



# JOURNAL OF LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

Warsaw, 28 October 2021

Item 1958

## REGULATION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

of 01 October 2021

### on the security of radioactive sources

Pursuant to Article 43 Section 10 of the Act of 29 November 2000 - Atomic Law (Dz. U. of 2021, item 1941), it is ordered as follows:

**§ 1.** This Regulation shall establish:

- 1) categories of radioactive sources and detailed reasons for qualifying radioactive sources into these categories;
- 2) a level of security for individual categories of radioactive sources;
- 3) organizational and technical arrangements for securing radioactive sources, the purposes of securing and the functions of securing radioactive sources;
- 4) the minimum content of the plan for securing radioactive sources.

**§ 2.** The categories of radioactive sources and the detailed reasons for qualifying radioactive sources into these categories are set out in Annex 1 to this Regulation.

**§ 3. 1.** Depending on the category of radioactive sources, the following levels of security of radioactive sources shall be established:

- 1) in the case of conducting activities with radioactive sources, excluding activities involving the transport of radioactive sources - levels A, B, C and D, where level A means the highest level of security and level D means the lowest level of security;
- 2) in the case of an activity involving the transport of radioactive sources, a basic level and a higher level.

2. Security level for each category of radioactive sources shall be set out in Annex 2 to this Regulation.

**§ 4. 1.** The organizational and technical arrangements for securing radioactive sources, the purposes of securing and the radioactive source security functions shall be set out in Annex 3 to this Regulation.

2. The minimum content of a plan for securing radioactive sources shall be set out in Annex 4 to this Regulation.

**§ 5.** This Regulation shall enter into force 14 days following its promulgation.

Prime Minister: *M. Morawiecki*

Annexes to the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 1 October 2021 (item 1958)

**Annex 1**

**CATEGORIES OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES AND DETAILED REASONS FOR QUALIFYING RADIOACTIVE SOURCES INTO THESE CATEGORIES**

Category of radioactive sources	Detailed reasons for qualifying radioactive sources into particular their categories
1	2
1	1) activities involving the use of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs),</li> <li>b) irradiation installations, in particular for irradiating tissue and blood,</li> <li>c) devices for telegammatherapy (cobalt bombs),</li> <li>d) devices for telegammatherapy (gamma knives);</li> </ul> 2) other activities with radioactive sources in which $A/P_2^{(1)} \geq 1000$ .
2	1) activities involving the use of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) industrial radiography devices (defectoscopes),</li> <li>b) HDR brachytherapy devices;</li> </ul> 2) other activities with radioactive sources in which $1000 > A/P_2^{(1)} \geq 10$ .
3	1) activities involving the use of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) stationary industrial meters that contain high-activity sources (HASS),</li> <li>b) geophysical probes;</li> </ul> 2) other activities with radioactive sources in which $10 > A/P_2^{(1)} \geq 1$
4	1) activities involving the use of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) LDR brachytherapy devices (excluding ocular applicators and permanently applied radioactive sources),</li> <li>b) industrial meters that do not use high-activity sources,</li> <li>c) bone isotope densitometers,</li> <li>d) static charge eliminators;</li> </ul> 2) other activities with radioactive sources in which $1 > A/P_2^{(1)} \geq 0.01$ .
5	1) activities involving the use of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) ocular applicators and permanently applied radioactive sources,</li> <li>b) isotope spectrometers,</li> <li>c) electron capture detectors,</li> <li>d) radioactive sources for Mössbauer spectrometry,</li> <li>e) radioactive control sources for positron emission tomography (PET);</li> </ul> 2) other activities with radioactive sources in which $0,01 > A/P_2^{(1)}$ and $A > P_1^{(2)}$

