Polish Foreign Policy Strategy

2017-2021
Our World Today – Poland’s International Environment

In this second decade of the 21st century, the world has become less stable and less predictable. The international order – established in the wake of the Cold War, when the West defeated Communist totalitarianism and the countries of Central Europe rejoined the free world – has in recent years been steadily eroding. At the heart of this process lies a deep and multi-faceted crisis of the Western world.

There are various reasons for this, but two major ones stand out: the failure to adequately respond to Russia’s revisionist policy, dating back at least to 2007-2008, and the economic crisis – first the banking crash and then the Eurozone crisis – which dragged almost every European economy into recession, and which has still not been overcome. The failure to respond to Russia’s aggressive drive for domination over ex-Soviet territories revealed the West’s weakness. This ultimately led to war in Ukraine and undermined Europe’s security architecture. The economic crisis, meanwhile, exposed the flaws of European economic governance and created a breeding ground for movements that contest the very foundations of European integration.

Economic woes in Europe and the United States are accompanied by growing threats and unpredictability in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. Today, terrorism and uncontrolled migration flows – an aftermath of political and economic destabilisation in North Africa and the Middle East – constitute a genuine challenge to transatlantic security. This challenge is aggravated by Russia’s deliberate policy aimed at destabilising both the eastern and southern neighbourhoods of the European Union. Traditional distinctions between internal and external security dimensions have begun to blur.

Such circumstances are favourable to those who question the international order based on the United Nations (UN) system, the European Union (EU), the transatlantic bond between the United States and European countries, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This order has been challenged by states seeking to use power politics to their own advantage and by political movements hostile both to the international system as such, and to Western civilisation.

In Europe, Russia serves as a case in point. It is a revisionist power willing to resort to military means to achieve its goals. Russia disregards the most fundamental tenets of international law, such as territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, and renunciation of the use of force. At the same time, Europe is threatened by religious radicalism, especially Islamic fundamentalism, bent on destroying the European civilisation through terror.

All of this takes its toll on the European Union and NATO. Membership of these two major international institutions helps Poland develop its two overarching goals: to ensure security of the state and its citizens, and to create conditions for overall growth. Any long-term deterioration in the international status of both the EU and NATO would harm Poland’s vital interests. All efforts must today be undertaken to strengthen these bodies and to ensure their internal consolidation.
In 2014-16, NATO managed to reverse several negative trends, especially as regards defence spending, exercise locations, and contingency planning. However, much remains to be done. The European Union is facing major challenges. It is grappling with a severe economic and migration crisis. It remains divided on the future of the European project. And it is unable to promptly deliver an effective response to these trials. The EU’s protracted inefficiency and often inconsistent approach to fixing its economic ills and facing the challenges stemming from its immediate neighbourhood may lead to rising popular discontent in ever more Member States. This is mainly due to the establishment of a decision-making mechanism based on simple demographic weight, which has shaken the balance of power between large and small states. The second mistake was to try and resolve the Union’s troubles by strengthening EU bodies at the expense of Member States’ prerogatives and democratic procedures. This process has contributed to the growth of movements that question the achievements, as well as the very essence, of European integration.

Until recently, many believed that the European project would permanently evolve toward ever closer Union. This no longer holds true today. The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU closes a chapter in the project’s history. It is near certain that future discussions on the European project will become increasingly polarized – oscillating between the federalist vision of a European superstate and a protectionist Euroscepticism that questions the EU as such. If prolonged, this dispute will continue to weaken the Union and thus play to the advantage of its rivals and foreign enemies.

A weak EU also works to the detriment of its neighbours. Eastern European countries already face economic and social stagnation, having exhausted the post-Soviet development model based on the exploitation of raw materials as well as material assets dating back to the Soviet era. Furthermore, they are under constant pressure from Russia – a country that undermines their stability and strives consistently to limit their sovereign right to walk their own path. In response to the Eastern Partnership and pro-European reforms undertaken in some countries, Russia has chosen to pursue its own integration project – the Eurasian Union – often resorting to military and economic blackmail. Russia sees war as a means to achieving political ends in Eastern Europe, as exemplified by its aggression against Georgia and Ukraine – not least the annexation of Crimea.

By imposing sanctions on Russia, the European Union demonstrated its willingness to stand up for the values that underpin the post-Cold War international order. Moreover, it has succeeded in maintaining this unity over time. It nevertheless appears that, in the current context, it will be more difficult to pursue ambitious EU enlargement and/or association projects.

The European Union’s weakening also impacts the situation in the Mediterranean, where social tensions led to the collapse of the regional political order. The so-called Islamic State poses both an external and internal challenge to the EU: by destabilizing the European neighbourhood, but also by undermining Europe’s political and social order by embracing terrorist attacks. This has been accompanied by a vast wave of immigration that has caused deep divisions among EU Member States, shaking the very foundations of the European project.

As the West’s international standing falters, the non-Western world is developing dynamically and profound civilisational changes are taking place: the digital revolution, rapid urbanisation, demographic changes, migrations. The European Union and the United States still enjoy the status of
global economic and political powers, but the landscape is evolving rapidly. Increased interdependence between global regions and the pace and scale of civilizational changes provide fertile ground for ever stronger economic competition between states and great power rivalry. Events in faraway regions – Asia, Africa, and Latin America – are already having a strong ripple effect on Europe, including Poland. This trend will accelerate over time and will bring both positive and negative repercussions. On the one hand, it will help forge global trade deals and closer economic ties; on the other hand, it may well lead to armed conflict and heightened political tension.

The locus of the global economy is shifting towards Asia and the Pacific. Currently the region generates approximately 40% of global GDP; together with the United States, it amounts to over half of the world’s GDP. Asia will increasingly serve as an engine for global growth. Much of this dynamic will stem from infrastructure investment and middle-class consumption in large urban centres. In the strictly political realm, certain Asian countries will increasingly aspire to exert influence on the world order.

NATO and the United States – a key member of the Alliance – serve as the main pillars of military security and stability in Europe, and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. However, Europe is not and will never be the only area of US military and political engagement overseas. Washington’s involvement in resolving crises in other regions will continue to bear indirectly on Poland’s security.

Countering negative international trends will require redoubled diplomatic efforts, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

**What Strategy for Poland?**

Dynamic changes in the international environment and profound civilizational changes require a deep strategic reflection on Poland’s place and role in the contemporary world. This, in turn, should translate into an ambitious yet realistic vision of Poland’s foreign policy goals, tasks, and instruments.

The fundamental tenet of this vision is that international relations are the domain of sovereign states, and that states retain this sovereignty even while they engage in various forms of cooperation. It is clear, however, that no country – no matter how powerful – can effectively pursue its policies by itself. States must act jointly, especially if they share strong common interests and values, as enshrined in the Atlantic Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. This philosophy rejects any attempts to revise the post-Cold War order, create spheres of influence, and regard war as an extension of diplomacy.

