

## **ANNUAL REPORT**

on the activities of the President of the National Atomic Energy Agency and assessment of nuclear safety and radiological protection in Poland in 2015 2015



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Translation: National Atomic Energy Agency



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### INTRODUCTION



*To the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland* 

#### Dear Madam,

I have the honour to convey to you the Report on the activities of the President of the National Atomic Energy Agency in 2015. From the perspective of nuclear safety and radiological protection the inhabitants of Poland were not exposed to any significant threat in the previous year, and the natural environment was appropriately protected against negative effects of ionising radiation. The radiation emergencies in 2015, both in our country and abroad, had no significant impact on the health of Poles. The President of the National Atomic Energy Agency exercises supervision not only over the research reactor MARIA, but also over thousands of other uses of radioactive materials in medicine, veterinary medicine, industry and the service sector. While inviting you to read the enclosed Report, I would like to assure you, Madam Prime Minister, that owing to regulatory activities conducted by the National Atomic Energy Agency, the risk resulting from the use of ionising radiation is maintained at the lowest reasonably achievable level.

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Andrzej Przybycin Acting President of the National Atomic Energy Agency

## PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AS A CENTRAL BODY OF GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION MATTERS



### I. PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AS A CENTRAL BODY OF GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION MATTERS

#### I. 1. LEGAL BASIS OF ACTIVITIES OF THE PAA PRESIDENT

The President of the National Atomic Energy Agency (PAA) constitutes a central body of governmental administration competent for matters of nuclear safety and radiological protection. The PAA President's activity is regulated by the Atomic Law Act of 29 November 2000 (Journal of Laws of 2014 item 1512, of 2015 item 1505 and 1893, and of 2016 item 266) and the relevant secondary legislation to the act in question.

Since 1 January 2002 the PAA President has been obliged to report to a minister competent for environmental matters. Pursuant to the provisions of the aforementioned Act, in the year 2015 the scope of activities of the PAA President included tasks which involved ensuring nuclear safety and radiological protection of Poland, and in particular:

- preparation of draft documents related to national policies involving nuclear safety and radiological protection, entailing the nuclear power engineering development programme, as well as internal and external threats;
- exercising regulatory control and supervision over activities leading to actual or potential ionising radiation exposure of people and natural environment, including inspections conducted in this scope and issuance of decisions on licenses and authorisations connected with the said activity;
- promulgation of technical and organizational rec-ommendations concerning nuclear safety and ra-diological protection;
  - 4) performing tasks related to assessment of the national radiation situation in normal conditions and in radiation emergency situations as well as furnishing the relevant informa

tion to appropriate authorities and to the general public;

- 5) performing tasks resulting from the obliga-tions imposed upon the Republic of Poland in terms of record keeping and control of nuclear materials, physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, special control measures for foreign trade in nuclear materials and technologies, and from other obligations resulting from international agreements on nuclear safety and radiological protection;
- 6) activities involving public communication, education and popularisation, as well as scientific, technical and legal information concerning nuclear safety and radiological protection, including providing the general public with the relevant information on ionising radiation and its impact on human health and the environment, and on the available measures to be implemented in the event of radiation emergency, excluding promotion of the use of ionising radiation and promotion of nuclear power engineering in particular;
- cooperation with central and local administration authorities on matters involving nuclear safety, radiological protection as well as scientific research in the field of nuclear safety and radiological protection;
- performing tasks involving national and civil defence as well as protection of classified information, as stipulated in separate regulations;
- 9) preparing opinions on nuclear safety and radiological protection with reference to plans of technical activities involving peaceful use of nuclear energy for purposes of central and local administration authorities;
- cooperation with competent foreign entities and international organisations on matters provided for in the Act;
- preparing drafts of legal acts on the matters provided for in the Atomic Law and settling them with other state authorities according to the procedures established in the Rules of Procedure of the Council of Ministers;
- 12) issuing opinions on draft legal acts developed by authorised bodies;
- 13) submitting annual reports on the activities of the Agency President and assessments of the status of national nuclear safety and radiological protection to the Prime Minister.

Since 1990, processing of claims submitted by former workers of Industrial Plant R-1 (ZPR-1) in Kowary has been the PAA President's additional duty (resulting from the fact that the PAA President used to perform the function of a founding body of the POLON Nuclear Technology Applications Plant). Until 1972, ZPR-1 had been extracting and preprocessing uranium ores. Pursuant to Ordinance no. 4 of the PAA President of 14 April 1992, the Office for Handling Claims of Former Workers of Uranium Ore Mining and Milling Facilities was established in Jelenia Góra for purposes of legal assistance and processing of claims for damages lodged by former workers of the ZPR-1 in Kowary and their families.

The claims settled in 2015 resulted in the following payments:

- compensating benefits payable on a monthly basis to 8 persons (since May 2015 – 7 persons) in the total amount of PLN 56,955.76,
- monetary equivalent for coal allowance in kind paid in accordance with provisions of the collective labour agreement to 183 persons in the total amount of PLN 172,490.

Starting from the year 2000, the Office has been fulfilling its statutory obligation to award and pay oneoff damages to former soldiers who were compulsorily employed in uranium ore mining plants while performing substitute military service. In 2015 no payments were effected in connection with such claims.




#### I. 2. NATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY – the organisation

The PAA President fulfils his duties through the National Atomic Energy Agency operating under the former's direct management. The PAA internal organisation is defined in its charter of established by the Minister of the Environment.

#### 2.1. Organizational structure of the National Atomic Energy Agency

The charter of the National Atomic Energy Agency currently in force was enacted by virtue of Ordinance of the Minister of the Environment no. 69 of 3 November 2011. PAA's detailed structure was laid down in Ordinance no. 4 of the PAA President of 4 November 2011 on the Organisational Rules of the National Atomic Energy Agency (Official Journal of PAA no. 2, item 6, as amended). The Agency's organisational structure has been depicted in Figure 1.





#### 2.2. Employment at the National Atomic Energy Agency

PAA's mean annual headcount in 2015 came to 123 persons (119.68 full-time employees), including 24 Nuclear Regulatory Inspectors at the end of December.

#### 2.3. Budget of the National Atomic Energy Agency

The PAA's budgetary expenses in 2015 amounted to PLN 30.9 million, including:

- Financing the activities of the emergency service and the national contact point acting under the international nuclear accident notification system as well as national radiological monitoring - 13.0%,
- Performing inspections of and issuing licenses for activities conducted under conditions of exposure to ionising radiation 12.6%,
- Membership contributions on account of Poland's membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency 46.9%,
- Operating costs of the National Atomic Energy Agency 25.6%,
- Other activity 1.9%.

#### I. 3. COUNCIL FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION

The Council for Nuclear Safety and Radiological Protection is appointed by the PAA President. The Council is composed of the chairman, the deputy chairman, the secretary and not more than seven members appointed from among outstanding experts in the field of nuclear safety, radiological protection, physical protection, safeguards of nuclear material (henceforth: "safeguards") and other fields of expertise crucial from the perspective of nuclear safety supervision. Members of the Council must hold security clearances authorizing them to access classified information marked as "classified".

The Chairman of the Council manages its activities. He/she represents the Council outside, as well as prepares draft plans regarding the Council's activities for each calendar year and presents them at the Council meetings.

#### 3.1. Council composition

In 2015 the Council composition was as follows:

Henryk Jacek Jezierski, Chairman of the Council, Grzegorz Krzysztoszek, Deputy Chairman of the Council, Andrzej Cholerzyński, Secretary of the Council, Roman Jóźwik, Member of the Council, Jerzy Wojnarowicz, Member of the Council, Janusz Janeczek, Member of the Council, Andrzej Grzegorz Chmielewski, Member of the Council.

#### 3.2. Tasks of the Council

Main tasks of the Council particularly include issuing opinions upon the PAA President's request with regard to draft version of licences for conducting activities involving exposure to ionising radiation and consisting in construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities, and furthermore, draft versions of legal acts, as well as organizational and technical recommendations, and undertaking initiatives concerning improvements in the supervision of the aforementioned exposure-related activities.

There were four Council meetings in 2015: in January, February, March and November.

In 2015, the Council adopted two resolutions under a vote concerning the following matters:

- 1. accepting a report on the Council's operations in 2014,
- issuing of licence No. 1/2015/MARIA for the operation of the research reactor located at the National Centre for Nuclear Research (NCBJ) in Otwock, 7 Andrzeja Sołtana Street.

#### I. 4. ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY'S OPERATIONS

#### 4.1. Administrative courts' control of administrative decisions issued by PAA President

In 2015, nuclear regulatory bodies issued 1506 administrative decisions, and fourteen appeals against the decisions of nuclear regulatory bodies were filed with the Province Administrative Court in Warsaw. As a result of examination of eleven of them, the judgments dismissing the appeals were pronounced. Furthermore, one judgement annulling the decisions appealed against in 2014 was issued, and against the said judgement PAA President lodged a last resort appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court.

#### 4.2. Audit carried out by the Supreme Audit Office (NIK)

In 2015 PAA was audited by the Supreme Audit Office (NIK) with regard to implementation of the state budget in 2014 in section 68 – National Atomic Energy Agency (in the period from 11 February to 9 April).

The Supreme Audit Office positively assessed the state budget implementation in 2014 in section 68 -National Atomic Energy Agency.

#### 4.3. Audit carried out by the Minister of the Environment

In 2015 PAA was audited by the Minister of the Environment with regard to:

- anti-mobbing procedure binding in PAA, the lawfulness of the civil service recruitment of a director of the PAA President's Office and the system of periodic appraisal of civil servants in the PAA (from 13 to 17 April), and
- civil defense training (on 26 and 27 October).

With regard to the anti-mobbing procedure binding in the PAA the audit carried out by the representatives of the Minister of the Environment showed no significant weaknesses, it was recommended, however, to pay more attention to any behavior that could be signs of mobbing. This recommendation was taken into account in an internal anti-mobbing and anti-discrimination policy of the National Atomic Energy Agency adopted in 2015.

In terms of the lawfulness of the civil service recruitment for the position of the director of the PAA President's Office and the system of periodic appraisal of civil servants in the PAA the audit of the Ministry of the Environment made post-audit recommendations, including:

• Need for clarification of recruitment procedures binding in the PAA – it was reflected in the order of the PAA Director General concerning the recruitment procedure for higher positions in the civil service,

- Need to ensure the timeliness and accuracy of conducting periodic appraisals – the recommendations in this regard were implemented.
- With regard to the civil defense training, on the basis of the audit conducted, the Minister of the Environment positively assessed the activity of the National Atomic Energy Agency. One recommendation concerning the need to take into account the provisions on the protection of classified information in the field of operational planning was formulated.

#### 4.4. Management control

In accordance with the Public Finance Act, PAA has introduced a management control system which enables execution of a risk analysis and a management system assessment, among other available options.

#### 4.5. Assessment of efficiency of nuclear regulatory activities

Pursuant to article 113a, section 1 of the Atomic Law Act, at least every 3 years the President of the National Atomic Energy Agency is obliged to conduct an assessment of functioning of nuclear regulatory activities and of a current legal status from the perspective of its adequacy against the needs of nuclear safety and radiological protection assurance. The first assessment was conducted in 2014. As a result of the analysis included in the assessment report it was shown, among other things, that the current legal status provides sufficient legal framework for purposes of activities related to the use of nuclear energy or ionising radiation in a manner which ensures security to the relevant entities, the property and the environment. It was stressed in the report that the nuclear regulatory authority was performing its duties in an appropriate manner by exercising regulatory control and supervision over activities which may lead to ionising radiation exposure of people and natural environment, as well as conducting inspections in this respect. It was also recommended that continuation of training for the PAA regulatory service personnel should be considered a priority in order to prepare them for implementation of the Polish Nuclear Power Program (PPEJ) and ensure stability of employment of highly qualified experts in nuclear regulatory institutions, thus providing grounds for competent assessment of the entire project and ..... supervision of construction and operation of the first nuclear power plant in Poland.

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## INFRASTRUCTURE FOR NUCLEAR REGULATORY ACTIVITIES IN POLAND

### **II. INFRASTRUCTURE FOR** NUCLEAR REGULATORY **ACTIVITIES IN POLAND**

#### **II. 1. DEFINITION, STRUCTURE** AND FUNCTIONS OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIOLOGICAL **PROTECTION SYSTEM**

The nuclear safety and radiological protection system comprises all legal, organisational and technological activities which ensure appropriate state of nuclear and radiological safety of nuclear plants as well as other facilities making use of ionising radiation sources in Poland. A threat to this type of safety may be posed by operation of nuclear facilities, both in Poland and abroad, as well as other activities involving ionising radiation sources. In Poland, all issues connected with radiological protection or the environmental radiation monitoring are, in accordance with the applicable provisions of law, considered jointly with the matter of nuclear safety, physical protection and safeguards. Owing to this solution, there is one common approach to all aspects of radiological protection, nuclear safety, safeguards and radioactive sources, and thus all the nuclear regulatory activities are consolidated into one regulatory system.

The nuclear safety and radiological protection system functions in accordance with the Atomic Law of 29 November 2000 and its secondary legislation, the applicable EU directives and regulations, as well as treaties and international conventions to which Poland is a party.

The act of 4 April 2014 amending the Atomic Law (Journal of Laws, item 587), once it became effective on 24 May 2014, abolished one of nuclear regulatory bodies, namely the position of the Chief Nuclear Regulatory Inspector (CNRI), thus initiating a two-stage nuclear regulatory system by transferring the entitlements of the CNRI to the President of the National Atomic Energy Agency.

At present, pursuant to the provisions of the Atomic Law, the nuclear regulatory authorities in Poland are the following:

- Nuclear regulatory inspectors,
- President of the National Atomic Energy Agency.

The most essential aspects of the nuclear safety and radiological protection system include:

- exercising regulatory supervision over activities, involving nuclear material and ionising radiation sources through regulatory safety assessment of the activities applied for, and issuing decisions on granting licenses concerning the performance of these activities or registration of such activities, control over the manner in which activities are performed, applying sanctions in the case of breach of the rules of safe conduct of the said activities, control over doses received by workers, supervision of training for radiation protection officers (experts in nuclear safety and radiological protection matters in the entities which conduct activities based on the licenses granted) and workers employed on the positions significant for nuclear safety and radiological protection and workers exposed to ionising radiation, control over the trade in radioactive material, keeping records of radioactive sources and users of radioactive sources and a central register of individual doses, and in cases of activities involving nuclear material, also detailed records and accountancy for this material, providing approvals for systems of physical protection of nuclear material and control of the technologies applied;
- recognising and assessing the national radiation situation through coordination (including standardisation) of works performed by local stations and units measuring the level of radiation dose rate, content of radionuclides in the chosen elements of natural environment and in drinking water, foodstuffs and feedingstuffs;
- maintaining services prepared to recognise and assess the national radiation situation and to respond in cases of radiation emergencies (in cooperation with other competent authorities and services operating under the national emergency response system);
- performing tasks aimed at fulfilment of obligations imposed upon Poland under treaties, conventions and international agreements with regard to nuclear safety and radiological protection, and bilateral agreements on mutual support in cases of nuclear accidents and cooperation with Poland's neighbouring countries in the scope of nuclear safety and radiological protection, as well as for the purpose of assessment of the condition of nuclear facilities, radioactive sources and waste management, and nu-..... clear safety and radiological protection system located outside of Polish borders.

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Pursuant to the Atomic Law Act, the aforementioned tasks are performed by the PAA President with the assistance of nuclear regulatory inspectors and workers of specialized organizational units of the Agency. In implementing its tasks, the PAA President also uses external experts appointed to the Council for Nuclear Safety and Radiological Protection and examination committees.

An exception to the foregoing is that the PAA President's supervision of activities involving ionising radiation sources is not required in cases of using X-ray devices for purposes of medical diagnostics, interventional radiology, surface radiotherapy and radiotherapy of non-cancerous diseases, since the supervision of the said activities is exercised by provincial national sanitary inspectorates (or other competent sanitary inspection bodies reporting to the Minister of National Defence and to the Minister of the Interior).

The PAA President's supervision over any activity conducted under conditions involving exposure to ionising radiation comprises the following:

- 1. Determining conditions which are required to ensure nuclear safety and radiological protection.
- 2. Safety Assessment as a basis for granting and formulating the conditions of licenses and taking other administrative decisions.
- 3. Issuing licences for performance of activity which involves the exposure, consisting in:
  - production, processing, storage, transport or use of nuclear material or radioactive sources as well as trade in this material or sources,
  - storage, transport, processing or disposal of radioactive waste,
  - storage, transport or processing of spent nuclear fuel and trade in this fuel,
  - isotopic enrichment,
  - construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities,
  - construction, operation and closure of radioactive waste repositories,
  - production, installation, operation and maintenance of equipment containing radioactive sources and trade in such equipment,
    - commissioning and use of equipment generating ionising radiation,

- commissioning of laboratories where ionising radiation sources are to be used, including X-ray laboratories,
- intentional adding of radioactive substances in processes of manufacturing consumer and medical products, medical products for purposes of in vitro diagnostics, equipment for medical products, equipment for medical products for purposes of in vitro diagnostics, active medical products for implantation, in the meaning of provisions of the Act on Medical Products of 20 May 2010 (Journal of Laws no. 107, item 679, as amended), trade in such products, import into and export from the territory of the Republic of Poland of consumer and medical products to which radioactive substances have been added, intentional administration of radioactive substances to people and animals for purposes of medical or veterinary diagnostics, therapy or scientific research.

and granting personal authorisations related to the performance and supervision of those activities.

- 4. Controlling the aforementioned activities from the perspective of compliance with the criteria specified in the applicable regulations and with requirements of the licenses granted.
- 5. Imposition of sanctions forcing compliance with the above requirements as a result of the implemented administrative proceedings.

In the scope of activities connected with nuclear material and facilities, the PAA President's supervision also involves approvals and inspections of physical protection systems as well as activities envisaged in the obligations of the Republic of Poland relating to safeguards.



#### **II. 2. BASIC PROVISIONS OF LAW ON NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION**

#### 2.1. Atomic Law Act

The Atomic Law Act of 29 November 2000, effective as of 1 January 2002, introduced a consolidated system ensuring nuclear safety and radiological protection of workers and the entire population in Poland.

The most important provisions of the aforementioned Act concern issuance of licences for activities connected with exposure to ionising radiation (i.e. licenses for activities specified above in the subchapter "Definition, structure and functions of the nuclear safety and radiological protection system"), obligations of heads of organisational units conducting activities which involve radiation and prerogatives of the President of the National Atomic Energy Agency (PAA) to exercise regulatory control and supervision of these activities. The Act also provides for other tasks of the PAA President related to such matters as the assessment of the national radiation situation and response in cases of radiation emergencies.

The principles and procedures set forth in the aforementioned act pertain, among others, to the following matters:

- 1) justification for instituting activities which involve exposure to ionising radiation, their optimisation and establishing dose limits for workers and the entire population,
- 2) procedure for obtaining the required licenses concerning the performance of such activities as well as the mode and method of controlling the performance of such activities,
- 3) keeping records and inspection of ionising radiation sources,
- 4) keeping records and inspection of nuclear material,
- 5) physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities,
- 6) management of high-activity radioactive sources,
- 7) classification of radioactive waste and methods of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management,
- 8) classification of workers and their workstations based on the degree of exposure involved in the

work performed and designation of protection measures suitable to counteract this exposure,

- 9) training and issuing authorisations to be employed at particular positions considered important for ensuring nuclear safety and radiological protection,
- 10) assessment of the national radiation situation,
- 11) procedures applied in cases of radiation emergencies,
- 12) siting, designing, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities.

In accordance with the Act in question, the head of an entity conducting activities which involve ionising radiation is held responsible for ensuring safety of the use of ionising radiation. In order to support the individuals in the performance of their obligations, a special rule has been introduced stipulating that internal supervision of compliance with safety requirements is exercised at the given entity by a radiation protection officer, i.e. a person provided with special authorisations granted by the PAA President under the provisions of the Atomic Law. The foregoing concerns specific types of activity which require a licence to have been granted. What the Act also stipulates is a possibility to perform activities involving ionising radiation exposure based on a suitable notification only, and also specifies circumstances where neither a license nor any notification is required. In such cases, there is no obligation to provide for internal supervision of their performance via a person holding authorisations of a radiological protection officer.

Some types of positions (particularly those performed at nuclear facilities, but also at organisational entities conducting activities which involve ionising radiation) have been considered to be exceptionally significant for ensuring nuclear safety and radiological protection. These positions may only be staffed by those candidates who have completed courses offered by special training centres and have successfully passed suitable examinations before an examination board appointed by the PAA President. Similar rules will apply in the future to individuals who will perform specific activities of special importance for ensuring nuclear safety and radiological protection in nuclear power plants. Other employees from various entities are also trained – it is an internal course provided by the head of their employer, having previously received an approval of the course curricu-..... lum from the PAA President.



In order to ensure radiological safety of workers exposed to ionising radiation, specific dose limits were established which, except for cases determined in the Act, must not be exceeded. Workers are covered by a compulsory dosimetry scheme intended for control of the doses they receive. The head of the given entity is obliged to monitor the workers' dose measurement results. At the same time, dose measurement results for all workers classified under category A, who are potentially most exposed to ionising radiation, are submitted to the central register of doses maintained by the PAA President.

The Act also addresses the issue of nuclear material and high-activity radioactive sources as well as their transport, but also cross-border movement of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. The Act introduces mechanisms which allow for safe shipment of the aforementioned material as well as a specific requirement that their receipt by the target recipient must be guaranteed.

The Act also includes is a set of special regulations dedicated to radioactive waste. In order to ensure suitable conditions of waste management for purposes of their disposal, a state-owned public utility enterprise was established, namely "Radioactive Waste Management Plant", subsidised by the state to conduct its statutory activity. It has been secured against liquidation or bankruptcy which allows for its uninterrupted operations.

High-activity radioactive sources are under supervision from the moment of production until the time of their disposal: the management procedure at each stage of their use has been defined, and the form of securing costs of delivery and management after completing operations involving their use has been agreed.

Assuming that, even with the most effective safety system, an event may always occur leading to an increase of the radiation level, the Act has obliged the PAA President to perform ongoing assessment of national radiation situation and undertake follow-up measures both in Poland and on an international scale. Moreover, the Act has defined a radiation emergency, systematised individual types of emergencies and determined the ways in which appropriate authorities and services should respond to such emergencies. In order to ensure efficient enforcement of the nuclear safety and radiological protection regulations, the Act also includes provisions which allow competent authorities to respond immediately to any potential violations thereof. These comprise a possibility of administrative fines being imposed by the PAA President by way of administrative decisions.

Qualified infringement of legal regulations regarding the aforementioned issues is subject to the provisions of the Penal Code.

The use of ionising radiation is managed in accordance with international solutions defining rules and procedures applied to handle the former. The solutions adopted by the Atomic Law fully correspond to the relevant international regulations, since they result from international agreements binding for Poland and from laws of the European Union, particularly the EU directives.

The current status of the Atomic Law was achieved by introducing two significant amendments in 2011 and 2014. The amendment of 2011 was enacted in connection with the required implementation into the Polish laws of provisions of Council Directive 2009/71/EURATOM of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations<sup>1</sup>, and Poland's ratification of the Protocol to amend the Vienna Convention of 1963 on civil liability for nuclear damage signed in Vienna on 12 September 1997<sup>2</sup>, as well as the commencement of works on the Polish Nuclear Power Programme.

The most important changes introduced under the Act of 13 May 2011 amending the Atomic Law and certain other acts (Journal of Laws no. 132, item 766) included provisions determining detailed requirements for nuclear safety and radiological protection concerning the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities as well as those regarding the siting and construction of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel repositories. The Act in question assumed a principle that a nuclear facility was to be sited within a territory ensuring nuclear safety, radiological protection, physical protection during commissioning, operation and decommissioning of this facility as well as effective emergency response procedures in cases of radiation emergency. An investor of a nuclear facility was provided with the possibility to submit a request to the PAA President for issuance of a preliminary opinion concerning the planned siting for a nuclear facility.

What has not been stipulated in the Atomic Law is that a separate license required for designing of nuclear facilities may be issued. However, basic conditions have been determined with regard to nuclear facility design, which must be met from the perspective of nuclear safety and radiological protection as well as safe functioning of technical devices installed and operated at a nuclear facility.

Under the provisions of the amended Atomic Law, the investor has become obliged to conduct, prior to submitting a request for issuing a licence for construction of a nuclear facility to the PAA President, nuclear safety analyses entailing technical and environmental factors. The results of safety analyses comprise a basis for development of a preliminary safety report to be delivered to the PAA President along with a request for issuance of a licence for construction of a nuclear facility.

Systems, structure and components of the nuclear facility that are of the highest importance from the perspective of nuclear safety and radiological protection, including control and monitoring software, in accordance with the provisions of the Atomic Law, must be identified and classified under safety classes depending on the degree to which these systems and elements affect nuclear safety and radiological protection of the nuclear facility. The documentation containing safety classification for systems, structure and components of a nuclear facility should be submitted for approval to the PAA President along with a request for issuing a license for construction of a nuclear facility. In the process of the nuclear facility construction, nuclear regulatory bodies as well as other authorities, within the scope of their respective authorizations, may inspect contractors and suppliers of systems, structures and components of the nuclear facility as well as contractors of works performed while constructing the nuclear facility and furnishing it in the area of systems, elements and works important for nuclear safety and radiological protection and safe operation of technical devices. The PAA President has been vested the following regulatory measures of supervision towards an organisational unit conducting activity which consists in construction, operation or decommissioning of a nuclear facility for which audited contractors and suppliers perform their services:

• interdiction to use a particular system, structure or component of a nuclear facility, if it was established in the course of the inspection that it may negatively affect nuclear safety and radiological protection of the nuclear facility;

• order to suspend particular works at the nuclear facility, if it has been established that they are conducted in a way which may negatively affect nuclear safety and radiological protection of the nuclear facility.

The Atomic Law emphasizes the principle that a nuclear facility is commissioned and operated in a manner ensuring nuclear safety and radiological protection of workers and general public in accordance with the integrated management system. The commissioning of the nuclear facility should be carried out in accordance with the programme approved by the PAA President and reflected in the nuclear facility commissioning documentation.

The PAA President has been vested special regulatory powers regarding the nuclear facility commissioning stage, such as the authorisation to issue decisions to suspend the commissioning of a nuclear facility and to approve a report on the nuclear facility commissioning.

The PAA President has also been authorised to issue an order to reduce the power output or to stop the operation of a nuclear facility if his own assessment or the information forwarded by the President of the Office of Technical Inspection implies that further operation of this facility poses a threat to nuclear safety or radiological protection.

The head of the given organisational unit operating the nuclear facility has been obliged to conduct regular assessments of the nuclear facility safety (referred to as "periodical safety assessments") in accordance with periodical safety assessment plans approved each time by the PAA President.

What the head of the organisational unit has also been obliged is to develop a programme of the nuclear facility decommissioning and to submit it for approval to the PAA President along with a request for issuing a license for the construction, commissioning or operation of a nuclear facility. In the course of the facility operation, this programme must be updated and approved at least once in every 5 years and immediately after completion of the nuclear facility operation due to extraordinary events. The nuclear fa-..... cility decommissioning is formally considered completed on the day when the nucle-

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ar facility decommissioning report is approved by the PAA President.

The Atomic Law has introduced a system dedicated to financing of the final handling of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste as well as decommissioning of a nuclear facility. In order to cover all the costs related thereto, the given entity, having received a licence to operate a nuclear power plant, is obliged to systematically effect quarterly payments to a special fund referred to as a "decommissioning fund". The funds allocated this way will only be distributed for the coverage of costs of final management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel from the nuclear facility and for the coverage of costs related to decommissioning of this nuclear facility. The payment of decommissioning funds will only take place following a favourable opinion of the PAA President in response to a request submitted by the organisational unit licensed to operate or decommission the nuclear facility.

As a consequence of the amendment of 2011 to the Atomic Law, new provisions not directly connected with the PAA President's duties were introduced, pertaining to the sector of nuclear power engineering. They particularly concerned the following:

- obligations of different entities on providing public information with regard to nuclear power facilities;
- activities of the minister competent for economic matters and the Council of Ministers regarding the development of nuclear power engineering, and particularly the adoption of the Polish Nuclear Power Programme.