<sup>1)</sup>  $A/P_2$  means the ratio of the activity  $A$  of a radioactive source to the threshold level of activity  $P_2$ , defined for a specific radioactive isotope in Annex 2 to the Act of 29 November 2000 - Atomic Law (Dz. U. of 2021, item 1941). Where a breach of a common physical safety barrier (in particular, a closed door at the entrance to the radioactive source laboratory or storehouse) would allow access to more than one radioactive source, including radioactive sources containing different radioactive isotopes stored in one place, the  $A/P_2$  ratio shall be determined, taking into account the total activity of the collected radioactive sources, according to the following formula:

$$= \frac{\sum_i A_{i,n}}{\sum_n P_{2,n}}$$

$A/P_2$  of collected radioactive sources

where:

$A_{i,n}$  – activity of each individual source and radioactive isotope  $n$

$P_{2,n}$  –  $P_2$  value for radioactive isotope  $n$  as defined in Annex 2 to the Act of 29 November 2000 - Atomic Law.

<sup>2)</sup>  $P_1$  means the threshold level of activity defined for a particular radioactive isotope in Annex 2 to the Act of 29 November 2000 - Atomic Law.

LEVEL OF SECURITY FOR INDIVIDUAL CATEGORIES OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

Category of radioactive sources	Level of security	
	in case of activities with radioactive sources, excluding activities involving the transport of radioactive sources	in case of activities involving the transport of radioactive sources
1	A	higher
2	B	
3	C	basic
4	D	
5		

ORGANIZATIONAL AND TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECURING RADIOACTIVE SOURCES, THE PURPOSES OF SECURING AND THE RADIOACTIVE SOURCE SECURITY FUNCTIONS

Table 1.

A level of security		
Radioactive source security functions	Purposes of securing radioactive sources	Organizational and technical arrangements for securing radioactive sources
Detecting	immediate detection of unauthorized access to the protected location of the radioactive source	an electronic system to detect the presence of unauthorized persons in the location or constant visual observation by staff
	immediate detection of any attempt to damage or steal the radioactive source or fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons, including an attempt by an authorized person to gain access to the protected location of the radioactive source	
	immediate assessment of detected attempt to gain unauthorized access to the protected location of a radioactive source, of any attempt to damage or steal the radioactive source, or of any fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons, including attempts by an authorized person to remove the radioactive source	devices for remote observation or constant visual observation by staff
	detection of the loss of a radioactive source by verification	daily verification by means such as: physical inspection (in particular checking safety seals, taking dosimetric measurements), or use of a remote observation device
Delaying	delay after detection to prevent, by reaction personnel, the damage, theft of the radioactive source or fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons	a system consisting of at least two barriers (in particular walls, cages, bars, safes, locks) which together provide sufficient delay to allow reaction personnel or competent services to intervene
Reacting	immediately alert to reaction personnel or competent services	fast, reliable and various means of communication (in particular landline telephones, mobile phones, radios, panic button)
	immediate response to prevent the loss, damage, theft of the radioactive source or fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons	ensuring that competent services or adequately equipped and trained reaction personnel can intervene immediately, documented in the plan for securing radioactive sources

Security management	granting authorization for independent access to a radioactive source and to information subject to special protection	procedures specifying how and under what conditions authorizations for access to a protected location of a radioactive source and to sensitive information are granted and withdrawn, training courses on securing radioactive sources, documentation of such trainings as well as the granting and withdrawal of authorizations
	control of access to a protected location of the radioactive source, which allows only authorized persons to have such an access	procedures defining the granting and withdrawal of authorisations, verification of authorizations, identification and verification of persons having access to the protected location of the radioactive source, in particular by means of a lock with the magnetic card reader and a PIN code
	identification and protection of information subject to special protection	procedures to distinguish between sensitive information and the introduction of appropriate safeguards against unauthorized disclosure of such information
	development of the plan for securing radioactive sources	plan for securing radioactive sources, which defines how to respond to specific emergency(-ies)
	ensuring that incidents of loss, damage, theft of the radioactive source or fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons can be managed	procedures for responding to scenarios in which the security level is threatened
	introduction of a system for notification of incidents that involve violations of the principles of radioactive source security	procedures for immediately informing the competent services about incidents violating radioactive source security rules

Table 2.

