the provisions of the Construction Law and internal procedures, and shall take appropriate actions based on the said standardisation.
The above recommendations, adopted under a PKBWK resolution, were included in the report published online and forwarded to the President of UTK in accordance with Article 28l(8) of the Rail Transport Act of 28 March 2003.	

Table 13. **Analysis of the information provided concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 04/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities** (according to information from the President of UTK)


Statistical analysis of information concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report PKBWK 04/2024		
Number of recommendation addressees	1	
Responses given in time	1	
Failure to respond in time	0	

Table 14. **Assessment of the information provided concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 04/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities** (according to information from the President of UTK)

Assessment of information concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report PKBWK 04/2024			
Recommendations	PKBWK 04/2024_1	PKBWK 04/2024_2	PKBWK 04/2024_3
Positive assessment	1	1	1
Incomplete response	0	0	0
Average percent implemented:	100	100	100

Figure 14. **Average percentage level of implementation of respective recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 04/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK** (according to information from the President of UTK)





Chart 15. Average percentage level of implementation of the recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 04/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK (according to information from the President of UTK)



The average percentage level of implementation of the recommendations was determined by UTK on the basis of declarations made by the addressees of the respective recommendations.

Table 15. Implementation of the recommendations by the entities listed by the Commission in Report No. PKBWK 04/2024 – based on the information provided to PKBWK in March 2025.

Recommendations arising from Report No. PKBWK 04/2024 (issued in 2024)	Recommendation addressees	Recommendation implementation date	Average percentage level (%) of implementation of the recommendation by the entities listed in column 2/(implementation stage)
1	2	3	4
Recommendation 1	PKP PLK	2024-09-30	<b>100</b> (% - implemented by - PKP PLK)
Recommendation 2	PKP PLK	2024-09-30	<b>100</b> (% - implemented by - PKP PLK)

Recommendation 3	PKP PLK	2025-01-15	<b>100</b> (% - implemented by - PKP PLK)
------------------	---------	------------	---

<sup>\*)</sup> according to the "Information on the implementation of the recommendations issued by the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation in 2024" provided from UTK in letter no. DPN-WDZK.464.5.2024.1.KG of 30 April 2025 (applies to implementation of the recommendations forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities)

<b>Re 5)</b> <b>REPORT No. PKBWK 05/2024 on the investigation of a railway accident on 12 April 2022 at 09:22 hrs at Poznań Główny station, turnout no. 140, track 51, km -0.181 of railway line no. 351 Poznań Główny - Szczecin Główny</b>	
<b>Recommendations of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation communicated in the report</b>	<b>Recommendations forwarded for implementation to railway market entities by the President of UTK under letter no. DPN-WDZK.464.17.2024.2.MF of 12 July 2024</b>
1. PKP PLK S.A. ensure safe organisation of traffic for trains terminating on track 51 at Poznań Główny station, PKP PLK S.A. IZ Poznań shall install an intermediate signal instead of the Tm60 shield to change the location of the route place.	<b>PKBWK 05/2024_3</b> In order to ensure safe organisation of traffic for trains terminating on track 51 at Poznań Główny station, PKP PLK S.A. IZ Poznań shall install an intermediate signal instead of the Tm60 shield to change the location of the route place.
2. Pending implementation of Recommendation 1, PKP PLK S.A. IZ Poznań shall specify - in <i>Plot 22. Other provisions not covered by the preceding provisions</i> in Paragraph 12 of the <i>Technical Regulations of Poznań station</i> - the detailed rules of conduct in the event of the need to use the special command "ZW" deviating from the provisions contained in §46(4) and (8) of Instruction Ir-1 and in §13(4) and §14(4) of Instruction Ie-20.	<b>PKBWK 05/2024_2</b> Pending implementation of Recommendation 1, PKP PLK S.A. IZ Poznań shall clarify - in Section 22. Other provisions not covered by the preceding provisions in <i>Paragraph 12</i> of the <i>Technical Regulations of Poznań station</i> - the detailed rules of conduct in the event of the need to use the special command "ZW" deviating from the provisions contained in §46(4) and (8) of Instruction Ir-1 and in §13(4) and §14(4) of Instruction Ie-20
3. PKP PLK S.A., together with the system supplier, shall adapt the computer system at Poznań Główny station - special command "ZW", specifying the required time delay in accordance with applicable <i>Technical Standards for Rail Traffic Control Devices</i> and <i>Operator Manual for Poznań Railway Node E-20</i> .	<b>PKBWK 05/2024_3</b> PKP PLK S.A., together with the system supplier, shall adapt the computer system at Poznań Główny station - special command "ZW", specifying the required time delay in accordance with applicable <i>Technical Standards for Rail Traffic Control Devices</i> and <i>Operator Manual for Poznań Railway Node E-20</i> .
4. PKP PLK S.A. IZ Poznań shall bring the road plan into line with the actual situation - (the location of indicator W4 at track 51).	<b>PKBWK 05/2024_4</b> In order to ensure IZ Poznań shall bring the road plan into line with the actual situation - (the location of indicator W4 at track 51).
5. Authorised railway infrastructure managers and infrastructure managers operating under a safety attestation and exempt from the requirement to obtain a safety authorisation shall verify, at posts equipped with computer rail traffic control equipment, the advisability of using the special order to	<b>PKBWK 05/2024_5</b> Authorised railway infrastructure managers and infrastructure managers operating under a safety attestation and exempt from the requirement to obtain a safety authorisation shall verify, at posts equipped with computer rail traffic control equipment, the advisability of using the



release a route on an ad hoc basis (e.g. ZW; PZA; ...) with regard to compliance with the rules on the safety of operation of rail traffic.	special order to release a route on an ad hoc basis (e.g. ZW; PZA; ... ) with regard to compliance with the rules on the safety of operation of rail traffic.
6. PKP CARGO S.A. shall implement order no. DBK-550/R-03/KB/12 of the President of the Rail Transport Office of 30 May 2012 addressed to railway carriers on the obligation to install recording devices - digital cameras or video recorders in newly built and operating railway vehicles.	<b>PKBWK 05/2024_6</b> PKP CARGO S.A. shall implement order no. DBK-05/R-2024/KB/6 of the President of the Office of Rail Transport of 30 May 2012 addressed to railway carriers on the obligation to install recording devices - digital cameras or video recorders in newly built and operating railway vehicles.
7. PKP PLK S.A. shall supplement the Hazard Record by adding another hazard: " <i>Clauses on traffic organisation in the Technical Regulations of the traffic service station incompatible with applicable regulations</i> ".	<b>PKBWK 05/2024_7</b> PKP PLK S.A. shall supplement the Hazard Record by adding another hazard: " <i>Clauses on traffic organisation in the Technical Regulations of the traffic service station that are are incompatible with applicable regulations</i> ".
8. PKP PLK S.A. IZ Poznań shall take actions to rectify the irregularities referred to in Point 3.4 of Chapter IV, i.e. to improve the ergonomics of the workstations of signallers at the CTC signal box of Poznań Główny station.	<b>PKBWK 05/2024_8</b> PKP PLK S.A. IZ Poznań shall take actions to rectify the irregularities referred to in Point 3.4 of Chapter IV, i.e. to improve the ergonomics of the workstations of signallers at the CTC signal box of Poznań Główny station.
9. Authorised infrastructure managers shall include in the Hazard Record the hazard associated with inappropriate ergonomics of signaller duty stations. Furthermore, they shall verify the ergonomics of signaller duty stations where several duty stations are located in close proximity in the same room; and if any irregularities are detected, they shall take actions to improve the working conditions of signallers.	<b>PKBWK 05/2024_9</b> Authorised infrastructure managers shall include in the Hazard Record the hazard associated with inappropriate ergonomics of signaller duty stations. In addition, they shall verify the ergonomics of signaller duty stations where several duty stations are located in close proximity in the same room; and if any irregularities are detected, they shall take actions to improve the working conditions of signallers.
Recommendations No. 1÷9 , adopted under a PKBWK resolution, were included in the report published online and forwarded to the President of UTK in accordance with Article 28l(8) of the Rail Transport Act of 5 March 2003.	

Table 16. **Analysis of the information provided concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 05/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities** (according to information from the President of UTK)

Statistical analysis of information concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report PKBWK 05/2024	
Number of recommendation addressees	14
Responses given in time	14
Failure to respond in time	1
Number of notices issued to entities	1
Number of responses given after notice	1
No response to notice	0

odpowiedzi po wezwaniu 7%

udzielono odpowiedzi 93%

Table 17. **Assessment of the information provided concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 05/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities** (according to information from the President of UTK)

Assessment of information concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report PKBWK 05/2024									
Recommendations	PKBWK 05/2024_1	PKBWK 05/2024_2	PKBWK 05/2024_3	PKBWK 05/2024_4	PKBWK 05/2024_5	PKBWK 05/2024_6	PKBWK 05/2024_7	PKBWK 05/2024_8	PKBWK 05/2024_9
Positive assessment	1	1	1	1	13	1	1	1	11
Incomplete response	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Average percent implemented:	15	100	15	30	89	27	100	100	92

Figure 16. **Average percentage level of implementation of respective recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 05/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK** (according to information from the President of UTK)





Chart 17. Average percentage level of implementation of the recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 05/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK (according to information from the President of UTK)



The average percentage level of implementation of the recommendations was determined by UTK on the basis of declarations made by the addressees of the respective recommendations. Absence of a recommendation with the implementation level of 100% is due to the entity's timetable of actions aimed at full implementation of the PKBWK recommendations.

Table 18. Implementation of the recommendations by the entities listed by the Commission in Report No. PKBWK 05/2024 – based on the information provided to PKBWK in March 2025.