The year 2014 saw yet another significant amendment enacted, namely the act of 4 April 2014 amending the Atomic Law and certain other acts (Journal of Laws, item 587) which entered into force on 24 May 2014. A draft of the said act had been prepared by the Ministry of Economy with the assistance of the PAA President. The act was aimed at complementing the national legal framework with the provisions of Council Directive 2011/70/EURATOM of 19 July 2011 establishing a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste (OJ L 199 of 2 August 2011, p. 48). The said Directive imposes an obligation on the Member States to introduce national legislative, regulatory and organisational framework ensuring high level of safety for management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. The aforementioned amendment to the Act has supplemented the current solutions already deployed in Poland.

The amended Atomic Law has changed definitions of such notions as radioactive waste, radioactive waste management, spent nuclear fuel management, storage of radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel, processing of radioactive waste, disposal of radioactive waste and closure of radioactive waste repositories, the foregoing being caused by a necessity to ensure that the said definitions match those provided in Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom. The definition of the decommissioning of a radioactive waste repository or a spent nuclear fuel repository has been removed from the Atomic Law, for it stems from the very definition of radioactive waste that, since radioactive waste is disposed at a radioactive waste repository without an intention of its subsequent extraction, the repository decommissioning process should not be taken into account at all.

The amended Atomic Law contains provisions defining entities responsible for management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. Among the legal instruments they have introduced, one should mention, for instance, that the organisational unit which has generated the radioactive waste or the spent nuclear fuel is held responsible for ensuring that it is possible to manage the radioactive waste and the spent nuclear fuel from the moment of their generation until their disposal at the repository, including for financing of this procedure and coverage of the related disposal costs.

What the Atomic Law has also altered, are the principles of classification, storage, disposal and keeping records of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. With regard to the classification of radioactive waste, the notion of activity level or dose rate on the surface of waste material has been replaced by a criterion of radioactive concentration of radioisotopes the former contain. The list of situations in which radioactive waste can be classified by the PAA President has been complemented by the case of a failure to classify radioactive waste by the head of the given organizational unit. Principles concerning the manner in which costs of radioactive waste classification are to be settled have been defined in detail, and consequently they will be charged to entities which, pursuant to article 48, section 1 of the Atomic Law, should perform such qualification as a part of their activity, and specifically to the head of an organisational unit who has conducted incorrect qualification or has failed to complete it at all. Individual principles defined in the Act, like those pertaining to the manner in which records are to be kept as well as conditions of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel storage, and criteria according to which a radioactive waste repository is to be recognised as a National Radioactive Waste Repository, rely on the provisions previously provided in the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 3 December 2002 on radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel (Journal of Laws no. 230, item 1925). Sections 1a and 1b added to article 62e of the Atomic Law have introduced an explicit prohibition of removing radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel from the territory of the Republic of Poland for the sake of disposal, but at the same time they stipulate specific exceptions to the said prohibition, one of which being the disposal of radioactive waste at a radioactive waste repository located in another country with which the minister competent for economic matters has entered into an appropriate agreement under which such a solution is permissible.

The amended Atomic Law also contains provisions which regulate the processes of construction, operation and closure of a radioactive waste repository and defines specific roles of the nuclear regulatory body with regard to the said activities in a manner corresponding to the IAEA's recommendations referred to in item 16 of the preamble to Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom (IAEA Safety Standards for Protecting People and the Environment: Predisposal management of radioactive waste, no. GSR part 5; The management system for the disposal of radioactive waste, no. GS-G-3.4; Storage of radioactive waste, Safety guide, no. WS-G-6.1). As a consequence of the amendment, the Atomic Law has defined criteria for siting of radioactive waste repositories, types of tests and analyses required for a siting decision to be made as well as requirements as to the design, the construction process and operation of the repository, partially relying on the previously applicable provisions of Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 3 December 2002 on radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. Before requesting the PAA President for issuing a licence for construction of a radioactive waste repository, the investor is obliged to conduct safety analyses the results of which are provided in a report on the safety of the radioactive waste repository drawn up by the latter. Besides the foregoing, the said report should provide a number of other data specified in article 53d, section 4 of the Atomic Law, including information which, pursuant to article 55a of the Act, revoked under the amendment of 2014, was required for purposes of the reposito-

ry siting report. The safety report is attached to the request for issuance of the radioactive waste repository construction license and, once the relevant updates have been effected, to individual requests for issuing licences for operation and closure of the repository.

The Atomic Law has been supplemented with specific provisions pertaining to safety of a radioactive waste repository. The most fundamental principle applicable in this respect stipulates that, in the course of design, construction, operation and closure of a radioactive waste repository, one must not apply any solutions and technologies which have not been verified in practice at radioactive waste repositories or through tests, examinations and analyses. The Atomic Law also comprises provisions concerning the procedure of a periodical safety assessment for a radioactive waste repository to be conducted by the head of the given organisational unit at a frequency defined in the licence for operation of the repository, and every 15 years at the least. By issuing a decision, the PAA President approves the assessment plan as well as a report on the periodical safety assessment after being furnished with an opinion on the status of physical protection prepared by the Head of the Internal Security Agency (ABW).

Pursuant to article 55j of the Atomic Law, prior to submitting a request for issuing a licence for construction or operation of the repository, the head of the given organisational unit is obliged to develop a repository closure scheme, to be updated at least every 15 years and subject to the PAA President's approval. The amended Act has also defined detailed requirements to be taken into account on closure of near-surface and deep repositories. What has also been envisaged in the Act is an obligation to ensure physical protection of a closed repository in conformity with the relevant regulations on personal and property protection. Following the completion of the repository closure process, a radioactive waste repository closure report is drawn up. The day of the repository closure completion is considered to be the day when the said report is approved by the PAA President.

As far as the procedure observed by the PAA President in issuing licences for construction, operation and closure of a radioactive waste repository is con-..... cerned, the amended Atomic Law contains such provisions as, for instance, regulations defining deadlines for the PAA President's issuance of

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permits and licences, decisions to be procured prior to submitting a request for issuing a radioactive waste repository construction license, authorisations of the PAA President aimed at better assessment of the request content, as well as decisions whose prerequisite is procurement of the relevant licences issued by the PAA President.

The amended Atomic Law has envisaged an introduction of an obligation regarding the development of a national programme for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management in Poland. It is prepared by the minister competent for energy matters<sup>3</sup>, enacted by the Council of Ministers, updated every four years and subject to international external review at last once in every 10 years. The Act also defines requirements as to the content of the national programme for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management comprising such matters as the current and the forecast quantity of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, entities responsible for the programme implementation and the related costs.

The amended Atomic Law contains specific provisions enabling the general public to obtain information on the management of radioactive waste, and its disposal in particular. The Act provides for a possibility to obtain the required information concerning the impact of an activity comprising operation or closure of a radioactive waste repository on the human health and the environment, either directly from the head of the organisational unit conducting such activity, from this unit's website or from a dedicated Public Information Bulletin webpage of the PAA President.

As a result of the amendment one of nuclear regulatory authorities, namely the Chief Nuclear Regulatory Inspector (CNRI) was liquidated. It was caused by an alteration of the scope of the PAA President's activities who, starting from the year 2011, has mainly been focused on nuclear regulatory duties. Consequently, maintaining a separate body supportive to the PAA President, and the CNRI had been one, was considered to be unnecessary, and the latter's duties and authorisations were transferred to the PAA President being the supreme nuclear regulatory authority.

> In 2015 the Atomic Law was amended twice. Article 10 of the act of 5 August
>  2015 amending the acts regulating conditions for access to certain

professions (Journal of Laws item 1505) introduced in article 12, 12b and 12f of the Atomic Law Act the amendments causing that the hitherto recognition of 14 professions significant for ensuring nuclear safety and radiological protection, are deemed to be 1 regulated profession – a position significant for ensuring nuclear safety and radiological protection. This amendment entered into force as of 30 March 2016.

Article 13 of the act of 25 September 2015 on the amendment to the economic activity act and certain other acts (Journal of Law item 1893) introduced an amendment to article 5 paragraph 1 subparagraph 2 of the Atomic Law Act, aimed at clarifying that in the application for the issue of a licence to carry out the activity involving an exposure to ionising radiation, an entrepreneur should provide not only the number under which he is registered in the Register of Entrepreneurs of the National Court Register (KRS), but also the tax identification number (NIP), as long as the entrepreneur has got the said numbers. This amendment entered into force as of 19 May 2016.

In order to prepare oneself to the implementation to the Polish law of Council Directive 2013/59/EUR-ATOM of 5 December 2013 laying down basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation, and repealing Directives 89/618/Euratom, 90/641/Euratom, 96/29/ Euratom, 97/43/Euratom and 2003/122/Euratom (OJ L 13 of 17 January 2014, p. 1), by way of an order of the Minister of the Environment of 8 August 2014 the Team for the development of the concept of implementation of Council Directive 2013/59/EURAT-OM to the Polish law (Journal of Laws of the Minister of the Environment, item 50), hereinafter referred to the "Team", was designated. The President of the National Atomic Energy Agency was appointed a chairman of the Team, and the Team was composed of the representatives of the Minister of the Environment and the National Atomic Energy Agency In accordance with § 3 paragraph 2 of the order of the Minister of the Environment concerning the appointment of the Team, the representatives of the governmental administration and scientific communities, participated in the Team works in an advisory capacity, and were invited by the Team Chairman.

The Team's tasks included:

1) identifying the provisions of Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom which require the implementation to the Polish law;

- 2) determining which provisions of Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom call for regulation in acts and which call for regulation in regulations;
- 3) considering, in particular, to the extent described in the report of the mission of the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS), the need for regulation in the Polish law of other issues related to the activities involving exposure to ionizing radiation and supervision of such activity;
- 4) cooperation with public administration authorities in order to determine during the course of works on the implementation of Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom the way of regulating of particular issues arising from the said Directive, falling within the competence of those authorities;
- 5) conducting an assessment of expected socio-economic effects of implementation of Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom and presenting the results of this assessment in a regulatory test;
- 6) presentation of a report containing the concept of implementation into the Polish law of Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom, the essence of the proposed legislative solutions and the results of assessment of expected socio-economic impact of implementation of the said Directive, to the management of the Ministry of the Environment, by 30 November 2015.


The above tasks were performed within the prescribed deadline. The report from the Team works was approved by the Management of the Ministry of the Environment on 11 January 2016.

Pursuant to the concept presented in the above mentioned report, the implementation of Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom is to be carried out by way of amending the Act of 29 November 2000 – Atomic Law. The issues of technical nature aimed at the implementation of the act should be governed in new or amended currently binding regulations issued on the basis of the Atomic Law Act.

The Team elaborated a detailed concept of implementation of the provisions of Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom to the Polish law and attached it to the Report, and the following issues were identified in the said concept:

- issues regulated in the Atomic Law Act so far or in the regulations issued on the basis of the Act which do not require any legislative changes;
- issues which have not been regulated in the Atomic Law Act or the regulations issued on the basis of the Act which would require any legislative changes;
- issues which have not been regulated in the Atomic Law Act or regulations issued on its basis or other normative acts so far, therefore, requiring an introduction into the Polish legal system (among others, the issues related to an exposure to radon in residential buildings and at workplaces, issues concerning an activity with the use of radioactive material occurring naturally, or a new form of regulating an activity involving an exposure, with the use of notifications).

The commencement of the works on the bill is scheduled for the beginning of 2016. Pursuant to Article 106 paragraph 1 of Council Directive 2013/59//Euratom, its provisions should be implemented by the Member States by 6 February 2018.





#### 2.2. Other acts

The provisions indirectly connected with the matters of nuclear safety and radiological protection are also included in other acts, and particularly in:

- 1) Act of 19 August 2011 on transport of dangerous goods (Journal of Laws No. 227 item 1367, as amended),
- 2) Act of 18 August 2011 on maritime safety (Journal of Laws No. 228 item 1368, as amended),
- 3) Act of 21 December 2000 on technical supervision (Journal of Laws of 2013, item 963, as amended).

#### 2.3. Secondary legislation of the Atomic Law Act

Secondary legislation of the Atomic Law Act includes detailed regulations concerning nuclear safety and radiological protection. As for the PAA President's rights and responsibilities, these provisions address in particular:

- documents which must be submitted and attached to an application for the issue of a license for specific activity involving exposure to ionising radiation (or attached to a notification concerning such activity),
- 2. cases in which the activity involving exposure may be conducted without a license or a notification,
- 3. requirements concerning controlled and supervised areas, as well as dosimetry equipment,
- 4. values of dose limits for workers and the general public,
- 5. positions being important from the perspective of nuclear safety and radiological protection and requirements to be fulfilled by a person applying for authorisations needed in order to be employed at a given position as well as requirements for being granted the authorisations of a radiation protection officer,
- 6. detailed conditions of work involving ionising radiation sources,
- 7. methods of physical protection of nuclear material,
- 8. siting requirements for a nuclear facility,
- 9. nuclear safety and radiological protection requirements to be entailed in a nuclear facility design,
  - scope and manner of conducting safety analyses prior to submission of a request for issuing a licence for construction of a nuclear facility and the scope of a preliminary nucle-

ar facility and the scope of a preliminary nuclear facility safety report,

- 11. requirements for commissioning and operation of nuclear facilities,
- 12. method and working procedure of the Council for Nuclear Safety and Radiological Protection,
- 13. manner of performing a periodical nuclear safety assessment of a nuclear facility,
- 14. matters related to the fees contributed to a decommissioning fund,
- 15. nuclear safety and radiological protection requirements for the stage of decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the content of a report on decommissioning of a nuclear facility,
- 16. nuclear regulatory inspectors,
- 17. positions considered important for nuclear safety and radiological protection as well as radiation protection officers,
- 18. activities considered important for ensuring nuclear safety and radiological protection in a nuclear power plant.

Furthermore, a range of implementing regulations to the Atomic Law Act which do not regulate directly the matters falling within the scope of tasks of the PAA President, are in force. Those matters are related to, among others:

- 1. activity related to medical application of ionising radiation,
- 2. granting authorisations of a radiation protection officer employed at a laboratory using X-ray devices for medical purposes,
- 3. special purpose grant for ensuring nuclear safety and radiological protection of Poland when ionising radiation is used,
- 4. special purpose and specific subsidies granted to the state-owned public utility enterprise "Radio-active Waste Management Plant",
- 5. detailed principles of establishment and operation of Local Information Committees as well as cooperation in terms of nuclear power facilities.

In 2015 four regulations of the Council of Ministers were issued and their drafts were elaborated by PAA. The said regulations are:

 Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 30 June 2015 concerning documents required while submitting a request for issuing a licence for activity involving exposure to ionising radiation or a notification about such activity (Journal of Laws item 1355) – entered into force on 1 January 2016. This Regulation replaced the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 3 December 2002 concerning documents required while submitting a request for issuing a licence for activity involving exposure to ionising radiation or a notification about such activity (Journal of Laws No. 220, item 1851, as amended). This Regulation is aimed at implementation of a range of directives of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)<sup>4</sup>, and is a successive element of adaptation of the Polish legal system to the implementation of the Polish Nuclear Power Programme, and in particular to the construction of a nuclear power plant. The Regulation takes into account the changes that have occurred in the provisions concerning nuclear facilities, especially as a result of the enactment of the act of 13 May 2011 amending the Atomic Law Act and certain other acts (Journal of Laws No. 132, item 766) and implementing regulations issued as a result of the entry into force of this act. The said regulation takes into account the changes of the legal status which were introduced by the entry into force of the act of 4 April 2014 amending the Atomic Law Act and certain other acts (Journal of Laws item 587), concerning activity mainly related to radioactive waste management.

2. Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 14 December 2015 concerning radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel (Journal of Laws item 2267 and Journal of Laws of 2016 item 94) entered into force on 30 December 2015. This Regulation implements into the national law the provisions of Article 5 paragraph 1 letter b of Council Directive establishing a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste (OJ L 199 of 2.8.2011, p. 48). In its content the provisions of the previous regulation of the Council of Ministers of 3 December 2002 on radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel (Journal of Laws No. 230, item 1925) are repeated. The necessity of adoption of this Regulation resulted from the transfer of certain provisions of the existing regulation to the level of an act, repealing of existing empowering provisions and replacement thereof with a new authorization to issue a regulation.

4. Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 14 December 2015 amending the regulation concerning nuclear regulatory inspectors (Journal of Laws of 2016 item 29) entered into force on 23 January 2016. This Regulation was adopted in connection with the amendments introduced by the act of 4 April 2014 on the amendment of the Atomic Law Act, which liquidated one of nuclear regulatory bodies – Chief Nuclear Regulatory Inspector (CNRI) and transferred its rights to the PAA President in the scope covered by the amended Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 24 August 2012 concerning nuclear regulatory inspectors (Journal of Laws of 2012 item 1014), such as:

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<sup>3.</sup> Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 14 December 2015 concerning periodical safety assessment of a radioactive waste disposal facility (Journal of Laws of 2016 item 28) entered into force on 23 January 2016. The Regulation is aimed to enable the fulfillment of the obligation of regular assessment and verification and continuous improvement, as far as is reasonably achievable, the safety of the radioactive waste and spent fuel management facility or activity, directly resulting from Article 7 paragraph 2 of the Council Directive 2011/70/ Euratom and the IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles SF-1. So far no detailed provisions in this regard have been binding in the Republic of Poland. Therefore, the Regulation was based on the guidelines of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) pertaining to radioactive waste management prior to their disposal, disposal of radioactive waste, supervision and monitoring of surface radioactive waste disposal facilities, periodical safety assessments of nuclear facilities, safety assessments of nuclear facilities and surface radioactive waste disposal facilities, as well as on fundamental safety principles developed by the IAEA. Apart from that, the reference levels for storage of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, developed by the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA), were taken into account.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>These directives are as follows:

<sup>1)</sup> Council Directive 96/29/Euratom of 13 May 1996 laying down basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiation (OJ L 159 of 29 June 1996, p. 1; OJ of the EU, Polish special edition, chapter 5, vol. 2, p. 291);

<sup>2)</sup> Council Directive 2003/122/Euratom of 22 December 2003 on the control of high-activity sealed radioactive sources and radioactive waste (OJ L 346 of 31.12.2003, p. 57; OJ – Polish special edition, ch. 15, vol. 7, p. 694);

<sup>3)</sup> Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations (OJ L 172 of 02.07.2009, p. 18, as amended);

<sup>4)</sup> Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom of 19 July 2011 establish-ing a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste (OJ L 199 of 02.8.2011, p. 48).



- development of traineeship programme for a candidate for a nuclear regulatory inspector,
- confirmation of traineeship attended,
- setting the date and place of an examination and issuance of a certificate of passing the qualifying examination for the position of a nuclear regulatory inspector.

Model certificates of passing the qualifying examination for the position of 1st degree or 2nd degree nuclear regulatory inspector were also changed.

Moreover, in 2015 in PAA the works on the draft of the regulation of the Council of Ministers concerning the position important for ensuring nuclear safety and radiation protection and radiological protection inspectors, which takes into account the amendments to the Atomic Law Act, made by way of the act of 5 August 2015 concerning the amendment to the acts regulating the conditions of access to exercise certain occupations.

A detailed list of all secondary legislation acts to the Atomic Law Act is provided in Appendix No. 1 to this Report (See Chapter III.1).

#### 2.4. International regulations

Poland has ratified a number of international agreements relating to nuclear safety and radiological protection which, under the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, constitute the source of commonly applicable law in Poland. They cover the areas of international cooperation and exchange of information in cases of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency, nuclear safety of nuclear facilities, safety of the spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management, physical protection of nuclear material. As regards the matters of civil liability for damage caused by nuclear accidents, the Republic of Poland is a party

to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage concluded in Vienna on 21 May 1963 (Journal of Laws of 1990 no. 63, item 370) and to the Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage concluded in Vienna on 12 September 1997 (Journal of Laws of 2011, no. 4, item 9). The Republic of Poland is also a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons concluded in Moscow, Washington and London on 1 July 1968 (Journal of Laws of 1970, no. 8, item 60) (INFCIRC/140), and all the resulting agreements and protocols.

Furthermore, Poland is a party to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).

Based on the foregoing Treaty, a number of directives have been adopted and implemented in the Polish legal system throughout the recent years.

They have governed such matters as nuclear safety of nuclear facilities, safe radioactive waste management, radiological protection of workers, including external workers and the general public, information provided to the general public about health protection measures to be applied and steps to be taken in the event of radiological emergency, management of high-activity sealed ionising radiation sources, including uncontrolled sources (e.g. abandoned, stolen, illegally possessed ones). Shipment of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel across internal and external borders of the European Union also constitutes an important sphere of the European regulations.

A list of major acts of international and European Union law has been provided in Appendix no. 2 to this Report.



## NATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND THE POLISH NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME

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### III. NATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND THE POLISH NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME

#### III. 1. NATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND THE POLISH NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME

The Polish Nuclear Power Programme (PNPP) was adopted by the Council of Ministers on 28 January 2014. It is the first comprehensive document providing a structure for the organisation of activities to be undertaken in order to implement nuclear power in Poland.

The National Atomic Energy Agency is one of the main stakeholders to the Polish Nuclear Power Programme and performs the role of a regulator. The Agency supervises safety of nuclear facilities and of the activity conducted in these facilities, performs safety inspections and assessments, issues licenses and imposes potential sanctions. Other parties involved in the Programme implementation are the Ministry of Energy (formerly: the Ministry of Economy) as a promoter (handling coordination and promotion of the project and the use of nuclear power for public and economic purposes of the country) and PGE as an investor (providing funds for the construction of a nuclear facility and organising its construction and operation).

PAA started preparations to the implementation of the PNPP in 2009 when a Government Commissioner for Polish Nuclear Power was appointed. In the subsequent years, PAA experts actively participated in works related to the document preparation, and the Agency itself was subject to numerous transformations and organisational changes aimed at its adaptation to the function of a modern nuclear regulator. Tasks of PAA as a nuclear regulatory body in relation to nuclear facilities, including nuclear power plants, comprise the following in particular:

 Defining requirements for nuclear safety and radiological protection and issuing technical recommendations indicating detailed methods of ensuring safety,
 2. Performing analyses and assess-

ments of technical information

provided with appropriate safety analyses by investors or organisations operating a nuclear facility, or obtained as a result of an inspection, in order to verify whether this nuclear facility conforms with the applicable objectives, rules and criteria of safety for purposes of licensing processes and other decisions of nuclear regulatory bodies,

- 3. Conducting the licensing process with regard to construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities,
- 4. Conducting inspections of activities performed by an investor or an organisation operating the nuclear facility in order to ensure safety, including in the scope of compliance with safety requirements set forth in the relevant regulations on nuclear safety and radiological protection as well as compliance with the conditions specified in individual licenses and decisions issued by a nuclear regulator,
- 5. Imposing sanctions enforcing compliance with the aforementioned requirements.

At present, PAA is fully prepared to perform the function of a nuclear regulatory body proportionally to the stage of advancement of the PNPP implementation process. In the nearest future, the Agency will review the process of site selection for the first Polish nuclear power plant as well as the technology chosen and the construction license issued.

#### III. 2. NATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY CHANGES ITS IMAGE AND OPENS NEW COMMUNICATION CHANNELS

As the Polish Nuclear Power Programme (PNPP) is gradually implemented, there are questions arising among the general public about safety of nuclear technologies and of their application. In order to satisfy these expectations and demands, in 2014, PAA prepared a communication strategy for the Agency for the years 2014-2018. It is a comprehensive document comprising annual communication action plans for successive years, and among the aspects taken into account there is a process of consistent creation of the National Atomic Energy Agency's coherent image, development of communication competence among experts, progress of collaboration with the academia as well as promotion of international cooperation. In 2015 this strategy was supplemented with an appendix devoted to the principles of communication with the society in extraordinary situations. The said appendix takes into account the situations in which social concerns related to supposed accident in nuclear power plants located in neighboring countries, which do not pose any real threat to Poland and its inhabitants. Owing to the gradual deployment and evaluation of the communication strategy, PAA's communication actions will be conducted in a sequenced and consistent manner.

Pursuant to article 110, section 6 of the Atomic Law, duties of the PAA President include activities related to public information, education and popularisation as well as scientific, technical and legal information in terms of nuclear safety and radiological protection. One of major assumptions of the communication strategy of PAA is not being limited to statutory requirements, and displaying a proactive stance in terms of communication in order to build public trust in PAA.

In this respect, PAA relies on modern means of communication. In order to be able to explain the complexities of nuclear safety and radiological protection to the general public, in 2015, PAA produced a short film concerning the principles of safe processing and disposal of radioactive waste. The film showed the statements by the experts and visualization of radioactive waste disposal facility, and presented the classification of radioactive waste in an easily accessible way. A range of educational and information materials was also prepared concerning such issues as: siting process and issuance of construction permit for a nuclear power plant, international INES scale or the effects of unintended exposure to ionizing radiation.

In order to conduct an open information policy adapted to the changing needs of society, in 2015 PAA adapted its website and the Public Information Bulletin of the PAA President to enable browsing them by the disabled persons.







## SUPERVISION OF THE USE OF IONISING RADIATION SOURCES

### **IV. SUPERVISION OF THE USE OF IONISING RADIATION SOURCES**

#### **IV. 1. USERS OF IONISING RADIATION** SOURCES IN POLAND

Main tasks of the PAA President in terms of regulatory supervision of activities connected with exposure to ionising radiation are as follows:

• issuing licenses and making other decisions concerning nuclear safety and radiological protection following the analysis and assessment of documentation submitted by users of ionising radiation sources,

- preparing and performing inspections of organisational units which conduct activities connected with exposure.
- maintaining register of these entities.

The number of registered organisational units conducting activity (one or more) involving exposure to ionising radiation subject to regulatory supervision of the PAA President under the Atomic Law came to 3,839 (as at 31 December 2015).

The number of registered activities involving the exposure was 5,525. The latter is much larger than the overall number of organisational units, since many of them conduct several different activities (some of them even several activities of the same type based on separate licenses). A division of activities involving exposure to ionising radiation according to the type of an ionising radiation source and the purpose of its use has been provided in Table 1.





**Table 1.** Organisational units conducting activities involving exposure to ionising radiation(as at 31 December 2015).

Organisational units (according to activity types)	Number of units and activity symbol	
Class I laboratory	1	I
Class II laboratory	94	II
Class III laboratory	122	
Class Z laboratory	105	Z
Smoke detector service	373	UIC
Device service	162	UIA
Isotope devices	565	АКР
Manufacture of isotope sources and devices	28	PRO
Trade in isotope sources and devices	70	DYS
Accelerator	77	АКС
Isotope applicators	36	APL
Telegamma therapy	5	TLG
Radiation device	37	URD
Gamma graphic apparatus	113	DEF
Storage facility of isotope sources	66	MAG
Works with sources outside registered laboratory	52	TER
Transport of sources or waste	484	TRN
Chromatograph	228	CHR
Veterinary X-ray apparatus	982	RTW
X-ray scanner	454	RTS
Defectoscope	209	RTD
Other X-ray apparatus	374	RTG

#### **IV. 2. LICENSES AND NOTIFICATIONS**

Drafts of the PAA President's licenses for performance of activities involving exposure to ionising radiation and other decisions in matters considered important for nuclear safety and radiological protection were prepared by the Radiological Protection Department of PAA.

In cases when the activity involving ionising radiation did not require authorisation, decisions were made with regard to the receipt of notification on performance of activity involving exposure to ionising radiation. These cases are specified in the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 6 August 2002 on the cases when activities involving exposure to ionizing radiation do not require authorization or notification and on the cases when such activities may be conducted on the basis of notification (Journal of Laws, No 137, Item 1153, as amended).

The number of licenses, annexes to licenses issued (in cases of amendments to conditions of licenses already held) and notifications received in 2015 has been provided in Table 2.

Issuance of a license, an annex to a license or receipt of a notification is always preceded by the analysis and assessment of the documentation submitted by Table 2. Number of licenses issued and notifications received in connection with exposure to ionising radiation in 2015.