Given these assumptions, the multiannual foreign policy concept must address five principal questions:

- How to ensure Poland’s security in light of the growing uncertainty and unpredictability of its international environment?
- How to preserve an international setting conducive to vibrant social and economic growth?
- How to consolidate and restore the European Union’s high global standing?
- How to ensure the stability of Poland’s immediate neighbourhood?
• How to capitalise on major civilisational changes – globalisation, urbanisation, profound demographic changes across the world – so as to unlock economic growth and lead to civilisational progress?

To meet these goals, Poland must take multiple actions, individually and in cooperation with allies and partners, while factoring in the many dimensions of international relations. Accordingly, Poland’s foreign policy goals for 2017-2021 will focus on three interlinked priorities:

• Security – developing Poland’s own defence capabilities; strengthening Poland’s position in NATO and the EU; pursuing an active regional policy;
• Growth – international endeavours to promote economic growth and social development;
• High standing – shaping a positive image of Poland and bolstering its credibility in Europe and globally.

When Poles think about their future, they draw inspiration from their heritage – their attachment to freedom, the peaceful co-existence of nations, respect for human rights and human dignity. They derive their historical and civilisational aspirations from the traditions and Christian roots of the Western world, as well as from Poland’s legacy of patriotism and its struggle for independence. Poland’s efforts to preserve peace on the European continent and to ensure ever greater international stability and predictability will necessarily be accompanied by its memory of the past and reading of contemporary challenges.

Poland’s fate is inextricably linked with that of other Central and Eastern European nations. The 20th century was a turbulent time when Poland fought for and regained independence between 1918 and 1921, only to lose it again in 1939-1945, and to once again reclaim it in 1989-1991. Standing in solidarity with both closer and more distant neighbours is thus a moral imperative, which also serves the best interests of the Republic of Poland.
I. Security

Poland’s security environment has deteriorated considerably as a result of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the Russian-provoked conflict in eastern Ukraine. Not since World War II has the European political landscape seen such a level of open hostilities, aggression against sovereign neighbours, and violation of territorial integrity. The entire European security architecture based on OSCE principles has been called into question. What should raise concerns is the fact that it was not the first time that the Russian Federation departed from the principles of peaceful co-existence. The armed conflict in Ukraine was preceded by the war with Georgia and the international community’s blind eye to Russia’s support for the secession of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria.

Russia’s self-proclaimed readiness to treat military force as an instrument of foreign and security policy, evidenced by its actual conduct, means that Russia’s programme to modernise its armed forces and expand its military infrastructure merits a closer look. This especially concerns the announcement to deploy missile systems – capable of delivering tactical nuclear weapons – in the proximity of Poland’s borders. The scale of hybrid warfare put to use in Ukraine is also alarming.

The impasse in Russia’s relations with the West and the fact that Russia has broken off a number of international agreements on European security architecture, in place since the 1970s, have led to the steady degradation of the major arms control treaties and agreements on confidence-building measures. This development increases the likelihood of military incidents with far-reaching and negative consequences for Europe as a whole.

But there are also hotspots beyond Eastern Europe which pose a challenge both to European and Polish security. The Middle East and North Africa are witnessing a domino effect of wars, revolutions, and armed interventions – stirred by internal instability, the collapse of the international order, and a chain reaction of negative social, economic and political events. Regional movements that use terror to achieve political goals have been gaining strength at an unprecedented pace. In Europe’s southern neighbourhood, many countries have found themselves helpless in confronting such movements; others have managed to gain the upper hand, albeit at the expense of civil rights. Russia’s intervention in Syria has only aggravated the situation. This intervention can be interpreted as a proxy war with the West on the one hand; on the other, as a manifestation of Russia’s willingness to force the international community to accept its policy of faits accomplis conducted from a position of strength.

Political problems in the Middle East and Africa – brought about by economic stagnation, demographic shifts, and climate change – will doubtless gain strength over time. As such, they will increasingly sap the strength of European states and confront the continent with tough challenges. Poland is not immune to such developments: its citizens have fallen victim to multiple acts of terror and our country, in keeping with the spirit of allied solidarity, participates in NATO and EU operations in the Mediterranean. But we must bear in mind that the diverse challenges originating from the South and from the East each require a tailored response.

Strategic planning must strike the necessary balance between defending the Alliance’s eastern and southern flanks. Both within NATO and bilaterally, Poland will seek to reinforce its defence partnership with the United States, particularly with respect to US military presence in Poland and,
more broadly, across the entire eastern flank. American military involvement in Europe is key to maintaining NATO’s collective defence and deterrence capabilities. Poland’s comprehensive security outlook is also based on fostering closer NATO-EU cooperation, developing the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and preserving the credibility of the existing European security foundations (OSCE). These efforts should also aim at boosting resilience in the European neighbourhood against contemporary threats, especially internal destabilisation. This will be done through security cooperation with partnership countries – for example in countering hybrid threats, including cyber threats – and by helping them strengthen their democratic institutions and rule of law. International development cooperation, and Poland’s engagement in this area, should also serve to reverse these tendencies.

Poland’s security requires simultaneous measures in three complementary dimensions:

- **Allied:** enhancing NATO credibility, boosting the EU’s potential, and maintaining close ties with the United States;
- **Regional:** closer cooperation with countries in the region, especially Romania, the Visegrad Group, and the Baltic and Nordic states; a pro-active Eastern policy;
- **Domestic:** significantly bolstering Poland’s own defence capabilities.

**Alliances**

As of today, self-reliance in the realm of defence is the privilege of only a few powers – and even they face limitations in this regard. The North Atlantic Alliance continues to serve as the bedrock of Polish and European security. Poland’s strategic goal is to ensure that NATO maintains its central role as the guarantor of security in Europe. NATO’s effectiveness as a defence alliance of democratic states rests on its deterrence and collective defence capabilities.

Decisions taken by NATO in Newport (2014) and Warsaw (2016) halted the gradual deterioration of the security environment in Central and Eastern Europe. The Wales summit ushered in NATO’s adaptation to new challenges, while the Warsaw summit adopted decisions to deploy allied forces in Poland and the Baltic States. These decisions are vital to Poland’s security. Their implementation – particularly the presence of the first allied troops in Poland and the Baltic States – has sent a clear signal that further attempts at undermining the European order will not be tolerated. By the end of 2016, Poland was far more secure than even a year or two before.

The two NATO summits set the right direction for the evolution of the Alliance, especially with respect to the Alliance’s eastern flank. By reinforcing the eastern border, the Alliance regained its ability to deliver its primary function: collective defence. However, NATO faces multiple other challenges that require the improvement of its defence capabilities in all crucial areas of its involvement.

To make up for the deficit of allied presence at the eastern flank and to meet the challenges at hand, it is essential that the Warsaw summit decisions be fully implemented. The presence of NATO troops and facilities in Poland, the Baltic States, Romania, and Bulgaria precludes “grey zones” in Central European security. In this spirit, Poland will collaborate with Scandinavian countries and undertake
actions in the Black Sea region in order to strengthen the northern and southern dimensions of the eastern flank.