Recommendations arising from Report No. PKBWK 05/2024 (issued in 2024)	Recommendation addressees	Recommendation implementation date	Average percentage level (%) of implementation of the recommendation by the entities listed in column 2/(implementation stage)
1	2	3	4
Recommendation 1	PKP PLK	2025-12-31	<b>15</b> (% - under implementation by PKP PLK)
Recommendation	PKP PLK	2024-07-31	<b>100</b> (% - implemented by PKP PLK)

2			
Recommendation 3	PKP PLK	2025-12-31	<b>15</b> (% - under implementation by PKP PLK)
Recommendation 4	PKP PLK	2025-12-31	<b>30</b> (% - under implementation by PKP PLK)
Recommendation 5	(IM + <sup>11</sup> ) IMsa) PKP PLK	..... 2024-08-31	<b>89</b> (% - under implementation by IM + IMsa*) <b>100</b> (% - implemented by PKP PLK)
Recommendation 6	<sup>12</sup> ) PKP CARGO S.A.	.....	<b>27</b> (% - under implementation by PKP CARGO)
Recommendation 7	PKP PLK	2024-11-30	<b>100</b> (% - implemented by PKP PLK)
Recommendation 8	PKP PLK	2024-08-06	<b>100</b> (% - implemented by PKP PLK)
Recommendation 9	ZI PKP PLK	..... 2025-02-28	<b>92</b> (% - under implementation by IM) *) <b>100</b> (% - implemented by PKP PLK)

\*) according to the "Information on the implementation of the recommendations issued by the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation in 2024" provided from UTK in letter no. DPN-WDZK.464.5.2024.1.KG of 30 April 2025 (applies to implementation of the recommendations forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities)

<sup>11</sup>) IMsa means infrastructure managers exempt from the obligation to obtain a safety authorisation, authorised to operate on the basis of a safety attestation

<sup>12</sup>) PKP CARGO S.A. - means the railway carrier PKP CARGO S.A., hereinafter referred to as PKP CARGO

<b>Re 6)</b> <b>REPORT No. PKBWK 06/2024 on the investigation of a railway accident on 24 August 2023 at 12:05 hrs at Skierniewice station at turnout no. 13, km 64.282 of railway line no. 1 Warszawa Zachodnia - Katowice</b>	
<b>Recommendations of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation communicated in the report</b>	<b>Recommendations forwarded for implementation to railway market entities by the President of UTK under letter no. DPN-WDZK.464.22.2024.2.KG of 5 September 2024.</b>
<p>1. Certified railway carriers shall incorporate a train driver improvement programme in their safety management systems. Addressed to train drivers who have less than 5 years of work experience, the programme shall include at least:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) obligatory supervised instruction rides with all employee who are starting their careers as train drivers, at a rate of at least one ride per month for a period of one year, applicable to each train driver from the moment they obtain their train driver's certificate,</li> <li>b) ad hoc training, including an increased number of hours of simulator training,</li> <li>c) special assistance to that group of employees in terms of behavioural processes such as maintaining concentration, selecting stimuli, dividing attention, and the ability to work under time pressure and under stress.</li> </ul>	<p><b>PKBWK 06/2024_1</b> Certified railway carriers shall incorporate a train driver improvement programme in their safety management systems. Addressed to train drivers who have less than 06 years of work experience, the programme shall include at least:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) obligatory supervised instruction rides with all employee who are starting their careers as train drivers, at a rate of at least one ride per month for a period of one year, applicable to each train driver from the moment they obtain their train driver's certificate,</li> <li>b) ad hoc training, including an increased number of hours of simulator training,</li> <li>c) special assistance to that group of employees in terms of behavioural processes such as maintaining concentration, selecting stimuli, dividing attention, and the ability to work under pressure and under stress.</li> </ul>
<p>2. Licensed railway carriers shall include the topics related to the rules on the use of mobile phones and other mobile devices while driving and shunting in their preparatory courses, training and periodic instruction briefings for train drivers, as recommended by the Chairman of PKBWK (Report no. PKBWK/1/2012 Recommendation No. 3).</p>	<p><b>PKBWK 06/2024_2</b> Certified carriers shall include the topics related to the rules on the use of mobile phones and other mobile devices while driving and shunting in their preparatory courses, training and periodic instruction briefings for train drivers, as recommended by the President of PKBWK (Report No. PKBWK/1/2012, Recommendation No. 3:</p> <p>Introduce, in the instructions and internal rules of carriers and managers with powered railway vehicles, a prohibition of using mobile phones by drivers while driving, except in special situations (e.g. lack of communications, accident) provided for in their internal rules.</p>
<p>3. Certified railway carriers and entities in charge of maintenance shall</p>	<p><b>PKBWK 06/2024_3</b> Certified railway carriers and entities in charge of maintenance shall identify within their management systems the hazard of</p>

<p>identify within their management systems the hazard of recurrence of the causes of failure for a given vehicle type, and shall carry out a risk assessment for that risk. If the hazard is identified, they shall continue to:</p> <p>a) apply corrective measures to eliminate the safety hazard,</p> <p>b) report recurrent failures of vehicles of a given type to the rolling stock manufacturer so that the latter could verify the failure rate in relation to other vehicles of the type, monitor the performance of potentially defective components and take actions to ensure the safe operation of these vehicles, e.g. by repairing/replacing the defective component in all vehicles of the type.</p>	<p>recurrence of the causes of failures for a given vehicle type, and shall carry out a risk assessment for that hazard. If the hazard is identified, they shall continue to:</p> <p>a) apply corrective measures to eliminate the safety hazard,</p> <p>b) report recurrent failures of vehicles of a given type to the rolling stock manufacturer so that the latter could verify the failure rate in relation to other vehicles of the type, monitor the performance of potentially defective components and take actions to ensure the safe operation of these vehicles, e.g. by repairing/replacing the defective component in all vehicles of the type.</p>
<p>4. PKP PLK S.A. IZ Łódź shall install repeater signals ahead of the intermediate signal J1<sup>1/2/3/m</sup> to provide clear and uninterrupted visibility of the aspects shown by that signal.</p>	<p><b>PKBWK 06/2024_4</b> PKP PLK S.A. IZ Łódź shall install repeater signals ahead of the intermediate signal J1<sup>1/2/3/m</sup> to provide clear and uninterrupted visibility of the aspects shown by that signal.</p>
<p>5. PKP PLK S.A. shall cover the following topics in their periodic and ad hoc instructions for personnel directly involved in the operation of railway traffic:</p> <p>a) a good practice for their signal box personnel to send an additional notification by radio to the drivers of railway vehicles concerning changes in the traffic organisation applicable to a given train within a station, in particular concerning an unscheduled stop at a station or en route to let other trains pass as recommended by the Chairman of PKBWK in relevant Reports (No. PKBWK/03/2018 and No. PKBWK/02/2022).</p>	<p><b>PKBWK 06/2024_5</b> In their periodic and ad hoc instructions for personnel directly involved in the operation of railway traffic, PKP PLK S.A. shall:</p> <p>a) adopt it as a good practice for their signal box personnel to send an additional notification by radio to the drivers of railway vehicles concerning changes in the traffic organisation applicable to a given train within a station, in particular concerning an unscheduled stop at a station or en route to let other trains pass as recommended by the Chairman of PKBWK relevant Reports (No. <b>PKBWK/03/2018</b> recommendation no. 4:</p> <p><i>PKP PLK S.A. shall put particular emphasis on the following topics in their periodic and ad hoc instructions for personnel directly involved in the operation of railway traffic:</i></p> <p><i>(...) (c) a good practice for their signal box personnel to send an additional notification by radio to the drivers of railway vehicles concerning changes in the traffic organisation applicable to a given train within a station, in particular concerning an unscheduled stop at a station to let other trains pass</i></p>



<p>b) formulation of radiotelegrams in accordance with Instruction Ir-5 (R-12).</p>	<p>and <b>PKBWK/02/2022</b> recommendation no. 1:</p> <p><i>Infrastructure managers shall ensure that, when giving information to train drivers about the need to let trains pass, signallers shall keep them informed of the change of traffic organisation at the station).</i></p> <p>b) cover the topic of formulation of radiotelegrams in accordance with Instruction Ir-5 (R-12).</p>
<p>Recommendations No. 1÷5 , adopted under a PKBWK resolution, were included in the report published online and forwarded to the President of UTK in accordance with Article 28l(4) of the Rail Transport Act of 5 March 2003.</p>	

Table 19. **Analysis of the information provided concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 06/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities** (according to information from the President of UTK)

Statistical analysis of information concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report PKBWK 06/2024	
Number of recommendation addressees	<b>225</b>
Responses given in time	<b>184</b>
Failure to respond in time	<b>35</b>
Number of notices issued to entities	<b>35</b>
Number of responses given after notice	<b>21</b>
No response to notice	<b>14</b>
Number of entities that ceased operations in the reporting period	<b>6</b>

Category	Percentage
udzielono odpowiedzi	82%
odpowiedzi po wezwaniu	9%
brak odpowiedzi	6%
zaprzestanie prowadzenia działalności	3%
niezgodnie z prawem	0%

Table 20. **Assessment of the information provided concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 06/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities** (according to information from the President of UTK)

Assessment of information concerning implementation of the recommendations from Report PKBWK 06/2024					
Recommendations	PKBWK 06/2024-1	PKBWK 06/2024-2	PKBWK 06/2024-3	PKBWK 06/2024-4	PKBWK 06/2024-5
Positive assessment	<b>135</b>	135	180	<b>1</b>	0
Incomplete response/ Negative assessment	6	6	24	0	<b>1</b>
Average percent implemented:	<b>68</b>	84	86	20	30

Figure 18. **Average percentage level of implementation of respective recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 06/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK** (according to information from the President of UTK)





Chart 19. Average percentage level of implementation of the recommendations from Report No. PKBWK 06/2024 forwarded by the President of UTK (according to information from the President of UTK)



The average percentage level of implementation of the recommendations was determined by UTK on the basis of declarations made by the addressees of the respective recommendations. Absence of a recommendation with the implementation level of 100% is due to the entity's timetable of actions aimed at full implementation of the PKBWK recommendations.

Table 21. Implementation of the recommendations by the entities listed by the Commission in Report No. PKBWK 06/2024 – based on the information provided to PKBWK in March 2025.