	Number of activity types	Number of authorisations issued in 2015		
Activity type	in organisational units (as at 31 December 2015)	licenses	annexes	decisions on registration
Class I laboratory	1	0	0	0
Class II laboratory	107	8	21	0
Class III laboratory	239	6	11	8
Class Z laboratory	191	9	4	7
Smoke detector service	373	7	2	0
Device service	174	15	14	0
Isotope devices	695	40	33	5
Manufacture of isotope sources and devices	32	1	2	0
Trade in isotope sources and devices	77	4	6	2
Accelerator	147	16	21	0
Isotope applicators	50	3	12	0
Telegamma therapy	5	0	0	0
Radiation device	38	1	0	0
Gamma graphic apparatus	115	7	21	0
Storage facility of isotope sources	76	21	1	0
Works with sources outside registered laboratory	59	8	1	2
Transport of sources or waste	495	7	4	5
Chromatograph	276	0	0	9
Veterinary X-ray apparatus	1021	123	8	0
X-ray scanner	568	60	13	0
Defectoscope	228	13	20	0
Other X-ray apparatus	558	48	23	8
Total:	5525	397	217	46

users of ionising radiation sources. In 2015 individual documentation types were specified in the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 3 December 2002 on the documents required when applying for authorization to conduct activity involving exposure to ionizing radiation or when notifying the conduct of such activity (Journal of Laws No 220, Item 1851, as amended).

Apart from the said documentation, a detailed analysis is also conducted to cover the following issues: substantiation for the commencement of the activity involving exposure, utility dose limits proposed, quality assurance programme in connection with the activity conducted and an internal emergency plan for cases of radiation emergency.


Figure 2 provides a collation of data concerning ..... the number of licenses and annexes to licences issued in the years 1992– -2015.

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The above figures do not cover nuclear facilities and radioactive waste processing and storage facilities.







#### IV. 3. REGULATORY INSPECTIONS

Inspections covering organisational entities, other than nuclear facilities or radioactive waste repository, were performed by Nuclear Regulatory Inspectors from the PAA Radiological Protection Department (RPD) operating in Warsaw, Katowice and Poznań. In 2015, 773 such inspections were performed, including 9 re-inspections (i.e. second inspections performed in the same year), out of which 281 inspections were conducted by RPD inspectors from Warsaw, 301 – by inspectors from the RPD unit in Katowice and 191 – by inspectors from the Poznań unit. Prior to commencement of every inspection, a detailed analysis was performed covering documentation concerning the inspected organisational entity and the activity it conducts from the perspective of initial assessment of potential "critical points" of the activity conducted and the quality system deployed at the given unit (Figure 3).

In order to ensure appropriate frequency of inspections, new cycles of inspections were agreed for particular groups of activities depending on the threat posed by the given group of activities. At the same time, based on the results of inspections performed in recent years, specific activities were distinguished which, from the perspective of assessment of the hazards involved in such activities and on account of the evolving safety culture of personnel performing such activities, do not require direct supervision in the form of routine inspections or when such inspections are aimless.

Ad-hoc inspections in entities performing the selected activities are only conducted occasionally, as the need be, and supervision of such activities is mainly based on the analysis of reports on the activity, records of individual sources and declarations of shipment submitted. Data regarding audits and inspections performed by Nuclear Regulatory Inspectors from the PAA Radiological Protection Department in 2015 have been provided in Table 3.

**Table 3.** Number and frequency of inspections
 conducted in 2015 by the PAA Radiological Protection Department inspectors.

Symbols designating activity types	Number of audits/ inspec- tions in 2015	Frequency of audits /inspections
I	2	annual
II	37	every 2 years
	44	every 3 years
Z	44	every 4 years
UIC	9	ad hoc
UIA	51	every 3 years
AKP	139	every 3 years
PRO	10	every 3 years
DYS	8	ad hoc
АКС	50	every 2 years
APL	21	every 2 years
TLG	3	every 2 years
URD	10	every 3 years
DEF	49	every 2 years
MAG	19	every 3 years
TER	19	every 3 years
TRN	6	ad hoc
CHR	0	ad hoc
RTW	12	ad hoc
RTS	10	ad hoc
RTD	95	every 2 years
RTG	131	every 7 years

The symbols used in the above table, designating activity types have been defined in Table 1.





#### IV. 4. REGISTER OF SEALED RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

The obligation of maintaining sealed radioactive sources register stems from article 43c, section 1 of the Atomic Law of 29 November 2000. In accordance with section 3 of the said article, heads of organisational units performing activity which involves use or storage of sealed radioactive sources or equipment featuring such sources under the relevant authorisation granted are obliged to submit copies of records concerning the radioactive sources to the PAA President. Such documents include record sheets containing the following data about sources: radioactive isotope name, activity according to a source certificate, date when the activity was established, certificate number and source type, storage vessel type or device name and place of the source use or storage. Heads of organisational units are obliged to send copies of the record sheets to the PAA President by 31 January each year.

Data extracted from the accountancy cards are entered into the register of sealed radioactive sources, used to verify information about individual sources. The information contained in the said register is used to supervise organisational units conducting activity involving exposure to ionising radiation. The supervision consists in comparing accountancy cards entries with the scope of the given authorisation issued. Data from the register are also used to prepare information and statements for central government and local administration bodies for purposes of mutual cooperation and statistics. A detailed collation of selected isotopes and sources containing them, extracted from the register of sealed radioactive sources, has been provided in Table 4.

The register contains data of 24,562 sources, including disused radioactive sources (taken out of service and delivered to the Radioactive Waste Management Plant in Otwock-Świerk) as well as information concerning their movement (i.e. date of receipt and shipment of the given source) and associated documents. The register software enables identification of a source according to the certificate number and determination of its current activity, use or storage place as well as identification of the current and previous users of the source.

> Depending on the purpose and the activity of the source, and a type of the radioactive isotope contained in the source, the register software

enables the given source to be classified under different categories in accordance with recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency:

- Category 1 comprises sealed radioactive sources used in such fields as: teleradiotherapy in medicine, industrial radiography, radiation technologies. The register contains 1,633 sources of this category which are currently in use (status as at 31 December 2015).
- Category 2 comprises sealed radioactive sources used in such fields as: medicine (brachytherapy), geology (borehole drilling), industrial radiography (mobile control and measurement instruments and stationary instruments for industrial applications) including level and density meters containing sources of Cs-137 with the activity exceeding 20 GBq and of Co-60 with the activity exceeding 1 GBq, thickness meters containing sources of Kr-85 with the activity exceeding 50 GBq, sources of Am-241 with the activity exceeding 10 GBq, sources of Sr-90 with the activity exceeding 4 GBg and of Tl-204 with the activity exceeding 40 GBq, belt conveyor weighbridges containing sources of Cs-137 with the activity exceeding 10 GBq, sources of Co-60 with the activity exceeding 1 GBg and of Am-241 with the activity exceeding 10 GBq.

The register contains 2,539 sources of this category (status as at 31 December 2015).

• Category 3 comprises other sealed radioactive sources, including those used in stationary control and measurement instruments.

The register contains 8,124 sources of this category (status as at 31 December 2015).



lastasa	Number of registered sources				
Isotope	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3		
Co-60	776	1 324	2 117		
Ir-192	400	72	1		
Cs-137	79	272	2327		
Se-75	353	9	5		
Am-241	6	404	904		
Pu-239	3	120	104		
Ra-226	-	79	63		
Sr-90	-	31	845		
Pu-238	1	76	21		
Кг-85	3	23	205		
Tl-204	-	-	95		
other	12	129	1 437		

**Table 4.** Examples of radioactive isotopes and sources containing them, classified under individual categories.



# SUPERVISION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES

### V. SUPERVISION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES

### V. 1. NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN POLAND

According to the Atomic Law, there are the following nuclear facilities in Poland: the MARIA research reactor along with its technological pool where spent nuclear fuel is stored during the facility operation; the EWA research reactor (the first research reactor in Poland operated in the years 1958–1995, and subsequently subject to decommissioning), as well as spent nuclear fuel storages.

These facilities are administered by two separate organisational entities:

- the MARIA reactor at the National Centre for Nuclear Research (NCNR) based in Świerk near Otwock, established in September 2011 by merging the Institute for Nuclear Problems and the POLA-TOM Institute of Nuclear Energy,
- the EWA reactor as well as spent nuclear fuel storages at the Radioactive Waste Management Plant (RWMP), which also owns and administers the National Radioactive Waste Repository (NRWR) based in Różan.

Pursuant to the Atomic Law, directors of these entities are responsible for ensuring nuclear safety, radiological protection, physical protection and safeguards.

### 1.1. MARIA reactor

Historically, the MARIA research reactor is the second research reactor which has been built in Poland (disregarding the critical assemblies of ANNA, AGA-TA and MARYLA), and currently the only Polish nuclear reactor in service. It is a high-flux pool-type reactor with the nominal thermal power of 30 MWt and the maximum flux density of thermal neutrons in the core of 3.5.10<sup>18</sup> n/(m<sup>2</sup>·s). The MARIA reactor was commissioned in 1975, and in the years 1985–1993, the reactor was shut down for the necessary upgrading which included installation of a passive core cooling system using water from the reactor pool. From April 1999 to June 2002, gradual conversion of the reactor core was conducted in 106 consecutive reactor fuel cycles, thus decreasing the fuel enrichment from 80% to 36% of the U-235 isotope content (HEU - high enriched fuel).

Under implementation of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) programme, low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel with the content of the U-235 isotope below 20% was introduced into the MARIA reactor core. For the sake of application of this fuel type, a dedicated tender was conducted, a supplier was chosen and tests of the new fuel were undertaken. The tender was won by CERCA, a company belonging to the French corporation AREVA. In 2009, CER-CA manufactured two fuel elements marked as MC, with the 19.75% enrichment and containing 485 g of the U-235 isotope, installed in the MARIA reactor. The tests of the said elements were completed in the first quarter of 2011, and the results obtained as well as visual inspections of spent fuel elements in the technological pool confirmed their good quality and fitness for the MARIA reactor. Upon obtaining the PAA President's approval in September 2012, the reactor core conversion into low enriched fuel commenced by gradually introducing the MC fuel elements into the core and using them to replace the high enriched fuel previously used. The use of high enriched fuel and the official core conversion into low enriched fuel was completed in September 2014. The core conversion process was handled without issues and in conformity with documentation approved by the PAA President beforehand.

At the end of 2014 the reactor's operator started its efforts to obtain a new license for the operation of the MARIA research reactor. Having supplemented the license documentation required by the Polish law and having presented relevant safety analyses the license for next 10 years of operation of the reactor was issued by the PAA President on 31 March 2015.

The 2015 reactor operation schedule was set in a manner matching the following needs:

- demand for irradiation of uranium plates required for production of molybdenum-99 for an American company, Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals. The task was performed in 17 fuel cycles during which the uranium plates were irradiated in channels adapted to this purpose exclusively;
- irradiation of target materials for the Radioisotope Centre POLATOM, namely tellurium dioxide, potassium chloride, sulphur, lutetium, cobalt and iron intended for radioisotopes production to be used in nuclear medicine.


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Figure 4 provides statistics concerning the irradiation of target materials (from 1978 to 2015, inclusive). In 2015, the MARIA reactor remained in service for

4,776 hours, working in 36 fuel cycles, as illustrated in Figure 5 on page 42.

### Fig. 4. Materials irradiated in the MARIA reactor until 2015 (NCNR).



#### **Table 5.** General information concerning operation of the MARIA reactor in 2015.

Quarter		L.	Ш	Ш	IV	Total
Number of c	ycles	9	8	10	9	36
Time of oper	ation at nominal power [h]	1290	996	1357	1133	4776
Reactor pow	er [MWt]	0.3-23	0.3-25.5	0.3-24	0.3-23	-
Number of fuel elements in the core		25-26	26	25-26	25	-
Unplanned sl	Unplanned shutdowns and trips		6	2	0	8
	Human error	0	0	0	0	0
Causes	Leakage of primary cooling cir- cuit	0	2	0	0	2
	Instrumentation error	0	3	1	0	4
	Loss of electrical power	0	1	1	0	2
Malfunctions/defects and non-conformity found		4	4	1	1	10
Repair and maintenance works conducted		9	14	9	10	42
Tests, inspec	tions and checks conducted	19	38	16	48	111

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Compared to the preceding year, the overall number of unplanned shutdowns increased. The unplanned shutdowns were caused by minor losses of electrical power, not constituting a risk of leakages in the primary circuit, caused by weather conditions and equipment failures, while the number of tests, inspections and maintenance in comparison with the preceding year increased by about 33%.

The MARIA research reactor has also been used for physical studies, mainly of condensed matter, using horizontal channels (H-3 to H-8), and in 2015, they were predominantly used for the following purposes:

- Measurements of the grain size and intergranular inclusion in the ODS type steels,
- Measurements of the peculiarities of inelastic neutron scattering in the Mn-10% Ge alloy,
- Studies of the migration process of transformer oil in paper insulation,
- Survey radiographs samples holder standardizing paleobiological objects,
- Studies of nanostructures synthetic zeolites A, F9, and BCV,
- Studies of radiographs standard layer obtained at different exposure parameters,
- Studies of the process of capillary water through a mixture of quartz sand and granulated synthetic zeolites A, F9, and BCV1000,
- Studies of ageing effect in samples of brass and bronze using neutron small angle scattering meth-

od (in collaboration with the Institute of Archeology of the University of Warsaw),

- Studies of relation dispersion spin waves in the sample Mn-7.5% Ge alloy,
- Studies of historical objects including photography and leather holder (in cooperation with the Paper and Leather Conservation Section of Institute of Historical Monument and Restoration Studies at the Fine Arts Department, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń),
- Drying test samples of paper flat materials including paper towel and one layer of tissue saturated with water,
- Absorption measurements for the layer standard for different gains and exposure times,
- Testing of temperature distributions in drying and soaking analyses systems,
- Studies of orientation and quality of 4 Mn-Ge alloy samples and determination of their crystal structure properties,
- Characterization of Bragg-Reflexion in neutron scattering on monocrystal Cu-Al before and after extrusion,
- Measurements of chosen fragments of photon dispersion relations in tempered sample of Mn-Ni-Cu alloy.

The total opening time of 6 horizontal channels in the MARIA reactor in 2015 came to ca. 6,530 hours.





**Fig. 5.** Summary of the MARIA reactor operation cycles in 2015 – (NCNR. Developed and prepared by Andrzej Frydrysiak – DOM EJ2).



### 1.2. EWA reactor under decommissioning

The EWA research reactor was operated in the years 1958–1995 initially by the Institute of Nuclear Research, and after the entity's transformation – by the Institute of Atomic Energy. The reactor's original thermal power was 2 MWt, and afterwards increased to 10 MWt.

Started in 1997, the reactor decommissioning process, in 2002 reached the status referred to as the end of phase two. It means that nuclear fuel and all irradiated structures and components whose activity level might have been hazardous from the perspective of radiological protection, were removed from the reactor. The re-

actor building was refurbished and office premises were adapted to the needs of the Radioactive Waste Management Plant. Under the Phare PL0113.02.01 project, a hot cell intended for processing of high-activity material was constructed by Babcock Noell Nuclear in the decommissioned EWA reactor hall. Low enriched spent nuclear fuel marked with the EK-10 symbol, which had been used at the initial stage of the EWA reactor's operation in the years 1958–1967, was encapsulated in the hot cell.

### 1.3. Spent nuclear fuel storages

In accordance with the Atomic Law, in Poland, the category of nuclear facilities also includes wet spent nuclear fuel storages, i.e. facilities no. 19 and 19A op-

**Table 6.** Spent nuclear fuel stored in water pools at NCNR (MARIA reactor) and RWMP (EWA reactor)in Świerk on 31 December 2015.

Fuel from reactor	Fuel label	Storage facility	Number of elements
MARIA	MC	technological pool	19
	MR-6	technological pool	51
	MR LEU	technological pool	2

erated since January 2002 by the Radioactive Waste Management Plant which assumed supervisory control over the spent fuel stored in them.

Facility no. 19 was used to store the encapsulated spent low enriched nuclear fuel EK-10 from the EWA reactor, shipped to the country of origin (i.e. the Russian Federation) in September 2012.

This facility is also used for storage of some solid radioactive waste (structural elements) from decommissioning of the EWA reactor and operation of the MARIA reactor, as well as disused high-activity sealed sources.

Facility no. 19A was used for storage of spent high enriched nuclear fuel marked as WWR-SM and WWR-M2 from the operation of the EWA reactor in the years 1967–1995 as well as the spent encapsulated MR nuclear fuel from the MARIA reactor's operation in the years 1974–2005. Since all the spent nuclear fuel from storage no. 19A was shipped back to the Russian Federation in 2010, the Storage is currently used as a backup for storage of spent fuel from the MARIA reactor in case of emergency.

The MARIA reactor's technological pool is mainly used for the storage of spent MC nuclear fuel from the current operation of the reactor and from spent nuclear MR fuel before the full conversion of the core.

After being removed from the reactor core, spent fuel elements require suitable cooling time before they can be shipped to another location, e.g. to the country of origin for recycling or to the permanent spent nuclear fuel repository.

### V. 2. LICENSES ISSUED

Until 31 March 2015 the MARIA reactor has been operated by the National Centre of Nuclear Research on the basis of license no. 1/2009/MARIA of 31 March 2009 issued by the PAA President. Since 1 April 2015 the said reactor has been operated in accordance with license no. 1/2015/Maria issued by the PAA President. The said license is valid until 31 March 2025.

Furthermore, the PAA President issued the following licenses concerning the functioning of the MARIA reactor which are not the licenses to operate a nuclear facility:

- License no. 1/2015/NCBJ of 3 April 2015 for storage of nuclear material,
- License no. 2/2015/NCBJ of 3 April 2015 for storage of spent nuclear fuel.

The EWA reactor decommissioning as well as the spent nuclear fuel storages are operated by the Radioactive Waste Management Plant under license no. 1/2002/EWA of 15 January 2002. The license is valid for an indefinite period of time.

The license was amended several times in previous years, in connection with the transport of spent nuclear fuel.

Licenses issued by the PAA President for the performance of activities at nuclear facilities are prepared by PAA's Nuclear Safety Department (NSD).



### V. 3. REGULATORY INSPECTIONS

In 2015, Nuclear Regulatory Inspectors from PAA's Nuclear Safety Department performed 15 inspections concerning nuclear safety and radiation protection as well as physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, including:

- thirteen inspections at the National Centre for Nuclear Research,
- two inspections at the Radioactive Waste Management Plant, including at the National Radioactive Waste Repository in Różan.

The inspections conducted at NCNR covered the MA-RIA reactor and included, among other aspects, the verification and assessment of:

- Technical condition of systems, structures and components, as well as the compliance of technical documentation and the documentation for the operation of the MARIA reactor during the issuance of a license for the operation of a nuclear facility,
- Compliance of the MARIA reactor current operation and documentation with limits and conditions of the license granted,
- Status of radiation protection of the reactor facility,
- Fulfilment of recommendations from the inspections conducted in 2014,
- Emergency and preparedness plan to take action in the event of a radiation emergency at NCNR,
- Radioactive waste management,
- Condition of absorbing rods, correctness of operation of the system for measuring the vacuum in technological rooms and the implementation of the provisions of the quality assurance programme and other legal requirements in terms of a break for repair works,
- Operation of warning and emergency signaling,
- Keeping proper order at all workstations in a nuclear facility and supervision over external units performing outsourced works for a nuclear facility.

In addition to the inspections directly related to the MARIA reactor, the inspectors conducted the inspections related to provision of physical protection of nuclear facilities and verification of the NCNR emergency plan.

> The inspection conducted in the Radioactive Waste Management Plant in Świerk was related to:

- status of radiological protection of the facilities operated by the Radioactive Waste Management Plant,
- ensuring radiological protection and the compliance of conduct with relevant instructions during taking the samples from concrete elements of the EWA reactor (under decommissioning) core shell,
- carrying out the processes of radioactive waste disposal and radioactive waste storage,
- keeping records of incoming and stored radioactive waste.

The inspection carried out at the National Radioactive Waste Repository in Różan which belongs to the Radioactive Waste Management Plant, was focused on:

- checking the procedure of receipt of radioactive waste for disposal and the documentation of radioactive waste received for disposal in the current year from the Radioactive Waste Management Plant,
- observance of radiological protection rules of the National Radioactive Waste Repository in Różan,
- measurement of ionising radiation dose rate in selected points of the NRWR,
- status of operation of the facilities of the National Radioactive Waste Repository in Różan.

The inspections conducted in NCNR and NRWR, as well as an analysis of quarterly reports did not show any threat to nuclear safety, any breach of provisions in the scope of radiological protection or any breach of the conditions of licenses and binding procedures of conduct.

### V. 4. FUNCTIONING OF THE COORDINATION SYSTEM FOR INSPECTION AND SUPERVISION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES

In accordance with the provisions of the Atomic Law, for purposes of supervision and control of nuclear safety and radiological protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear regulatory authority - the PAA cooperates with other public administration bodies entailing competences and responsibilities of these authorities, particularly with the Office of Technical Inspection, the National Fire Service, environmental protection inspection bodies, building inspection bodies,

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State Sanitary Inspection authorities, the National Labour Inspectorate and the Internal Security Agency.

The Atomic Law defines principles of coordination and cooperation of the aforementioned administration bodies by establishing a coordination system for control and supervision of nuclear facilities, referred to as the "coordination system". The management of the coordination system was entrusted to the PAA President who was vested with several necessary entitlements, such as the possibility to convene meetings of representatives of cooperating authorities and inviting to these meetings representatives of other authorities and services as well as laboratories, expert organisations, expert surveyors and specialists who can render advice and support and ultimately contribute to the effectiveness of the system. The latter objective is also attained by establishing teams to handle individual specific tasks connected with the coordination of control and supervision of nuclear facilities.

The cooperation between the bodies covered by the system particularly entails the exchange of information about the controlling activities conducted, organization of joint training courses and exchange of experience as well as new legal acts and technical and organisational guidance.

In 2015,

- collaboration between PAA and the Internal Security Agency in assessment of documentation of the physical protection system at the National Centre for Nuclear Research in Świerk, as well as the preparation for the International Physical Protection Advisory Service Review Mission of the International Atomic Energy Agency planned for February 2016,
- continuation of works aimed to develop a draft agreement (the signature of which is scheduled for 2016) between parties to the coordination system, the purpose of which is to define detailed working principles of the system, including: planning of joint inspections, exchange of information on results of the supervisory activities conducted and joint training actions,
- analysis of the results of inspections conducted at the National Centre for Nuclear Research by the General Office of Building Control.

### V. 5. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

## 5.1. Nuclear power plants in a 300 km distance from the country borders

In a distance not larger than 300 km from Polish borders, there are 8 nuclear power plants operating 23 power reactor units with the total capacity of ca. 15 GWe (Figure 6), which has not changed since the year 2014. They include:

- 14 WWER-440 type reactors:
  - 2 units at the Rivne NPP (Ukraine)
    - 420 MWe and 415 MWe,
  - 2 units at the Bohunice NPP (Slovakia) – 505 MWe each,
  - 2 units at the Mochovce NPP (Slovakia) – 470 MWe each,
  - 4 units at the Paks NPP (Hungary),
  - 500 MWe each,
  - 4 units at the Dukovany NPP
  - (Czech Republic) 500 MWe each,
- 6 reactors of WWER-1000 type:
  - 2 units at the Rivne NPP (Ukraine)
  - 1000 MWe each,
  - 2 units at the Khmelnytskyi NPP (Ukraine) – 1000 MWe each,
  - 2 units at the Temelin NPP
  - (Czech Republic) 1080 MWe each,
- 3 type BWR reactors:
  - 3 units at the Oskarshamn NPP (Sweden) with nominal capacities of 492, 661 and 1450 MWe, respectively.

Within the same distance, there are seven units in four nuclear power plants in a permanent shutdown stage, subject to the decommissioning process:

- Ignalina NPP (Lithuania)
  - 2 type RBMK units with the nominal power of 1300 MWe, shut down in 2004 and 2009,
- Barsebäck NPP (Sweden)
  - 2 type BWR units with the nominal power of 600 MWe, shut down in 1999 and 2005, and
- Bohunice NPP (Slovakia)
  - 2 type WWER-440 units with the nominal power of 440 MWe, shut down in 2006 and 2008,
- as well as a nuclear power plant shut down after the

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- Fukushima disaster in 2011:
- Krümmel NPP (Germany)
- 1 type BWR unit with the nominal power of 1315 MWe.






Fig. 6. Nuclear power plants located within the distance of 300km from Polish borders.

Due to the fact that the operation of these nuclear power plants may theoretically create radiation hazards for the population of Poland, bilateral intergovernmental agreements were signed with respective nuclear regulatory authorities of the neighbouring countries (see chapter XII.2.)

## 5.2. Operating data of nuclear power plants in neighbouring countries

Based on the information published by the IAEA, operating data of nuclear power plants located within the distance of 300 km from Polish borders have been collated in Table 7.

**Table 7.** Basic information and operating parameters from 2015 for all reactors located in the vicinity of Polish<br/>borders (data obtained from the IAEA, 4 May 2016).

	Country	Nuclear	Gross electric	Start-	Electric Energy	Caj	pacity factor [%]
	/Nuclear power unit	power share /Reactor type	power [MWe]	up year	output [TWh]	2015 (annual)	multiannual (accumulated)
	Czech Republic	35.8%					
	Dukovany-1	WWER-440/213	500	1985	2.66	64.8	84.5
	Dukovany-2	WWER-440/213	500	1986	2.50	60.5	84.3
	Dukovany-3	WWER-440/213	500	1986	2.67	65.2	83.6
•	Dukovany-4	WWER-440/213	500	1987	4.00	97.1	86.0

Country	Nuclear	Gross electric	Start-	Electric Energy	Capacity factor [%]	
/Nuclear power unit	power share /Reactor type	power [MWe]	up year	output [TWh]	2015 (annual)	multiannual (accumulated)
Temelin	WWER-1000/320	1080	2000	7.58	84.4	73.7
Temelin	WWER-1000/320	1080	2002	5.93	66.8	77.2
Slovakia	55.9%					
Bohunice-3	WWER-440/213	505	1984	3.40	82.1	78.6
Bohunice-4	WWER-440/213	505	1985	3.70	89.6	80.2
Mochovce-1	WWER-440/213	470	1998	3.44	90.0	84.6
Mochovce-2	WWER-440/213	470	1999	3.56	93.2	83.8
Sweden	34.3%					
Oskarshamn-1	ABB BWR	492	1971	2.49	60.1	60.4
Oskarshamn-2	ABB BWR	661	1974	0.00	00.0	71.4
Oskarshamn-3	ABB BWR	1450	1985	9.67	78.8	77.5
Ukraine	56.5%		1			
Chmielnicki-1	WWER-1000/320	1000	1987	6.75	81.2	73.7
Chmielnicki-2	WWER-1000/320	1000	2004	6.04	72.6	76.1
Równe-1	WWER-440/2013	420	1980	2.71	81.3	75.5
Równe-2	WWER-440/213	415	1981	2.71	82.3	77.2
Równe-3	WWER-1000/320	1000	1986	5.59	67.2	67.6
Równe-4	WWER-1000/320	1000	2004	6.50	78.2	66.7
Hungary	52.7%		L			<b>I</b>
Paks-1	WWER-440/213	500	1982	3.42	83.0	87.1
Paks-2	WWER-440/213	500	1984	3.89	93.9	82.5
Paks-3	WWER-440/213	500	1986	3.80	91.8	87.2
		500	1987	3.85	92.9	89.1



The table contains data regarding:

- 1) share of nuclear power plants in the electric energy output in the given country, ,
- 2) current gross electric power after all the upgrades completed,
- date of the first connection to the grid (and not of commissioning),
- 4) annual and multiannual (accumulated) capacity factor in 2015 (first column) since the beginning of the unit operation until 2015 (second column), calculated as a proportion between the electric energy produced and the output theoretically attainable on nominal power in a unit of time.

Comments to the data provided in the table above:

- 1. majority of reactors (i.e. 12) were commissioned in the years 1984-1987, and they are WWER-440 reactors, subject to significant upgrades increasing their nominal power (440 MW) at the unit commissioning time, and two reactors of the same type put into operation in Slovakia after prolonged interruption in the construction phase,
- 2. WWER-1000 reactors were commissioned in the years 1986-2004,
- 3. in 2015, WWER-440 reactors operated with the capacity factor from 60,5 to 97,1%, whereas WWER-1000 reactors operated with the capacity factor from 66,86 to 84,4%, where the lower factor implies that the given unit operated with reduced capacity, as defined by the grid administrating party,
- 4. the multiannual capacity factor for the Paks-2 reactor was clearly lower compared to other reactors of the same power plant, but it resulted from a long downtime in the years 2003–2004 as a consequence of a failure which occurred while cleaning fuel elements,
- 5. the Oskarshamn-1 reactor (Sweden) is BWR type reactor of the highest capacity in the world at present,
- 6. the owner of Oskarshamn-1 and 2 reactors announced that the reactors would be decommissioned by 2020.