**B level of security**

Radioactive source security functions	Purposes of securing radioactive sources	Organizational and technical arrangements for securing radioactive sources, excluding portable radioactive sources used during fieldwork	Organizational and technical arrangements for securing portable radioactive sources used during fieldwork
Detecting	immediate detection of unauthorized access to the protected location of the radioactive source	an electronic system to detect the presence of unauthorized persons in the location or constant visual observation by staff	visual observation by two persons

	detection of attempted damage, theft of the radioactive source or fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons	weekly verification by means such as: physical inspection (in particular checking safety seals, taking dosimetric measurements), or use of a remote observation device	visual observation by two persons
	immediate assessment of detected attempt to gain unauthorized access to the protected location of a radioactive source, of any attempt to damage or steal the radioactive source, or of any fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons	devices for remote observation or constant visual observation by staff	visual observation by two persons
	detection of the loss of a radioactive source by verification	weekly verification by means such as: physical inspection (in particular checking safety seals, taking dosimetric measurements), or use of a remote observation device	daily verification at the end of field work with a radioactive source
Delaying	delay to minimize the probability of damage, theft of the radioactive source or fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons	a system consisting of at least two barriers (in particular walls, cages, bars, safes, locks) which together provide sufficient delay to allow reaction personnel or competent services to take action	fixing a device to the stationary object, if possible
Reacting	immediately alert to reaction personnel or competent services	fast, reliable and various means of communication (in particular landline telephones, mobile phones, radios, panic button)	two persons each equipped with independent means of communication
	immediate response to stop activities leading to the loss, damage, theft of the radioactive source or fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons	ensuring that competent services or adequately equipped and trained reaction personnel can intervene immediately, documented in the plan for securing radioactive sources	immediate notification of the relevant Regional Crisis Management Centre

Security management	granting authorization for independent access to a radioactive source and to information subject to special protection	procedures specifying how and under what conditions authorizations for access to a protected location of a radioactive source and to sensitive information are granted and withdrawn, training courses on securing radioactive sources, documentation of such trainings as well as the granting and withdrawal of authorizations	
	control of access to a protected location of the radioactive source, which allows only authorized persons to have such an access	identification and verification of persons having access to the protected location of the radioactive source, in particular by means of a lock with the magnetic card reader and a PIN code	procedures for controlling access to the area where the radioactive source is used
	identification and protection of information subject to special protection	procedures to distinguish between sensitive information and the introduction of appropriate safeguards against unauthorized disclosure of such information	
	development of the plan for securing radioactive sources	plan for securing radioactive sources, which defines how to respond to specific emergency(-ies)	
	ensuring that incidents of loss, damage, theft of the radioactive source or fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons can be managed	procedures for responding to scenarios in which the security level is threatened	
	introduction of a system for notification of incidents that involve violations of the principles of radioactive source security	procedures for immediately informing the competent services about incidents violating radioactive source security rules	

Table 3.

**C level of security**

Radioactive source security functions	Purposes of securing radioactive sources	Organizational and technical arrangements for securing radioactive sources
Detecting	detection of damage, theft of the radioactive source or fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons	observation

	detection of the loss by verification	monthly verification by means such as: physical inspection (in particular checking safety seals, taking dosimetric measurements), or use of a remote observation device
Delaying	delay to reduce the probability of damage, theft of the radioactive source or fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons	one barrier (in particular, bars, shielding of the radioactive source) or observation by personnel
Reacting	immediately alert to reaction personnel or competent services	fast, reliable and various means of communication (such as landline telephones, mobile phones, radios, emergency/panic button)
	implementation of the measures envisaged in the plan for securing radioactive sources in the event of their loss, damage, theft or fall into the hands of unauthorized persons	procedures specifying the necessary actions under the plan for securing radioactive sources
Security management	granting authorization for independent access to a radioactive source and to information subject to special protection	procedures specifying how and under what conditions authorizations for access to a protected location of a radioactive source and to sensitive information are granted and withdrawn, training courses on securing radioactive sources, documentation of such trainings as well as the granting and withdrawal of authorizations
	control of access to a protected location of the radioactive source, which allows only authorized persons to have such an access	identification and verification of persons having access to the protected location of the radioactive source, in particular by means of a lock with the magnetic card reader and a PIN code
	identification and protection of information subject to special protection	procedures to distinguish between sensitive information and the introduction of appropriate safeguards against unauthorized disclosure of such information
	development of the plan for securing radioactive sources	plan for securing radioactive sources, which defines how to respond to specific emergency(s)
	ensuring that incidents of loss, damage, theft of the radioactive source or fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons can be managed	procedures for responding to scenarios in which the security level is threatened