Recommendations arising from Report No. PKBWK 06/2024 (issued in 2024)	Recommendation addressee	Recommendation implementation date	Average percentage level (%) of implementation of the recommendation by the entities listed in column 2/(implementation stage)
1	2	3	4
Recommendation 1	13) PK	31/12/2024	68 (% - under implementation by: RC*)

Recommendation 2	National Public Prosecutor's Office	31/12/2024	<b>84</b> (% - under implementation by: RC) <sup>*)</sup>
Recommendation 3	<sup>14)</sup> RC(ECM)	31/12/2024	<b>86</b> (% - under implementation by: RC(ECM)) <sup>*)</sup>
Recommendation 4	PKP PLK	2025-12-31	<b>20</b> (% - under implementation by: PKP PLK)
Recommendation 5	PKP PLK	2025-12-31	<b>30</b> (% - under implementation by: PKP PLK)


<sup>\*)</sup> according to the "Information on the implementation of the recommendations issued by the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation in 2024" provided from UTK in letter no. DPN-WDZK.464.5.2024.1.KG of 30 April 2025 (applies to implementation of the recommendations forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities)

<sup>13)</sup> RC - means certified railway carriers

<sup>14)</sup> RC(ECM) - means certified railway carriers and entities in charge of maintenance as part of their management systems

Table 22. **Analysis of the information provided concerning implementation of the recommendations from the Annual Report 2023 on the activities of PKBWK forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities** (according to information from the President of UTK)

Statistical analysis of information concerning implementation of the recommendations from the Annual Report 2023	
Number of recommendation addressees	<b>686</b>
Responses given in time	<b>488</b>
Failure to respond in time	<b>164</b>
Number of notices issued to entities	<b>164</b>
Number of responses given after notice	<b>119</b>
No response to notice	<b>45</b>
Number of entities that ceased operations in the reporting period	<b>34</b>



Category	Percentage
udzielono odpowiedzi	71%
odpowiedzi po wezwaniu	17%
brak odpowiedzi	7%
zaprzestanie prowadzenia działalności	5%

Table 23. **Assessment of the information provided concerning implementation of the recommendations from the Annual Report 2023 forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities** (according to information from the President of UTK)

Assessment of information concerning implementation of the recommendations from the Annual Report 2023						
Recommendations	Annual Report 2023_1	Annual Report 2023_2	Annual Report 2023_3	Annual Report 2023_4	Annual Report 2023_5	Annual Report 2023_6
Positive assessment	<b>1</b>	156	162	<b>1</b>	414	30
Incomplete response	<b>0</b>	10	4	<b>0</b>	90	9
Average percent implemented:	<b>20</b>	66	65	100	80	76

Figure 20. **Average percentage level of implementation of the recommendations from the Annual Report 2023 on the activities of PKBWK forwarded by the President of UTK**



*(based on information from UTK)*

Chart 21. **Average percentage level of implementation of the recommendations from the Annual Report 2023 on the activities of PKBWK forwarded by the President of UTK** *(based on information from UTK)*



The average percentage level of implementation of the recommendations was determined by UTK on the basis of declarations made by the addressees of the respective recommendations. Absence of a recommendation with the implementation level of 100% is due to the entity's timetable of actions aimed at full implementation of the PKBWK recommendations.

Table 24. **Status of implementation of the PKBWK recommendations issued in 2024 and published in the Annual Report 2023, based on the information provided to PKBWK in March 2025** *(and based on information from UTK)*

Recommendations from the Annual Report 2023 (issued in 2024)	Recommendation addressees	Recommendation implementation date	Average percentage level (%) of implementation of the recommendation by the entities listed in column 2/(implementation stage)
1	2	3	4
Recommendation 1	Minister of Infrastructure	19)	Not implemented by the date of publication of the Annual Report 2024



18) Recommendation 2	PKP PLK	2025-04-30	<b>20</b> (% - under implementation by PKP PLK)
18) Recommendation 3	(RC + <sup>15)</sup> RCsa)	.....	<b>66</b> (% - under implementation by RC + RCsa *)
18) Recommendation 4	(RC + RCsa)	.....	<b>65</b> (% - under implementation by RC + RCsa *)
18) Recommendation 5	PKP PLK	2025-03-15	<b>100</b> (% - implemented by PKP PLK)
18) Recommendation 6	(PKP PLK + IM + <sup>16)</sup> RSU <sup>17)</sup> NGRO + IMsa) PKP PLK	..... 2025-12-31	<b>80</b> (% - under implementation by: PKP PLK + IM + RSU + NGRO + IMsa)*) <b>50</b> (% - under implementation by PKP PLK)
Recommendation 7	Minister of Infrastructure	<sup>19)</sup>	Not implemented by the date of publication of the Annual Report 2024
18) Recommendation 8	(IM+IMsa) PKP PLK	..... 2025-12-31	<b>76</b> (% - under implementation by: IM + IMsa)*) <b>50</b> (% - under implementation by PKP PLK)

\*) according to the "Information on the implementation of the recommendations issued by the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation in 2024" provided from UTK in letter no. DPN-WDZK.464.5.2024.1.KG of 30 April 2025 (applies to implementation of the recommendations forwarded by the President of UTK to railway market entities)

<sup>15)</sup> RCsab - means railway carriers and railway carriers exempt from the obligation to obtain a safety certificate, authorised to operate on the basis of a safety attestation

<sup>16)</sup> RSU - means a railway siding user

<sup>17)</sup> NGRO - means a narrow-gauge railway operator - hereinafter referred to as "NRGO"


<sup>18)</sup> The recommendations forwarded for implementation by the President of UTK - included in the summary in Section 5.1 of this report

<sup>19)</sup> The State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation forwarded the "Annual Report 2023" to the Minister of Infrastructure in letter no. PKBWK.592.12.2024 of 7 October 2024 together with information on Recommendations no. 1 and 7.

Recommendations no. 1 and 7 contained in the "Annual Report 2023" are within the remit of the Minister of Infrastructure and require taking a position on their implementation, pursuant to Article 28l(10) of the Rail Transport Act.

Information on **average percentage levels of implementation of individual recommendations forwarded for implementation by the President of UTK** is included in Annex A to this Annual Report. Furthermore, information on implementation of the PKBWK recommendations issued in 2024 to other stakeholders (in accordance with Article 28l(8) of the Rail Transport Act) is included in Annex B.

**Figure 22.** Average percentage level of implementation of the PKBWK recommendations issued in 2024 (as per to Appendix A)



### 6.2 Summary of implementation of the Commission's recommendations (according to information from the President of UTK)

In 2024, the Commission published 6 occurrence investigation reports and the annual report for the year 2023. In these reports, the Commission issued 43 recommendations, of which 40 were forwarded to the President of UTK. Two recommendations were forwarded to the President of UTK

for implementation. Two recommendations arising from a completed investigation (Report No. PKBWK 5/2023) were forwarded by PKBWK to the Minister of Infrastructure, and one to a county road manager.

The President of UTK forwarded 38 recommendations arising from the PKBWK reports to the following railway market entities: certified railway carriers, authorised infrastructure managers, railway siding users, operators of narrow-gauge railways and managers of the existing railway networks that are functionally separated from the Union railway system and intended only for voivodeship or local transport (operating on the basis of safety attestations).

The designated entities were obliged to inform the President of the UTK within a defined period on how they would deal with the PKBWK recommendations.

In 2024, a total of 1,175 addressees were provided with PKBWK recommendations. The term "addressee" means any entity to which the recommendations from a specific report were forwarded. Therefore, addressees represent the total number of entities to which the recommendations from all 7 reports issued in 2024 were forwarded. Responses concerning implementation of the recommendations were provided by 1,060 addressees, or 90.2%; 6.0% of the addressees did not provide any response despite notices sent, and 45 addressees (3.8%) ceased their operations during the reporting period and therefore did not provide information on the implementation of the recommendations.

UTK carried out an analysis of the responses received from the railway market entities regarding the declared and executed actions to implement the recommendations, and their implementation was assessed, with 89% of all responses receiving a positive assessment.

For the most part, the analysis includes the assessment made by the President of UTK of how the recommendations had been implemented by entities operating under a safety management system or a maintenance management system. There were cases where it was found that the required information was missing, or where no justification was provided to demonstrate that the recommendation did not apply to the entity concerned. These issues will be monitored in the course of oversight activities carried out by the President of UTK, taking into account the potential safety risk and the seriousness of the non-compliance.

A "positive assessment" indicates that either the proposed manner of implementation of the recommendations has been accepted, considering that the declared actions are aimed at their correct implementation, or the associated clarifications indicating that the recommendation concerned issued does not apply to the entity concerned have been accepted. Where the implementation timetable presented by an entity concerned did not raise any doubts, the lack of 100% implementation of the recommendation did not negatively affect the assessment of the actions presented.

In all, 70 entities did not provide any response concerning implementation of the recommendations.

According to the President of UTK, the entities that have not responded include mainly those that operate on the basis of safety certificates, including railway siding users, operators of narrow-gauge railways or infrastructure managers exempt from authorisation.

Within the framework of his oversight (in accordance with Article 28l(9) of the Act), the President of UTK inspected the implementation of selected recommendations arising from the PKBWK reports issued in 2024. In the reporting period, inspections/audits were carried out at 81 entities, including 28 certified railway carriers, 5 authorised infrastructure managers, 5 inspections and railway siding users, and 43 audits at entities in charge of maintenance. As part of the oversight activities, 21 recommendations issued in 2024 were subjected to verification.

In the course of the oversight activities, irregularities concerning the implementation of five different recommendations were identified.

The oversight activity of the President of UTK covers not only the recommendations issued by the Commission in a given reporting period, but also the recommendations issued in previous years that are of key importance to the safety of rail transport but had not been implemented in 100%.

#### **7. Other aspects related to the activities of the Commission in 2024.**

In 2024, the Commission carried out its activities with the aim to address the scheduled goals and challenges within the budget allocated for that year. Within the allocated funding, 10 permanent members of the Commission were employed.

As part of its activities, the Commission cooperated with other organisational units of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, including in the analysis of draft legislation and industry programs, budget preparations as well as organisational and personnel matters.

The Commission's activities included:

- cooperation with the Office of Rail Transport (UTK),
- cooperation with railway commissions investigating the causes and circumstances of occurrences,
- trips by permanent members of the Commission to the scene of occurrences under instructions of the Chairman of the Commission,
- establishment of an investigation into a serious accident, accident or incident, provided that it occurred under circumstances that justified such an investigation (6 decisions by the Chairman of the Commission),
- issue of safety recommendations in during investigations in progress (14 recommendations),

- cooperation with the public prosecutor's office and the police at the scene and in the later stages of the investigation in accordance with agreements signed and applicable regulations,
- cooperation with the organisers of training and conferences concerning the presentation of the Commission's work and the manner of investigating railway occurrences (serious accidents, accidents and incidents) by railway commissions, as well as participation in meetings and briefings at railway undertakings concerning the assessment of the state of rail transport safety,
- participation of Commission members in seminars and conferences on rail transport safety,
- cooperation with public road managers at various levels (voivodeship, county, municipal) following railway occurrences at level crossings,
- cooperation with national investigating bodies of other EU Member States,
- participation in meetings and working groups, and cooperation with the European Union Agency for Railways (EUAR),
- cooperation with units of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration in the area of drafting amendments to national legislation,
- cooperation with the office supporting the Minister of the Interior and Administration, in accordance with Article 28d of the Act,
- cooperation with the Ministry of Infrastructure,
- cooperation with the General Inspectorate of Road Transport (GITD) concerning devices that monitor offences committed by drivers of road vehicles in the area of level crossings.