For decades, robust transatlantic relations and the US military presence in Europe have been the cornerstone of peace and stability on the European continent. Today’s challenges reaffirm the relevance and value of the transatlantic partnership. It is in Poland’s interest to continue developing bilateral relations with the United States in the framework of the Alliance. These will be furthered by the implementation of joint defence projects, including the commenced missile defence shield programme. NATO’s unity and credibility will be further enhanced when member countries fulfil their pledge to spend 2% of GDP on defence, with one-fifth of that sum allocated to armed forces modernisation. Political readiness to take part in Alliance operations on both flanks – eastern and southern – will be equally important. Ever since it entered NATO, Poland has actively participated in most operations, in the spirit of allied solidarity and mindful of the need to ensure NATO credibility. Despite the British decision to leave the EU, Poland will actively promote close security and defence ties between the European Union and the United Kingdom.

The complexity of today’s many threats forces us to shed the rigid distinctions between “hard” and “soft” security measures. The effectiveness of preventive measures and crisis management rests on the skilful application of a vast array of tools – both civilian and military. Hence the pertinence of ongoing efforts to step up EU-NATO cooperation, as well as of the EU’s own security ambitions, as outlined in the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS).

It is in the Polish interest for the European Union to develop Common Security and Defence Policy capabilities enabling it to engage in autonomous operations in theatres where united NATO involvement is redundant, while maintaining complementarity with the North Atlantic Alliance. In the spirit of the Warsaw EU-NATO declaration, Poland will actively support the action plan to strengthen cooperation between the two organisations as regards hybrid threats, improved cybersecurity, and building resilience among our partners in the eastern and southern neighbourhoods. This will also be facilitated by actions to strengthen European defence capabilities – including the European defence industry – provided that they stem from a realistic assessment of continental security. Such initiatives should be balanced and transparent, and should accommodate the interests of all Member States.

**Tasks:**

- Ensure full implementation of Newport and Warsaw NATO summit conclusions.
- Continue measures to strengthen the eastern flank, while engaging in joint operations in the south, also in collaboration with Turkey.
- Foster cooperation between NATO and the EU in the spirit of the Warsaw Summit Communique.
- Promote a robust transatlantic relationship and a strong US presence in Europe. Observe commitments on defence spending and armed forces modernisation.
- Take part in out-of-area missions carried out by NATO.
Poland’s Neighbourhood

Poland lies at a key junction in Europe, at the intersection of two geopolitical tectonic plates: Western Europe, institutionally embodied in NATO and the European Union, and Eastern Europe, largely dominated by Russia. The country also functions as a keystone on the North-South axis – between the wider Baltic Sea region and Central Europe, and beyond: the Balkan states and the Adriatic and Black Sea areas. Its geographical location poses many challenges, but also offers unique opportunities to strengthen Poland’s international position.

Eastern Europe will continue to pose some of the greatest challenges to Poland’s foreign policy in the years to come. The region has witnessed a steady downward trend in stability and predictability, both foreign and domestic. International conflicts have grown in number in the region, as have the so-called colour revolutions (triggered by a growing popular discontent with corrupt and authoritarian regimes incapable of undertaking reform or providing a credible vision of development). Russia plays a detrimental role in this regard, as it seeks to turn the CIS into a buffer zone. However, it is unable to offer its neighbours any political and/or economic goods. Russia seeks to make up for this deficiency by spreading disinformation, applying more or less overt political and economic pressure, engaging in corruption, stoking ethnic conflicts, and reviving historical disputes between the nations it once ruled. When these instruments fail, Russia resorts to military force, as in the case of the wars in Georgia and Ukraine. Moreover, Eastern European stability has been negatively affected by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Russian support for separatist movements in Donbas, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria. These trends are likely to continue in the near future and expose Poland’s immediate neighbourhood to the risk of political and social turmoil – triggered also by aggression below the threshold of open warfare.

From the Polish perspective, long-term stability in the ex-Soviet Union can only be assured if countries in the region carry out thorough reforms and implement modernization measures that emulate the European development model. This is one of the reasons why Poland strongly supports pro-European and transatlantic reforms in Eastern European countries.

The principle of sovereignty under international law implies each country’s inalienable right to choose its own development path, organisational affiliation, and alliances. Ever since the Washington Treaty, NATO has pursued an open door policy which offers membership prospects to countries that meet its rigorous criteria. NATO enlargement decisions are not intended to impinge on the security interests of third countries. Moreover, a membership perspective provides an incentive to undertake requisite reforms and enforce democratic standards.

It is imperative for Poland that ambitious cooperation instruments be developed within the framework of an updated Eastern Partnership. Over the long term, it is important that partnership countries – especially Ukraine and Belarus, but also other East European countries – receive support in building resilience to internal and external challenges.

Against this backdrop of Eastern policy, Poland and Europe must tackle a separate, complex issue: their relationship with Russia. In response to the aggression against Ukraine, the Western community took the decision to impose economic sanctions against Russian entities. This decision was deeply
justified on political and ethical grounds, and strongly founded in international law. It is equally justified for NATO to adapt its military capabilities to counter Russia’s breach of every material principle of the OSCE, both political and in the area of arms control.

Nevertheless, isolating Russia is not Poland’s policy goal. We support the idea of maintaining regular channels of dialogue with Russia. However, the normalisation of EU-Russia relations cannot be based on premises that derive their logic from the Yalta system and that concur with the existence of spheres of influence. Dialogue with Russia should serve to communicate a coherent and clear message that leaves no doubt as to the West’s priorities and its assessment of Russian actions. Difficult strategic issues must not be obscured by matters of lesser weight.

Poland’s long-term strategic goal is to prevent the dismantling of the European security architecture based on OSCE principles and the primacy of law. An important element of this policy will involve measures to avoid military incidents and to enhance confidence and transparency.

Working together with our neighbours that share the Polish view of Eastern European challenges will play a prominent role in shaping Poland’s security policy. First and foremost, Poland will cooperate in this regard with its closest NATO neighbours: the Visegrad Group countries, Romania, and the Baltic States. Poland will also seek to consolidate ties with the Scandinavian countries – especially Sweden and Finland – and NATO-aspiring Eastern European countries: Georgia and Ukraine.

In its immediate neighbourhood, Poland will support EU-NATO cooperation in the spirit of the Warsaw Summit Communiqué – in the field of crisis management, energy security, and strengthening the eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy, especially the Eastern Partnership. Poland will also seek to improve regional resilience to crisis situations by enhancing connectivity between Baltic and Central European countries, i.e. within the Baltic-Adriatic-Black Sea triangle. This policy will target infrastructure networks in the area of energy, transportation, and communication. Poland also sees vast potential in re-invigorating and enhancing security cooperation with Germany and France in the framework of the Weimar Triangle.