### 5.3. Nuclear power plants constructed and planned in the vicinity of the country borders

In 2015, Poland's neighbouring countries were implementing the following construction projects:


- two type WWER-440 reactors at the Mochovce NPP (Slovakia) which, according to the current plans, are to be commissioned in 2017. They are second generation reactors, and their construction started already in the 1980s, subsequently interrupted and then resumed after a series of improvements had been introduced following the latest requirements for safety of reactors operated in the European Union;
- 2) two type WWER-1200 (AES-2006) reactors at the Ostrovets NPP (Belarus) The construction of the first one was officially commenced (once the first concrete was poured) in November 2013, whereas its commissioning is scheduled for 2019. The second reactor started being built in May 2014, and it is scheduled for commissioning in 2020.

Furthermore, as far as countries bordering on Poland are concerned, there were plans to start the construction of a nuclear reactor at the Visaginas NPP in Lithuania in 2015 in the closest vicinity of a decommissioned power plant in Ignalina. This construction project is still under discussion in terms of economic issues.

The plans to build two blocks of WWER-1200 type in the Paks NPP in Hungary are also in the phase of trade negotiations and political discussions.

The construction of the first WWER-1200 reactor at the Baltic NPP in the Kaliningrad region in Russia is still suspended. The construction was started in 2012 and it is anticipated that it will involve the construction of WWER-1200 type reactor. The suspension of the construction is associated with a second economic analysis with regard to the refusal to supply electricity to Poland and resignation from the installation of a submarine power cable to Germany.

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## VI. NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFEGUARDS

### VI. 1. LEGAL BASIS FOR SAFEGUARDS

With regard to safeguards Poland fulfills its obligations resulting from the following international regulations:

- Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty) of 25 March 1957. The Treaty came into force on 1 January 1958. In Poland, the provisions of the Treaty have been binding since Poland's accession to the European Union;
- Article III of the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Treaty came into force on 5 March 1970, and it was extended for an indefinite period of time in 1995. Poland ratified the Treaty on 3 May 1969 and it came into force on 5 May 1970;
- Agreement between Poland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with the implementation of Article III of the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also known as Trilateral Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193. It came into force in Poland on 1 March 2007;
- Additional Protocol to the Trilateral Safeguards Agreement in connection with the implementation of Article III of the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/193/Add8). The Protocol came into force on 1 March 2007;
- Commission Regulation (Euratom) no. 302/2005 of 8 February 2005 on the application of Euratom safeguards (OJ L 54 of 28 February 2005).

The most common form of safeguards agreement, concluded on the grounds provided by the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons between countries not being in possession of nuclear weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), is an agreement based on the IAEA's model document, INFCIRC/153.

Pursuant to the latter, in 1972 Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency signed the agreement for the application of safeguards, as laid down in the IAEA's document INFCIRC/179. In March 2006 an integrated safeguards system was introduced in Poland. The introduction of this system became possible following the submission of all the relevant information concerning the safeguards to the IAEA. On this basis the IAEA established that nuclear material was used in Poland for peaceful purposes only. The deployment of the integrated safeguards system allowed for considerable reduction of the number of inspections undertaken by the IAEA in Poland. The bilateral agreement for the application of safeguards concluded between Poland and the IAEA remained effective until February 2007.

Once Poland joined the European Union, the agreement between Poland and the IAEA was suspended. The integrated safeguards system has been binding since 1 March 2007 under a trilateral agreement between Poland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The PAA President is responsible for the implementation of this agreement.

Pursuant to the trilateral agreement in question, the IAEA and EURATOM have been vested with entitlements to conduct safeguards inspections. Objectives of these inspections include verification of conformity between reports and the operator's documentation, identification and validation of the nuclear material storage facility, verification of quantity and composition of materials placed under safeguards, explanation of reasons for material unaccounted for and discrepancies in the information provided by the nuclear material dispatcher and recipient. Inspections are also conducted before nuclear material are removed from the Polish territory or after they are brought in.

The tasks of the national system of accounting and control of nuclear material are conducted by the Non-Proliferation Division of PAA's Department of Nuclear Safety, which is responsible for the collection and storing of information concerning nuclear material and for carrying out inspections in all material balance areas.

In matters regarding inspection of export and import of nuclear material, strategic goods and dual-use technologies the PAA cooperates with the Ministry of Economic Development, which uses the opinions submitted by under the Tracker system by PAA and other ministries, and issues decisions in this regard. In 2015 PAA submitted to the Ministry of Economic Development, by way of the Tracker system, a range of opinions concerning the applications for import or export of nuclear material and strategic goods.

### VI. 2. USERS OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN POLAND

The state system for accounting for and control of nuclear material, previously required by the bilateral agreement and subsequently by the trilateral agreement between Poland, EURATOM and the IAEA, is based on structures referred to as material balance areas.

Nuclear material is used in Poland by the following entities constituting separate material balance areas:

- Radioactive Waste Management Plant (RWMP), responsible for spent nuclear fuel storages, the shipment warehouse and the National Radioactive Waste Repository in Różan (material balance area);
- MARIA Reactor Operations Division and the associated research laboratories at the National Centre for Nuclear Research (NCNR) in Świerk (WPLC);
- POLATOM Radioisotopes Centre / NCNR in Świerk (WPLD);
- Institute of Chemistry and Nuclear Technology in Warsaw (WPLF);
- 26 medical and research facilities using small quantities of nuclear material and 95 industrial, diagnostic and service facilities equipped with depleted uranium shields. All facilities comprise the material balance area. Locations Outside the Facilities (WPLE).

Until October 2013, the research laboratories at NCNR constituted an independent material balance area. On account of the small quantities of nuclear material in this area, under the agreement with EU-RATOM, in November 2013, it was included into the material balance area established by the MARIA Reactor Operations Division.


In accordance with the requirements of the Euratom Treaty and Commission Regulation no. 302/2005, any changes to quantities of nuclear material held by individual users must be reported on a monthly basis to the system of nuclear material accountancy and inspection managed by the European Commission's Euratom Energy Directorate in Luxembourg. Copies of the foregoing information are also submitted by users to PAA. The reports prepared by users of nuclear material are sent to the Commission and to PAA by means of the ENMAS Light programme. The European Commission's Euratom Safeguards Directorate forwards copies of the reports to the International Atomic Energy Agency based in Vienna.

For the purpose of fulfillment of obligations assumed under the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), in 2015 all institutions responsible for the transport started their preparations to last transport of spent nuclear fuel from the Nuclear Centre in Świerk to the Russian Federation. The transport assumed for 2016 will cause that there will be no high enriched uranium nuclear fuel in Poland.









### VI. 3. INSPECTIONS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFEGUARDS

In 2015, nuclear regulatory inspectors from the Non-Proliferation Division of PAA's Nuclear Safety Department, unassisted or acting together with the IAEA and EURATOM inspectors, performed 38 safeguards inspections in all material balance areas in Poland. The EURATOM inspectors participated in 18 inspections, whereas the IAEA inspectors participated in one inspection in WPLC.


Moreover, in accordance with the Trilateral Agreement in force the IAEA inspectors carried out a so called "short notice inspection" in WPLC. The EURAT-OM and PAA inspectors took part in the said inspection.

The IAEA carried out one inspection without any notice, in which the PAA inspector participated.

On 14-16 July 2015 the European Commission carried out an audit in POLATOM Radioisotopes Centre of the National Centre for Nuclear Research (WPLD), which is a distributor of radioisotopes produced in NCNR and used for medical, scientific, and industrial purposes. The basis of the audit conduct and corresponding criteria are set out in the Commission Recommendation of 11 February 2009 on the Implementation of a nuclear material accountancy and control system by nuclear operators of nuclear installations (2009/120/Euratom). The subject-matter of the audit was handling nuclear material safeguarded in the Radioisotopes Centre. In the Centre depleted uranium is mainly used as a shielding material in containers for transport of isotopes. During the audit the representatives of the European Commission assessed the management system of accountancy and control, recording the movement of nuclear material (containers for the transport of isotopes) and data processing. As a result of the audit a number of conclusions were formulated, the implementation of which will improve the system of internal accountancy and control of nuclear material in POLA-TOM Radioisotopes Centre.

In connection with the fulfillment of all the relevant obligations under the Additional Protocol to the Trilateral Agreement, PAA submitted to Euratom a declaration which updates the information about the technical or research activities performed in Poland in relation to a nuclear fuel cycle as well as information about absence of export of goods specified in Annex II to the said Protocol, and also a declaration concerning users of small quantities of nuclear material operating in Poland.

The inspections performed revealed no non-conformities connected with safeguards of nuclear material in Poland, and it was specifically confirmed that all nuclear material in Poland was used for peaceful activities.







# TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

## **VII. TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE** MATERIAL

### **VII. 1. TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE** SOURCES AND WASTE

In 2015, transport of radioactive material was conducted in accordance with requirements of the following national regulations:

- Atomic Law Act of 29 November 2000,
- Transport of Dangerous Goods Act of 19 August 2011,
- Maritime Safety Act of 18 August 2011,
- Aviation Law Act of 3 July 2002,
- Transport Law Act of 15 November 1984.

The Polish provisions of law are based on the following international modal regulations:

- ADR (L'Accord européen relatif au transport international des marchandises Dangereuses par Route)
- **RID** (Reglement concernant le transport Internationale ferroviaire des marchandises Dangereuses)
- ADN (European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways)
- IMDG Code (International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code)
- ICAO Technical Instructions
- IATA DGR (International Air Transport Association Dangerous Goods Regulation)

The aforementioned regulations apply to different modes of international transport of dangerous goods.

In accordance with the foregoing regulations, radioactive material is categorised under Class 7 on account of the ionising radiation being the predominant threat involved.

Radioactive material is transported in accordance with transport regulations SSR-6 developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency. They provide grounds for international organisations preparing the aforementioned international modal regulations or they are directly implemented to the national legal framework and constitute the basic legal form in international transport.

Pursuant to the obligations of Poland towards the IAEA, radioactive sources classified under appropriate categories are transported in accordance with the provisions laid down in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources as well as in a supplementary document of Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

The annual reports of organisational entities holding the applicable transport licenses and performing shipments of radioactive material imply that in 2015, in Poland, 32,016 shipments were made and 108,650 items were transported by roads, railway, inland, sea and air means.

Analysing the matter of transport of radioactive substances as a potential source of radiation hazards, one should also mention attempts of illegal (i.e. without proper authorisation or notification) transport of radioactive substances and nuclear material to Poland.

These attempts are prevented by the National Border Guard having 312 fixed radiation portal monitors installed at border crossing points and 1,220 mobile signalling and measurement devices at their disposal. Monitoring of cross-border movement of radioactive and nuclear material is performed by officers of the National Border Guard who have completed expert training courses in radiometric monitoring and radiological protection.

In 2015, the National Border Guard units performed the inspections as follows:

- shipments of radioactive sources:
  - regarding import to Poland 981 inspections,
  - regarding transit through and transport out of Poland – 2672 inspections
- shipments of materials containing naturally occurring radioactive isotopes (NORM):
  - regarding import to Poland 3871 inspections,
  - regarding transit through and transport out of Poland – 9829 inspections,
- persons treated or diagnosed with radioactive isotopes – 978 inspections.

As a result of the inspections per-..... formed the National Border Guard detained 17 shipments for

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further clarification due to the lack of required authorisations for import and transport of radioactive substances and exceedance of the admissible radioactive contamination thresholds.

In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2009 by and between the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE), the Minister of the Interior and Administration and the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Poland concerning cooperation in preventing the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material, the National Border Guard was reinforced by the American partner, as in previous years, supplying them with equipment. It included state-of-the-art stationary devices, which supported the activities of the National Border Guard on the eastern border of Poland, being the external border of the EU at the same time. Furthermore, the meetings of the National Board Guard with the experts from the Energy Department of the United States of America were held in connection with the preparation of further installations of stationary equipment on the eastern border and at one of the airports in 2016.

### **VII. 2. TRANSPORT OF NUCLEAR FUEL**

Fresh and spent nuclear fuel is transported under an authorisation granted by the PAA President. In 2015, there was only one shipment of fresh nuclear fuel performed in the territory of Poland.

### 2.1. Fresh nuclear fuel

In 2015, there was one shipment of fresh MC nuclear fuel made from France to Poland for purposes of operation of the MARIA research reactor at the National Centre for Nuclear Research in Świerk.

### 2.2. Spent nuclear fuel

In relation to the implementation of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) which consisted in a transition of research reactors from using high enriched fuel produced in the former Soviet Union to low enriched fuel, the last shipment of spent high enriched nuclear fuel from the MARIA research reactor to the Russian Federation was made in 2014. whereas in 2015 no further shipments were made. In the years 2009–2014, there were seven shipments of spent high enriched nuclear fuel from Polish research reactors of EWA and MARIA to the Russian Federation. Shipments are managed by the Radioactive Waste Management Plant. The PAA President, on the other hand, is responsible for issuing authorisations for the transport and supervises its performance.

Due to the finalized process of conversion of the MA-RIA reactor to low enriched fuel, it is projected that there will still be one more final shipment of spent high enriched nuclear fuel (with the U-235 enrichment above 20%) to the Russian Federation, and at present the said fuel is kept in the storage pool of MARIA reactor. After the shipment is made from Poland, there will be only low enriched nuclear fuel left within its territory.





## **VIII. RADIOACTIVE WASTE**

Radioactive waste is generated as a result of the use of radioisotopes in medicine, industry and scientific research, production of open and sealed radioactive sources and in the course of operation of research reactors. This type of waste may occur in gaseous, solid and liquid form.

The gaseous waste is produced as a consequence of operation of the MARIA research reactor. It mainly comprises radioactive noble gases, iodine, caesium and tritium.

The group of liquid waste mainly constitutes aqueous solutions and suspensions of radioactive substances.

The solid waste group includes disused sealed radioactive sources, personal protection items contaminated with radioactive substances (rubber gloves, protective clothing, footwear), laboratory materials and equipment (glass, components of instruments, lignin, cotton wool, foil), used tools and elements of technological equipment (valves, parts of pipelines or pumps) as well as used sorptive and filtering materials utilised in the purification of radioactive solutions or air released from reactors and isotope laboratories (used ionites, precipitation sludge, filter cartridges etc.). What is taken into consideration in classification of radioactive waste is the radioactive concentration of radioactive isotopes contained in the waste as well as radioactive half-life. One may distinguish between the following categories of radioactive waste: low-, intermediate- and high- level radioactive waste, classified under three sub-categories, namely transitional, short- and long-lived. There are also spent sealed radioactive sources which constitute an additional category of radioactive waste, classified according to the activity level criterion under the following three sub-categories: low-, medium- and high-activity ones. Radioactive waste types containing nuclear material and spent nuclear fuel, the latter becoming high-activity waste when a decision is made to dispose of it, are subject to special regulations on the management procedures applicable at every stage (including storage and disposal).

Radioactive waste may be stored temporarily, however, it is ultimately to be disposed. It should be pointed out that such terms as "storage" and "disposal" are time-specific in nature, since storage is a process limited in time until waste is deposited at a repository, whereas disposal is final and its time is indefinite.

Processing and disposal of radioactive waste require reduction of its production quantity, its appropriate segregation, decrease of volume, solidification and packaging in a manner ensuring that all the measures undertaken and barriers provided effectively isolate the waste from people and the environment. Radioactive waste is stored in a way which ensures

protection of people and the environment under normal conditions and in cases of radiation emergency, including protection of radioactive waste against leakage, dispersion or release. The means that can be used for these purposes are dedicated facilities or compartments (radioactive waste storages) featuring equipment for mechanical or gravitational ventilation as well as purification of air released from such compartments.

Radioactive waste disposal is only allowed at facilities dedicated to this purpose, i.e. at repositories. In accordance with Polish regulations, repositories are divided into near-surface and deep ones, and in the process of their licensing as to the compliance with nuclear safety and radiological protection requirements, this being covered by duties of the PAA President, a detailed specification is prepared regarding types of radioactive waste under particular categories which may be disposed at the given facility.

The organizational entity responsible for collection, transport, processing and disposal of waste generated by radioactive material users in Poland is the Radioactive Waste Management Plant (RWMP). The supervision of safety of waste management, including supervision of safety of waste disposal by RWMP is performed by the PAA President. Before 1 January 2002, not only had the PAA President been responsible for the supervision of waste management safety, but also for the waste management itself, including for the process of investigation into potential sites where a new radioactive waste repository could be constructed. At present, the latter two tasks are excluded from the scope of the PAA President's responsibilities. The PAA President is no longer responsible for exploration and selection of a site for a radioactive waste repository or for the construction or operation of such a repository. These matters are currently managed by the Minister of Economy<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Legal status in 2015.

RWMP renders its services against payment, however, the revenue generated from this activity covers only a part of costs incurred by this enterprise. In 2015, the lacking funds were covered from a subsidy granted by the Ministry of Economy. The Radioactive Waste Management Plant operates facilities situated on the premises of the Nuclear Centre in Świerk, all of them fitted with equipment for radioactive waste conditioning.

The National Radioactive Waste Repository (NRWR) in Różan on the Narew river (ca. 90 km away from Warsaw) is the site of radioactive waste disposal in Poland. According to the IAEA classification, NRWR is a near-surface type repository intended for disposal of short-lived, low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (with the half-life of radionuclides being shorter than 30 years). It is also used to store long-lived, mainly alpha radioactive waste, as well as disused sealed radioactive sources waiting to be placed in a deep repository (also known as geological or underground repository). The Różan repository has been in operation since 1961, and it is the only facility of this type in Poland. Due to the fact that the disposal space is running short, the repository is scheduled to be prepared for closure in the years 2021–2024 and for ultimate closure in 2025-2029 (as stipulated in the National Plan for Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel Management). In 2015, RWMP received 263 orders covering collection of radioactive waste from 168 institutions. Quantities of radioactive waste collected and processed by RWMP (including the waste generated at RWMP) have been provided in Table 8.

The breakdown of solid and liquid waste collected according to its types and categories was as follows:

- Low-level waste (solid) 99.35 m<sup>3</sup>
- Intermediate-level waste (solid) 0.06 m<sup>3</sup>
- Low-level waste (liquid) 49.55m<sup>3</sup>
- Intermediate-level waste (liquid) 0.00 m<sup>3</sup>
- Alpha radioactive waste 0.30 m<sup>3</sup>
- Smoke detectors 18,258 pcs.
- Disused sealed radioactive sources 1,615 pcs.

After being processed, radioactive waste in the solidified form is placed in drums of 200 and 50 dm<sup>3</sup> in capacity, and only then delivered for disposal. In 2015, the National Radioactive Waste Repository received 427 drums of 200 litres with processed radioactive waste as well as 6 hobbocks of 50-litre containing 39 disused radioactive sources. Additionally, 14 nonstandard packages and 13 containers were delivered to the repository. Disused radioactive sources which are not subject to processing (there were 231 containers with 442 disused radioactive sources and 18 shielding containers with 583 disused radioactive sources) are sealed in separate containers.

Processed solid waste was delivered to the repository in the quantity of 121.83 m<sup>3</sup> with the total activity of 1205.00 GBq (as at 31 December 2015).

Sources of waste	Solid waste [m³]	Liquid waste [m³]
From outside of the Świerk Nuclear Centre (medicine. industry. scientific research)	13.04	0.35
National Centre for Nuclear Research/Radioisotope Cen- tre POLATOM	78.90	0.20
National Centre for Nuclear Research + MARIA Reactor*	4.96	49.00
Radioactive Waste Management Plant	2.51	0.00
Total:	99.41	49.55

#### **Table 8.** Quantities of radioactive waste collected by RWMP in 2015.

\* Total number of waste from MARIA reactor and the National Centre for Nuclear Research.

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The repository also receives waste from dismantling of smoke detectors, delivered for the purpose of temporary storage.

RWMP proceeds with the radioactive waste management based on two licenses granted by the PAA President:

- License no. D-14177 of 17 December 2001 authorising to perform activity related to the use of nuclear energy and consisting in transport, processing and storage of radioactive waste on the premises of the Świerk centre, collected from organizational entities conducting activity involving the use of nuclear energy from the entire territory of the country,
- License no. 1/2002/KSOP Różan of 15 January 2002 authorising the operation of the National Radioactive Waste Repository in Różan.

The foregoing licenses are valid for an indefinite period of time, and they require submission of reports on an annual (the first) and quarterly (the second) basis, subsequently to be analysed by Nuclear Regulatory Inspectors from PAA's NSD. The information contained in these reports is then reviewed during regulatory inspections.

In 2015, Nuclear Regulatory Inspectors from PAA's NSD performed two inspections on radioactive waste management at RWMP, including:

- one inspection at NRWR in Różan, comprising measurements of ionizing radiation dose rate in selected points of the repository, review of documentation of the waste received for disposal and procedure of receipt of radioactive waste for disposal, observance of principles of radiological protection and the status of operation of the repository facilities;
- one inspection of RWMP facilities within the area of the nuclear centre in Świerk which covered technological processes of radioactive waste processing and storage of radioactive waste, maintaining documentation of radioactive waste received and stored, as well as the status of radiological protection of the facilities managed by RWMP.

Conclusions and remarks from the inspections completed were deployed by the RWMP management on an ongoing basis, whereas all non-conformities and infringements found by Nuclear Regulatory Inspectors were eliminated in accordance with provisions of the applicable inspection reports or follow-up statements.

The performed inspections of radioactive waste disposed and stored at NRWR and RWMP in Świerk near Otwock did not reveal any threats to people and the environment.



# RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION OF POPULATION AND WORKERS IN POLAND



### IX. RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION OF POPULATION AND WORKERS IN POLAND

### IX. 1. EXPOSURE OF POPULATION TO IONISING RADIATION

Exposure of a statistical inhabitant of Poland to ionising radiation, expressed as an effective dose, is a sum of doses from natural radiation sources as well as from artificial sources, namely those created by men. Sources of ionising radiation emitted by radionuclides, being natural components of all elements of the environment, as well as cosmic radiation constitute the first exposure group. The second group comprises all artificial radiation sources used in different areas of economic and scientific activity as well as for medical purposes, and they include artificial isotopes of radioactive elements and devices generating radiation, for example X-ray devices, accelerators, nuclear reactors and other radiation devices.

Human radiation exposure may not be eliminated completely but only limited, since one cannot affect cosmic radiation or contents of natural radionuclides in the lithosphere which have existed for billions of years. Therefore, the said limitation of radiation applies to exposure caused by artificial ionising radiation sources, and it is determined through threshold doses (limits), as they are referred to, which - to the best of scientific knowledge – do not cause negative health effects when conformed with. In this respect, one should note that the said limits do not include natural radiation. In particular, they do not cover exposure to radon in residential buildings, to natural radioactive radionuclides occurring in a human body, to cosmic radiation on the ground level as well as exposure above the surface of the ground to nuclides contained in intact lithosphere. Neither do they include doses received by patients as a consequence of irradiation for medical purposes and doses received by people in cases of radiation emergency, i.e. under circumstances where the radiation source remains out of control.

> Exposure limits for the entire population include external radiation and internal radiation caused by

radionuclides which enter human body with the food ingested or the air breathed, and they are expressed, similarly to occupational exposure, as:

- 1) effective dose illustrating the exposure of the whole body, and
- 2) equivalent dose corresponding to the exposure of particular organs and body tissues.


The basic national normative act which specifies the aforementioned limits is the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 18 January 2005 on ionising radiation dose limits (Journal of Laws of 2005, no. 20, item 168). This document also stipulates that a dose limit for the entire population (caused by artificial ionising radiation sources) expressed in terms of an effective dose amounts to 1 mSv in a calendar year. This dose may be exceeded in the given calendar year on a condition that, within the period of the next five years, its total value does not exceed 5 mSv.

It is estimated that an annual effective ionising radiation dose received by a statistical inhabitant of Poland from natural and artificial ionising radiation sources (including radiation sources used in medical diagnostics) amounted to 3.31 mSv on average in 2015, i.e. it remained on the same level as in previous years. The percentage share of different radiation sources in the exposure has been shown in Figure 8. This value has been estimated with reference to data received from the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection in Warsaw, National Radiological Protection Centre in Łódź, the Institute of Meteorology and Water Management in Warsaw, the Institute of Occupational Medicine in Łódź and the Central Mining Institute in Katowice.

Exposure to radiation from natural sources, presented in Fig. 8, comes from:

- radon and products of its decay,
- cosmic radiation,
- earth radiation, i.e. radiation emitted by natural radionuclides, found in intact lithosphere,
- natural radionuclides present in the human body.

Figure 8 implies that in Poland – similarly to many European countries – exposure to natural sources constitutes 73.6% of the total radiation exposure, and when expressed in terms of the effective dose, as it is referred to – it amounts to ca. 2.433 mSv per annum. Radon and radon decay products, from which a statistical Polish inhabitant receives a dose of ca. 1.201 mSv per annum, account for the largest share in the said exposure. It should also be noted that the expo-



**Fig. 8.** Share of different ionising radiation sources in mean annual effective dose.

sure of a statistical Polish inhabitant to natural radiation sources is ca. 1.5-2 times lower than that of inhabitants of Finland, Sweden, Romania or Italy.

The exposure of a statistical inhabitant of Poland in 2015 to radioactive sources used for medical purposes, and mainly in medical diagnostics including X-ray examinations and in vivo tests (i.e. administering radioactive preparations to patients) is estimated at 0.860 mSv.

This overall dose predominantly includes doses received during computer tomography examination (0.33 mSv) as well as conventional radiography and fluoroscopy (0.38 mSv).

These doses are far lower in other diagnostic examinations. In mammography tests, the annual effective dose received by a statistical inhabitant of our country amounts to 0.02 mSv; in cases of cardiac surgery procedures – it is 0.08 mSv and in nuclear medicine – 0.05 mSv.

An average effective dose received in a single X-ray examination comes to 1.2 mSv, and with the most popular tests, these amounts are as follows:

- chest X-ray ca. 0.11 mSv,
- spine and lungs X-ray from 3 mSv to 4.3 mSv respectively.

The range of variability for the aforementioned amounts as regards individual examinations may even reach two orders of magnitude, and may result from the quality of instruments and examination conditions which may depart significantly from standard examination conditions.

Moreover, the foregoing data may change in the future due to the fact that the X-ray equipment which does not meet requirements provided for in Council Directive 97/43/Euratom of 30 June 1997 on health protection of individuals against the dangers of ionising radiation in relation to medical exposures and repealing Directive 84/466/Euratom, is subject to successive replacement. 63





However, it should also be noted that exposure limits for population do not include exposure resulting from the use of ionising radiation for therapeutic purposes.

The radiation exposure caused by:

- presence of artificial radionuclides in foodstuffs and the environment resulting from nuclear explosions and radiation emergencies,
- use of household articles which emit radiation or contain radioactive substances,
- professional activity connected with the use of ionising radiation sources,

is subject to monitoring and is subject to monitoring and restrictions resulting from international standards establishing exposure limits for the population.

As aforementioned, national regulations define the annual effective dose limit, which equals 1 mSv for the population. The value of effective dose for a statistical Pole, subject to the said limit, consists of the three aforementioned elements.

The exposure of a statistical inhabitant of Poland to artificial radionuclides – mainly isotopes of caesium and strontium – in foodstuffs and in the environment has been estimated at ca. 0.010 mSv (which corresponds to 1% of a dose limit for the population), whereas the exposure to radionuclides in foodstuffs has been estimated at ca. 0.007 mSv (which corresponds to 0.7% of a dose limit for the population).

The foregoing values have been calculated based on measure-

ments of the content of radionuclides in foodstuffs which constitute basic ingredients of an average diet, entailing the current data on the consumption of main ingredients. Similarly to previous years, the largest share in the exposure in question is attributed to dairy products, meat products, vegetables (mainly potatoes) and cereals, whereas mushrooms, forest fruit and meat of wild animals (game), despite increased levels of caesium and strontium isotopes, do not contribute significantly – owing to relatively low consumption of these products – to the said exposure.