## 8. Summary

In 2024, the total number of occurrences reported to the Commission increased by 2.6% compared to the previous year. There were 2,493 occurrences reported to the Railway Occurrence Record (EwZd) kept by the Commission in 2024, compared to 2,429 in 2023 (an increase by 64 occurrences) (see Chart 1).

In 2024, 3 serious railway accidents were included in the Record (EwZd) (two at Category B level crossings and one at a Category D level crossing), while one occurrence which took place in 2023 was re-categorised in the course of investigation from a Category B34 accident to a Category A34 serious accident.

The accident record saw a 6.2% decrease in the total number of accidents and a 5.9% increase in incidents compared to 2023.

On a positive note, there was a decrease in the number of accidents at Category A, B and D level crossings.

In 2024, there were 2 accidents at Category A level crossings, down by three compared to the previous year (5 accidents in 2023).

There were 11 accidents at Category B level crossings in 2023, compared to 8 accidents in 2024.

There were 32 accidents at Category C level crossings in 2024, compared to 30 in 2023.

A positive development involved a decrease in the number of accidents at Category D level crossings, where the number of occurrences decreased by 10.7% in 2024 - from 131 in 2023 to 117 in 2024 (of which 7 accidents occurred at railway sidings and 6 on narrow-gauge railway lines).

In 2024, there were 39 occurrences involving a road vehicle entering a level crossing and running into the side of a rail vehicle in a train when crossing Category D, C and also B and A level crossings.

Of concern is the increase in the number of Category B13 occurrences (51 occurrences in 2024, compared to 34 in 2023 - caused by a railway vehicle running into a railway vehicle or other obstacle, e.g. a brake skid) and Category C60 incidents (102 occurrences in 2024, compared to 60 in 2023 - caused by a railway vehicle running into an obstacle, e.g. a brake skid) without derailment or casualties.

In 2024, the record showed an increase in SPAD (Signal Passed at Danger) occurrences - Category C44 incidents (129 in 2023, compared to 157 in 2024) and Category B04 accidents (36 in 2023, compared to 39 in 2024). The number of cases of failure of a rail vehicle to stop before a "Stop" signal aspect or where it was supposed to stop, or starting a rail vehicle without the required authorisation (Cat. B04 accidents and Cat. C44 incidents) has been on the rise in the last three years. It is therefore necessary to take coordinated action leading to a reduction in their number (preventing the trend to escalate) and negative impact on the operation of the railway system. The tasks to be undertaken may include, among others, enhancing the instructor supervision; practical exercises involving stopping the train at the W4 indicator or ahead of the S1 signal; additional elements of training and assessment of candidate train drivers and train drivers as regards proper observation of indicators and signals; periodic analyses of occurrences during practical and theoretical training, appropriate selection of train drivers for practical vocational training, etc.

The Commission's Railway Occurrence Record (EwZD) showed a decrease in the number of Category B17 occurrences, i.e. improper loading, unloading, irregularities in securing the cargo or other irregularities in cargo operations, or improper formation of a train or shunting consist, from 24 Cat. B17 accidents in 2023 to 12 occurrences in 2024. This demonstrates the of the commitment of the entities responsible for carrying out these activities.

An analysis of the number of occurrences shows that there was also an increase (by 22 incidents) in occurrences categorised as C64 (743 incidents in 2024, compared to 721 in 2023), i.e. *malicious, hooligan or reckless offences (e.g. throwing stones at a train, stealing cargo from a train or shunting consist in motion, placing an obstruction on the track, vandalising power, communication or rail*

*traffic control equipment or track surface, and interfering with such equipment), with no casualties or adverse consequences for property or the environment, posing a risk to passengers or train staff). As C64, railway commissions categorise incidents that involve road vehicles entering and remaining in the danger zone of a level crossing between closed semi-barriers (barriers).*

In 2024, there were 743 Category C64 occurrences, including: 645 at level crossings, 70 cases of objects being thrown at trains, and 28 other incidents (theft, laying an obstruction and other hooligan acts). In contrast, there were 721 Category C64 occurrences in 2023, including: 638 at level crossings, 67 cases of objects being thrown at trains, and 16 other incidents.

A total of 698 incidents were recorded at level crossings in 2024 – involving failure of a road vehicle to stop before a closing or closed barrier (half-barrier closing the entry onto the level crossing), leading to damage to the barrier or road signals (53 Category C66 incidents) and malicious, hooligan or reckless offences posing a threat to passengers or train staff, including confinement of road vehicles at level crossings, damaging the barriers (645 Category C64 incidents).

It must be noted that the above figures concerning level crossing incidents, including confinement of road vehicles in the danger zone at Category B level crossings, are based only on information provided by the railway commissions in the *Final Findings Reports*. However, the true number of such occurrences is actually much higher, as some of them are categorised as Category C66 occurrences. It must be emphasised that not all occurrences are reported because once the train leaves the level crossing without colliding with the road vehicle, the barriers are lifted automatically, allowing the driver to drive away with impunity, despite the fact that they did not observe the traffic rules when entering the level crossing.

Infrastructure managers should continue to take steps to ensure that each incident where a road vehicle remains between closed barriers without any contact with rail vehicles is categorised only as Cat. C64. Railway carriers should, as part of their safety culture, take measures to ensure that drivers of rail vehicles report each case of a road vehicle remaining between closed barriers to the personnel of the infrastructure manager.

The number of casualties (fatalities) in the record of all railway accidents was higher, by 4.4 %, despite a decrease in the number of occurrences (accidents) at level crossings in 2024 (see Chart 2).

Attention must be drawn to Category B34, which was updated as of 15 August 2025. The number of occurrences in the statistics in that category is significantly lower than that recorded as of 31 December 2024 due to completed investigations by the prosecutor office and reclassification of some incidents in Category B34 as suicides or attempted suicides.

Category C53 occurrences, i.e. rolling stock malfunctions or emergency conditions of powered rail vehicles identified by detection equipment, confirmed in workshop conditions (hot axle boxes,



hot brake resulting in a displaced rim), as well as other defects on rail vehicles in motion observed by the operating staff, should be subject to an in-depth analysis and hazard (irregularity) prevention efforts. Indeed, the number of such occurrences increased from 31 in 2023 to 45 in 2024. The above requires enhanced oversight and involvement of railway carriers.

On a positive note, there was a decrease in the number of Category C68 incidents - break-up of a train or shunting consist not resulting in a rail vehicle runaway (186 incidents in 2024, compared to 215 in 2023). Nevertheless, a high number of these occurrences still take place, which should mobilise railway commissions to conduct more in-depth analyses of their causes and investigate their circumstances in order to minimise the risks.

In 2024, the Record showed a 5.9% increase in incidents reported, compared to the previous year (see Chart 1). Compared to accidents, the reported incidents generated less material damage and fewer casualties. Nevertheless, their number, which is still high, continues to provide important information about the existing risks which rail market entities should monitor as part of their safety management and maintenance management systems. Category C54, C64 and C68 incidents (173, 743 and 186 respectively) together accounted for more than 59.4% of all incidents that occurred in 2024.

Incidents that occurred during investment and modernisation works should be subject to an in-depth analysis and risk (irregularity) prevention. Investment-related occurrences are most often categorised as B09 and C51. Occurrence in Categories B09 and C51 related to damage to or poor maintenance of structures include also improper execution of investment and modernisation works (e.g. a rail vehicle running into equipment (materials) left on the track or within the track clearance). Furthermore, in addition to the aforementioned categories, occurrences related to irregularities in the execution of infrastructure repairs, investment and modernisation works were classified by railway commissions in other categories.

The previous year saw a decrease in the number of Category B09 accidents from 50 in 2023 to 32 in 2024, but a significant increase in the number of Category C51 incidents from 58 in 2023 to 92 in 2024. The rise in the number of those incidents is worrying and should be given careful consideration by entities that oversee and organise such works (due to the significant impact of the human factor).

An analysis of the number of occurrences at railway sidings shows that there was a slight decrease in their number in 2024 (i.e. there were 169 occurrences in 2024, including 131 accidents and 38 incidents), compared to 2023 (a total of 180 occurrences, of which 146 were categorised as railway accidents and 34 as railway incidents).

Railway siding occurrences in 2024 accounted for 6.8% of the total number (2,493) of occurrences reported to PKBWK; accidents (131) accounted for 20.6% of the total number (637) of serious

railway accidents and accidents reported to PKBWK; and incidents (38) accounted for 2.0% of the total number of railway incidents (1,856).

In this report, the Commission issued recommendations aimed at improving the safety of rail transport.

In 2024, the Commission carried out its statutory duties in cooperation with a number of entities, primarily railway commissions, national investigating bodies of other EU Member States, infrastructure managers and railway carriers, UTK and the European Union Railway Agency.