In the current context, apart from the eastern perspective, Poland also recognizes the security and stability imperatives of the southern neighbourhood. This focus stems primarily from Poland’s concern with the security of its allies, but also from the need to curtail instabilities arising in the Mediterranean and the Middle East – such as terrorism and mass migrations, which have come to pose a challenge to Europe. The focus on the southern neighbourhood also springs from the need to provide for the safety of Polish citizens, who in recent years have fallen victim to terrorist attacks in Western Europe and Africa.

Tasks:

- Take action to uphold the European security architecture based on OSCE principles, focusing on confidence-building measures.
- Ensure that NATO-Russia relations – based on the “3D” principle (Defence, Deterrence, Dialogue) – are a tool for NATO to clearly communicate its position and to make Russia aware of the costs of continuing its policies of aggression, and not to sideline sensitive questions and return to “business as usual”.

POLISH FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY 2017-2021 10
• Support NATO and EU open-door policies; strengthen security cooperation with Eastern European countries and build up their crisis resilience.
• Continue to collaborate with the Baltic States and Romania on reinforcing the eastern flank, especially when it comes to the Baltic Air Policing mission and Enhanced Forward Presence.
• Continue collaboration with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary in the framework of the Visegrad Battlegroup.
• Continue Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian military cooperation as part of a joint brigade.
• Reinforce infrastructural connectivity between Baltic and Central European countries, including those located between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas.
• Continue to take measures aimed at consolidating cooperation between the defence industries of the V4 countries, as well as cooperation between Poland’s arms industry and its Scandinavian counterparts.
• Facilitate cooperation between the defence industries of Poland and Ukraine.
• Deepen collaboration within the Weimar Triangle.
• Partake in efforts and initiatives – both regional and global – in support of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Military Strength

Developing national military capabilities is an indispensable component of Poland’s security policy. The armed forces offer not only the requisite capabilities to defend the country and meet allied commitments, they are also a vital tool for pursuing Polish foreign policy goals. Their operational effectiveness in carrying out tasks both at home and abroad enhances Poland’s credibility and high standing. Moreover, it facilitates the promotion of Polish interests abroad. The Strategic Defence Review, currently underway, will help to identify priority areas in the development of Poland’s armed forces and thus ensure that these forces stand ready to enact Poland’s security policy.

In parallel with developing its own military potential, Poland will continue measures to reinforce Allied military presence along NATO’s eastern borders. The measures will include political and diplomatic steps to fully implement decisions taken at the Newport and Warsaw Summits, and to continue these policies at subsequent summits, as well as initiatives aimed at providing Allied forces in the territory of the Republic of Poland with adequate logistics and infrastructure facilities.

Poland will maintain the size and structure of its military budget in line with allied commitments, as a necessary step in attaining strategic goals set out in its security policy. Poland needs a robust and modern defence industry, with strong ties to allied industries. In order to enhance its defence capabilities, Poland will work closely with like-minded countries and will seek to strengthen strategic alliances – both bilaterally and within NATO and the EU (especially the European Defence Agency). In this regard, it will be paramount that Poland actively participate in EU security initiatives stemming from the 2016 European Union Global Strategy. The sustainable growth of the European defence industry should lead to a qualitative improvement in the defence capabilities of EU countries; at the same time, it should not detract from Member States’ own defence policy competencies as set out in the Treaties.
Tasks:

- In line with allied commitments, ensure the development of national defence capabilities by maintaining spending at a minimum of 2% GDP (as per NATO methodology whereby defence spending is calculated as a percentage of GDP in the year it is incurred), and ensure that at least 20% of that budget is allocated to armed forces modernisation.
- Leverage the process of armed forces modernisation in order to transfer modern technologies to Poland.
- Support the Polish defence industry’s global presence, including its involvement in initiatives taken by NATO and the EU.
- Create proper conditions for implementing the Warsaw NATO summit decisions, especially with respect to the deployment of the US Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) and Enhanced Forward Presence in Poland; take active part in these initiatives.
- Ensure full implementation of the Polish-US agreement on the establishment of the Missile Defence base in Poland.
- Continue to develop anti-hybrid capabilities.
- With regard to NATO’s area of responsibility during peace, ensure allied troops’ critical freedom of cross-border movement.
II. Growth

Fostering Polish growth, providing prosperity to its citizens, and bolstering the country’s international economic standing are some of the key goals of Poland’s foreign policy. As such, Poland will seek international support for the implementation of the Strategy for Responsible Development until 2020 (with prospects until 2030) and the Plan for Responsible Development, complete with its five pillars: reindustrialisation, development of innovative companies, ensuring capital for development, foreign expansion, and social and regional growth.

The ambitious plan to accelerate Poland’s growth will take place at a time of profound social and economic changes in modern-day societies, including the digital revolution, urbanisation leading to a growing number of megacities, demographic shifts in Africa, and ageing societies in Europe and Asia. More and newer resources will be needed to meet the challenges of a growing – and ageing – global population.

Poland’s economic prospects will largely depend on the course taken by the European Union. Our country will be greatly affected by what happens to the Eurozone, Cohesion Policy, Common Agricultural Policy, energy and climate policy, and the plan to create a Single European Transport Area. The EU single market is highly susceptible to hidden and indirect protectionist mechanisms, in the form of welfare legislation and practices which lead to a fragmentation of the single market and reduce competition. Poland is determined to maintain unity within the EU and to avoid internal divisions over economic governance. The integrity of the EU single market is a crucial precondition for economic growth in both Poland and Europe. Poland will strive to expand the single market, especially in unfinished areas (services) and novel areas (the digital market).

Europe

Attempts to tackle the EU crisis in the second decade of the 21st century have been accompanied by a departure from Treaty principles in favour of temporary results, a disregard for the principle of subsidiarity, and vague decision-making procedures. In this context, Poland will support measures aimed at strengthening a transparent decision-making process and the democratic mandate in the functioning of EU institutions. Poland will take efforts to truly put into practice the four fundamental freedoms – the freedom of movement of people, goods, capital, and services. These freedoms have been increasingly subject to limitations that carry the risk of eroding the EU’s foundations. It is in Poland’s interest to actively participate in the debate on the future of European integration. The fact that Poland benefits from European integration will continue to serve as the bedrock of our position. Nevertheless, we do not turn a blind eye to the EU’s flaws. The most serious threat to EU stability is the prospect of transforming the Union into a project based on a bureaucratic elite who are not subject to democratic oversight. The continuing transfer of power to the EU level – via majority voting in ever more areas – threatens to deprive Member States of their sovereignty. Hence, when it comes to European integration, Poland will be guided by the following principle: the degree of integration shall be determined by the degree of support provided to it by the citizen-voter.

The concept of a multi-speed Europe – a de facto “union within a union”, with a hard core in the form of the Eurozone, its own institutions and budget – is yet another threat to EU cohesion, which
would push countries that have not adopted the common currency away from the mainstream of European integration.