It should also be mentioned that exposure to the natural K-40 isotope, which commonly occurs in foodstuffs, amounts to ca. 0.17 mSv per annum, which is 20 times higher than the exposure caused by artificial radionuclides.

Values illustrating the exposure caused by radiation emitted by artificial radionuclides present in such environmental components as: soil, air, open waters, have been established based on measurements of the content of individual radionuclides in samples of environmental materials collected in different parts of Poland (the measurement results have been discussed in Chapter XI "Assessment of the national radiation situation"). Bearing in mind local discrepancies in the content level of the Cs-137 isotope, still present in soil and food, it can be estimated that the maximum dose value may be about 4-5 times higher than an average value, which means that the exposure caused by artificial radionuclides does not exceed 5% of the dose limit.

The exposure to household goods came to ca. 0.001 mSv in 2015, which corresponded to 0.1% of

the dose limit for the population. The said amount was mainly established based on measurements of radiation emitted by TV picture tubes and isotope smoke detectors as well as gamma radiation emitted by artificial radionuclides used to stain ceramic tiles or porcelain. The value calculated also entailed the dose from cosmic radiation received by passengers during air travels. In relation to the increasing popularity of LCD screens and monitors replacing picture tube lamps, the dose received by a statistical Pole from these devices is continuously decreasing.

The exposure of statistical Poles in their professional activities involving ionising radiation sources (read more about this problem in Chapter IX.2 "Control of exposure to ionising radiation at work") came to ca. 0.002 mSv in 2015, which corresponded to 0.2% of the dose limit.

In 2015, the total exposure of a statistical Polish inhabitant to artificial ionising radiation sources, exclusive of medical exposure (with the predominant share in the exposure attributed to Cs-137 present in the environment as a consequence of nuclear explosions and the Chernobyl disaster), came to ca. 0.016 mSv, i.e. 1.6% of a dose limit for artificial radioactive isotopes for the entire population, which is 1 mSv per annum, and only 0.48% of a dose received by a statistical inhabitant of Poland from all ionising radiation sources.

In light of the radiological protection regulations adopted all around the world and applied in Poland, the radiation exposure of a statistical inhabitant of Poland in 2015, being a consequence of the use of artificial ionising radiation sources, should be considered as low.



### IX. 2. CONTROL OF EXPOSURE TO IONISING RADIATION AT WORK

## 2.1. Occupational exposure to artificial ionising radiation sources

Performing occupational duties related to working in nuclear facilities, entities managing radioactive waste and other entities using ionising radiation sources is a cause of radiation exposure of workers. Specific principles for monitoring of people working under conditions of occupational exposure have been applied in Poland since 2002. They result from the implementation of Council Directive 96/29/ EURATOM of 13 May 1996 laying down basic safety standards for the protection of health of workers and the general public against the dangers resulting from ionising radiation (OJ L 159 of 29 June 1996, p. 1; OJ of the EU, Polish special edition, chapter 5, vol. 2, p. 291).

The principles applicable to exposure control are included in Chapter 3 of the Atomic Law, dedicated to nuclear safety, radiological protection and protection of workers' health.

In accordance with these provisions, the responsibility for compliance with the relevant requirements applicable in this scope rests firstly with a head of the organisational entity which is responsible for the assessment of doses received by workers. This assessment (article 21 of the Atomic Law) must be performed with reference to results of environmental measurements or individual dosimetry conducted by a specialised and authorised radiometric laboratory. Both measurements and the assessment of individual doses were performed in 2015 by the following authorised laboratories, commissioned by the organisational entities involved, i.e.:

- Laboratory of Individual and Environmental Dosimetry of the H. Niewodniczanski Institute of Nuclear Physics in Krakow,
- Radiological Protection Unit, of the J. Nofer Institute of Occupational Medicine in Łódź,
- Department of Dose Control and Calibration of the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection in Warsaw,
- Laboratory of Dosimetry of the National Centre for Nuclear Research in Świerk,



 in terms of monitoring of doses from natural radioactive isotopes received by miners working underground – Laboratory of Radiometry of the Central Mining Institute in Katowice.

Provisions of the Atomic Law introduced an obligation to maintain a register of doses and to apply personal dosimetry only to workers classified under category A of ionising radiation exposure, i.e. those who, according to the head's opinion, may be, under normal occupational conditions, exposed to an effective dose exceeding 6 mSv per annum or to an equivalent dose exceeding the level of 0.3 of the relevant dose limits for skin, limbs and eye lenses within the period of 12 months.

The assessment of doses of category B workers, who are exposed to annual doses from 1 to 6 mSv from artificial radiation sources, is based on measurements conducted in the working environment. When the head of the given organisational entity considers it necessary, workers of this category may (but are not obliged to) be covered by exposure monitoring by means of personal dosimeters.

It is acceptable for people working under the conditions of exposure to ionising radiation that the limit of 20 mSv (but not more than 50 mSv) is exceeded within a year's time, provided that the dose of 100 mSv is not exceeded in a five-year period. Due to the foregoing, it is necessary to check a sum of doses received in the present year and in previous 4 calendar years while supervising the exposure of workers handling ionising radiation sources. The foregoing means that heads of organisational entity must maintain a register of doses received by the exposed workers. Detailed information concerning records, reporting and registration of individual doses is provided in the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 23 March 2007 on requirements concerning registration of individual doses (Journal of Laws of 2007 no. 131, item 913). Pursuant to this regulation, heads of organisational entities are obliged to send data concerning exposure of subordinate category A workers to the central register of individual doses maintained by the PAA President.

There are a few dozen thousand people working in contact with ionising radiation sources in Poland. However, only a small part of them perform routine work under conditions of actual exposure to ionising radiation. The control of individual doses in Poland (according to data provid-

ed by the aforementioned authorised laboratories) in 2015 covered 50,000 persons. For 95% of the group analysed, the dose control is performed in order to confirm that the use of ionising radiation sources is not hazardous and should not cause any health detriment. Workers of this group are classified under category B of exposure to ionising radiation. Medical personnel working at diagnostic X-ray laboratories (ca. 30,000 people working in ca. 4,000 diagnostic centres featuring X-ray laboratories) constitutes the largest group of persons classified under category B.

Ca. 2,500 potentially endangered persons who must be covered by the personal dosimetry scheme for external exposure or/and assessment of internal doses (committed doses from radioactive substances which, under working conditions, could penetrate the body as a result of an intake) are classified annually under category A of exposure to ionising radiation.

Data concerning doses received by workers classified under category A are collected by heads of individual entities in the PAA President's central register of doses. Workers under this category of exposure to ionising radiation are obliged to undergo measurements of effective doses received by the whole body and/or by individual most exposed body parts (for example, hands). Exceptionally, in cases of exposure to contamination caused by diffusible radioactive substances referred to as open sources, an assessment of committed dose from internal contaminations is performed.

Since the beginning of the central register of doses, i.e. since 2002, until the end of April 2016, the total number of 5,374 persons were reported, and data of 2,276 from among those reported were updated within the past four years. In 2015, data of 1,516 persons was updated.

Owing to appropriate radiological protection, 1,479 persons classified under category A received effective annual doses not exceeding 6 mSv (being the lower exposure limit assumed for category A workers), and doses exceeding 6 mSv were received by 37 persons, among whom only three cases were found to have exceeded the annual dose of 20 mSv, i.e. a dose limit which may be received during a calendar year as a result of routine work with ionising radiation. In cases of the dose limit exceedance, working conditions and reasons for the exposure to radiation were analysed in detail.

The data summary for 2015 concerning exposure to ionising radiation of workers classified under category A, who were entered into the central register of doses by individual organisational entities, has been provided in Table 9<sup>6</sup>.

 
 Table 9. Statistics on individual annual effective
 doses of workers classified under category A of exposure to ionising radiation in 2015.

Annual effective dose received [mSv]	Number of employees*
< 6	1 469
6 ÷ 15	36
15 ÷ 20	9
20 ÷ 50	2
> 50.0	0

\* According to notifications to the central register of doses submitted until 30 April 2016.

The foregoing data imply that, in the group of category A workers, the percentage of individuals who did not exceed the lower limit specified for this exposure category, i.e. 6 mSv per annum, in 2015, came to 98.5%, and the percentage of individuals who did not exceed the limit of 20 mSv per annum – 99.9%. Consequently, only ca. 1.5% of persons exposed at work, who had been classified under category A, received doses established for workers of this ionising radiation exposure category.

In 2015, the Central Register of Doses received the reports on two cases of exposure to radiation under circumstances referred to in article 16, section 1 (incidental exposure), of the Atomic Law.

The first case took place in the radioactive sources store, when the worker checking the store condition,

opened a protective container which was supposed to be empty, however there was a high-activity radioactive source in it. Within a few seconds of exposure the worker received an effective dose of 40mSv.

The second case was related to the dosimeter reading, indicating an exposure of one worker, exceeding the limit dose (>20 mSv/per annum) during the examination with the use of industrial radiography.

An equivalent dose limit with regard to an exposure to hands and skin (500 mSv/per annum) was exceeded by surgeons and cardiologists who performed sophisticated medical treatment under X-ray monitoring.

All cases of annual dose limit exceedance are subject to detailed explanatory investigation conducted by Nuclear Regulatory Inspectors.

### 2.2. Control of exposure to natural ionising radiation sources in mining

Unlike with radiation hazards resulting from artificial radioactive isotopes and devices emitting radiation, radiation hazards in mining (coal mining and extraction of other natural raw materials) are mainly caused by the increased level of ionising radiation in mines, being the effect of natural radioactivity. Sources of these hazards include:

- radon and products of its decay in the mine air (basic source of hazard),
- gamma radiation emitted by natural radioactive isotopes (mainly radium) contained in the rock mass,
- mine water (and the related sediments) with increased content of radium isotopes.

The former two factors practically apply to all miners working underground, whereas radiation hazards resulting from mine waters and sediments occur under special circumstances and apply to a limited number of workers.

ses of the PAA President which has been functioning since 2003. They only concern workers classified by the given person in charge under category A, and are obtained directly from organisatio-..... nal units whose heads are obliged to submit datasheets containing information for the previous calendar year until 15 April of the present year. The datasheets submitted provide an assessment of the effective doses received by the given worker, as prepared by authorised laboratories.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>By 2002, annual collations of data concerning individual exposure (according to occupational groups, industries and facility types) had relied on data obtained directly from laboratories conducting readouts of dosimeters and dose assessments. They concerned workers who were subject to the exposure control scheme but disregarded the division into categories A and B. This division of worker had not been introduced until the beginning of the year 2002. Data on the doses received by people working under conditions of ionising radiation exposure are currently stored in the central register of do-



### As reported by the State Mining Authority (WUG), the headcount of persons employed in coal mines as at 31 December 2015 was: 98,096 miners.

As for radiation hazards, apart from secondary legislation to the Atomic Law, also the following implementing regulations to the Geological and Mining Law applied in 2015:

- Regulation of Minister of Economy of 28 June 2002 on occupational safety and hygiene, movement and special fire safeguards in underground mining facilities (Journal of Laws, No 124 of 2006, Item 863 as amended) regulating principles of supervision over protection against radiation hazards of natural radioactive substances and the method of the performance of measurements and assessment of radiation hazards in the underground mining plant,
- 2. Regulation of Minister of Interior and Administration of 14 June 2002 on natural hazards in mining facilities (Journal of Laws No 94 of 2003, Item 841 as amended) distinguishing the following excavations:
  - class A excavations, situated in controlled area within the meaning of provisions of the Atomic Law, where the occupational environment creates potential exposure of a worker to an annual effective dose exceeding 6 mSv,
  - class B excavations, situated in supervised area within the meaning of the provisions of Atomic Law, where the occupational en-

vironment creates potential exposure to an annual effective dose which is more than 1 mSv, but does not exceed 6 mSv.

The foregoing dose levels are values entailing the effect of the natural surface background (i.e. from outside the working environment). It means that while performing calculations necessary to classify excavations under individual classes of radiation hazard. the dose value calculated based on measurements must be reduced by the dose resulting from natural surface background for the working time assumed. Table 10 contains values of working limits of hazard rates for both classes of headings which create radiation hazards. The values proposed result from the model prepared and implemented for calculation of committed doses caused by specific working conditions in underground mining facilities. In examinations, one must consider the following aspects of radiation hazard:

- 1) potential alpha energy concentration of shortlived products of radon decay in mine heading air,
- 2) gamma radiation dose rate at a workplace in a mine heading,
- 3) radium concentration in mine water,
- 4) radium concentration in mine water sediments.

Hazard rate	Class A*	Class B*
(Central Mining Institute).	5	5

**Table 10.** Values of working limits of hazard rates for individual classes of headings creating radiation hazards

Hazard rate	Class A*	Class B*
Potential alpha energy concentration of short-lived products of radon decay (Ca), µJ/m³	Ca > 2.5	0.5 < Ca ≤ 2.5
Radiation kerma rate γ (K), μGy/h	K > 2.5	0.5 < K ≤ 2.5
Specific activity of radium isotopes present in sediments ( $C_{_{RaO}}\!),$ kBq/kg	C <sub>RaO</sub> > 120	20 <sup>7</sup> < C <sub>RaO</sub> ≤ 120

\* The foregoing values correspond to doses of 1 mSv and 6 mSv, provided that the effects from particular hazard sources are not accumulated and the annual working time is 1,800 hours.

<sup>7</sup> If specific activity of radium isotopes present in sediments exceeds 20kBq/kg, an effective committed dose should be obligatorily assessed for the persons who work at this workplace.

Hazard class	Number of mines	Hazard due to short-lived products of radon decay	Hazard due to radiation y	Hazard due to radioactive deposits	External radiation γ (individual dosimetry)
А	3	-	2	2	2
В	20	17	4	3	2

**Table 11.** Number of hard coal mines featuring headings with radiological hazard (Central Mining Institute).

Miners' exposure to natural radiation sources is assessed (based on measurements conducted in the working environment) by the Central Mining Institute (GIG) in Katowice.


Work organization methods which prevent the exceedance of the 20 mSv dose limit were introduced in underground mining facilities, in headings exposed to radiological hazard (where workers are likely to receive an annual effective dose exceeding 1 mSv).

Table 11 contains a collation of the mines where (based on confirmed cases of exceedance of individual radiation hazard rates) headings classified under classes A and B of radiation hazard may occur. It should be stressed that headings exposed to radiological hazard are classified by managers of individual mining facilities based on a sum of effective doses for all radiation hazard factors in the course of the actual work. Therefore, the number of headings classified under individual categories of radiation hazard is in fact smaller.

Furthermore, a percentage share has been estimated with regard to persons working in headings belonging to individual hazard classes. Results of this assessment have been provided in Figure 9.

The analysis entailed the number of mines with radiologically hazardous headings, the heading type, the hazard source and the headcount of the mining crew. Based on the information acquired by the State Mining Authority, it was possible to determine the share of miners working in headings potentially exposed to radiation hazard. The foregoing particularly applies to sites possibly containing water and sediments with increased concentration of radium isotopes, increased concentrations of potential alpha energy and dose rates of gamma radiation higher than average.

**Fig. 9.** Percentage share of hard coal miners working in headings classified under individual radiation hazard classes. Total employment in hard coal mines on 31.12.2015 according to the State Mining Authority: 84,937 persons.



In 2015, the Central Mining Institute conducted 3,096 measurements of potential alpha energy of short-lived radon decay products, 834 measurements of exposure to external gamma radiation in underground mining facilities, 691 analyses of radioactivity of mine water sampled in underground headings of hard coal mines as well as 134 analyses of concentration of radionuclides found in samples of mine water sediments.

In 2015, measurements of individual doses of gamma radiation were conducted in five hard coal ..... mines. In other mining facilities, no such measurements were undertaken. The employees subject to

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the examinations, namely 40 persons, were mainly involved in removal of radioactive mine sediments or worked at locations where such sediments may accumulate. In one hard coal mine, the annual dose estimated, based on results of individual dose measurements, exceeded 1 mSv, but it was lower than 6 mSv (category B), and it exceeded 6 mSv (category A) in two mines.

Based on the radiation hazard monitoring conducted, it was found out that under disadvantageous circumstances (lack of proper ventilation) it may occur in nearly every single mine heading. The hazard assessment performed by the Central Mining Institute for coal mines has implied that there are 3 mines with active class A headings (the hazard being applicable to 0.08% of all working miners) and 20 mines with class B headings (the hazard being applicable to 0.56% of all working miners). In mine headings with slightly increased natural radiation background (yet below the level corresponding to class B), 9% of the total number of miners employed work, whereas more than 90.4% of miners work in headings where the radiation level remains on the level of natural surface background.

In 2015, the maximum dose came to 9.5 mSv for the total annual working time of 1,800 hours, and ca. 4 mSv for the working time of 750 hours.

The Silesian Mining Institute has got precise information regarding working time in individual headings for calculation of committed effective doses only. For other radiation hazard factors, the analysis of the extent of hazard was performed according to specific assumptions: nominal working time of 1,800 hours and – as frequently reported – working time in water galleries of 750 hours. The estimates developed on the basis of these values may depart significantly from the actual situation. In 2015, the maximum additional annual effective dose connected with individual hazard sources amounted to:

- for short-lived radon decay products Ea = 4.8 mSv (assuming the annual working time of 1,800 hours),
- for environmental gamma radiation measurements

   Eγ = 5.51 mSv (assuming the annual working time in water galleries of 750 hours);
- and expressed as an effective committed dose  $E_{Ra}$  = 3.47 mSv for absorption of radium isotopes into human organism (with regard to actual working time).

In accordance with the requirements of the Atomic Law concerning controlled and supervised areas, underground headings classified under category B (supervised area) should be reclassified to category A (controlled area) in cases when there is the possibility of contamination spread, e.g. during the performance of works connected with removal of sediments or effluents.

The analysis of measurement results against the data collected in recent years has showed that, in underground mining facilities (with working times assumed for individual hazard factors), there are always headings classified under radiation hazard category B, including stations where the dose exceeds 1 mSv. The headings which should belong to radiation hazard category A are those where the dose received by miners could exceed 6 mSv and they are very infrequent, and after the hazard is confirmed, they could be abandoned.

In 2015, the main reasons for the occurrence of increased effective doses for miners was the exposure to external gamma radiation and short-lived products of radon decay.

In no mine was the dose of 20 mSv found to be exceeded throughout the entire year. The said value is a dose limit for persons whose professional activity is connected with exposure to radiation.



### IX. 3. GRANTING PERSONAL AUTHORISATIONS ON NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION

In nuclear facilities and in other entities where exposure to ionising radiation occurs, on individual positions, persons holding authorisations granted by the PAA President are employed (in accordance with article 7, section 3 and 10, and article 12, section 1 of the Atomic Law of 29 November 2000 and the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 10 August 2012 on positions important for ensuring nuclear safety and radiological protection and on radiation protection officers (Journal of Laws of 2012, item 1022). This Regulation entered into force on 29 September 2012 and superseded Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 18 January 2005 with the same title (Journal of Laws no. 21, item 173).

In light of article 7, section 6 and article 12, section 2 of the Act, the authorisations in question may only be obtained upon completion of training on radiological protection and nuclear safety in the scope required for the specific type of authorisations, and upon passing an examination before the PAA President's examination board. The information about entities which offered such training in 2015, has been provided in Table 12.

#### **Table 12.** Entities which conducted nuclear safety and radiological protection safety training in 2015.

Type of au- thorisations	Entity name	Number of training courses held	Number of training participants	Number of authori- sations received*	
	Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection in Warsaw	2	36		
Radiation	Chief Technical Organisation (NOT) in Katowice	3	27		
Protection Officer	Association of Radiation Protection Officers in Poznań	2	18	209	
	National Defence University in Warsaw	1	18		
	Faculty of Physics of the University of Warsaw	1	36		
	Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection in Warsaw	5	40		
Accelerator	Association of Radiation Protection Officers in Poznań	10	193	459	
Operator	National Centre for Nuclear Research	2	9	-55 -	
	Oncology Centre, Division in Krakow	1	30		
	Oncology Centre, Division in Gliwice	1	21		

\* Including persons who attended training before 2015 or were authorised to take examination without an obligation to attend training.



The training courses required were conducted by organisational entities authorised to conduct such activity by the PAA President. They employed sufficient staff of instructors and used the necessary technical equipment enabling practical classes to be conducted in accordance with the course syllabus developed for each such entity, in line with the type of training approved by the PAA President.

In 2015, there were two examination boards functioning, appointed by the PAA President pursuant to article 7, section 1 and article 12a, section 6 of the Atomic Law:

- an examination board entitled to grant authorisations of a radiological protection officer,
- an examination board entitled to grant authorisations which allowed for being employed at positions considered particularly important for ensuring nuclear safety and radiological protection.

The training courses organised in 2015 were attended by 456 persons in total.

Having passed the examination and fulfilled all the remaining conditions required to obtain the relevant authorisations, 209 persons were granted authorisations of a radiation protection officer and 459 persons received authorisations enabling them to be employed at positions of special importance for ensuring nuclear safety and radiological protection, including:

- 296 persons authorisations of an operator of accelerators for medical applications and of teleradiotherapy devices and/or devices used in brachytherapy involving radioactive sources,
- 163 persons authorisations of an accelerator operator applied in applications other than medical.

Moreover, having passed the examination before the PAA President's Examination Board, 10 persons not having attended previous training were granted extensions of authorisations to be employed at positions of special importance for ensuring nuclear safety and radiological protection, including:

- 4 persons research reactor operator,
- 3 persons research reactor dosimetrist,
- 2 persons research reactor manager,
- 1 person research reactor shift manager.

In 2015, the total number of 678 persons received authorisations of a radiation protection officer and authorisations to be employed at positions of special importance for nuclear safety and radiological protection (including 10 persons connected with the operation of the MARIA reactor).



# NATIONAL RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING



#### X. NATIONAL RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING

National radiological monitoring consists in systematic measurements of the gamma radiation dose rate at specific points within the territory of Poland as well as measurements of content of radioactive isotopes in main components of the environment (foodstuffs). Depending on the scope of tasks performed, one may distinguish between two types of monitoring:

- nationwide monitoring making it possible to obtain data necessary to assess the radiological situation of the entire country under normal conditions and in cases of radiation emergency, and to examine long-term changes in the environment and foodstuff radioactivity,
- local monitoring making it possible to obtain data from areas where activities are (or have been) conducted potentially causing local increase of radiation exposure of local population (it applies to the

Fig. 10. Radiological monitoring system in Poland.

Świerk nuclear centre, the radioactive waste repository in Różan and areas of former uranium ore plants in Kowary).


Nationwide and local monitoring measurements are conducted by:

- **measurement stations** forming the early warning network for radioactive contamination;
- **measurement units** which conduct measurements of radioactive contamination related to environmental materials and foodstuffs;
- services of entities operating nuclear facilities and nuclear regulatory bodies responsible for local monitoring.

In 2015, as in the previous years, the PAA Radiation Emergency Centre (CEZAR) was responsible for coordination of a network of measurement stations and units on behalf of the President of the National Atomic Energy Agency.

A general schematic overview of this system has been depicted in Figure 10.

Results of the national radiological monitoring provide grounds for the national radiological status assessment made by the PAA President, which is announced every day at 11:00 a.m. on the PAA website



(ambient gamma dose rate) and cumulatively in quarterly releases published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Poland titled Monitor Polski (ambient gamma dose rate and content of Cs-137 in air and milk) as well as in annual reports (all measurement results). This procedure is followed under "normal" circumstances, when there is no potential radiation hazard, and in the event of emergency, the frequency of communication releases is agreed individually. The information thus provided constitutes the basis for the assessment of radiation hazards for people and for undertaking suitable intervention measures, if the situation so requires.

#### X. 1. NATIONWIDE MONITORING

#### 1.1. Early warning stations for radioactive contamination

The purpose of measurement stations operating in the early warning network for radioactive contamination is to provide information necessary for ongoing assessment of the radiological status of Poland and to enable early detection of radioactive contamination in the event of radiation emergency. The system consists of basic and auxiliary stations, as they are referred to (Figure 11).

#### **BASIC STATIONS:**

- 13 automatic Permanent Monitoring Stations (PMS) managed by PAA as well as operating under the international systems of the EU and of the Baltic States (Council of the Baltic Sea States), conducting ongoing measurements of:
  - ambient gamma dose rate and spectrum caused by radioactive elements in the air and in the ground,
  - intensity of precipitation and ambient temperature.
- 12 ASS-500 stations, 11 of which are owned by the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection and 1 belonging to PAA, which continuously sample atmospheric aerosols on the filters and perform spectrometric determination of content of individual radioisotopes on a weekly basis. The stations also conduct continuous measurements of activity of atmospheric aerosols collected on the filters, which enable immediate detection of a significant increase in the concentration of the Cs- 137 and I-131 isotopes in air.

- 9 stations of the Institute of Meteorology and Water Management (IMWM) which conduct:
  - continuous measurement of ambient gamma dose rate.
  - continuous measurement of total and artificial alpha and beta activity of atmospheric aerosols (7 stations),
  - measurement of total beta activity in 24hour and monthly samples of total fallout.

Additionally, once a month the content of Cs-137 (by a spectrometric method) and Sr-90 (by a radiochemical method) is determined in cumulative monthly samples of total fallout from all 9 stations.

#### **AUXILIARY STATIONS:**

13 monitoring stations of the Ministry of National Defence (MON) which perform ongoing measurements of ambient gamma dose rate, registered automatically at the Centre for Analysis of Contamination (COAS). In the years 2014-2015, the network of stations managed by the Ministry of National Defence had been modernized. Since October 2015 all MON stations have been operating within the network.

#### 1.2. Facilities conducting measurements of radioactive contamination of the environment and foodstuffs

It is a network of facilities applying laboratory methods to monitor the content of radioactive contamination in samples of environmental materials as well as in foodstuffs and animal feed. The network consists of:


- basic units operating at Sanitary and Epidemiological Stations, conducting measurements of total beta activity in milk samples and foodstuffs (on a quarterly basis) as well as the content of individual radionuclides (Cs-137, Sr-90) in selected foodstuffs (twice a year on average),
- special facilities conducting more extensive analyses concerning radioactivity of environmental samples. Locations of basic monitoring units have been shown in Figure 12.

Until the end of 2002, there were 48 basic units established in accordance with Appendix no. 2 to the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 17 ..... December 2002 on stations for early detection of radioactive contamination and on units conducting .....

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measurements of radioactive contamination (Journal of Laws of 2002, no. 239, item 2030). As a result of the reorganisation of the National Sanitary Inspection system undertaken in 2003 and further changes introduced in the following years, the number of units decreased to 30 (status at the end of 2015).

#### X. 2. LOCAL MONITORING

#### 2.1. Nuclear Centre in Świerk

Radiological monitoring on the premises and in the vicinity of the Świerk nuclear centre was conducted in 2015 by the Laboratory of Dosimetry of the National Centre for Nuclear Research (former POLATOM Institute of Atomic Energy), and additionally, in the close vicinity of the Centre – by the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection in Warsaw, commissioned by the PAA President. The monitoring was performed in the manner described below.

- on-line (measurement every 2 minutes) gamma radiation fields are controlled at the entrance gate to the Centre and in selected places of its premises, as well as radioactive concentration in the utilities released to the environment (sanitary sewage, drainage water and atmospheric aerosols with regard to alfa, beta and gamma isotope content.
- off-line (according to the measurement schedule) on the premises and in the vicinity of the Świerk Nuclear Centre the Laboratory of Dosimetry of the National Centre for Nuclear Research conducted



Fig. 12. Locations of basic units monitoring radioactive contamination in Poland.

measurements of concentration of the following radioactive isotopes specified in Table 13.

Measurements of gamma radiation were also conducted for selected locations on the premises and in the vicinity of the Centre using thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD) in order to establish annual dose levels.

- As commissioned by the PAA President, measurements of the content of natural and artificial radioactive isotopes were conducted in the vicinity of the Centre, addressing the following components of the environment:
  - water from the nearby Świder river,
  - water from a sewage treatment plant in the closest (to the Centre) municipality of Otwock,
  - well water,
  - soil,
  - grass.

Also, the gamma radiation dose rate was measured at five locations chosen.