## 9. PKBWK contact details as of 1 August 2025.

<b>State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation (Polish: Państwowa Komisja Badania Wypadków Kolejowych)</b> <b>ul. Domaniewska 36/38</b> <b>02-672 Warsaw</b> <b>PERMANENT MEMBERS:</b>	
<b>Tadeusz Ryś</b> Chair of the Commission Tel. 47 72 17 790	..... Vice Chair of the Commission (vacancy)
<b>Rafał Leśniowski</b> Vice-Chair of the Commission Tel. 47 72 17 793	<b>Arkadiusz Kowalski</b> Permanent member of the Commission Tel. 47 72 17 794
<b>Henryk Zgrzebnicki</b> Secretary of the Commission Tel. 47 72 17 792	<b>Barbara Pióro</b> Commission Service Worker Tel. 47 72 17 791, Fax 47 72 87 715 e-mail: pkbwk@mswia.gov.pl
<b>Branch in Katowice</b> ul. Rolna 43 40-555 Katowice	<b>Branch in Poznań</b> ul. Składowa 4 61-897 Poznań
<b>Grzegorz Skarwecki</b> Permanent member of the Commission - coordinating the work of the Branch in Katowice Tel. 32 607-24-64	<b>Benedykt Kugielski</b> Permanent member of the Commission coordinating the work of the Branch in Poznań Tel. 61 221-64-03
<b>Tomasz Resiak</b> Permanent member of the Commission - Branch in Katowice Tel. 32 607-24-65	<b>Dionizy Jędrych</b> Permanent member of the Commission - Branch in Poznań Tel. 61 221-64-05
<b>Marek Różyc</b> Permanent member of the Commission - Branch in Katowice Tel. 32 607-24-65	<b>Tomasz Aleksandrowicz</b> Permanent member of the Commission - Branch in Poznań Tel. 61 221-64-05
..... Permanent member of the Commission (vacancy)	
<b>Duty telephone 510 126 711</b>	

### PKBWK website

The Commission's website is available at:

<https://www.gov.pl/web/mswia>

section: What we do → State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation

On the Commission's website, all available information and documents are grouped into the following sections:

immediate notification of occurrences (Article 28g),

- written notification of railway occurrences (§7),
- composition of the Commission,
- legal acts and documents,
- reports,
- protection of personal data (in accordance with RODO).

## APPENDIX "A"

### Information on the implementation of the PKBWK recommendations issued in 2024

(according to information provided by the President of the Office of Railway Transport)

As part of supervision of the implementation of the PKBWK recommendations by railway market entities, the President of UTK analysed the recommendations from the above-said reports submitted to him and, after making changes to their content, forwarded them for implementation to managers, railway carriers, entities in charge of maintenance of rail vehicles and entities operating special vehicles.

1. REPORT No. PKBWK 01/2024 on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 19 January 2023 at 18:37 hrs on the Szczecin Podjuchy – Szczecin Port Centralny SPA route, km 349.520 of track no. 1, railway line no. 273 Wrocław Główny – Szczecin Główny;
2. REPORT No. PKBWK 02-2024 on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 7 February 2023 at 02:00 hrs at Wrocław Brochów station, km 1.701 of track no. 1N of railway line no. 349 Św. Katarzyna – Wrocław Kuźniki;
3. REPORT No. PKBWK 03/2024 on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 19 May 2023 at 09:51 hrs on the Komorów – Podkowa Leśna Główna route, track no. 1, Cat. D level crossing at km 18.805 of railway line no. 47 Warszawa Śródmieście WKD – Grodzisk Mazowiecki Radońska;
4. REPORT No. PKBWK 04/2024 on the investigation of a railway incident which took place on 8 May 2023 at 07:26 hrs on the Góra Włodowska – Zawiercie route, track no. 1, km 212.400 of railway line no. 4 Grodzisk Mazowiecki – Zawiercie;
5. REPORT No. PKBWK 05/2024 on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 12 April 2022 at 09:22 hrs at Poznań Główny station, at turnout no. 140 on track 51, km -0.181 of railway line no. 351 Poznań Główny - Szczecin Główny;
6. REPORT No. PKBWK 06/2024 on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 24 August 2023 at 12:05 hrs at Skierniewice station, turnout no. 13, km 64.282 of railway line no. 1 Warszawa Zachodnia - Katowice;
7. Annual Report 2023 on the activities of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation.

#### Analysis of information on implementation of respective recommendations – based on responses declared by railway market entities

Shown under each recommendation is the average percentage level of implementation of the recommendation concerned.

The average percentage level of implementation of the recommendations was determined by UTK on the basis of information provided by the addressees of the respective recommendations.

#### I. Recommendations forwarded by the President of UTK after the analysis of Report No. PKBWK 01/2024

on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 19 January 2023 at 18:37 hrs on the Szczecin Podjuchy - Szczecin Port Central SPA route, km 349.520 of track no. 1 of railway line 273 Wrocław Główny - Szczecin Główny

**PKBWK 01/2024\_1** The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall, within the framework of its periodic

and additional training and courses for signallers, place particular emphasis on the prescribed use of telephone signalling messages provided while managing traffic on the basis of train signalling by telephone, as prescribed in Instruction Ir-01.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.

**PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: 100%**

**PKBWK 01/2024\_2** The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall extend particular supervision to workers directly involved in rail traffic management (traffic officers, point operators) with less than two years of employment.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.

**PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: 100%**

**PKBWK 01/2024\_3** The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall enhance actions concerning periodic replays of recorded conversations from traffic operation posts, in particular under restriction in force (signalling by telephone, issuing orders and reporting readiness of routes).

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.

**PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: 100%**

**PKBWK 01/2024\_4** The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall introduce permanent supervision of the correct use of telephone signalling messages when managing traffic on the basis of train signalling by telephone, in accordance with templates contained in Instruction Ir-1.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.

**PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: 100%**

**PKBWK 01/2024\_5** The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall verify the presence, in the railway network under its management, of the W28 "Radio channel indicators" at the locations of change of the prescribed train radio communication channel.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.

**PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: 100%**

**PKBWK 01/2024\_6** In order to ensure good visibility of the return reflection from Pc-5 signal disks (daylight) on curves, the railway carriers shall implement the obligation to use Pc-5 signal disks "Marking of the end of a train or another rail vehicle" in accordance with the technical requirements laid down in Part II of Instruction Ie-102 "Technical requirements for indicators and signal discs" on freight trains operating on railway lines managed by PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: Railway carriers licensed to carry goods.

**AVERAGE PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: 84%**

**PKBWK 01/2024\_7** The railway carrier CTL Logistics Sp. z o.o. shall ensure supervision of the correct setting of the real time in traction vehicle recorders.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: CTL Logistics Sp. z o.o.

**PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: 100%**

**PKBWK 01/2024\_8** Authorised railway infrastructure managers and infrastructure managers exempt from the obligation to obtain a safety authorisation shall procure that works contractors eliminate visibility of sources of light illuminating their construction sites in the area of active railway tracks which dazzle drivers of rail vehicles.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: Authorised infrastructure managers.

AVERAGE PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **97%**

**II. Recommendations forwarded by the President of UTK after the analysis of Report No. PKBWK 02/2024**

on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 7 February 2023 at 02:00 hrs at Wrocław Brochów station, km 1.701 of track no. 1N of railway line no. 349 Św. Katarzyna – Wrocław Kuźniki

**PKBWK 02/2021\_1** Entities in charge of maintenance (ECMs) of freight wagons shall strengthen supervision of the process of repairs of wheelsets during replacement of wheels and P4 and P5 maintenance.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: Entities in charge of maintenance of freight wago

AVERAGE PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **71%**

**PKBWK 02/2024\_2** Entities in charge of maintenance (ECMs) of freight wagons shall check their Maintenance Management Systems (MMSs) for factors contributing to the occurrence, and shall consider inclusion of the following elements in those systems:

- a) detailed requirements regarding contractors that perform P4 and P5 maintenance activities,
- b) inclusion in the freight wagon Maintenance Management System (MMS) of competence requirements and detailed tasks for workers authorised to perform commissioning, in particular as regards in-process commissioning.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: Entities in charge of maintenance of freight wagons.

AVERAGE PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **81%**

**PKBWK 02/2024\_3** As part of its Maintenance Management System, TORPOL S.A. shall take actions relating to:

- a) increasing the supervision of compliance with the Maintenance Management System procedures,
- b) ensuring detailed supervision of rail vehicle maintenance service providers, in particular as regards tests of running gear. .

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: TORPOL S.A.

AVERAGE PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **80%**

**PKBWK 02/2024\_4** MEGA-MET sp. z o.o. sp.k. in Łazy shall take actions to strengthen the supervision of its P4 and P5 maintenance activities, including enhanced quality control of repair activities provided, in particular ones that are outsourced.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: MEGA-MET sp. z o.o. sp.k. . in Łazy.

PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **100%**

**PKBWK 02/2024\_5** Entities in charge of maintenance (ECMs) of freight wagons shall immediately implement the obligation to carry out detailed documented<sup>1)</sup> non-destructive tests of wheelset axles prior to their re-introduction to service.

<sup>(1)</sup>The scope of a detailed non-destructive test of freight wagon wheelset axles, as used in the Report, includes inter alia disassembly of wheelsets from under a freight wagon, disassembly of bearings and exposure of the centre section of the axle, external examination. The test must be carried out with the ultrasonic testing (UT) and magnetic particle testing (MT) methods following removal of the

protection coating from the side surface of axle journals and from the centre section of the axles.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: Entities in charge of maintenance of freight wagons.

AVERAGE PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **72%**

### **III. Recommendations forwarded by the President of UTK after the analysis of Report No. PKBWK 03/2024**

on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 19 May 2023 at 09:51 hrs on the Komorów – Podkowa Leśna Główna route, track no. 1, Cat. D level crossing at km 18.805 of railway line no. 47 Warszawa Śródmieście WKD – Grodzisk Mazowiecki Radońska

**PKBWK 03/2024\_1.1** Adjust – move the apparatus cabinets to ensure visibility of the head of trains approaching the level crossing.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: Warszawska Kolej Dojazdowa Sp. z o.o.

PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **100%**

Actions taken: - dismantling of the apparatus cabinets.

**PKBWK 03/2024\_1.2** Install additional devices at the level crossing to record transgressions committed by road vehicle drivers where the B-20 sign is placed, and install light panels with the message "Caution. Train" to inform road vehicle drivers about the level crossing.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: Warszawska Kolej Dojazdowa Sp. z o.o.

PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **10%**

Actions taken: preparation of materials for a call for tenders for execution of a study on the installation of monitoring equipment.

**PKBWK 03/2024\_1.3** Considering the exposure factor, the manager of the railway line shall take action to re-classify the level crossing from Category D to a higher category "C" (it is not possible to install Cat. B devices due to terrain limitations) and to install additional devices to warn/record transgressions of road vehicle drivers when signals are given by roadside signalling devices.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: Warszawska Kolej Dojazdowa Sp. z o.o.

PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **10%**

**PKBWK 03/2024\_2** The infrastructure manager, i.e. Warszawska Kolej Dojazdowa sp. z o. o., shall re-analyse the risk of accidents at level crossings and, where necessary, shall take measures to mitigate the risk.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: Warszawska Kolej Dojazdowa Sp. z o.o.

PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **10%**

### **IV. Recommendations forwarded by the President of UTK after the analysis of Report No. PKBWK 04/2024**

on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 8 May 2023 at 07:26 hrs on the Góra Włodowska – Zawiercie route, track no. 1, km 212.400 of railway line no. 4 Grodzisk Mazowiecki – Zawiercie

**PKBWK 04/2024\_1** PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. shall enforce the rules of admission of workers with required authorisations and permits to carry out works and exercise supervision.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.



PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **100%**

**PKBWK 04/2024\_2** PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. shall enforce the rules of admission of outsourced company workers with access cards to carry out works on the managed infrastructure.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.

PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **100%**

This recommendation is being implemented on a systemic basis, and the subjects identified therein are being and will be implemented on an ongoing basis.

**PKBWK 04/2024\_3** PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. shall standardise the work of contract managers and supervision inspectors on line investments in terms of the ability to fulfil tasks arising under the provisions of the Construction Law and internal procedures, and shall take appropriate actions based on the said standardisation.

**V. Recommendations forwarded by the President of UTK after the analysis of Report No. PKBWK 05/2023**

on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 12 April 2022 at 09:22 hrs at Poznań Główny station, turnout no. 140 on track 51, km -0.181 of railway line no. 351 Poznań Główny - Szczecin Główny

**PKBWK 05/2024\_3** In order to ensure ensure safe organisation of traffic for trains terminating on track 51 at Poznań Główny station, PKP PLK S.A. IZ Poznań shall install an intermediate signal instead of the Tm60 shield to change the location of the route place.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.

PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **15%**

**PKBWK 05/2024\_2** Pending implementation of Recommendation 1, PKP PLK S.A. IZ Poznań shall clarify in Section 22. "Other provisions not covered by the preceding provisions" in Paragraph 12 of Technical Regulations of Poznań station the detailed rules of conduct in the event of the need to use the special command "ZW" deviating from the provisions contained in §46(4) and (8) of Instruction Ir-1 and in §13(4) and §14(4) of Instruction Ie-20.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.

PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **100%**

**PKBWK 05/2024\_3** PKP PLK S.A., together with the system supplier, shall adapt the computer system at Poznań Główny station - special command "ZW", specifying the required time delay in accordance with applicable Technical Standards for Rail Traffic Control Devices and Operator Manual for Poznań Railway Node E-20.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.

PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **15%**

**PKBWK 05/2024\_4** PKP PLK S.A. IZ Poznań shall bring the road plan into line with the actual situation - (the location of indicator W4 at track 51).

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.

PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **30%**

**PKBWK 05/2024\_5** Authorised railway infrastructure managers and infrastructure managers operating under a safety attestation and exempt from the requirement to obtain a safety authorisation shall verify, at posts equipped with computer rail traffic control equipment, the advisability of using the special order to release a route on an ad hoc basis (e.g. ZW; PZA; ...) with regard to compliance with the rules on the safety of operation of rail traffic.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: Authorised railway infrastructure managers and infrastructure managers operating under a safety attestation and exempt from the obligation to obtain a safety authorisation  
AVERAGE PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **89%**

**PKBWK 05/2024\_6** PKP CARGO S.A. shall implement order no. DBK-550/R-03/KB/12 of the President of the Office of Rail Transport of 30 May 2012 addressed to railway carriers on the obligation to install recording devices - digital cameras or video recorders in newly built and operating railway vehicles.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: PKP CARGO S.A  
PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **27%**

**PKBWK 05/2024\_7** PKP PLK S.A. shall supplement the Hazard Record by adding another hazard: "Clauses on traffic organisation in the Technical Regulations of the traffic service station that are are incompatible with applicable regulations".

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.  
PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **100%**

- Lack of precise rules in the technical documentation or internal regulations.
- The content of the "Hazard Record of PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. (version 20 of 29 November 2024)" was updated, as a result of which a new source of hazard 12.6.7 "Clauses on traffic organisation in the Technical Regulations that are are incompatible with applicable regulations" was included under hazard 12.6. "Incorrectly drafted Technical Regulations".

**PKBWK 05/2024\_8** PKP PLK S.A. IZ Poznań shall take actions to rectify the irregularities referred to in Point 3.4 of Chapter IV, i.e. to improve the ergonomics of the workstations of signallers at the CTC signal box of Poznań Główny station.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.  
PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **100%**

Due to inability to improve the ergonomics of the workstations at LCS Poznań PoA, the Railway Line Plant relocated 3 workstations to local posts: Swarzędz (as of 6 August 2024) Poznań Wschód and Poznań Górczyn (as of 05 August 2024).

**PKBWK 05/2024\_9** Authorised infrastructure managers shall include in the Hazard Record the hazard associated with inappropriate ergonomics of signaller duty stations. In addition, they shall verify the ergonomics of signaller duty stations where several duty stations are located in close proximity in the same room; and if any irregularities are detected, they shall take actions to improve the working conditions of signallers.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: Authorised infrastructure managers  
AVERAGE PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **92%**

**VI. Recommendations forwarded by the President of UTK after the analysis of Report No. PKBWK 05/2023**

on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 24 August 2023 at 12:05 hrs at Skierniewice station, turnout no. 13, km 64.282 of railway line no. 1 Warszawa Zachodnia - Katowice

**PKBWK 06/2024\_1** Certified railway carriers shall incorporate a train driver improvement programme in their safety management systems. Addressed to train drivers who have less than 06 years of work experience, the programme shall include at least:

- a) obligatory supervised instruction rides with all employee who are starting their careers as train drivers, at a rate of at least one ride per month for a period of one year, applicable to each train driver from the moment they obtain their train driver's certificate,
- b) ad hoc training, including an increased number of hours of simulator training, at least 1h/year,
- c) special assistance to that group of employees in terms of behavioural processes such as maintaining concentration, selecting stimuli, dividing attention, and the ability to work under pressure and under stress.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: Certified railway carriers

AVERAGE PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **68%**

**PKBWK 06/2024\_2** Certified carriers shall include the topics related to the rules on the use of mobile phones and other mobile devices while driving and shunting in their preparatory courses, training and periodic instruction briefings for train drivers, as recommended by the President of PKBWK (Report No. PKBWK/1/2012, Recommendation No. 3:

Introduce, in the instructions and internal rules of carriers and managers with powered railway vehicles, a prohibition of using mobile phones by drivers while driving, except in special situations (e.g. lack of communications, accident) provided for in their internal rules).

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: Certified railway carriers

AVERAGE PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **84%**

**PKBWK 06/2024\_3** Certified railway carriers and entities in charge of maintenance shall identify within their management systems the hazard of recurrence of the causes of failures for a given vehicle type, and shall carry out a risk assessment for that hazard. If the hazard is identified, they shall continue to:

- a) apply corrective measures to eliminate the safety hazard,
- b) report recurrent failures of vehicles of a given type to the rolling stock manufacturer so that the latter could verify the failure rate in relation to other vehicles of the type, monitor the performance of potentially defective components and take actions to ensure the safe operation of these vehicles, e.g. by repairing/replacing the defective component in all vehicles of the type.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: Certified railway carriers and entities in charge of maintenance as part of their management systems

AVERAGE PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **86%**

**PKBWK 06/2024\_4** PKP PLK S.A. IZ Łódź shall install repeater signals ahead of the intermediate signal J1<sup>1/2/3/m</sup> to provide clear and uninterrupted visibility of the aspects shown by that signal.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.

PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **20%**

PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. and the manufacturer of signalling equipment have agreed on the possibility of implementing this recommendation, i.e. the installation of repeater signals ahead of the intermediate signal J11<sup>2/3/m</sup>.

Following an enquiry by the Railway Line Plant in Łódź, an offer prepared by Hitachi Rail GTS Polska Sp. z o.o. has been received. Funds were also obtained in the amount of PLN 2.49 million for the execution of the task arising from this recommendation, i.e. the installation of repeater signals at Skierniewice station on THALES equipment.

Currently, the implementation of the recommendation is at the procurement process stage.

**PKBWK 06/2024\_5** In their periodic and ad hoc instructions for personnel directly involved in the operation of railway traffic, PKP PLK S.A. shall:

- a) adopt it as a good practice for their signal box personnel to send an additional notification by radio to the drivers of railway vehicles concerning changes in the traffic organisation applicable to a given train within a station, in particular concerning an unscheduled stop at a station or en route to let other trains pass as recommended by the Chairman of PKBWK relevant Reports (No. PKBWK/03/2018 recommendation no. 4:

PKP PLK S.A. shall put particular emphasis on the following topics in their periodic and ad hoc instructions for personnel directly involved in the operation of railway traffic:

*(...) c) a good practice for their signal box personnel to send an additional notification by radio to the drivers of railway vehicles concerning changes in the traffic organisation applicable to a given train within a station, in particular concerning an unscheduled stop at a station to let other trains pass*

and PKBWK/02/2022 recommendation no. 1:

*Infrastructure managers shall ensure that, when giving information to train drivers about the need to let trains pass, signallers shall keep them informed of the change of traffic organisation at the station.)*

- b) cover the topic of formulation of radiotelegrams in accordance with Instruction Ir-5 (R-12).

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.

PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **30%**

- As an alternative to this recommendation, PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. **introduced, as of 12 September 2024, an amendment to the "Instruction on operating railway traffic" Ir- 1 detailing the provisions of § 48(1) and § 64(9).**
- The amended provisions of Instruction Ir-1 require drivers of rail vehicle to contact the signaller when their train is approaching a home signal or a warning disc indicating that the next signal shows the aspect "Stop", and also in case when the train is scheduled to pass a post without stopping and the home signal or warning signal indicates that the next signal shows the aspect "Stop", in order to clarify the reason for not giving the permissive aspect, in the same way as when no permissive aspect is shown on the home signal. If the driver neglects this duty, communication with him shall be established by the signaller. Thus, the provision indicates that an exchange of information between the driver and the signaller is required before the permissive aspect is given.
- The topics concerning indications arising from the recommendations contained in PKBWK reports are permanently included in the "Guidelines on the organisation of periodic instructions".

## VII. Recommendations forwarded by the President of UTK following an analysis of the Annual Report 2023

**Annual Report 2023\_1** The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall analyse cases of vehicles stopping between the barriers that occurred in 2023 at Category B level crossings. If the number of occurrences at a given level crossing exceeds 1 per year, measures must be taken to reduce the risk of occurrences; the infrastructure manager shall, in particular:

- a) conduct a detailed analysis of why vehicles tend to remain within the zone during the passage of a train,
- b) in cooperation with road managers (and other stakeholders), develop measures to reduce the risk of occurrences at level crossings by changing the organisation of road traffic, introducing additional traffic restrictions for road vehicles, introducing speed limits for trains,
- c) eliminate exit barriers - as recommended by PKBWK in the Annual Report 2018,
- d) introduce the rule of switching on/off lights on barrier bars in the open state (vertical) concurrently with showing the prohibition on the road signals.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.

PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **20%**

The recommendation has been included in the Railway Safety Improvement Programme 2025 and will be implemented in accordance with the content and guidelines contained in the Programme, i.e. all Railway Line Plants will - as part of priority M.1.5 "Risk assessment concerning key infrastructure hazards", in accordance with action M.1.5.3. - carry out a risk assessment for hazards associated with a vehicle stopping between barriers at the Category B level crossings where 5 or more occurrences took place in 2023-2024

**Annual Report 2023\_2** Certified railway carriers and railway carriers exempt from the obligation to obtain a safety certificate, authorised to operate under a safety attestation, which recorded Category B2 and C44 railway occurrences in 2023 shall, within the framework of their safety management systems or internal arrangements, take measures to prevent SPADs (Signal Passed At Danger), and supplement their recurrent train driver training programmes by adding methods of dealing with stress, psychological burden, lack of concentration and fatigue as fundamental factors in these categories of occurrences.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: Certified railway carriers and railway carriers exempt from the obligation to obtain a safety certificate and authorised to operate under a safety attestation

AVERAGE PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **66%**

Most common activities:

- Amending the instruction on the rules for vocational improvement, examinations and training as regards extending the subjects of periodic training for train drivers and training on simulators.
- The periodic training for train drivers shall include the subject of how to deal with stress, mental strain, lack of concentration, or fatigue, as factors having a fundamental impact on this category of occurrences.
- Supervision of the implementation of the periodic instruction programme and training plan, proper selection of persons/training units, referral of employees for specialised training.

**Annual Report 2023\_3** Certified railway carriers and railway carriers exempt from the obligation to obtain a safety certificate, authorised to operate under a safety attestation, shall include in their recurrent train driver training programmes, including simulator training, the rules of dealing with situations of imminent collision with another rail and/or road vehicle, including in particular the reaction of traction teams and the need for them to leave the cab of the traction vehicle immediately (to a safer location).

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: Certified railway carriers and railway carriers exempt from the obligation to obtain a safety certificate and authorised to operate under a safety attestation

AVERAGE PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **65%**

Most common activities:

- Conducting periodic training for train drivers and traction teams on how to react and behave in situations where a collision with another rail vehicle and/or a road vehicle is imminent. Incorporating the recommendation in simulator training.
- Supervision of the implementation of the periodic instruction programme and training plan, proper selection of persons/training units, referral of employees for specialised training.

- Discussing the causes of and ways of behaving in potentially dangerous situations with the personnel directly involved in the operation and safety of railway traffic.

**Annual Report 2023\_4** The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall develop guidelines concerning the construction of multi-level crossings to replace level crossings with heavy traffic, taking into account in particular: the speed of the railway line concerned, the traffic ratio and other conditions relating to the location of the crossing.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A.

AVERAGE PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **100%**

According to the information provided by PKP PLK S.A., a project entitled "Improving the safety at level crossings, including their conversion to two-level crossings". The project aims to improve safety by eliminating level crossings and replacing them with collision-free crossings across Poland.

**Annual Report 2023\_5** PKP PLK S.A. and other authorised railway infrastructure managers, users of railway sidings, operators of narrow gauge railways and infrastructure managers that are exempt from the obligation to obtain a safety authorisation and authorised to operate under a safety attestation shall take measures concerning detection of obstacles at and within level crossings by means of intelligent detection systems that allow informing relevant personnel of the infrastructure manager and railway carrier of the danger where an obstacle is detected, warning motorists that they are approaching a level crossing, and recording the motorists' behaviour and compliance with road traffic regulations

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: PKP PLK S.A. and other authorised managers of railway infrastructure, users of railway sidings, operators of narrow gauge railways and infrastructure managers exempt from the obligation to obtain a safety authorisation and authorised to operate under a safety attestation.

AVERAGE PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **80%**

Most common activities:

- Review of local conditions at level crossings, checks of signalling, random checks of driver behaviour at level crossings.
- Exploring the feasibility of using smart detection systems to notify the relevant personnel at railway sidings and railway carriers of a hazard when obstacles are detected at level crossings. Familiarisation with the solutions available on the market and how they can be applied to level crossings.
- Analysis of the recommendation in the context of the characteristics of the low-traffic level crossings used - justification for taking alternative measures in this respect

**Annual Report 2023\_6** Authorised railway infrastructure managers and infrastructure managers exempt from the obligation to obtain a safety authorisation, authorised to operate on the basis of a safety attestation, together with local authorities and road managers, shall implement a procedure whereby - prior to the revitalisation and modernisation of a railway line, in order to reduce the number of level crossings and the related distant signals (TOP) on the line - they will analyse the existing communication routes (roads) so that they could be channelled into a single level crossing, maintaining the 3 km spacing, and possibly replace the decommissioned level crossings with pedestrian routes as Cat. pedestrian crossings.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEES: Authorised railway infrastructure managers and infrastructure managers exempt from obtaining a safety authorisation and authorised to operate under a safety attestation.

AVERAGE PERCENT IMPLEMENTED: **76%**

Most common activities:

- Where a railway line is revitalised or modernised, a traffic route analysis will be carried out to reduce the number of level crossings by channelising car traffic through by means of linking crossings or changing the traffic organisation.
- The recommendation will be discussed with road managers during cyclical meetings concerning organisation of traffic at level crossings.
- Analysis of existing traffic routes to reduce the number of level crossings.



**ANNEX B**

**Information on implementation of the PKBWK recommendations issued in 2024 and addressed to other stakeholders** (Article 281(8) of the Rail Transport Act)

**Recommendations No. 5 and 7 from REPORT No. PKBWK 02/2024** on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 7 February 2023 at 02: 00 hrs at Wrocław Brochów station, km 1.701 of track no. 1N of railway line no. 349 Św. Katarzyna - Wrocław Kuźniki, addressed to the President of UTK

**PKBWK 02/2024\_recommendation\_5** The President of the Office of Rail Transport shall finalise the actions commenced in 2020 to introduce *the obligation regarding traceability of wheelsets for freight wagon axles* in accordance with *the Implementation guide for the European Wheelset Traceability (EWT) for freight wagon axles* made in Brussels on 26 July 2010 by *the Joint Sector Group for ERA Task Force on wagon/axle maintenance* and agreed with the National Safety Authorities.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEE: President of the Office of Rail Transport

STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION - under implementation

The President of UTK has requested the Ministry of Infrastructure to reconsider the proposal to introduce legislative changes to the Act and to issue an implementing act in this respect, to regulate the implementation of <sup>20)</sup> KRZK and enable the continuation of the activities undertaken by the President of UTK.

**PKBWK 02/2024\_recommendation\_7** The President of the office of Rail Transport shall consider appointing a team of experts to obtain opinions and knowledge to define the scope of additional tests of wheelset axles in service in freight wagons for longer than 40 years.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEE: President of the Office of Rail Transport

IMPLEMENTATION STATUS - **100%**

- Between June and December 2024, a team of experts worked at the Office of Rail Transport to determine the possible scope of additional axle tests for wheelsets in service in freight wagons for more than 40 years. The conclusions reached by the experts were issued in the form of recommendations by the President of UTK.
- The President of UTK recognised the validity of the conclusions reached by the expert team and made recommendations based on them. They should be applied by, among others, entities in charge of maintenance (ECMs) certified in the maintenance function, as well as other providers of NDT-related services.
- "Recommendations of the President of UTK on NDTs <sup>21)</sup> of axles of wheelsets in freight wagons" - have been published on the website of the Office of Rail Transport (<https://utk.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/21381>)  
The recommendations of the President of UTK refer to:
  1. testing of axles in wheelsets older than 40 years;
  2. types and frequency of NDTs of axles in wheelsets used in freight wagons;
  3. additional requirements applicable to ECMs and maintenance providers;
  4. other railway market entities.

The President of UTK has exempt from the application of the recommendation the entities authorised according to VPI or equivalent systems, which already have regulated their supervision of non-destructive tests of wheelset axles.

**Recommendation No. 3 from REPORT No. PKBWK 3/2024** on the investigation of a railway accident which took place on 19 May 2023 at 09:51 hrs on the Komorów – Podkowa Leśna Główna route, track no. 1, Cat. D level crossing at km 18.805 of railway line no. 47 Warszawa Śródmieście WKD – Grodzisk Mazowiecki Radońska, addressed to the manager of the county road, i.e. the County Governor's Office in Pruszków

**PKBWK 1.4/2024\_recommendation\_1** The infrastructure manager Warszawska Kolej Dojazdowa Sp. z o.o. and the County Governor's Office in Pruszków shall implement the recommendations issued during the investigation and set forth in Section V.2 of this Report.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEE: County road manager - the County Governor's Office in Pruszków

STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION - implemented

Implemented as far as the county road manager, the County Governor's Office in Pruszków, is concerned.

**PKBWK 02/2024\_recommendation\_2** The manager of the county road, i.e. the County Governor's Office in Pruszków, shall ensure supervision and control mechanisms for the appropriate visibility of the level crossing from the road, and of the road signs informing about the level crossing, including actions to ensure regular removal of vegetation that obstructs the visibility of the road signs.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEE: County road manager - the County Governor's Office in Pruszków

STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION - implemented

Implemented as far as the county road manager, the County Governor's Office in Pruszków, is concerned.

**Recommendations No. 1 and 7 from the Annual Report for 2023 on the activities of the State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation**

**Annual Report 2023\_recommendation\_1** The Minister of Infrastructure shall amend the national regulations (*§21 of the Regulation on general conditions for rail traffic operation and signalling*) restoring two-person traction staffing for trains travelling at speeds above 130 km/h where the railway line or rail vehicle is not equipped with ETCS devices.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEE: Minister of Infrastructure

**Annual Report 2023\_recommendation\_7** The Minister of Infrastructure shall lay down, in the Regulation on the technical conditions to be met by crossings of railway lines and sidings with roads, and on their positioning, the guidelines concerning the construction of multi-level crossings replacing level crossings and the maximum traffic ratio threshold for Category B level crossings that necessitates the construction of a multi-level crossing.