The debate on the future of the EU will coincide with the Brexit negotiations. The sovereign decision taken by UK citizens must be fully respected, along with its consequences. However, the final outcome of Brexit should not encourage other Member States to view “EU-exit” as a new and better way of structuring their relationship with the Union. From the Polish perspective, the final EU-UK settlement must provide proper guarantees to Poles working, studying and living in the United Kingdom. Just as importantly, the two markets must also remain open to the exchange of goods, services and investment. Finally, Poland will seek to ensure a beneficial agreement on the UK’s financial obligations to the EU budget.

Promoting Poland’s growth by shaping the economic policy of the European Union is one of the strategic tasks of Polish foreign policy. First and foremost, this refers to negotiations of the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027, and to Poland’s needs as regards Cohesion Policy and Common Agricultural Policy. The policy of levelling out development gaps within the EU via European Structural and Investment Funds complements and stabilises the EU single market. It leads to higher living standards and promotes structural changes. All the while, it does not connote a sacrifice on the part of richer countries in favour of poorer ones. Indeed, evaluation studies have shown that net contributors to the EU budget benefit economically – and strongly so – from Cohesion Policy projects implemented in less affluent Member States. Thus, Poland will defy any attempt to depict this policy as development aid provided by Western European countries to the countries of the poorer East. Some have argued publically for the supposed conditionality of Cohesion Policy, but such statements only serve to legitimise it as an instrument of political influence, thereby adding to existing divisions between Member States and further weakening the EU. In order to rebuild EU competitiveness and restore the four fundamental freedoms, Poland will seek to eliminate existing barriers in the digital market, the services market, the transportation market, and labour mobility. In this regard, Poland will work to effectively implement the Single Market Strategy and the Digital Single Market Strategy. Measures taken in this regard help industries adopt new technologies, boosting the global competitiveness of each and every EU economy. Poland will support new initiatives concerning the EU single market, especially in the area of services – paying due attention to their complementarity and cohesion. The legal and administrative instruments at our disposal should be used to facilitate and pursue these goals, and not to create additional burdens. It is important to revive industrial policy at the European agenda level, enabling it to meet new challenges that have emerged in recent years.

Poland will oppose the idea of “intelligent” protectionism currently promoted in a number of Western European capitals.

Sustaining a strong Common Agricultural Policy, especially in its financial dimension, is key. CAP should evolve to address new challenges facing the EU, such as the implications stemming from the planned liberalisation of trade and cooperation with third countries under EU bilateral agreements, and the effects of energy and climate policy. CAP should also continue to ensure equal competition across the EU market, further reduce discrepancies in rural development among Member States,
promote the development of all farm types (including small/medium-sized family farms), and support biodiversity.

The stability and development of the Eurozone – which includes some of Poland’s biggest trade and investment partners – is in our interest. Poland will support measures in this regard, as long as these initiatives do not infringe the rights of those EU Member States that are unwilling to join in at the moment. Moreover, taking part in such initiatives must not allow the Polish economy to lose its competitive edge.

Poland will be able to engage in talks concerning the implementation of the acquis communautaire as regards the common currency only after the Eurozone regains stability. The process of systemic reform must advance to a point that clearly determines what kind common currency zone Poland would be acceding to. It is also worth underlining that currency integration can succeed only when a country aspiring to enter the Eurozone attains a high level of social and economic convergence. Furthermore, currency integration must not lead to the transfer of fiscal and public finance competences away from the national parliaments, i.e. to the loss of citizen-voter oversight. This would undermine a key tenet of democracy and parliamentary rule, expressed in the maxim “No taxation without representation.”

Poland will seek to anchor EU climate policy more firmly in the real economy. Fulfilling commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions goes hand in hand with the growing realisation that the Union has already reached the limit of safe unilateral declarations and commitments. Any future reform of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme – including pricing – must not jeopardise Poland’s energy security, which revolves around the use of national resources, primarily coal. With a view to maintaining competitiveness on global markets, European countries should retain greater freedom and flexibility in choosing their own energy mix, as provided for in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

The key long-term goal of climate policy is to achieve climate neutrality, as spelled out in the Paris Agreement. This connotes stabilising the concentrations of greenhouse gases, both by reducing their emissions and by absorbing them (by forests and other means). Poland’s negotiating objective for COP24 – chaired by Poland in 2018 – will be to establish rules to implement the UN Paris Agreement.

In implementing the White Paper on Transport, Poland will take measures aimed at establishing a Single European Transport Area based on the principles of competition and economy of resources.

Energy constitutes an important dimension of Polish activity within the EU. Poland faces a singular challenge when it comes to obtaining advantageous terms from the Clean Energy for All Europeans package – especially regarding the country’s freedom in shaping its energy mix and using coal as part of that mix. Poland should also retain the capacity to manage its own energy grid to ensure energy security. Furthermore, Poland will support the development of the Energy Union through its continued efforts to liberalise the EU market, diversify supply sources, and develop transit infrastructure. Central Europe would especially benefit from projects along the North-South axis that enable the transit of natural gas between the Baltic Sea region and the Balkans, and that provide
access to Norwegian deposits. The expansion of supraregional energy interconnectors would, for instance, lead to greater use of the LNG Terminal in Świnoujście.

It is in the EU interest for national energy systems to rely on Member States’ own resources and generation capacities. Therefore, the EU should uphold technological neutrality when it comes to Member States’ decisions on energy sector development and ensure contract transparency. These rules must also apply to non-EU suppliers wishing to operate in the single market.

Tasks:

- Communicate that the EU integration model based on the four fundamental freedoms and the principle of subsidiarity is inviolable – especially in discussions on the future of the EU.
- Ensure full implementation of the principle of free movement of services and – when it comes to the digital market – free movement of goods, digital content, and data (while protecting privacy and identifying exceptions arising from the need to ensure public security).
- Take action to uphold labour mobility in the EU.
- Seek to link EU climate policy with the need to ensure the Union’s competitiveness.
- Support measures aimed at stabilising the Eurozone, maintaining EU unity and cohesion, and ensuring citizen-voters’ democratic oversight over taxation and public finance in their respective countries.
- Seek to strengthen Central European countries’ say in the European Union.
- When negotiating legislative proposals relating to the European Commission’s Clean Energy for All Europeans package, ensure that EU Member States retain the freedom to shape their own energy mix, energy and climate policy, and investment decisions – while upholding the principle of subsidiary and technological neutrality.

Economy

More than twenty-five years since the outset of Poland’s political transformation, the country’s economy remains strong. Poland has been systematically reducing growth gaps between itself and more affluent European economies, which traditionally serve as a reference point for Poland’s aspirations in terms of socio-economic development. Poland’s GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity has been growing continuously since almost the very start of the transformation. In 2015, it amounted to nearly 70 percent of the EU average. In recent years, this indicator has been growing steadily, by 1-2 percentage points per year. At the root of Poland’s dynamic development lies its sustainable growth model and strong domestic fundamentals.