#### 2.2. National Radioactive Waste Repository in Różan

Radiological monitoring on the premises and in the vicinity of the National Radioactive Waste Repository (NRWR) in Różan was conducted in 2015 by the Radioactive Waste Management Plant, and additionally in the vicinity of the Repository – by the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection commissioned by the PAA President. The monitoring was performed in the manner described below:

• On the premises of NRWR, measurements of the content of radioactive isotopes were conducted:



**Table 13.** Measurements of radioactive isotopes on the premises and in the vicinity of the Nuclear Centre in<br/>Świerk.

ltem no.	Type of measurement and sample	Nuclear Centre premises	Nuclear Centre vicinity
1.	gamma isotopes in atmospheric aerosols	×	X
2.	beta and gamma isotopes in atmospheric fallout	Х	
3.	beta and gamma isotopes in well water		Х
4.	beta isotopes in water from the water supply system	Х	
5.	beta isotopes in water from the Świder river		X
6.	gamma as well as alfa and beta isotopes (including the content of H-3 and Sr-90) in drainage and storm water	Х	
7.	H-3 in underground water	х	
8.	Sr-90 and gamma isotopes in sludge	Х	Х
9.	gamma and beta isotopes (including the content of Sr-90) in sanitary sewage	Х	
10.	beta isotopes in sludge from an in-house sewage pumping station		Х
11.	gamma isotopes in soil and grass	Х	Х
12.	gamma isotopes in milk and crops		Х



in underground water, water from the water supply system, atmospheric aerosols, soil and grass.

Also, the following measurements were conducted:

- gamma radiation dose rate,
- radioactive contamination on the NRWR premises.

In the vicinity of the NRWR the following components of the environment were measured:

- concentration of Cs-137, Cs-134, H-3 and Sr-90 in spring water,
- Content of radioactive substances in surface water, drainage water, underground water and water from the water supply system,
- Content of radioactive beta isotopes, including H-3, in groundwater (piezometers),
- Content of artificial (mainly Cs-137) and natural radioactive gamma isotopes in soil and grass,
- Content of radioactive gamma isotopes in atmospheric aerosols,
- Radioactive contamination of roads' surface.

The gamma radiation dose rate was also measured at five fixed check points.

The most important measurement results and data illustrating the radiological situation on the premises and in the vicinity of the Nuclear Centre in Świerk and NRWR in Różan have been discussed in Chapter XI "Assessment of the national radiation situation".

Having compared the data from 2015 and from the preceding years, one may draw a conclusion that the operation of the Nuclear Centre in Świerk and of the National Radioactive Waste Repository in Różan does not affect natural environment, whereas the radioactivity of sewage as well as drainage and storm water removed from the premises of the Nuclear Centre in Świerk in 2015 was much lower than the applicable limits.

#### 2.3. Areas of former uranium ore extraction and processing plants

Since 1998, the PAA division in Jelenia Góra (Office for Handling Claims of Former Workers of Uranium Ore Plants) has been implementing the "Programme of radiological monitoring of areas degraded due to uranium ore extraction and processing". In 2015 the following measures were undertaken under the programme in question:

- measurements of the content of radioactive alpha and beta isotopes in drinking water (from public water intakes) within the territory managed by the Association of Municipalities of the Karkonosze Region (Związek Gmin Karkonoskich), in the town of Jelenia Góra as well as in surface and underground water (outflows from underground headings),
- determination of radon concentration in water from public intakes, in water supplied to residential premises and in surface and underground water (outflows from underground headings).

Results of the measurements have been provided in Chapter XI 3. "Assessment of the national radiation situation – Environmental radioactivity of natural radionuclides increased due to human activity".

#### X. 3. PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF **RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING DATA**

#### 3.1. The European Union measurement data exchange system based on routine radiological monitoring of the environment, deployed in the **European Union Member States**

The system encompasses data concerning dose rate, air contamination, contamination of drinking water, surface water, milk and food (diet). The data are submitted by the PAA Radiation Emergency Centre to the Joint Research Centre (JRC) based in the city of Ispra in Italy on an annual basis (by 30 June each year, data for the previous year are submitted).

#### 3.2. Exchange of data from early warning stations under the European Union's EURDEP system

In 2015, the European Radiological Data Exchange Platform (EURDEP) covered the exchange of the following data from early warning stations for radioactive contamination:

- Ambient gamma dose rate (Permanent Monitoring Stations and stations of the Institute of Meteorolo-...... gy and Water Management),
- Total alpha and beta activity from artificial radionuclides in atmosphe-



ric aerosols (stations of the Institute of Meteorology and Water Management).

The EURDEP system operates continuously, however:

- under normal conditions, data are updated at least once every 24 hours,
- under emergency conditions, data update should be provided at least every 2 hours,
- submitting data to the EURDEP central database should be conducted automatically ensuring that the normal and the emergency modes can be switched over (based on appropriate instructions).

Poland provides its measurement results once every hour, regardless of the mode of operation.

# 3.3. Exchange of data from early warning stations operating under the system of the Council of the Baltic Sea States

The scope and format of data submitted by Poland under the data exchange system of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), i.e. under the framework of regional exchange, is identical to the EURDEP system operating in the European Union.

The frequency of data updates under normal circumstances may differ from country to country, and it depends on individual frequency of data collection. In cases of emergency, it is recommended that data update should be made on a 2-hour basis.

#### X. 4. RADIATION EMERGENCIES

#### 4.1. Emergency procedures

In accordance with the definition laid down in the Atomic Law, radiation emergency is a hazardous situation which requires urgent actions to be undertaken for the sake of protection of workers or the population. In cases of radiation emergency, intervention measures are taken as scheduled separately for incidents occurring within the area of the given organisational unit (on-site emergency incidents) and for those whose results reach beyond the organisational unit ("regional" and "national" emergency incidents, including those of cross-border effects). A head of the given entity, a provincial governor or a minister competent for the interior are in charge of elimination of the hazard and of consequences of the incident, depending on the scale of emergency.

The Radiation Emergency Centre (CEZAR) provides information and consultancy for assessing the doses, contamination levels and measures which are reguired on the incident site, as well as other expert advice. Furthermore, CEZAR informs the communities which are exposed as an outcome of the emergency, international organisations and neighbouring countries about the radiation threat. The same procedure also applies in cases when illegal trade in radioactive substances is revealed (including attempts of illegal shipment across the national border). CEZAR employs a dosimetry team which may perform on-site measurements of radiation dose rate and radioactive contamination, identify the contamination type and the abandoned radioactive substances as well as remove the contamination and transport the radioactive waste from the incident site to the Radioactive Waste Management Plant.

CEZAR performs a number of functions: emergency service of the PAA President<sup>8</sup>, the function of a National Contact Point (NCP) for the International Atomic Energy Agency (the Unified System for Information Exchange in Incidents and Emergencies - USIE), for the European Commission (the European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange - ECU-RIE), for the Council of the Baltic Sea States, NATO and states bound with Poland by virtue of bilateral agreements on early notification and cooperation in cases of radiation emergency, being on duty for 7 days a week and 24 hours a day. The Centre conducts regular national radiological assessment, and in the event of radiation emergency, it makes use of computer-aided decision support systems (RODOS and ARGOS).

## 4.2. Radiation emergencies outside the country borders

In 2015, the National Contact Point did not receive any reports concerning accidents in nuclear facilities<sup>9</sup> classified above level 3 in the seven-degree international INES scale.

However, about 40 notifications were submitted with regard to minor incidents<sup>10</sup> which mainly concer-

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Jointly with Radioactive Waste Management Plant (under an agreement concluded between the PAA President and RWMP).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> An accident means an event above level 3 in the classification of the seven-degree INES scale.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> An incident refers to the level from 0 to 3 in the classification system of the seven-degree INES scale.

ned unplanned exposure of workers to ionising radiation during the use of radiation sources, incidents on premises of nuclear power plants or related to ionizing radiation sources.

Moreover, the National Contact Point, via the USIE and the ECURIE system, received several dozen organisational and technical reports or notifications related to international exercises. It should be emphasized that no radiation emergency reported beyond the country borders in 2015 posed any hazard to the people and the environment in Poland.

#### 4.3. Radiation emergencies in the country

In 2015, the Radiation Emergency Centre's duty officers received 11 notifications of radiation emergency within the territory of Poland (see Table 14). In fulfilment of their respective tasks, the dosimetry team of the PAA President was deployed in two cases to the incident site in order to perform radiometric measurements and/or to collect materials which had been classified as radioactive waste (see Table 15).



#### **Table 14.** Notifications on radiation emergency in 2015.

The notifications concerned the following issues:	
Presence of radioactive substances in scrap metal	3
Radiation worker exceeding the dose limit	1
Discovery of uncontrolled radioactive sources	2
Theft of a radioactive source	2
Failure of probe containing radioactive source during geological investigation	2
Uncontrolled exposure of a member of the general public	1
IN TOTAL	11

**Table 15.** Emergency interventions of the PAA President's dosimetry team in 2015.

The interventions of the dosimetry team were related to the following incidents:	
Discovery of an uncontrolled radioactive source	1
Theft of radioactive sources	1
IN TOTAL	2



It should be emphasized that no radiation emergency reported within the territory of Poland in 2015 posed any hazard to people and the environment.

Moreover, within the reporting period in question the PAA CEZAR duty officers rendered consulting services in 8,588 cases (which were not connected with mitigation of the hazard and of consequences of radiation emergency incidents), and in the majority of cases (8,494), the consultancy was provided to National Border Guard units in relation to detection of an increased radioactivity level. The consultations concerned such matters as, for instance, transit carriage or import to Poland, for domestic recipients, of ceramic, minerals, charcoal, refractory brick, propane-butane, electronic and mechanical components, chemicals, radioactive sources (7,585 cases in total), as well as crossing the border by nuclear medicine patients (909 cases). Furthermore, officers on duty from the PAA President's emergency service provided consulting and advisory services in 94 cases to other state authorities and individuals.

Of particular importance from the point of view of public perception of safety in the context of the use of ionising radiation was a radiation incident associated with the loss of radioactive sources in Poznan in March 2015.

On 6 March 2015 the Radiation Emergency Centre (CEZAR) of the National Atomic Energy Agency (PAA) was notified of the theft of 22 radioactive sources in shielding containers from the warehouse of Polon Beta Sp. z o.o. Due to the age radioactive sources stolen did not meet their original function and were intended for disposal. The police was notified about this case and secured the place of the theft. In the course of investigation the PAA CEZAR was informed about the detention of a person suspected of theft, who indicated the hiding place of 4 radioactive sources without any shielding containers in a public place in the city of Poznan. In order to support the activities of the services of the Wielkopolska Province Governor, the dosimetry team of the PAA President was dispatched to the place of the incident. During the examination of a real estate, on the premises of which the disassembly of radioactive sources took place, two more unshielded sources were discovered. One of these radioactive sources was mechanically damaged by the persons who had stolen them. This resulted in the presence of radioactive contamination at the real property. The dosimetry team of the PAA President secured and made a preliminary decontamination of the area. In the course of the case further two radioactive sources were found. After re-checking of the records of radioactive sources in the Polon Beta company it turned out that 15 radioactive sources, and not 22, as originally stated, had been stolen. Under the agreement between the Wielkopolska Province Governor and the Radioactive Waste Management Plant a thorough decontamination of the building and the real estate on which the dismantling of radioactive sources was carried out. The effectiveness of these measures has been positively verified by the representatives of the National Atomic Energy Agency.

In the course of the event the Radiation Emergency Centre maintained a permanent contact with the Provincial Centre for Crisis Management in Poznan, ensuring the provision of risk assessments and the recommendations elaborated on the basis of measurement data delivered by the services of the Governor of Wielkopolska Province, dosimetry team of the PAA President, the nuclear regulatory inspector from the PAA Radiological Protection Department and the PAA Mobile Spectrometric Laboratory.

The international institutions have been notified of the event (via USIE system).

PAA has taken substantial actions and properly reacted to the situation, which took place in Poznan last year, and which was related to the Polon Beta company. For example, a comparative analysis of organizational entities whose activities can cause a similar exposure to that of the Polon Beta company's operations was made. Ten organizational entities using ionising radiation in a similar range as Polon Beta, and further 10 entities using high-level radioactive sources were selected. The questionnaires on physical security had been sent to the heads of organizational entities, and, afterwards, the inspections of the said entities were carried out. The results were compared with the guides on the physical protection of radioactive sources issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency. In the cases examined, the level of physical security is assessed as comparable to or higher than what is recommended by the IAEA.

Moreover, the instruction for the conduct of an inspection by nuclear regulatory inspectors (the PAA employees carrying out the inspections) was amended and a more thorough checking of safeguards and physical protection measures in the units inspected, and the recommendation to make photographs of the said safeguards, were introduced.

In accordance with the Atomic Law the President of the National Atomic Energy Agency has the right to issue technical and organizational recommendations with regard to the issues of nuclear safety and radiological protection. The PAA President's recommendations do not constitute the binding provisions of law in Poland, therefore, they do not impose any obligations on organizational entities, at the same time, however, they serve as guidelines for the conduct in the fields related to nuclear safety and radiological protection. The PAA Radiological Protection Department prepared the schedule of works aimed at the issuance of the PAA President's organizational and technical recommendations concerning physical protection of radioactive sources by the PAA. After the period of checking the effectiveness of the above mentioned recommendations, a further analysis of physical protection of radioactive sources will be carried out, and the issue of initiating the implementation of a regulation concerning high-activity sources to the binding law, will be considered.





## ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL RADIATION SITUATION

#### XI.ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL RADIATION SITUATION

#### XI. 1. RADIOACTIVITY IN THE ENVIRONMENT

#### 1.1. Gamma radiation dose rate

Values of the ambient dose rate equivalent, including cosmic radiation and radiation generated by radionuclides present in the soil, as provided in Table 16, imply that in Poland, the average 24-hour values varied in 2015 between 67 and 152 nSv/h, with the annual average of 94 nSv/h.

In the vicinity of the Świerk nuclear centre, gamma radiation exposure dose rates, taking into account the earth component only, were between 44.9 and 56.4 nGy/h (the average value being 51.1 nGy/h), whereas in the vicinity of the National Radioactive Waste Repository in Różan – from 66.1 to 80.54 nGy/h (with the average of 73.5 nGy/h), The foregoing values do not differ significantly from dose rate measurement results obtained in other regions of the country.

The measurement results imply that in 2015 the level of gamma radiation in Poland and in the vicinity of the Nuclear Centre in Świerk and the National Radioactive Waste Repository in Różan did not differ from the level measured in the previous year. The differences in the dose rate values (even for the same municipality) result from the local geological conditions affecting the level of earth radiation.

#### 1.2. Atmospheric aerosols

In 2015, the artificial radioactivity of aerosols in the near-surface atmosphere, determined based on measurements performed by early warning stations for radioactive contaminations (ASS-500), primarily implied, similarly to the several preceding years, presence of detectable amounts of the Cs-137 radionuclide. Its average concentrations in the period analysed varied from below 0.1 to 28.47  $\mu$ Bq/m<sup>3</sup> (the average being 0.91  $\mu$ Bq/m<sup>3</sup>). Average values of the I-131 radionuclide concentration in the same period varied between less than 0.02 to 5.99  $\mu$ Bq/m<sup>3</sup> (the average being 0.54  $\mu$ Bq/m<sup>3</sup>), whereas average values of

the natural Be-7 radionuclide concentration came to a few millibecquerels per m<sup>3</sup>.

Figures 13 and 14 show the annual average concentration of Cs-137 in atmospheric aerosols in the years 1998-2015, across the entire territory of Poland and in Warsaw, respectively. The increased concentrations of Cs-137 reported in 2002 were caused by fires of forests in Ukraine, contaminated as a result of the Chernobyl disaster, whereas the increased concentrations of Cs-137 in 2011 were due to air masses containing increased amounts of this radionuclide released during the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident moving over Poland. Detailed information on this subject was provided in the "Report on the activities of the President of the National Atomic Energy Agency and assessment of nuclear safety and radiological protection in Poland in 2011".

In 2015, weekly concentrations of the Cs-137 isotope in the air on the premises of NRWR in Różan were between 0.54 and 122  $\mu$ Bq/m<sup>3</sup> with the annual average value being 6.4  $\mu$ Bq/m<sup>3</sup>.

Measurements of concentration of radioactive isotopes in the air were conducted in 2015 within the territory and in the vicinity (Wólka Mlądzka) of the National Centre for Nuclear Research in Świerk on weekly basis. Measurement results obtained in 2015 on the premises of the Centre have been provided in Table 17.

In stations which perform continuous measurements of total alpha and beta activity of atmospheric aerosols, enabling detection of artificial radionuclides, daily concentrations of beta-emitting isotopes did not exceed 1.7 Bq/m<sup>3</sup>, whereas those of alpha-emitting isotopes – 1 Bq/m<sup>3</sup>.

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


**Table 16.** Dose rate values obtained from early warning stations for radioactive contamination in 2015 (PAA, based on data received from early warning stations for radioactive contamination).


Stations*	Municipality (location)	Range of average daily dose rate [nSv/h]	Annual average value [nSv/h]
	Białystok	90-110	94
	Gdynia	101-111	105
	Koszalin	84-103	89
	Kraków	108-126	113
	Łódź	83-99	89
Permanent Mo-	Lublin	90-112	96
nitoring Sta-	Olsztyn	87-103	93
tions	Sanok	102-142	115
	Szczecin	94-106	98
	Toruń	84-106	88
	Warszawa	88-113	91
	Wrocław	83-96	88
	Zielona Góra	86-104	90
	Gdynia	82-92	86
	Gorzów	81-100	87
	Legnica	90-115	99
Institute of	Lesko	88-126	104
Meteorology and Water	Mikołajki	86-119	102
Management	Świnoujście	72-85	76
	Warszawa	67-92	75
	Włodawa	74-104	80
	Zakopane	88-152	116

\* Symbols of stations as specified in Chapter X "National radiological monitoring".

Fig. 13. Annual average concentration of Cs-137 in aerosols in Warsaw in the years 1998-2015 (number of stations measuring the content of this radionuclide given in brackets) (PAA, based on data provided by the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection, measured by the ASS-500 early warning stations for radioactive contamination).



#### Fig. 14. Annual average concentration of Cs-137 in aerosols in Warsaw in the years 1998-2015 (PAA, based on data provided by the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection, measured by the ASS-500 early warning stations for radioactive contamination).



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**Table 17.** Collation of results of weekly measurements of radionuclide concentrations in atmosphericaerosols on the premises of the Świerk Nuclear Centre in 2015.

	Be-7 [mBq/m³]	K-40 [µBq/m³]	l-131 [µBq/m³]	Cs-137 [µBq/m³]
Average value	2.7	16	5.8	1.1
Minimum value	1.05	10.5	0.73	0.35
Maximum value	5.7	28	71	4.5

#### 1.3. Total fallout

The notion of total fallout refers to dusts contaminated with isotopes of radioactive elements which, due to the field of gravity and atmospheric precipitation, settle on the surface of the earth.

The measurement results provided in Table 18 imply that the content of artificial Sr-90 and Cs-137 radionuclides in the total annual fallout in 2015 remained on the level observed in previous years. The increased level of activity of Cs-137 in the total fallout in 2011 was caused by the arrival of the air masses from over the Fukushima nuclear power plant to the territory of Poland in March, April and May 2011.

#### 1.4. Waters and bottom sediments

Radioactivity of waters and bottom sediments was established based on determination of the chosen artificial and natural radionuclides in samples collected at fixed sampling points.

#### **OPEN WATERS**

Results of measurements of the content of Cs-137 and Sr-90 conducted in 2015 have been collated in Table 19. They indicate that the concentrations in question remained on the same level as in the last year and were similar to those observed in other European countries.

Concentrations of Cs-134 and Cs-137 in open water samples collected in 2015 at check points located in the vicinity of the Nuclear Centre in Świerk came to: **Table 18.** Average activity of Cs-137 and Sr-90 and<br/>average beta activity in total annual fal-<br/>lout in Poland in the years 1997-2015<br/>(Chief Inspectorate of Environmental<br/>Protection, measurements conducted<br/>by the Institute of Meteorology and Wa-<br/>ter Management).

Voor	Activit	y [Bq/m²]	Beta activity
Үеаг	Cs-137	Sr-90	[kBq/m <sup>2</sup> ]
1997	1.5	<1.0	0.35
1998	1.0	<1.0	0.32
1999	0.7	<1.0	0.34
2000	0.7	<1.0	0.33
2001	0.6	<1.0	0.34
2002	0.8	<1.0	0.34
2003	0.8	<0.1	0.32
2004	0.7	0.1	0.34
2005	0.5	0.1	0.32
2006	0.6	0.1	0.31
2007	0.5	0.1	0.31
2008	0.5	0.1	0.30
2009	0.5	0.1	0.33
2010	0.4	0.1	0.33
2011	1.1	0.2	0.34
2012	0.3	0.1	0.32
2013	0.3	0.2	0.31
2014	0.5	0.1	0.32
2015	0.6	0.1	0.31

- the Świder river: 6.29 mBq/dm<sup>3</sup> (upstream of the Centre) and 1.61 mBq/dm<sup>3</sup> (downstream of the centre),
- water from a sewage treatment plant in Otwock discharged to the Vistula river: 5.19 mBq/dm<sup>3</sup>.

The concentration of tritium in open water samples collected in 2015 at check points located in the vicinity of the Nuclear Centre in Świerk came to:

- The Świder river: 3.0 Bq/dm<sup>3</sup> (upstream of the Centre) and 0.7 Bq/dm<sup>3</sup> (downstream of the centre),
- water from a sewage treatment plant in Otwock discharged to the Vistula river: below 0.5 mBq/dm<sup>3</sup>.

In 2015 radioactivity of surface waters of the southern zone of the Baltic Sea was measured for the following isotopes: Cs-137, Ra-226 and K-40 (measurements conducted by the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection). Average concentrations of the aforementioned three isotopes remained on the level of 21.3 mBq/dm<sup>3</sup> for Cs-137, 3.39 mBq/dm<sup>3</sup> for Ra-226 and 3359 mBq/dm<sup>3</sup> for K-40, and did not depart from the results obtained in previous years.

Well, spring and ground water in the vicinity of the National Radioactive Waste Repository and the Nuclear Centre in Świerk.

#### NUCLEAR CENTRE IN ŚWIERK:

The average concentration of radioactive isotopes of caesium and strontium in well water from farms located in the vicinity of the Nuclear Centre in Świerk in 2015 was, respectively: 4.53 mBq/dm<sup>3</sup> for Cs-134 and 5.94 mBq/dm<sup>3</sup> for Cs-137, and 14.71 and 18.82 mBq/dm<sup>3</sup> for Sr-90. The concentration of tritium (H-3) was also determined, and it came to 2.3 and 0.9 Bq/dm<sup>3</sup> on average.

#### NATIONAL RADIOACTIVE WASTE REPOSITORY IN RÓŻAN:

Concentrations of radioactive isotopes of Cs-137 and Cs-134 in spring water near the National Radioactive Waste Repository in Różan came to 3.71 Bq/dm<sup>3</sup> on average.

In 2015, the concentration of tritium was also examined in the vicinity of the National Radioactive Waste Repository in Różan, and it amounted to 1.47 Bq/dm<sup>3</sup> on average.

Results of the concentration measurements conducted in 2015 did not depart from the results obtained in previous years.

#### **BOTTOM SEDIMENTS**

In 2015, as in the previous year, the concentration of selected artificial and natural radionuclides was determined in samples of dry mass of bottom sediments from rivers, lakes and the Baltic Sea. The results thus obtained have been provided in Tables 20 and 21.

The above results imply that, in 2015, the concentration of artificial radionuclides in bottom sediments and waters of the Baltic Sea remained on the same levels as observed in previous years.

# **Table 19.** Concentrations of Cs-137 and Sr-90 in river and lake water in Poland in 2015 [mBq/dm³](Chief Inspectorate of Environmental Protection; measurements conducted by the Central<br/>Laboratory for Radiological Protection).

	Cs-137		Sr-90*	
	Range	Average value	Range	Average value
Vistula, Bug and Narew	0.74-3.95	2.45	1.87-6.61	3.29
Oder and Warta	1.7-4.11	2.75	2.39-5.15	3.73
Lakes	1.23-4.87	2.49	1.87-9.01	3.69

\* The activity of Sr-90 in the radioactive contamination emitted during the Chernobyl disaster was considerably lower than the activity of Cs-137. The increased activity of Sr-90 currently observed in sediments is caused by the isotope washing out from soil proceeding more easily.



**Table 20.** Concentrations of caesium and plutonium in river and lake water in Poland in 2015 [Bq/kg of dry mass] (Chief Inspectorate of Environmental Protection; measurements conducted by the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection).

	Cs-137		Pu-234 i Pu-240	
	Range	Average value	Range	Average value
Vistula, Bug and Narew	0.59-14.14	3.75	0.005-0.0663	0.023
Oder and Warta	0.33-15.02	3.65	0.004-0.0651	0.021
Lakes	1.26-42.73	8.14	0.004-0.1792	0.042

Table 21. Concentrations of artificial radionuclides of Cs-137, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240 and Sr-90, and of thenatural radionuclide of K-40 and Ra-226 in bottom sediments from the southern Baltic Sea in 2015[Bq/kg of dry mass] (PAA, based on data provided by the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection).

Layer thickness	Cs-137	Pu-238	Pu-234, Pu-240	Ra-226	K-40	Sr-90
0-5 cm	124.29	0.06	1.45	35.76	818.4	2.20
5-19 cm	42.66	0.03	0.79	36.11	866.7	3.28

#### 1.5. Soil

Concentrations of both natural and artificial radionuclides in soil are determined based on cyclic spectrometric measurements conducted every few years on samples of non-cultivated soil collected from 10 and 25 cm thick layers of soil. Monitoring of radioactive isotopes present in soil is performed by the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection, as commissioned by the Chief Inspectorate of Environmental Protection.

The last completed measurement cycle was conducted in the years 2012-2013. In 2012, 264 samples of soil were taken at 254 fixed check points spread across the country.

In 2013, spectrometric measurements of these samples were conducted and the concentrations of artificial (Cs-137, Cs-134) and natural radioisotopes were determined. Based on the examinations conducted, it can be stated that the average deposition of Cs-137 in the surface layer of soil (10 cm) in Poland remains on the level exceeding 1 kBq/m<sup>2</sup> and equals 1.54 kBq/m<sup>2</sup> on average (data from measurements of samples collected in the autumn of 2012).

The average deposition of Cs-137 in Poland in the period of radioactive contamination monitoring of soil decreased from 4.64 kBq/m<sup>2</sup> in 1988 to 1.54 kBq/m<sup>2</sup> in 2012. The Cs-134 deposition in soil samples was changing throughout the monitoring period according to the half-life, and so this isotope does not appear in detectable amounts in Polish soils at present.

Results of spectrometric measurements indicate that deposition of Cs-137 in individual samples collected from a 10 cm thick soil layer in 2012 ranged from 0.22 to 17.97 kBq/m<sup>2</sup>, and more than 70% of results did not exceed the value of 1.5 kBq/m<sup>2</sup> (the average being 1.54 kBq/m<sup>2</sup>). However, the concentration of this isotope in soil ranges from 1.4 to 188.1 Bq/kg, with

the average concentration coming to 16.3 Bq/kg. The highest levels observed in the south of Poland were consequences of intense local rainfalls occurring in these regions in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster.

Average concentrations of natural radionuclides observed in 2012 in Poland equalled: 24.8 Bq/kg for Ra- 226 (natural uranium-radon series), 23.8 Bq/kg for Ac-228 (natural thorium series) and 415 Bq/kg for K-40 (naturally occurring potassium isotope).

The average deposition of Cs-137 in individual regions of Poland has been shown in Table 22, whereas average provincial concentrations of natural radioactive isotopes in soil determined in 2012 have been provided in Table 23.

# **Table 22.** Average deposition and concentrations of Cs-137 in soil in individual provinces of Poland in 2012 (Chief Inspectorate of Environmental Protection; measurements conducted by the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection in 2013<sup>11</sup>).