RECOMMENDATION ADDRESSEE: Minister of Infrastructure

The State Commission on Railway Accident Investigation forwarded the "Annual Report 2023" to the Minister of Infrastructure in letter no. PKBWK.592.12.2024 of 7 October 2024 together with information on Recommendations no. 1 and 7.

### ANNEX "C"

#### Breakdown of occurrences in 2024 compared to 2023, by category

Occurrence category (letter designation)	Description of occurrence category Classification of the immediate cause	Category (numerical designation)	Total 2023	Total 2024
A	Collision of a rail vehicle with a road vehicle (other road/agricultural machinery) at a level crossing equipped with an automatic crossing system with traffic lights and barriers (Cat. B)	19	-	2
	Collision of a rail vehicle with a road vehicle (other road/agricultural machinery) at a level crossing without a crossing system (Cat. D)	21	-	1
	Rail vehicle running into persons crossing the tracks outside level crossings or pedestrian passages at stations and on routes	34	122*)	-
<b>SERIOUS ACCIDENTS TOTAL</b>			<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>
B	Causes other than those listed below or a combination of several equivalent causes at the same time	00	19	19
	Dispatching a rail vehicle on an occupied, closed or opposite track or in the wrong direction	01	1	0
	Accepting a rail vehicle into a station on a closed or occupied track	02	0	1
	Dispatching, accepting or driving of a rail vehicle on an incorrectly set/unsecured route, or improper operation of signalling equipment	03	41	39
	Failure of a rail vehicle to stop before a "Stop" signal or where it was supposed to stop, or starting a rail vehicle without the required authorisation	04	36	39
	Failure to exercise caution after a railway vehicle has passed an automatic block signal displaying the aspect "Stop" or a doubtful aspect after having stopped beforehand	05	0	0
	Exceeding the maximum speed limit	06	1	1
	Carrying out a manoeuvre that poses a risk to the safety of train traffic	07	5	0
	Runaway rail vehicle	08	12	19
	Damage to or poor maintenance of the surface, bridge or overpass, overhead contact line, including also improper execution of works, e.g. improper unloading of materials, leaving materials and equipment (including road machinery) on the track or within the clearance of a rail vehicle	09	50	32
	Damage to or poor technical condition of a powered rail vehicle, special-purpose rail vehicle (including running into a structural element of a powered rail vehicle/special-purpose rail vehicle), and damage to or malfunction of the on-board rail vehicle control devices (ERTMS)	10	6	6
	Damage or poor condition of a wagon (including running into a structural part of the wagon)	11	15	10
	Damage to or malfunction of signalling equipment	12	3	2
	Rail vehicle running into a rail vehicle or other obstacle (e.g. a brake skid, a luggage trolley, a postal trolley)	13	34	51
	Criminal attack	14	0	0
	Premature route release or unlocking and switching the point under a rail vehicle	15	12	12
	Improper formation of a train or shunting consist	16	4	3
	Improper loading, unloading, irregularities in securing the cargo or other irregularities in cargo operations, or improper formation of a train or shunting consist	17	24	12
	Collision of a rail vehicle with a road vehicle (other road/agricultural machinery) at a level crossing with barriers (Cat. A according to the level crossing classification)	18	5	2
	Collision of a rail vehicle with a road vehicle (other road/agricultural machinery) at a level crossing equipped with an automatic crossing system with traffic lights and barriers (Cat. B)	19	11	6
	Collision of a rail vehicle with a road vehicle (other road/agricultural machinery) at a level crossing equipped with an automatic crossing system with traffic lights without barriers (Cat. C)	20	30	32
	Collision of a rail vehicle with a road vehicle (other road/agricultural machinery) at a level crossing without a crossing system (Cat. D)	21	131	116
	Collision of a rail vehicle with a road vehicle (other road/agricultural machinery) at a private-use level crossing (Cat. F)	22	2	3
	Collision of a rail vehicle with a road vehicle (other road/agricultural machinery) outside level crossings at stations and routes or on a siding access track	23	13	7
	Fire in a train, shunting consist or rail vehicle	24	3	5
	Fire in a building, etc. within a railway area; forest fire within the boundaries set by the end of the fire lane; fire of crops, grass and trackways arising within a railway area	26	0	0
	Explosion in a train, shunting consist or rail vehicle	27	0	0
	Natural disasters (e.g. flood, snowdrifts, ice jams, hurricanes, landslides)	28	0	0
	Construction disasters in the immediate vicinity of railway tracks on which normal train traffic is taking place	29	0	0
	Malicious, hooligan or reckless offences (e.g. throwing stones at a train, stealing cargo from a train or shunting consist in motion, placing an obstruction on the track, vandalising power, communication or rail traffic control equipment or track surface, and interfering with such equipment)	30	5	6
	Rail vehicle running into persons crossing the tracks at a level crossing or a guarded pedestrian passage	31	6	2
	Rail vehicle running into persons crossing the tracks at a level crossing with an automatic crossing system (Cat. B, C)	32	6	9
	Rail vehicle running into persons crossing the tracks at other level crossings and pedestrian passages	33	13	14
	Rail vehicle running into persons crossing the tracks outside level crossings or pedestrian passages at stations and on routes	34	166 <sup>22*)</sup>	175
	Occurrences to persons involving a rail vehicle in motion (jumping in/falling out of a train/rail vehicle, strong approach or sudden braking of a railway vehicle)	35	18	10
	Disregard by the driver of a road vehicle of signals prohibiting entry onto a level crossing, leading to damage to the barriers or road signals	36	0	0
	Break-up of a train or shunting consist resulting in a wagon runaway	37	0	0
	Improper activation of structures and equipment designed to operate railway traffic caused by theft	38	0	0
	Entry of a rail vehicle powered from an overhead contact line on an unoccupied non-electrified track	39	2	0
	Uncontrolled release of dangerous goods from a wagon or packaging that requires an intervention by the authorities or application of measures to eliminate a fire, chemical or biological hazard at a station or on a route	40	0	0
Undefined category	-	2	1	
<b>ACCIDENTS</b>			<b>676</b>	<b>634</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>676</b>	<b>634</b>
C	Dispatching a rail vehicle on an occupied, closed or opposite track or in the wrong direction	41	0	4
	Accepting a rail vehicle into a station on a closed or occupied track	42	2	6
	Dispatching, accepting or driving of a rail vehicle on an incorrectly set/unsecured route, or improper operation or absence of operation of signalling equipment	43	76	71

Failure of a rail vehicle to stop before a "Stop" signal or where it was supposed to stop, or starting a rail vehicle without the required authorisation	44	129	157
Exceeding the maximum speed limit	45	11	8
Carrying out a manoeuvre that poses a risk to the safety of train traffic	46	1	1
Runaway rail vehicle	47	5	8
Premature route release or unlocking and switching the point under a rail vehicle	48	2	5
Improper train formation	49	0	0
Improper loading, unloading, irregularities in securing the cargo or other irregularities in cargo operations	50	24	25
Damage to the surface, bridge or overpass, overhead contact line, including also improper execution of works, e.g. improper unloading of materials, leaving materials and equipment (including road machinery) on the track or within the clearance of a rail vehicle	51	58	92
Incorrect activation of signalling equipment causing: - failure to secure a line block section occupied by a rail vehicle with the "Stop" signal, - displaying the permissive aspect on a signal with an incorrectly set route, incorrectly operating track or turnout occupancy control equipment, incorrectly operating station or line block system, - failure to warn and protect road users against a train approaching a level crossing or pedestrian passage equipped with a crossing system	52	3	7
Damage to or poor technical condition of a powered rail vehicle, special-purpose rail vehicle leading to the necessity to put it out of service as a result of indications shown by rolling stock malfunction detection equipment, confirmed in workshop conditions (hot axle boxes, hot brake resulting in a displaced rim), as well as other defects on rail vehicles in motion observed by the operating staff (e.g. broken spring)	53	31	45
Damage to or poor technical condition of a wagon leading to the necessity to put it out of service as a result of indications shown by rolling stock malfunction detection equipment, confirmed in workshop conditions (hot axle boxes, hot brake resulting in a displaced rim), as well as other defects on rail vehicles in motion observed by the operating staff	54	177	173
Fire in a train or rail vehicle with no adverse consequences for property or the environment, without casualties	55	27	29
Fire of a building or vegetation in the immediate vicinity of a railway track on which normal rail traffic is taking place	57	2	4
Uncontrolled release of dangerous goods from a wagon or packaging that requires an intervention by the authorities or application of measures to eliminate a fire, chemical or biological hazard at a station or on a route	59	4	3
A rail vehicle running over an obstacle (e.g. a brake skid, aluggage trolley, a postal cart, etc.) without derailment or casualties	60	60	102
Criminal attack	61	0	0
Natural disasters (e.g. flood, snowdrifts, ice jams, hurricanes, landslides)	62	13	20
Construction disasters in the immediate vicinity of railway tracks on which normal train traffic is taking place	63	0	0
Malicious, hooligan or reckless offences (e.g. throwing stones at a train, stealing cargo from a train or shunting consist in motion, placing an obstruction on the track, vandalising power, communication or rail traffic control equipment or track surface, and interfering with such equipment), with no casualties or adverse consequences for property or the environment, posing a risk to passengers or train staff	64	721	743
Occurrences to persons involving a rail vehicle in motion (crossing the tracks at or outside level crossings and pedestrian passages, jumping in/falling out of a train/rail vehicle, being hit by rolling stock in motion, strong approach or sudden braking of a rail vehicle), without casualties or negative consequences for property or the environment	65	81	63
Failure of a road vehicle to stop ahead of a closed barrier (half-barrier), leading to damage to the barrier or road signals that displayed signals warning of an oncoming train, without a collision with a rail vehicle	66	82	53
Improper functioning of structures and equipment designed to operate railway traffic caused by theft	67	0	1
Break-up of a train or shunting consist not resulting in a wagon runaway	68	215	186
Causes other than those listed above or a combination of several equivalent causes at the same time	69	28	50
<b>INCIDENTS TOTAL</b>		<b>1752</b>	<b>1856</b>
<b>OCCURRENCES TOTAL</b>		<b>2429</b>	<b>2493</b>

22\*) one occurrence was categorised as a serious railway accident during the investigation of the occurrence in 2024 (a change in the statistics for the year 2023 from "accident - Cat. B34" to "serious accident - Cat. A34")