Today, Poland seeks to permanently shed the status of an ‘emerging’ or ‘developing’ market. Once Poland becomes a ‘developed’ economy, it will be more attractive to foreign investors and lower its costs of raising capital on international markets. This will help it gain a better chance of partaking in the work of the G20. Poland will attain this goal by steering away from a competitiveness model based on low labour costs and, instead, rely increasingly on high quality and innovation, also by
tapping into processes that are underway in the EU. This will in turn boost Poland’s position in the global value chain.

Poland will make active use of its economic diplomacy to help achieve these ambitious goals. It has recently taken steps to build a new model of economic promotion abroad. This model will create mechanisms to systematically identify and promote winners, facilitate inbound transfers of state-of-the-art technologies, and attract investment to Poland. The Polish Development Fund is set to play an important part in this process as it integrates scattered resources and provides comprehensive support to entrepreneurs.

Poland will take every effort to create an effective scientific diplomacy and to foster international ties through scientific research. This will strengthen Poland’s image as a country with a high quality science sector.

A great many Poles – mostly the young, educated, and entrepreneurial – have left the country over the course of these past twenty-five years of transition, leading to enormous ‘brain drain’. Ever since the EU labour markets opened, over two million Poles have moved to other Member States. With time, their absence will increasingly weigh down on Poland’s economic prospects and the sustainability of its pension system. Poland thus seeks to put a check on the outflow of people through its family-oriented social policy, first and foremost through the 500+ Programme. Secondly, the scale of the problem calls for a rise in relative wages vis-à-vis Western Europe and for long-term means to institute this change. Last but not least, Poland will strengthen its repatriation policy, which – notwithstanding its moral dimension that seeks to redress the wrongs suffered by the descendants of Poles who, mainly East of Poland’s borders, endured much hardship to preserve their national identity – also plays an important demographic role.

Both the return of recent Polish migrants from other EU Member States and the repatriation of Poles from former Soviet territories will require the adaptation of the consular service and the coordination of consular efforts with the domestic welfare services tasked with facilitating integration.

Tasks:

- Support the Polish Development Fund in creating a modern mechanism of economic promotion abroad that effectively facilitates the internationalisation of Polish business (by supporting Polish companies and attracting investment and technology) and implements the Strategy for Responsible Development until 2020 (with prospects until 2030) and the Plan for Responsible Development.
- Facilitate Poland’s transition from an ‘emerging’ economy to a ‘developed’ economy; in parallel, the Polish competitiveness model should shift from low labour costs to more hi-tech products.
- Promote instruments supporting the development of modern technologies and innovation by Polish entities, including the Horizon 2020 programme.
- Seek to incorporate scientific cooperation into international dialogue, especially in fields important for the development of a knowledge-based society and economy.
• Bid for Poland’s membership in the G20.
• Take action to facilitate re-emigration and repatriation in response to a possible demographic crisis.

Economic Expansion

Poland’s economy is closely intertwined with the global marketplace. In 2015, its exports amounted to 49.6% of GDP – significantly more than in the major global economies. Deteriorating global trade would thus likely have a dampening effect on Poland’s economy.

The Polish economy is part of the European economy. Therein lies its greatest source of foreign investment, its biggest trade partner – accounting for over 70 percent of Poland’s foreign trade – and its main market for outbound investment. Despite its advantages, this situation connotes an overdependence on one market – currently stagnating – and often limits Poland to the role of a subcontractor taking in lower profits.

To take full advantage of the opportunities offered by globalisation and trade liberalisation, Poland should widen its circle of economic partners and its export structure, which should be dominated by highly processed, high value-added goods, and should tap into its indigenous resource base, especially hard coal.

Without relinquishing its strong position in the European Union and Eastern Europe, Poland should strengthen its economic bonds with countries in more distant regions – South Asia, North America, South America, Africa, the Middle East, as well as selected developing countries. Making use of political support and trade promotion, Polish products and services should hit new markets where they can gain an edge thanks to their quality and competitive pricing, and make use of the abundance of Poland’s natural resources. Poland will continue to implement the Go Africa and Go China programmes, complementing them with similar initiatives addressed to the ASEAN countries, Iran, and India. Poland will develop new programmes aimed at the hi-tech, upstream and downstream industries, and will seek to gain access to new sources of raw materials abroad, including seabed resources (for instance, by strengthening relations with the UN International Seabed Authority). The changing geography of Poland’s global business presence will require adjustments – on the one hand, in the network of Polish diplomatic and consular posts, and, on the other hand, in future trade mission destinations.

The steady liberalisation of global trade has so far produced measurable, positive results for the Polish economy. Hence Poland’s support for EU negotiations of various free trade agreements. Poland will actively pursue its interests in this regard via international organisations, especially the WTO, OECD, World Bank, and UN agencies.

Poland will seek to satisfy its capital needs by mobilising more domestic resources, but will also welcome foreign capital and foreign direct investment. It will attach special importance to projects dealing with infrastructure, those involving the transfer of modern technologies to Poland, and those promoting domestic innovation. Poland will also encourage its businesses to take part in investment projects financed by international institutions such as the World Bank, the European Investment
Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

Economic expansion does not necessarily require involvement in projects in distant parts of the world. Regional cooperation also offers plenty of untapped potential. By virtue of its unique location at the juncture of Central Europe, the Baltic Sea, and the Carpathian region, Poland can play a key role in initiating cooperation between these regions. This refers first and foremost to the development of energy, transportation, road, rail, and inland waterways infrastructure. Gas interconnectors, Via Carpatia, and the TEN-T Baltic-Adriatic Core Network Corridor (linking Polish seaports with ports on the Adriatic Sea) could become flagship projects, acting as catalysts of cooperation between the Baltic countries, Carpathian countries, the Visegrad Group, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and Southern Europe. Poland will also undertake efforts to complement cross-border connectivity with inland waterways. Once completed, these projects will enhance the EU’s economic and social cohesion. It is worth noting that cooperation with China in the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative could, in the 2017 – 2020 perspective, facilitate these and similar projects.

Tasks:

- Take action to increase the share of highly processed goods in the structure of Polish exports.
- Seek to expand the volume of exported raw materials, especially hard coal.
- Enter into new international agreements with countries of South Asia, the Americas, the Middle East, and Australia – based on common goals as regards the use of raw materials, especially coal.
- Assist Polish businesses in expanding onto new international markets, in particular by developing cooperation with Asian, African, Middle Eastern, and Latin American countries.
- Seek favourable provisions in trade agreements negotiated by the EU.
- Continue the implementation of infrastructural initiatives that can enhance Central European cohesion, especially along the North-South axis.
- Seek cooperation opportunities with non-European partners, especially the People’s Republic of China, in the implementation of regional infrastructure projects.
- Identify and eliminate barriers to non-EU markets that are particularly cumbersome for Polish exporters.
- Support international measures – especially within the WTO – that strengthen the global trade system, in line with Polish economic interests.
- Cooperate with countries in our region, as well as with non-European countries, with a view to advancing scientific research and creating innovative products and technologies.
- Attract more foreign tourists by promoting innovative tourism products.
The fundamental premise of Polish foreign policy is political realism. We strive to find pragmatic solutions that are consistent with Poland’s raison d’état. However, high international status cannot be achieved solely on the basis of a country’s military capabilities or economic might. It also stems from “soft power”, the intangible dimension of foreign policy which is defined by its attitude towards values, as well as its predictability and consistency in adhering to them. Put together, these factors determine a country’s credibility and build its image. At times, such “soft” factors tip the scales by boosting the efficacy of other foreign policy instruments, thereby helping to achieve better results with fewer resources.