		Cs-	137
ltem	Province	Average deposition (Deposition range) [kBq/m²]	Average concentration (Concentration range) [Bq/kg]
1.	dolnośląskie	2.55 (0.44-17.97)	25.8 (3.9-188.1)
2.	kujawsko-pomorskie	0.75 (0.51-1.18)	6.3 (3.3-10.6)
3.	lubelskie	1.19 (0.22-4.81)	12.0 (1.7-57.2)
4.	lubuskie	0.73 (0.26-1.29)	6.5 (2.5-10.0)
5.	łódzkie	0.65 (0.28-1.80)	6.5 (2.3-17.7)
6.	małopolskie	1.89 (0.51-7.65)	25.4 (5.4-109.1)
7.	mazowieckie	1.76 (0.46-6.15)	15.5 (4.1-50.0)
8.	opolskie	4.02 (0.97-7.80)	32.7 (9.4-61.6)
9.	podkarpackie	0.83 (0.33-1.53)	7.7 (2.6-14.4)
10.	podlaskie	1.05 (0.71-1.66)	17.8 (6.3-63.8)
11.	pomorskie	0.86 (0.42-1.60)	9.3 (3.2-22.2)
12.	śląskie	2.50 (0.61-7.84)	26.4 (5.1-77.4)
13.	świętokrzyskie	1.28 (0.31-3.55)	12.8 (3.7-26.6)
14.	warmińsko-mazurskie	1.02 (0.23-1.82)	10.0 (2.8-18.8)
15.	wielkopolskie	0.68 (0.32-1.29)	6.5 (3.2-12.4)
16.	zachodniopomorskie	0.50 (0.22-1.19)	5.1 (1.4-9.7)

<sup>11</sup>Based on samples collected in 2012.

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
**Table 23.** Average concentrations of natural isotopes in soil in individual provinces of Poland in 2012 (Chief Inspectorate of Environmental Protection; measurements conducted by the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection in 2013<sup>12</sup>).

ltem	Province	Average concentration (Concentration range) [B			
		Ra-226	Ac-228	К-40	
1.	dolnośląskie	41.1 (5.5-128.3)	36.0 (6.0-101.7)	551 (178-924)	
2.	kujawsko-pomorskie	16.4 (10.0-22.7)	16.4 (8.5-23.6)	409 (243-536)	
3.	lubelskie	17.6 (10.3-32.6)	17.8 (10.0-33.9)	330 (196-552)	
4.	lubuskie	13.5 (8.6-19.2)	12.7 (8.0-20.3)	312 (224-429)	
5.	łódzkie	13.1 (7.4-18.2)	13.3 (6.8-22.1)	297 (164-430)	
6.	małopolskie	33.7 (10.3-57.6)	33.9 (11.6-49.6)	507 (218-816)	
7.	mazowieckie	13.5 (7.6-21.0)	13.8 (6.8-25.8)	322 (166-525)	
8.	opolskie	26.9 (7.6-43.5)	25.8 (7.7-43.9)	445 (190-694)	
9.	podkarpackie	33.7 (4.6-57.6)	32.2 (4.3-47.2)	473 (115-834)	
10.	podlaskie	17.7 (7.8-26.6)	18.9 (4.4-24.9)	458 (63-588)	
11.	pomorskie	17.9 (6.0-39.9)	15.9 (4.7-32.8)	350 (175-564)	
12.	śląskie	28.6 (10.1-51.4)	27.7 (7.7-48.3)	393 (147-627)	
13.	świętokrzyskie	20.4 (12.6-33.7)	19.8 (6.3-36.1)	318 (112-585)	
14.	warmińsko-mazurskie	17.9 (9.6-24.2)	16.8 (8.9-28.8)	425 (218-676)	
15.	wielkopolskie	14.4 (7.6-24.5)	14.0 (6.6-21.0)	335 (212-461)	
16.	zachodniopomorskie	15.8 (4.3-29.7)	15.3 (4.1-30.3)	335 (181-574)	

<sup>12</sup> Based on samples collected in 2012.


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<sup>13</sup> Based on samples collected in 2012. <sup>14</sup> Based on samples collected in 2012.

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Average values of deposition of the Cs-137 radioisotope in soil in individual provinces have been shown in Figure 15, whereas the average deposition of this radionuclide in soil within the entire territory of Poland measured chronologically in the years 1988-2012 has been illustrated in Figure 16.

Average values of surface contamination of soil with Cs-137 in 2012 in the vicinity of the Nuclear Centre in Świerk and of the National Radioactive Waste Repository in Różan equalled 6.8 Bq/kg and 70.5 Bq/kg respectively. For the sake of comparison, the average concentration of Cs-137 in soil all over Poland in 2012 ranged between 1.4 and 188.1 Bq/kg.

Having analysed the data acquired, the following conclusions can be drawn:

- the Cs-137 radioisotope occurring in soil mainly comes from the time of the Chernobyl disaster and its concentration is slowly decreasing, predominantly due to radioactive decay,
- the average concentration of Cs-137 in soil is 20 times lower than the average concentration of the natural K-40 radionuclide,
- average concentrations of the Cs-137 radioisotope in soil in the vicinity of the Nuclear Centre in Świerk and of the National Radioactive Waste Repository in Różan remain within the range of values observed in other parts of Poland.

In 2014, the execution of another project "Monitoring of Cs-137 concentration in soil in the years 2014-2015 was commenced. In accordance with the assumptions made, the samples were taken at 254 points spread all across Poland. The total number of 264 samples were collected: 254 from a 10 cm thick soil layer and 10 more from a 25 cm thick soil layer. In 2015, spectrometric measurements of these samples were conducted and the concentration of artificial (Cs-137, Cs-134) and natural radioisotopes was determined. In 2016, a collective report illustrating the deposition of Cs-137 in surface layer of soil and the concentration of natural radionuclides, on the basis of a full series of measurements of samples collected in October 2014, will be developed.

#### XI. 2. RADIOACTIVITY OF BASIC FOOD PROCESSING PRODUCTS AND OTHER FOODSTUFFS

Values of activity of radioactive isotopes in food processing products and other foodstuffs discussed in this subchapter should be referred to values specified in Council Regulation no. 737/90. This document stipulates that concentration of the Cs-137 and Cs-134 isotopes may not jointly exceed 370 Bq/kg in milk and dairy products and 600 Bg/kg in all food processing products and other foodstuffs. At present, the concentration of Cs-134 in food processing products and other foodstuffs is below the level of 1‰ of the Cs- 137 activity. Therefore, Cs-134 has been disregarded further on in this subsection. Lower activities of Cs-137 (compared to previous and following years) measured in 2006 in some foodstuffs were probably caused by meteorological conditions which occurred at that time on the territory of Poland (drought periods).

The data provided in this subchapter are based on measurement results submitted to the PAA by facilities conducting measurements of radioactive contamination (sanitary and epidemiological stations).

#### 2.1. Milk

Concentration of radioactive isotopes in milk constitutes an important factor for the assessment of radiation exposure through the alimentary tract. It may be assumed that, in an average Polish food ration, milk accounts for 20-30% of total nutritious supply.

In 2015, concentrations of Cs-137 in liquid (fresh) milk ranged from 0.18 to 2.45 Bq/dm<sup>3</sup> and amounted to ca. 0.51 Bq/dm<sup>3</sup> on average (Figure 17), which corresponds to ca. 25% of the total nutritious supply of Cs-137. Consequently, they were only ca. 20% higher than in 1985 and more than 10 times lower than in 1986 (the Chernobyl disaster). For the sake of comparison, it should be noted that the average concentration of the natural radioactive potassium isotope (K-40) in milk amounts to ca. 0.43 Bq/dm<sup>3</sup>.




Fig. 17. Annual average concentration of Cs-137 in milk in Poland in the years 2005-2015 (PAA, based on measurements conducted by sanitary and epidemiological stations).

#### 2.2. Meat, poultry, fish and eggs

Results of the Cs-137 activity measurements conducted on different kinds of meat from animal farms (beef, veal, pork) as well as poultry, fish and eggs in 2014 were as follows (annual average concentration of Cs-137):


- meat from animal farms ca. 0.77 Bq/kg,
- poultry ca. 0.60 Bq/kg,
- fish ca. 0.77 Bq/kg,
- eggs ca. 0.40 Bq/kg.

The time distribution of the Cs-137 activity in the years 2005-2015 in different types of meat from animal farms (beef, pork), as well as in poultry, eggs and fish has been shown in Figures 18-20. The data obtained imply that, in 2015, the average activity of the caesium isotope in meat, poultry, fish and eggs remained on the same level as in the previous year. Compared to the year 1986 (the Chernobyl disaster), the said activities were more than a dozen times lower in 2015.










**Fig. 19.** Annual average concentration of Cs-137 in poultry and eggs in Poland in the years 2005-2015 (PAA, based on measurements conducted by sanitary and epidemiological stations).










Fig. 21. Annual average concentration of Cs-137 in vegetables in Poland in the years 2004–2014 (PAA, based on measurements conducted by sanitary and epidemiological stations).





Fig. 22. Annual average concentration of Cs-137 in fruits in Poland in the years 2005–2015 (PAA, based on measurements conducted by sanitary and epidemiological stations).







## 2.3. Vegetables, fruits, cereals and mushrooms

Results of measurements of artificial radioactivity in vegetables and fruits conducted in 2015 imply that the concentration of the Cs-137 isotope in vegetables ranged from 0.15 to 0.95 Bq/kg, with the average value being 0.41 Bq/kg (Fig. 21), and in fruits in came to 0.18-0.41 Bq/kg on the average value of 0.27 Bq/kg (Fig. 22). In long-term comparisons, the results from 2015 remained on the level from year 1985, and in relation to the year 1986 – they were more than a dozen times lower.

The values of activity of Cs-137 in cereals observed in 2015 ranged from 0.22 to 1.38 Bq/kg (the average value being 0.5 Bq/kg) and were similar to amounts measured in 1985.

In 2013, measurements of the content of Cs-137 in cereals were conducted in the vicinity of the National Radioactive Waste Repository in Różan.

The values of activity of Cs-137 in cereals in the vicinity of NRWR in Różan in 2013 remained on a very low level, below the limit of detection. No cereal samples were collected in 2015.

Average values of activity of the caesium isotope in grass in the vicinity of the Świerk Nuclear Centre and of NRWR (with reference to dry mass) in 2014 ranged from <0.14 to 2.58 Bq/kg (the average value being 1.5 Bq/kg) for the Nuclear Centre in Świerk and from 0.62 to 352 Bq/kg (the average value being 46.5 Bq/kg) for NRWR.

In 2015, no radiochemical measurements of Cs-137 in fresh mushrooms were conducted. In 2014, the average activity of caesium in basic specimens of fresh mushrooms came to ca. 22 Bq/kg. It should be stressed that in 1985, i.e. before the Chernobyl disaster, the activity of Cs-137 in mushrooms was also much higher than in other foodstuffs. At that time, this radionuclide was produced in the course of tests of nuclear weapons (which is confirmed by an analysis of the proportion of the Cs-134 and Cs-137 isotopes in 1986).

#### XI. 3. ENVIRONMENTAL RADIOACTIVITY OF NATURAL RADIONUCLIDES INCREASED DUE TO HUMAN ACTIVITY

A part of radiological monitoring of the environment is the observation of the status of radiation in areas with an increased level of ionising radiation from natural sources caused by human activity. These areas include (as indicated in Chapter X "National radiological monitoring") territories of former uranium ore plants near Jelenia Góra.

For the purpose of interpretation of the relevant measurement results, recommendations developed by the World Health Organisation ("Guidelines for drinking-water quality", Vol. 1 – Recommendations. Geneva, 1993, item 4.1.3, p. 115) were applied, introducing what is referred to as reference levels for drinking water. In accordance with the aforementioned guidelines, the total alpha activity of drinking water should not, as a rule, exceed 100 mBq/dm<sup>3</sup>, whereas the beta activity should not exceed 1,000 mBq/dm<sup>3</sup>. However, it should also be noted that the said levels function as indicators only, and in cases of their exceedance, identification of radionuclides is recommended.

In line with the monitoring scheme, in 2015, measurements of the alpha and beta activity were conducted for 71 water samples in areas where uranium ore plants used to operate, and the following results were obtained:

- public intakes of drinking water:
- total alpha activity from 1.9 to 42.5 mBq/dm³,
- total beta activity from 23.8 to 242.8 mBq/dm<sup>3</sup>;
- water flowing out of mine headings (adits, rivers, ponds, springs, wells):
- total alpha activity from 4.2 to 602.3 mBq/dm³,
- total beta activity from 24.9 to 3,124.9 mBq/dm<sup>3</sup>;

however, the upper activity levels were observed in the water flowing out of adit no. 19a of the former "Podgórze" mine in Kowary.

Despite the fact that surface and underground water as well as water flowing out of mine headings is not intended to be used as drinking water and does not pose a direct health hazard, it should be systematically inspected due to increased radioactivity.

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The measurements conducted also covered the concentration of radon in water from public intakes within the area managed by the Association of Municipalities of the Karkonosze Region.

The Commission Recommendations 2001/928 EUR-ATOM on radon present in water stipulate that, for public intakes with radon concentration exceeding 100 Bq/dm<sup>3</sup>, the Member States should individually establish what is referred to as reference levels of radon concentration, and for concentrations exceeding 1,000 Bq/dm<sup>3</sup>, it is necessary that specific countermeasures be undertaken for the sake of radiological protection. In 2015, none of the results obtained in radon concentration measurements in water exceeded the threshold of 1,000 Bq/dm<sup>3</sup>.

The concentration of radon in water from public intakes and household wells in municipalities managed by the Association of Municipalities of the Karkonosze Region ranged from 0.0 to 806.8 Bq/dm<sup>3</sup>. The concentration of radon in water flowing out of mining facilities, which displayed the highest total alpha and beta radioactivity, showed the highest value of 411.0 Bq/dm<sup>3</sup> in water flowing out of adit no. 17 of the "Podgórze" mine.

Therefore, it can be stated that even in this part of Poland, where there is potentially the highest radiation hazard due to radon present in water and natural radioactive elements in soil, the threat to local population is negligibly small.

Based on the data provided in this subchapter, it can be concluded that the concentration of natural radionuclides in the environment has remained on a similar level for last dozen of years. Nevertheless, the concentration of artificial isotopes (mainly of Cs-137) which originated from the Chernobyl disaster and previous nuclear weapon tests is systematically decreasing owing to the natural process of radioactive decay. The radionuclide contents reported do not pose any radiation threat for the population and the environment of Poland.





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# INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Coordination of Poland's international cooperation in the field of nuclear safety and radiological protection is a statutory duty of the President of the National Atomic Energy Agency (PAA). This duty is performed by the President in close collaboration with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Energy and with other competent ministers (heads of central offices) in line with their respective responsibilities.

The goal of international cooperation in which PAA has become involved, is to pursue the mission of a nuclear regulatory body, i.e. ensuring nuclear safety and radiological protection of the country. PAA strives to accomplish this goal by entering international legal acts and implementing international standards by the exchange of information on nuclear protection between the neighbouring countries, as well as increasing their own competence in action by sharing experience and know-how with foreign partners. The international cooperation in question is pursued by way of the participation of PAA's representatives in the efforts undertaken by international organizations and associations, as well as their involvement in bilateral cooperation.

#### XII.1. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION

#### 1.1. Cooperation with international organizations

In 2015, the PAA President was involved in fulfilment of tasks resulting from Poland's multilateral cooperation under the framework of:

- 1. the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) – Poland has been its member since 2004;
- 2. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) -Poland has been its founding member since 1957;
- 3. the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (NEA OECD) – Poland joined NEA OECD in 2010;
- 4. the Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association (WENRA) - PAA has collaborated with WENRA since 2004, and has been holding the status of an observer since 2008;
- 5. Meetings of Heads of the European Radiological Protection Competent Authorities (HERCA) - the cooperation started in 2008;
- 6. the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) Poland has been its founding member since 1992;

- 7. the European Nuclear Security Regulators Association (ENSRA) – PAA has been a member of ENSRA since 2013:
- 8. the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) – PAA joined ESARDA in 2009.

#### 1.1.1. European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)

The European Atomic Energy Community is an intergovernmental organization established by virtue of the Rome Treaty signed on 25 March 1957 by France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. After the amendments effected under the Lisbon Treaty signed on 13 December 2007, the modified EURATOM Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009.

Among other provisions contained in the preamble, the Treaty stipulates that nuclear energy is a necessary mean for development and revival of the industry, and that it contributes to preservation of peace in Europe. What the EURATOM Treaty also defines, are the duties of the Community, including contribution to raising the living standards in the Member States and development of relationships with other countries by fostering conditions necessary to create and rapidly develop the nuclear industry.

PAA's involvement resulting from the membership of Poland in the Euratom Community in 2015 focused mainly on activities conducted in two groups:

- the European Nuclear Safety Regulators' Group (ENSREG) composed of representatives of the senior management of European nuclear regulators from the Member States, a representative of the European Commission, providing advisory support to the EU Council and the European Parliament through the European Commission.
- the Working Party on Atomic Questions B.07 WPAQ, in which PAA holds leading competence, responsible for the development and presentation of the Polish position with regard to the issues discussed.

In 2015 within the framework of ENSREG, the EU Commission organized the third European conference on nuclear safety, in which the Polish delegation consisting of the PAA representatives . . . . . . . . together with other delegates from nuclear safety related institutions participated. During the stat-

> ..... •



ed conference the views and comments on its essential matters were presented by the representatives of a wide variety of backgrounds, including nuclear energy opponents.

Among the most important topics within the WPAQ were:

- Further discussion on common position on Euratom community for the IAEA Diplomatic Conference (February 2015) started during the Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union on the Convention of Nuclear Safety. In the end, the position on accepting of the so-called Vienna Declaration was adopted, as an interpretation of the rules of procedure coherent with the updated Nuclear Safety Directive.
- The discussion on the Council Regulation laying down maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination of food and feed following a nuclear accident or any other case of radiological emergency. The discussion based on the position of MS national experts in the field of level of contamination of particular components of human food and animal feed ended with the agreement in the commonly agreed text of the regulation, which was accepted by the UE Council.
- Consultations and acceptance of the Council Conclusion on "Off-site nuclear emergency preparedness and response" encouraging the MS to cooperate in case of nuclear emergencies, especially in trans-border areas, and the European Commission to prepare the rules of the above cooperation based on the Basic Safety Standards Directive, establishing basic safety standards in order to protect against threats resulting from an exposure to ionizing radiation.

Under the auspices of Euratom, the PAA representatives participated in working groups and consultative bodies of the EU Council and European Commission in the scope of the assigned responsibilities to the President of the PAA. These were mainly:

- Working Group on Waste Management established on the basis of article 37 of the Euratom Treaty;
- Group for the monitoring of levels of radioactivity in air, water and soil and related to control of compliance with the basic standards and the supervision of the European Commission within the above aspects established under article 35 and obligation to inform the European Commission on results of measures of radiation moni-

toring of a MS, both in normal and emergency conditions (art. 36 of the Euratom Treaty);

- Advisory committee established on basis of Council Directive 2006/117/EURATOM of 20 November 2006 on the supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel;
- European Commission Permanent Working Group on safety of transport of radioactive materials.

In 2015, the PAA nuclear regulatory inspectors participated in all planned nuclear facilities inspections in Poland conducted by the Euratom inspectors. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that Poland, represented by the PAA, is an important contributor to the measurement data exchange systems deployed across the European Union. These include: an exchange system for data from routine radiation monitoring of the environment and the European Radiological Data Exchange Platform, i.e. an exchange system for data from early warning stations for radioactive contamination (dose rate). More information about this topic can be found in Chapter X "National radiological monitoring".

#### 1.1.2. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

The International Atomic Energy Agency is a specialized agency of the United Nations Organization, established in 1957, functioning as a center of cooperation in the fields relating to the safe use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Poland is a founding member of the IAEA and ratified the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 23 May 1957 (Journal of Laws of 1958, no. 41, item 187). The main partners from the Polish side who participate in the cooperation with IAEA are the Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs – together with the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Poland to the UN Office and International Organizations in Vienna – and the National Atomic Energy Agency (PAA).

The IAEA's goal, as provided for in its Statute, is "to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world" and to ensure that nuclear energy is used for peaceful purposes only. Promotion of nuclear energy in IAEA is performed in two fields of activity: the first is related with the **nuclear energy** and all technologies related to the nuclear fuel cycle and waste management, whereas the second field of activity focuses on **the use of ionising radiation** in industry, medicine, agriculture, scientific research and development of relevant nuclear technologies. The IAEA has three main activity fields related to broadly understood safety: **nuclear safety<sup>15</sup>**, **nuclear security**, and **safeguards**.

The basis of IAEA activities related to the peaceful use of nuclear energy are based in the Safety Standards and Security Guidelines prepared and published by the Agency. The IAEA facilitates the global safety and security though the International Conventions and the peer reviews related to them, as well as IAEA inspections of nuclear facilities within the scope of safeguards based on safeguards agreements concluded with each Member State or groups of Member States that are members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The highest plenary body of the IAEA is the General Conference, which is convened every year at a session in September. The second managing body of the Agency is the Board of Governors meeting five times a year. Poland was a temporary member of the Board of Governors in years 2012-2014.

The goals of IAEA within the areas stated above are pursued through the budget created from the contributions made by each IAEA Member State and other donations. Most of these resources is directed to the nuclear verification related to safeguards control and the IAEA Technical Cooperation, which provides support to the Member States for implementation of projects related to various aspects of use of nuclear energy.

Poland's membership fee payable to the IAEA (settled under PAA's budget) in 2015, amounted to:

- EUR 2,461,944 and USD 349,122 to the regular budget,
- EUR 618,401 to the Technical Cooperation Fund.

Both amounts are calculated based on the UN membership fee rates for a given state in a given year.

#### Cooperation in establishing the IAEA Safety Standards

A vital part of the IAEA's activities is dedicated for establishing of Safety Standards for peaceful use of nuclear energy. Works devoted to these Standards are performed by five committees and one commission:

- Nuclear Safety Standards Committee (NUSSC);
- Radiation Safety Standards Committee (RASSC);
- Waste Safety Standards Committee (WASSC);
- Transport Safety Standards Committee (TRANSSC);
- Security Guidance Committee (NSGC).

In 2015, the experts of the National Atomic Energy Agency actively participated in the works of all the aforementioned committees.

#### IAEA Safety Convention Peer Review

Both the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive **Waste Management** aim to achieve and sustain the high level of global safety and security with regard to nuclear power plants, disposal of spent nuclear fuel and waste, through constant improvement related to fulfillment of the requirements of the stated Conventions and the use of MS experience exchanged. To achieve this objective, each participating Member State of the above Conventions has an obligation to present a Country Report (this Report is made available to all MS of the Conventions) to other participating states every 3 years. The Country Report describes the level of the Convention fulfillment and obligations implementation status as well as written answers to questions and comments of all interested participating Member States, which are presented during the review meetings of a given participating State – including the description of achieving the goals and objectives resulting from those questions and comments in the perspective of the next 3 years, and after that – implementing the action plan to fulfill the said goals and objectives until next review process. Poland participated in preparations of these Conventions during the IAEA Diplomatic Conferences in the 1990's and participated (under the leadership of PAA) in all processes and review conferences of these Conventions so far (6 review meetings and

<sup>15</sup> Including radiation, waste and transport safety.



2 extraordinary meetings in respect to CNS and 5 review meetings in case of JC).

On 11-22 May 2015 at the IAEA office in Vienna 5<sup>th</sup> Review Conference of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management was held. The Polish delegation headed by the PAA Vice-President was composed of the representatives of PAA as a nuclear regulatory authority, the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Poland to the UN Office in Vienna, the Ministry of Economy – responsible for the policy and strategy with regard to spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, as well as by the Radioactive Waste Management Plant (RWMP). Among the objectives to be achieved by Poland, the most important one was the adoption of the National Plan for the Spent Fuel Management and Radioactive Waste Management by the Council of Ministers, developed by the Ministry of Economy (now Ministry of Energy) implementing the national policy in this area, and attaining relevant measurable progress in its implementation by 2018, in particular:

- a) Progress in implementation of the works aimed at the construction of a new surface radioactive waste disposal facility, the operation of which is planned from 2025, including:
  - Commencement of the works on the closure of the National Radioactive Waste Repository based in Różan, Poland, selection of the concept and performance of safety analyses,
  - Obtaining the consent of local community and agreeing the location for the new surface radioactive waste disposal facility by 2018, preceded by detailed examinations,
- b) Progress in establishing the location for an underground research laboratory and establishing the location for a deep radioactive waste disposal facility,
- c) Completion of transport of high-enriched nuclear fuel to the Russian Federation under the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI).
- d) Adoption by the Council of Ministers of an amendment to the regulation on radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.

During the assessment of national reports and at the sessions of 5th Review Conference the works on the safety of radioactive waste disposal and spent nuclear fuel which had been carried out in Poland so far, gained recognition, among others in the context of preparation to the Polish Nuclear Power Programme (PNPP), whereas the implementation of a complex strategy for preparation to PNPP, taking into account all significant activity areas, was considered to be a good practice.

## IAEA technical and scientific cooperation and technical assistance to Poland

An important instrument of the IAEA is the Technical Cooperation Programme, in which Poland has been participating in two roles: as a net contributor to the Fund, and as a beneficiary (the Polish institutions are involved in technical cooperation projects). The Polish institutions have been participating in national projects of the IAEA Technical Cooperation since the late 1970s. Since that time till the end of 2015 Poland was a direct recipient of more than 80 projects with a total value of tens of millions of USD, and participated in hundreds of regional and inter-regional projects together with other Member States. Among these projects there were both those related to nuclear medicine, material engineering, research reactors and radioisotope production, capacity building and the development of nuclear infrastructure, and those related to the nuclear regulatory activity and strengthening of nuclear safety.

In the years 2014-2015, Polish institutions were involved in three national projects under the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) (see Table 24).

In addition to national projects, in 2015, Poland, participated in more than 20 IAEA TC projects of regional cooperation (Central-Eastern Europe) and inter-regional cooperation, half of which were of strictly nuclear regulatory nature and were coordinated by the PAA representatives.


#### **Regulatory Cooperation Forum**

Poland regularly uses a range of tools offered by the IAEA which serve to strengthen nuclear safety in Poland. These are international peer review missions, such as the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS), the Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR), the Integrated Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS), the Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactor (INSARR) and other reviews. Moreover, Poland is an active member of the Regulatory Cooperation Forum (RCF), operating under the IAEA auspices. Under the RCF the Polish nuclear regulatory authority uses the experience of the countries which possess advanced nuclear power programmes. **Table 24.** The IAEA's national technical assistance projects implemented in Poland in 2015.

IAEA Project No.	Project title	Beneficiary
POL/2/017	Support for the development of nuclear infrastructure Ministry of Economy	
POL/6/010	Supporting the Network of Nuclear Medicine Centres for Cooperation in the Application of Positron Emis- sion Tomography in Oncology	Oncology Centre in Bydgoszcz
POL/9/022	Strengthening the Nuclear Regu- latory Authority for Nuclear Power Introduction	National Atomic Energy Agency (PAA)

The Regulatory Cooperation Forum (RCF) is a relatively new initiative of the International Atomic Energy Agency whose aim is to coordinate the cooperation between nuclear regulatory authorities operating in countries developing their nuclear power engineering industry and those which already have a well-developed nuclear power engineering sector. The strategy of the RCF's programme concentrates on developing a plan of activities adjusting the nuclear safety infrastructure to the objective of supervision of nuclear power plants as well as implementation of this plan in cooperation with experienced international partners. The cooperation involves consultations, peer reviews, training courses and employee exchange schemes.

In 2014, a dedicated PAA-RCF Action Plan was adopted for the years 2014-2015, under which 13 on-thejob training courses lasting several months were attended by PAA's employees at the nuclear regulatory bodies abroad in 2015. The training courses took place in the countries which had successfully deployed nuclear programmes, such as France, Canada, South Korea, the United States and the United Kingdom. The aforementioned training courses enabled PAA's personnel to acquire practical experience in supervision of nuclear facilities, including in the process of granting licences for operation of new power units. These trainings will be continued over the next years in order to strengthen the capacity of the National Atomic Energy Agency to carry out the tasks under the Polish Nuclear Power Programme.