The question of which principles should serve as the bedrock for modern-day relations between states is a pivotal one for the entire international community. In their basic form, such principles were formulated in the founding documents of the United Nations Organisation, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the European Union. The challenge today is how to apply them in practice. As a member of these organisations and a signatory of all of their most important documents, Poland has taken an active part in this process.

The credibility of international actors is inextricably linked to certain values. To affect its international environment, Poland must act as a responsible player in global politics. First and foremost, it will continue to fulfil its international commitments and engage not only in regional affairs, but also in selected global issues. Poland should strive to become and be seen as provider of “international public goods” – not only a consumer, but also a provider of stability. Cooperation in the area of international development plays a special role in this regard. Initiatives undertaken by Poland to reduce poverty, eliminate development gaps, and stimulate entrepreneurship in developing countries serve to stabilise Europe’s immediate neighbourhood. They also improve Poland’s security, and that of its citizens. By playing an active development role, Poland is helping to advance global progress in the 21st century.

Along with today’s communication and digital revolutions, this means that Poland’s international brand takes on a special significance. Our image abroad should be both rooted in tradition and open to the fundamentals of modernity. Poland’s brand is thus a key aspect of its foreign policy strategy, in conjunction with security and growth.

Values

Poland’s raison d’état is inseparable from the universal values of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and the Christian values which underpin European integration. It is in Poland’s interest to project them on an international scale, since they serve as the best guarantee of global peace, stability, and development. Poland will promote these values both out of respect for their axiological status, and as a means to strengthen its security and create an environment conducive to its development. Poland will also oppose any attempts to interpret fundamental UN, OSCE, EU, and Council of Europe documents in a manner contrary to the intentions of their founders.

In the 21st century, sovereignty still constitutes the preeminent reference point for modern-day states, irrespective of the proliferation of various integration projects. The issue of Poland’s
sovereignty is inseparable from its membership in the European Union – the most advanced and most ambitious integration project in modern history. Poland’s vision of the European Union is that of a union of sovereign states – neither a superstate, nor an amalgam of national egoisms. The practical application of the principle of subsidiarity should provide new impetus to the integration project. Poland will counteract both the process of reversing integration and the splitting of the Union into groups of states that would enjoy different rights. Different categories of membership would weaken the EU’s cohesion. Flexibility is justifiable in some EU policies, but Poland will not agree to projects that will weaken the integrity of the Schengen area, the common market, and the EU as a whole. Such a differentiation would weaken the whole of Europe. After all, the Union scored its greatest successes and forged its high international standing when it acted in unity and solidarity.

Since the European Union is not only a Union of interests, but also a Union of values, Poland will operate through the EU to promote democratic freedoms and human rights. Building on the best traditions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Poland will attach special importance to protecting freedom of thought and conscience, and to fostering interreligious dialogue as a means to promoting peaceful relations between religious communities and preventing extremism, intolerance, and terrorism. By doing so, Poland will also continue to care about the fate of Christians – the most persecuted religious community in the world today. Deeper cooperation between Poland and the Holy See should play a special role in this regard.

Modern-day Poles value their national identity, founded on Polish history and culture, and are willing to cultivate it around the world in all of its forms – social, cultural, and material. Poland will support Poles living and residing abroad (including those who have recently settled in EU countries). It will also protect Polish cultural heritage and memorial sites abroad, especially in Eastern Europe. The Polish diaspora should feel that its common identity is a path to partaking in Poland’s rich heritage and historical achievements. Polish identity should be regarded as a value – from the perspective of both the Polish state and those who treat Poland as their own homeland, or the homeland of their forefathers. In particular, Poland will go to great lengths to support members of the Polish diaspora in the East, whose lives and sacrifices show a strong allegiance to their Polish identity. Poland will promote its values among the international audience through culture and heritage outreach.

Tasks:

- Promote civil liberties and human rights, in the spirit of the fundamental documents of the United Nations Organisation.
- Stress the importance of values referred to in the fundamental documents of the OSCE, the EU, and the Council of Europe.
- Steer the EU toward restoring the right balance between the principle of state sovereignty and the prerogatives of Community institutions; promote transparency and the democratic mandate in the EU decision-making process.
- Support and initiate activities relating to interreligious dialogue.
- Support initiatives relating to pro-family policy, especially in the area of legislative regulations.
- Use the promotion of the Polish identity abroad as a path to promoting values arising from Poland’s history and culture.
- Promote Poland’s identity by taking into account local circumstances, paying special attention to the needs of Poles in the East.
- Undertake measures to reconstruct and protect Polish cultural heritage – including material heritage in the East.

**Credibility and Global Obligations**

Credibility constitutes one of the preconditions of an effective foreign policy defined as the readiness to take action in line with one’s professed values and undertaken commitments. High credibility may boost a country’s international status and its ability to form coalitions. To strengthen its credibility on the international stage, Poland will need to engage politically, economically, and sometimes even militarily, in processes taking shape both in its immediate neighbourhood, and on a global scale.

Poland’s non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2018-2019 is a step toward strengthening its international credibility. Poland aims to bolster the rules-based global order in the spirit of solidarity, responsibility, and commitment. Poland is prepared to make significant contributions to conflict prevention and resolution around the world. An important element of these efforts will be our country’s return to UN peacekeeping missions. Sending Polish troops to faraway countries where Poland has no direct interests is a difficult and often unpopular decision. But Poland participates in such international operations to advance the cause of human rights and democratic freedoms, and to raise its international standing in security matters. When we stand in solidarity with those in need, we do so in Poland’s best tradition of idealism in international relations.

Credibility can also be enhanced by meeting commitments in humanitarian and development aid, and by taking part in the global partnership to advance the international community’s goals. Today, 800 million people live in extreme poverty; millions more are victims of hostilities, natural disasters, and climate change. To improve their lot, and to create conditions conducive to the growth of prosperity in the world, Poland will implement its Development Cooperation Programme for 2016-2020 and will support efforts to further the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, taking into account both domestic conditions and partner countries’ needs and priorities.

Poland will adopt a flexible development assistance mechanism to meet its partners’ needs and priorities, both immediate and long-term. Development cooperation should also serve the interests of every one of its actor. Poland will support private entrepreneurship in partner countries and Polish businesses would do well to support development projects. Poland will also encourage closer private sector engagement in development cooperation.