### Other fields and forms of cooperation with the IAEA

In 2015, the cooperation with the IAEA was also related to such fields as:

- participation in the Emergency Notification and Assistance Convention (ENAC), being an international system coordinated by the IAEA. The National Contact Point of this system operates 24 hours a day at the PAA Radiation Emergency Centre;
- participation in the classification system of the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) which ensures, among other benefits, access to updated information available at the IAEA, concerning incidents which, due to their local impact, are not included in the early warning procedures;
- performance of obligations in the scope of state control over the trade and flow across the territory of Poland of nuclear material and devices subject to special supervision in order to counteract the proliferation of nuclear weapons (including supervision of the fulfilment of Poland's obligations connected with the IAEA safeguards system). This task is pursued by a contact point with the Non-Proliferation Division at PAA's Nuclear Safety Department in cooperation with the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

#### 1.1.3. Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (NEA OECD)

The Nuclear Energy Agency is an international, independent and specialised agency of the OECD based in Paris. Its main goal is to support the Member States in fostering peacetime use of nuclear energy in a safe, environmentally friendly and economically sound manner. All these objectives are pursued through international cooperation, organisation of joint research programmes, preparation of legal acts and implementation of new technological solutions for products and services. The NEA incorporates 31 Member States, including 30 out of 34 OECD countries and supports the Member States in their use of nuclear energy for peacetime purposes.

The NEA's activity is based on the cooperation of national experts in 7 standing technical committees and several subordinate working groups. Poland became the NEA member in 2010. The membership in the NEA enables more intensive participation in the exchange of experience between Poland and other Member States, this being particularly important on account of the fact that the NEA has incorporated the majority of the countries with a developed nuclear power engineering sector.

Three out of the NEA committees are directly involved in PAA's scope of activity i.e. the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA), the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) and the Nuclear Law Committee (NLC). PAA joined the works of the aforementioned committees just before Poland's accession to the NEA. From the perspective of PAA's preparations for the implementation of the Polish Nuclear Power Programme, under the framework of the CNRA, the participation in the Working Group on Regulation of New Reactors (WGRNR) is particularly important. PAA is also a member of the Working Party on Nuclear Emergency Matters (WPNEM) being an entity which seeks to improve national systems for detecting and mitigating radiation emergencies.

Since Poland's accession to the NEA, PAA has additionally participated in the following efforts: Working Group on Public Communication of Nuclear Regulatory Organizations (WGPC) and Working Group on Inspection Practices (WGIP) as well as the Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRISK) and Working Group on Analysis and Management of Accidents (WGAMA).

## 1.2. Other forms of multilateral cooperation

#### 1.2.1. Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA)

The Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA), operating since 1999, voluntarily incorporates officials in charge of the nuclear regulatory bodies of the European Union Member States and of Switzerland operating or commissioning nuclear power plants (i.e. seventeen states in total). The purpose of this organisation is to facilitate the harmonisation of safety requirements and practices pertaining to siting, design, construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, storage and disposal of radioactive waste as well as systematic improvement of safety level.

WENRA operates through permanent or ad hoc working groups, defines what is referred to as Safe-

ty Reference Levels (SRLs) accepted by all members in terms of safety and decommissioning of existing nuclear power plants, acting via a standing group referred to as RHWG<sup>16</sup> as well as storage and disposal of waste, this being handled by a standing group abbreviated as WGWD<sup>17</sup>.

In December 2010 WENRA published the document which specifies so called "safety objectives", the achievement of which must be ensured by the designs of new Generation-III and Generation-III+ nuclear plants. Those objectives and WENRA's Safety Reference Levels were used in the course of the legislative works aimed at preparation of the amendment to the Atomic Law in Poland with regard to the Polish Nuclear Power Programme adopted in May 2011. The WENRA's detailed guidelines to achieve particular safety objectives for new nuclear power plants, taking into account the conclusions from the Fukushima accident, were published as so called WENRA Position Papers in the RHWG report of October 2012. The WENRA's positions were taken into account in the secondary legislation to the Atomic Law Act, pertaining to designing and safety analyses of a nuclear power plant, issued by the Polish Council of Ministers in 2012.

PAA has been participating in plenary meetings of the Association since 2004, and since 2008, it has been holding the observer status. In WENRA Poland is represented by the PAA Vice-President, who took part in the meetings in Geneva held between 26-27 March 2015 and in Madrid - between 26-28 October 2015.

#### 1.2.2. Heads of European Radiation Control Authorities (HERCA)

A group known as HERCA (Heads of European Radiation Control Authorities) is a relatively new platform (since 2007) for cooperation of European nuclear regulators. The PAA's representatives joined HERCA activities in 2008, by participating in its Working Groups. The Working Groups' programmes are approved by the HERCA Board of Directors (BoH), composed of the heads of European radiation control authorities or their high-level representatives; at present – 31 heads from Europe, including Poland (the PAA Vice-President has been a member of the BoH since February 2011). The BoH monitors the progress of the works (accepting the reports and the working groups' reports, discussing the conclusions) during **2 plenary meetings** a year and formulates the recommendations for further activities to be implemented by the working groups designated by the BoH in the following fields:

- WG1- European Radiation Passbook & Outside workers)
- WG2 Non-medical sources and practices
- WGMA Medical Applications
- WG Emergencies
- WG6 Surveillance of collective doses from medical exposures
- WG Veterinary Applications

In 2015, 4 delegates from the PAA took part in the working groups' works (in WG1, WG2, WG-E and WG-VA Working Groups accordingly) and 1 delegate from the Oncology Centre of Maria Skłodowska-Curie Institute in Warsaw (in WGMA and WG6). The plenary meetings of the BoH, each with the participation of 2 delegates from Poland, took place on 4-5 May in Lisbon, and on 9-10 November 2015 in Athens. Also, the workshop devoted to a licence of a Radiation Protection Expert and Radiation Protection Inspector in the light of the new Basic Safety Standards Directive on 6-8 July in Paris was attended.

#### 1.2.3. Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS)

The Council of the Baltic Sea States was established in March 1992 at the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. It is composed of representatives of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland (since 1993), Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the Russian Federation. Poland has been represented at the Expert Group on Nuclear and Radiation Safety by the PAA since 1992.

On 3-4 November 2015 the National Atomic Energy Agency hosted a meeting of the EGNRS group in Warsaw. The meeting was followed by the topical day on the nuclear forensics organized within the framework of the Polish Presidency in the CBSS. The meeting was attended by the representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Institute for Transuranium Elements in Karlsruhe, the Ministry of the Interior and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the EGNRS members.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Reactors' Harmonization Working Group.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Working Group for Waste and Decommissioning.



The PAA participates in the Council of the Baltic Sea States' radiological data exchange sharing the data from its early warning stations for radioactive contamination. The information on the data exchange is included in subsection X 3 "National radiological monitoring – Participation in the international exchange of radiological monitoring data".

#### 1.2.4. European Nuclear Security Regulators Association (ENSRA)

The European Nuclear Security Regulators Association (ENSRA) dates back to 1990 when an informal group was composed of representatives of nuclear regulators from Belgium, Germany, France, Sweden, Spain and the United Kingdom. The group transformed into the Association abbreviated as ENSRA in 2004. At present, the Association incorporates 14 Member States of the European Union. Poland has been a member of the ENSRA since 2012. Bulgaria, Norway and Romania hold a status of an observer. Main goals of the Association include exchange of information concerning physical protection of nuclear material and facilities as well as promotion of a uniform approach towards physical protection in the European Union countries.

With regard to the recommendations provided in the report prepared by the Ad Hoc Group on Nuclear Security of the European Commission of May 2012, ENSRA undertook to review its terms of reference and to admit further countries with nuclear reactors to the Association as well as to tighten the cooperation through exchange of good practices between ENSRA countries. The new version of terms of reference was distributed among all the ENSRA members in 2014. Till the end of 2015 the document was accepted by all ENSRA countries, except for Sweden.

Between 30 September and 2 October 2015 a plenary meeting of ENSRA was held in Budapest, organized by the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority. During the meeting the information concerning the achievements and existing problems related to physical protection of nuclear material and facilities in particular ENSRA countries was presented. Special attention was paid to such problems as physical protection during transport, internal threats in nuclear facilities, as well as cyber-security. The tightening of cooperation between ENSRA and WENRA (Western European Nuclear Regulators Association) is being considered. A special speech of current Hungarian President of ENSRA was devoted to this issue.

#### 1.2.5. European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA)

PAA has been a member of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) since 2009. It is an organisation of the EU countries constituting a forum for exchange of information and experience concerning safeguards of nuclear material. This Association cooperates with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the laboratories of the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission. It incorporates scientific institutes, universities, industrial companies, specialists and administration bodies of the European Union countries. There are several thematic working groups operating within the Association. These groups are involved in such matters as: implementation of rules for safeguards, inspection of interlocks and access to nuclear material, destructive and non-destructive tests and measurements used in industry, verification techniques and methodology of quantitative status of nuclear material, also in the field of arms control, knowledge and training management, application of the Novell network technology, inspection of export of goods as well as strategic and dual use technologies. The PAA representative participates in the works of the Group for the Safeguards Principles' Implementation in accordance with the provisions of the European Commission (EURATOM). The Association issues its Bulletin which is available on: https://esarda.jrc. ec.europa.eu.

#### **XII. 2. BILATERAL COOPERATION**

In order to ensure nuclear and radiological safety, the Republic of Poland has signed a number of international bilateral agreements, the performance of which has been entrusted to the PAA President. The agreements concerning early notification of nuclear accidents and exchange of information and experience were concluded with: Denmark (1987), Austria and Norway (1989), Ukraine (1993), Belarus (1994), the Russian Federation (the relaxant agreement concerned a zone of 300 km from the Polish border, namely the area of the Kaliningrad Oblast), Lithuania (1995), Slovakia (1996), the Czech Republic (2005), and Germany (2009). Grounds for the foregoing were laid down in the international Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident concluded under the auspices of the IAEA, after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. Due to the fact that there is a number of operating nuclear power plants near the Polish borders, collaboration with nuclear regulators of the neighbouring countries, conducted in accordance with the aforementioned intergovernmental agreements and cooperation agreements between nuclear regulatory bodies, is an essential element of our radiological safety.

In the framework of PAA's preparation for the tasks related to the Polish Nuclear Power Programme, in 2010 the PAA President signed an agreement with the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) on technical information exchange and cooperation in the field of nuclear safety and, in 2012, a similar agreement with French nuclear regulator (ASN). In 2014, PAA signed cooperation agreements with nuclear regulatory bodies of Canada, Romania and Great Britain. A practical example of implementation of the cooperation arrangement with the US NRC is PAA's joining CAMP (2011) and CSARP (2012) programmes, which include international cooperation on the development of advanced computer codes used for safety analysis of nuclear power plants.

In 2015 the arrangement with the US National Regulatory Commission was extended, and a successive arrangement allowing PAA to continue the use of the US computer codes for safety analyses was concluded.

Under bilateral cooperation in 2015, a meeting with the delegates from Belarus was held, and the PAA representatives paid a visit to Austria. Furthermore, a study visit was organized for the PAA representatives at the Spanish regulatory body, enabling them to become familiar with the functioning and experience of the Spanish regulatory body, especially with regard to a radioactive waste disposal facility.







#### **APPENDIX NO. 1** LIST OF SECONDARY LEGISLATION ACTS TO THE ATOMIC LAW **OF 29 NOVEMBER 2000**

#### **Regulations:**

- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 6 August 2002 on the cases when activities involving exposure to ionising radiation are exempted from mandatory licensing or notification, and on the cases when such activities may be conducted on the basis of notification (Journal of Laws no. 137, item 1153 and of 2004, no. 98, Item 980),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 3 December 2002 on the documents required when applying for authorisation to conduct activity involving exposure to ionising radiation or when notifying the conduct of such activity (Journal of Laws no. 220, item 1851, of 2004, no. 98, item 981, of 2006, no. 127, item 883, and of 2009, no. 71, item 610)18,
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 3 December 2002 on radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel (Journal of Laws no. 230, item 1925)<sup>19</sup>,
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 17 December 2002 on the stations for early detection of radioactive contamination and on the units conducting measurements of radioactive contamination (Journal of Laws no. 239, item 2030),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 23 December 2002 on the requirements for dosimetry equipment (Journal of Laws no. 239, item 2032),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 27 April 2004 on values of intervention levels for individual types of intervention measures and criteria for revoking these measures (Journal of Laws no. 98, item 987),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 27 April 2004 on the determination of entities competent to inspect maximum permitted levels of radioac-

tive contamination of foodstuffs and feeding stuffs following a radiation event (Journal of Laws no. 98, item 988),

- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 27 April 2004 on the protection against ionising radiation of outside workers exposed during their work in a controlled area (Journal of Laws no. 102, item 1064),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 27 April 2004 on prior information for the general public in the event of radiation emergency (Journal of Laws no. 102, item 1065),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 18 January 2005 on ionising radiation dose limits (Journal of Laws no. 20, item 168),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 18 January 2005 on emergency response plans in cases of radiation emergency (Journal of Laws no. 20, item 169, and of 2007, no. 131, item 912),
- Regulation of the Minister of Health of 7 April 2006 on the minimum requirements for healthcare centres applying for the consent to conduct activity involving exposure to ionising radiation for medical purposes, which consists in rendering services related to oncological radiotherapy (Journal of Laws no. 75, item 528, Journal of Laws of 2011, no. 48, item 252, and of 2012, item 471),
- Regulation of the Minister of Health of 4 May 2006 on organization, mode of operation and detailed tasks of the National Centre for Radiation Protection in Health Care (Journal of Laws no. 85, item 592),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 12 July 2006 on the detailed safety requirements for work involving ionising radiation sources (Journal of Laws no. 140, item 994),
- Regulation of the Minister of Health of 21 August 2006 on the special conditions for safe work with radiological devices (Journal of Laws no. 180, item 1325),
- Regulation of the Minister of Health of 22 December 2006 on supervision and control of the compli-..... ance with radiological protection conditions



in organisational units using X-ray devices for purposes of medical diagnostics, interventional radiology, surface radiotherapy and radiotherapy of non-cancerous diseases (Journal of Laws of 2007, no. 1, item 11),

- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 2 January 2007 on the requirements concerning the content of natural radioactive isotopes: Potassium-40, Radium-226 and Thorium-228 in raw material and material used in buildings designed to accommodate people and livestock, as well as in industrial waste used in the construction industry and on the inspection of the content of these isotopes (Journal of Laws No. 4, item 29),
- Regulation of the Minister of Health of 2 February 2007 on the detailed requirements concerning the form and content of standard and working medical radiological procedures (Journal of Laws no. 24, item 161),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 20 February 2007 on the basic requirements for controlled and supervised areas (Journal of Laws no. 131, item 910),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 20 February 2007 on the conditions for import into the territory of the Republic of Poland, export out of the territory of the Republic of Poland and transit through this territory of nuclear material, radioactive sources and devices containing such sources (Journal of Laws no. 131, item 911),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 23 March 2007 on the requirements concerning registration of individual doses (Journal of Laws no. 131, item 913),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 4 October 2007 on the allocated and special purpose subsidy, fees and financial management of the state-owned public utility enterprise – "Radioactive Waste Management Plant" (Journal of Laws no. 185, item 1311 and Journal of Laws of 2013, item 574),
- Regulation of the Minister of Health of 27 March 2008 on the minimum requirements for health care units providing health care services in the scope of X-ray diagnostics, interventional radiology, diagnostics and

radioisotope therapy of non-cancerous diseases (Journal of Laws no. 59, item 365),

- Regulation of the Minister of Health of 27 March 2008 on the database of radiological devices (Journal of Laws no. 59, item 366),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 21 October 2008 on granting authorisation and consent for import into the territory of the Republic of Poland, export from the Republic of Poland and transit through this territory of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel (Journal of Laws no. 219, item 1402),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 4 November 2008 on physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (Journal of Laws no. 207, item 1295),
- Regulation of the Prime Minister of 8 January 2010 on the manner of exercising supervision and control at the Internal Security Agency, the Foreign Intelligence Agency and the Central Anticorruption Bureau by nuclear regulatory authorities (Journal of Laws No. 8, item 55),
- Regulation of the Minister of Health of 18 February 2011 on the conditions of safe use of ionising radiation for all types of medical exposure (Journal of Laws of 2013, item 1015 and item 1023, and Journal of Laws of 2015, item 2040),
- Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of 13 April 2011 on the list of border crossings across which nuclear material, radioactive sources, devices containing such sources, radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel may be imported into and exported from the territory of the Republic of Poland (Journal of Laws no. 89, item 513),
- Regulation of the Minister of Finance of 14 September 2011 on the guaranteed minimum amount of the compulsory civil liability insurance of the nuclear facility operator (Journal of Laws no. 206, item 1217),
- Regulation of the Minister of Health of 29 September 2011 on psychiatric and psychological tests of employees performing activities important for nuclear safety and radiological protection at the organisational unit conducting activity involving expo-

sure which consists in commissioning, operation or decommissioning of a nuclear power plant (Journal of Laws no. 220, item 1310),

- Regulation of the Minister of the Environment of 9 November 2011 on the standard form of an identity document of a Nuclear Regulatory Inspector (Journal of Laws no. 257, item 1544),
- Regulation of the Minister of the Environment of 18 November 2011 on the Council for Nuclear Safety and Radiological Protection (Journal of Laws no. 279, item 1643),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 27 December 2011 on the standard form of a quarterly report on the amount of fee contributed to a decommissioning fund (Journal of Laws of 2012, item 43),
- Regulation of the Council of Minister of 26 March 2012 on the special purpose subsidy granted for ensuring nuclear safety and radiological protection of Poland in cases of using ionising radiation (Journal of Laws, item 394),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 27 December 2011 on periodical safety assessment of a nuclear facility (Journal of Laws of 2012, item 556),
- Regulation of the Minister of Economy of 23 July 2012 on detailed rules for the establishment and operation of Local Information Committees and cooperation in terms of nuclear power facilities (Journal of Laws, item 861),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 24 August 2012 on Nuclear Regulatory Inspectors (Journal of Laws, item 1014 and Journal of Laws of 2016, item 26),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 10 August 2012 on positions important for nuclear safety and radiological protection and Radiation Protection Officers (Journal of Laws, item 1022)<sup>20</sup>,
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 10 August 2012 on activities important for nuclear safety and radiological protection in an organisational unit conducting activity which consists in commissioning, operation or decommissioning of a nuclear power plant (Journal of Laws, item 1024),

- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 10 August 2012 on the detailed scope of assessment of land intended for siting of a nuclear facility, cases excluding the land from being considered eligible for siting of a nuclear facility and on requirements concerning the siting report for a nuclear facility (Journal of Laws, item 1025),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 31 August 2012 on the scope and method for the performance of safety analyses prior to the submission of an application for issuing a license for the construction of a nuclear facility and the scope of the preliminary safety report for a nuclear facility (Journal of Laws, item 1043),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 31 August 2012 on the nuclear safety and radiological protection requirements which must be fulfilled by a nuclear facility design (Journal of Laws, item 1048),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 10 October 2012 on the amount of payment to cover the costs of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management and the costs of nuclear power plant decommissioning performed by an organisational unit which received license for the operation of a nuclear power plant (Journal of Laws, item 1213),
- Regulation of the Minister of Health of 21 December 2012 on granting authorisations of a radiation protection officer in laboratories using X-ray devices for medical purposes (Journal of Laws, item 1534),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 11 February 2013 on nuclear safety and radiological protection requirements for the stage of decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the contents of a report on the decommissioning of a nuclear facility (Journal of Laws, item 270),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 11 February 2013 on requirements for decommissioning and operation of nuclear facilities (Journal of Laws, item 281),
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 30 June 2015 on the documents required when applying for authorisation to conduct activity involving exposure to ionis-......

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> This Regulation was in force till 30 March 2016.



ing radiation or when notifying the conduct of such activity (Journal of Laws, item 1355)<sup>21</sup>,

- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 14 December 2015 on radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel (Journal of Laws item 2267 and of 2016, item 94)<sup>22</sup>,
- Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 14 December 2015 on periodic safety assessment of a radioactive waste disposal facility (Journal of Laws of 1016, item 28)<sup>23</sup>.

#### Major acts of internal law:

- Ordinance no. 4 of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of 26 March 2002 on the enforcement of provisions of the Atomic Law in the Police, State Fire Service, Border Guard and organisational units reporting to the minister competent for matters of the interior (Official Journal of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration no. 3, item 7),
- Ordinance no. 51/MON of the Minister of National Defence of 17 September 2003 on the enforcement of provisions of the Atomic Law at organisational units reporting to the Minister of National Defence (Official Journal of the Ministry of National Defence no. 15, item 161),
- Ordinance no. 69 of the Minister of the Environment of 3 November 2011 on establishing the charter of the National Atomic Energy Agency (Official Journal of the Minister of the Environment and the Chief Environmental Protection Inspector no. 4, item 66 and Official Journal of the Minister of the Environment of 2014 item 63),
- Ordinance no.1 of the Minister of Economy of 31 January 2014 on granting the statute to the state-owned public utility "Radioactive Waste Management Plant" (Official Journal of the Minister of Economy, item 6).

#### APPENDIX NO. 2 LIST OF MAJOR ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW

#### International agreements:

- Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM),
- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons signed in Moscow, Washington and London on 1 July 1968 (Journal of Laws of 1970, no. 8, item (INFCIRC/140), and consequential acts:
  - Agreement between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency on implementation of Article III, items 1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed in Brussels on 5 April 1973 (Journal of Laws of 2007 no. 218, item 1617),
  - Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency on implementation of Article III, items 1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998 (Journal of Laws of 2007 no. 156, item 1096).
- Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident signed in Vienna on 26 September 1986 (Journal of Laws of 1988, no. 31, item 216),

<sup>21</sup> This Regulation came into force on 1 January 2016.

<sup>22</sup> This Regulation came into force on 30 December 2015.

<sup>23</sup> This Regulation came into force on 23 January 2016.

- Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency signed in Vienna on 26 September 1986 (Journal of Laws of 1988, no. 31, item 218),
- Convention on Nuclear Safety signed in Vienna on 20 September 1994 (Journal of Laws of 1997, no. 42, item 262),
- Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management signed in Vienna on 5 September 1997 (Journal of Laws of 2002, no. 202, item 1704),
- Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, including Annexes I and II, open for signing in Vienna and New York on 3 March 1980 (Journal of Laws of 1989, no. 17, item 93),
- Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage signed in Vienna on 21 May 1963 (Journal of Laws of 1990 no. 63, item 370),
- Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention (on liability for nuclear damage) signed in Vienna on 21 September 1988 (Journal of Laws of 1994, no. 129, item 633),
- Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage signed in Vienna on 12 September 1997 (Journal of Laws of 2011, no. 4, item 9).

#### Selected acts of the European Community law:

- Council Directive 96/29/Euratom of 13 May 1996 laying down basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers resulting from ionising radiation (OJ L 159 of 29.61996, p. 1; OJ – Polish special edition, ch. 5, vol. 2, p. 291)<sup>24</sup>,
- Council Directive 89/618/Euratom of 27 November 1989 on informing the general public about health

protection measures to be applied and steps to be taken in the event of radiological emergency (OJ L 357 of 7.12.1989, p. 31; OJ – Polish special edition, ch. 15, vol. 1, p. 366)<sup>25</sup>,

- Council Directive 90/641/Euratom of 4 December 1990 on the operational protection of outside workers exposed to the risk of ionising radiation during their activities in controlled areas (OJ L 349 of 13.12.1990, p. 21, as amended; OJ – Polish special edition, ch. 5, vol. 1, p. 405, as amended)<sup>26</sup>,
- Council Directive 97/43/Euratom of 30 June 1997 on health protection of individuals against the dangers of ionising radiation in relation to medical exposure and repealing Directive 84/466/Euratom (OJ L 180 of 9.7.1997, p. 22, as amended; OJ – Polish special edition, ch. 15, vol. 3, p. 332, as amended)<sup>27</sup>,
- Council Directive 2003/122/Euratom of 22 December 2003 on the control of high-activity sealed radioactive sources and radioactive waste (OJ L 346 of 31.12.2003, p. 57, as amended; OJ – Polish special edition, ch. 15, vol. 7, p. 694)<sup>28</sup>,
- Council Directive 2006/117/Euratom of 20 November 2006 on the supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel (OJ L 337 of 5.12.2006, p. 21),
- Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations (OJ L 172 of 2.7.2009, p. 18, and OJ L 260 of 3.10.2009, p. 40 and OJ L 219 of 25.07.2014, p. 42),
- Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom of 19 July 2011 establishing a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste (OJ L 199 of 2.8.2011, p. 48),
- Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom of 5 December 2013 laying down basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation and repealing directives

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> In accordance with Article 107 of Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom of 5 December 2013 laying down basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation and repealing directives 89/618/Euratom, 90/641/Euratom, 96/29/Euratom, 97/43/Euratom and 2003/122/Euratom (OJ L 13 of 17 January 2014, p. 1), this directive is repealed as of 6 February 2018.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> In accordance with Article 107 of Council Directive 2013/59/EURATOM, this directive is repealed as of 6 February 2018.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> In accordance with Article 107 of Council Directive 2013/59/EURATOM, this directive is repealed as of 6 February 2018. <sup>27</sup> In accordance with Article 107 of Council Directive 2013/59/EURATOM, this directive is repealed as of 6 February 2018.

<sup>.....</sup> <sup>28</sup> In accordance with Article 107 of Council Directive 2013/59/EURATOM, this directive is repealed as of 6 February 2018.



89/618/Euratom, 90/641/Euratom, 96/29/Euratom, 97/43/Euratom and 2003/122/Euratom (OJ L 13 of 17 January 2014, p. 1),

- Council Regulation (Euratom) no. 3954/87 of 22 December 1987 laying down maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs and feed-ingstuffs following a nuclear accident or any other case of radiological emergency (OJ L 371 of 30.12.1987, p. 11, as amended; OJ –Polish special edition, ch. 15, vol. 1, p. 333, as amended)<sup>29</sup>,
- Commission Regulation (Euratom) no. 944/89 of 12 April 1989 laying down maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination in minor foodstuffs following a nuclear accident or any other case of radiological emergency (OJ L 101 of 13.4.1989, p. 17; OJ – Polish special edition, ch. 15, vol. 1, p. 347)<sup>30</sup>,
- Council Regulation (EEC) no. 2219/89 of 18 July 1989 on the special conditions for exporting foodstuffs and feedingstuffs following a nuclear accident or any other case of radiological emergency (OJ L 211 of 22.7.1989, p. 4; OJ – Polish special edition, ch. 11, v. 16, p. 342),
- Commission Regulation (Euratom) no. 770/90 of 29 March 1990 laying down maximum per mitted levels of radioactive contamination of feedingstuffs following a nuclear accident or any other case of radiological emergency (OJ L 83 of 30.3.1990, p. 78; OJ – Polish special edition, ch. 15, vol. 1, p. 379)<sup>31</sup>,
- Council Regulation (Euratom) no. 1493/93 of 8 June 1993 on shipments of radioactive substances between Member States (OJ L 148 of 19.6.1993, p. 1; OJ – Polish special edition, ch. 12, vol. 1, p. 155),
- Commission Regulation (Euratom) no. 302/2005 of 8 February 2005 on the application of Euratom safeguards (OJ L 54 of 28.2.2005, p. 1),
- Commission Regulation (EC) no. 1635/2006 of 6 November 2006 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EEC) no. 737/90 on the conditions governing imports of agricultural products originating in third countries following

the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station (OJ L 306 of 7.11.2006, p. 3),

- Council Regulation (EC) no. 733/2008 of 15 July 2008 on the conditions governing imports of agricultural products originating in third countries following the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station (OJ L 201 of 30.7.2007, p. 1),
- Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) no. 284/2012 of 29 March 2012 imposing special conditions governing the import of feed and food originating in or consigned from Japan following the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power station and repealing Implementing Regulation (EU) no. 961/2011 (OJ L 92 of 30.3.2011, p. 16),
- Council Regulation (Euratom) no. 2016/52 of 15 January 2016 laying down maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination of food and feed following a nuclear accident or any other case of radiological emergency, and repealing Regulation (Euratom) No 3954/87 and Commission Regulations (Euratom) No 944/89 and (Euratom) No 770/90, OJ L 13 of 20.1.2016, p. 2),<sup>32</sup>
- Council Decision of 14 December 1987 on Community arrangements for the early exchange of information in the event of a radiological emergency (87/600/Euratom) (OJ L 211 of 22.7.1989, p. 4; OJ Polish special edition, ch. 11, v. 16, p. 342),
- Commission Decision of 5 March 2008 establishing the standard document for the supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel referred to in Council Directive 2006/117/Euratom (2008/312/Euratom) (OJ L 107 of 17.4.2008, p. 32).