Poland sees the solution to the ongoing migration crisis in Europe in initiatives combining humanitarian assistance, development assistance, military operations, and effective border protection. The crisis calls for a European response that builds on individual countries’ capabilities. By pursuing the idea of flexible solidarity, Poland will participate in EU efforts aimed at tackling problems at their roots. This approach will apply to all areas: humanitarian assistance to refugees, development assistance to African and Middle Eastern countries, newly-shaped EU trade policy instruments, and support for structural reforms in countries fighting the so-called Islamic State.
Consular services also provide a number of tools that enhance Poland’s credibility. These involve primarily the protection of Polish citizens and the rights of Polish minorities abroad, especially in Germany, Lithuania, and Belarus. They also include a flexible visa policy and local border traffic – both of which reaffirm Poland’s openness to cooperation with Eastern European societies.

If it is to effectively carry out these humanitarian, development, and consular tasks, Poland must possess a robust network of diplomatic and consular posts. This is why the Polish state will seek to strengthen this network, or at least reverse the negative trend in this regard.

The efficacy of Polish foreign policy is contingent on the quality of its diplomacy and – more broadly – its government administration. But it also builds on the capabilities and contributions of local governments and NGOs, active not only in Poland’s immediate neighbourhood, but also in distant parts of the world. Poland will increasingly tap into their potential.

Tasks:

- Conduct an active UN policy to advance the implementation of the organisation’s fundamental principles, also in the framework of Poland’s non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
- Take actions aimed at Poland’s return to UN peacekeeping operations.
- Consistently fulfil the commitments arising from the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and the Polish Development Cooperation Programme for 2016 – 2020.
- Engage Polish businesses in development cooperation projects.
- Protect Polish citizens abroad, including in the area of workers’ rights and the rights of minors to use the Polish language.
- Uphold the rights of Polish minorities.
- Maintain an effective and flexible visa policy toward Eastern European countries.
- Adapt – possibly extend – the network of Polish embassies, consulates, cultural institutes, and honorary consulates, in order to meet new circumstances and protect Poland’s interests.

Brand

In the modern world, a country’s image is no longer a matter of arbitrary opinion – it has become a brand that comes with a measurable value. It can affect a country’s ability to achieve its foreign policy goals, as much as it can alter the costs of running a business. Since the Polish brand directly affects our international environment and helps determine our international economic and political standing, helping to build it is a major Polish foreign policy goal.

With over a millennium of history, a successful modernization, and an active membership in the EU and NATO, Poland has remarkable branding potential. Polish foreign policy will build on this potential by developing an ambitious yet realistic promotion plan, providing the requisite tools, and ensuring its consistent implementation.

The greatest challenge facing Polish public and cultural diplomacy is translating the key messages of Poland’s history and culture into a contemporary language that will be understood by audiences across the globe. Poland will tackle this challenge by restructuring its diplomatic network of cultural
institutes (called Polish Institutes), which will become an effective and professional resource for promoting culture by means of modern communication tools. The network will increasingly reflect the geography of Polish interests in light of the changing social, economic, and demographic trends affecting the world today.

Poland’s scientific diplomacy will be tasked with building Poland’s brand as a country of high scientific standards, a well-qualified academic staff, and modern research and teaching facilities. To do so, it will need to skillfully convey the benefits offered by Polish science and tertiary education.

The promotion of Poland as an innovative and modern country that is “open for business” should go hand in hand with historical diplomacy’s efforts to convey Poland’s contribution to European civilisation. In 2018, the 100th anniversary of Poland’s regained independence will provide the perfect opportunity to do just that. Polish historical diplomacy will speak out against the falsification of history and “defective codes of memory”, whether caused by ignorance, bias, or ill will. In response, it will offer reliable information on Poland’s contributions to the victory over Nazi Germany and Communism, and on the losses suffered by Poland at the hands of these two totalitarianisms. In the past, Poland paid a tremendous historical price due to the rival ambitions of superpowers. In an age of renascent geopolitical rivalry and attempts to recreate “a concert of superpowers”, the Polish experience holds universal significance. Refuting the false but widespread argument that Poland is at least passively responsible for the Holocaust is a key task for Polish foreign policy. In this regard, Poland’s diplomacy will continue to underscore that the *sine qua non* of the Holocaust was the partition of the Polish state by the German Third Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

A separate task will be to oppose the use of the term “new democracy” in reference to Poland. In fact, Poland has one of the longest democratic and parliamentary traditions in the world, albeit one that was forcefully interrupted by foreign powers on more than one occasion. Poles formed one of the first civic republics in the modern era, and they shared this tradition with the other nations that made up the First Polish Republic. Moreover, as soon as Poland regained independence and Poles regained the civic freedoms lost under foreign domination, Poland became one of the first countries in Europe to bestow equal political rights on both men and women.

Cooperation with Poles living abroad will also help build Poland’s global brand. This cooperation will be based on two pillars. First, it will actively engage the Polish diaspora – the Polonia – in dedicated branding projects. Second, the bond itself between the Polonia and Poland will help build a positive image of the country as one that cares about its citizens and their descendants living abroad. Poland’s branding initiatives should also account for the popularisation of the Polish language and the protection of Polish cultural heritage abroad, especially in Eastern Europe.

The organisation of important international events in Poland should help enhance the country’s brand; for instance, in 2018 Poland will once again host the most important event focusing on global actions to fight climate change – the 24th Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP24). Also, Poland is working to promote Łódź as it seeks to host EXPO 2022.

**Tasks:**
• Bolster the network of Polish Institutes.
• Protect and project Poland’s reputation as part of our political and economic promotion.
• Develop an international promotion programme that will underscore Poland’s historical accomplishments and modern-day achievements – including in the area of arts and culture – and reach out to modern audiences in different parts of the world.
• Define the principles of Poland’s scientific diplomacy that will help enhance the country’s international standing by promoting its scientific accomplishments and potential.
• Strengthen Poland’s soft power by conducting an active scholarship policy and fostering lasting relations with foreign graduates of Polish universities.
• Treat the 100th anniversary of Poland’s independence as an opportunity to promote Polish contributions to Western civilisation and to promote its historical and cultural heritage, including through the 2017-2021 “Niepodległa” (Independent Poland) Programme.
• Vehemently oppose “defective codes of memory” and the relativisation of responsibility for the Holocaust by popularising Poland’s role in defeating 20th-century totalitarianisms and by fostering the memory of Polish “Righteous Among the Nations”.
• Undertake promotion initiatives together with the Polish diaspora.
• Strive to transform teaching of the Polish language and culture into a key branding instrument.
• Take action to protect and reconstruct the Polish cultural heritage abroad, especially in Eastern Europe.
• Promote the joint accomplishments, culture and traditions of the First Polish Republic among the nations that were once part of it.
• Actively pursue the goals of the Polish presidency of the UN international climate negotiations.