	introduction of a system for notification of incidents that involve violations of the principles of radioactive source security	procedures for immediately informing the competent services about incidents violating radioactive source security rules
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Table 4.

**D level of security**

Radioactive source security functions	Purposes of securing radioactive sources	Organizational and technical arrangements for securing radioactive sources
Detecting	detection and assessment of damage, theft of the radioactive source or fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons	annual inspection of the manner in which radioactive sources are protected from loss, damage, theft or falling into the hands of unauthorized persons
	detection of the loss by verification	annual verification by means such as: physical inspection (in particular checking safety seals, taking dosimetric measurements), or use of a remote observation device
Delaying	delay to reduce the probability of damage, theft of the radioactive source or fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons	one physical barrier (locked room or radioactive source shielding)
Reacting	information for reaction personnel or competent services	at least one reliable means of communication
	implementation of the measures envisaged in the plan for securing radioactive sources in case of their loss, damage, theft or fall into the hands of unauthorized persons	procedures specifying the necessary actions under the plan for securing radioactive sources
Security management	granting authorization for independent access to a radioactive source	procedures specifying how and under what conditions authorizations for access to a protected location of a radioactive source are granted and withdrawn, training courses on securing radioactive sources, documentation of such trainings as well as the granting and withdrawal of authorizations
	control of access to a protected radioactive source, which allows only authorized persons to have such an access	list of persons authorized to take a radioactive source or to access the location of a radioactive source
	development of the plan for securing radioactive sources	plan for securing radioactive sources, which defines how to respond to specific emergency(-ies)

	ensuring that incidents of loss, damage, theft of the radioactive source or fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons can be managed	procedures for responding to scenarios in which the security level is threatened
	introduction of a system for notification of incidents that involve violations of the principles of radioactive source security	procedures for immediately informing the competent services about incidents violating radioactive source security rules

Table 5.

**Higher level of security**

Radioactive source security functions	Purposes of securing radioactive sources	Organizational and technical arrangements for securing radioactive sources
Detecting	immediate detection of attempted unauthorized access to the radioactive source	constant supervision by an individual, visual inspection of the means of transport and the consignment during transport, including planned and unplanned stops, also after its delivery (in particular checking safety seals, carrying out dosimetric measurements)
	immediate assessment of detected attempt to gain unauthorized access to the radioactive source	direct observation by staff, physical inspection (in particular checking safety seals, taking dosimetric measurements)
	detection of the loss by verification	systems or devices for detecting and tracking the movement of means of transport, taking dosimetric measurements
Delaying	delay to minimise the probability of unauthorized removal of the radioactive source	two barriers (means of transport and shielding of the radioactive source), lashing of the radioactive source transport package to the means of transport and devices to prevent loss of the means of transport
Reacting	immediately alert to reaction personnel or competent services	fast, reliable and various means of communication, such as mobile phones, radios
	immediately response to counteract the loss, damage, theft of the radioactive source or fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons	ensuring that competent services or adequately equipped and trained reaction personnel can intervene immediately, documented in the plan for securing radioactive sources
Security management	identification of a sender and receiver of the radioactive source	identification of personnel responsible for the transport, checking the authorization of the radioactive source sender and receiver

	granting authorization for independent access to a radioactive source	procedures specifying how and under what conditions authorizations for access to a radioactive source are granted and withdrawn, training courses on securing radioactive sources, documentation of such trainings as well as the granting and withdrawal of authorizations
	identification and protection of information subject to special protection	procedures to distinguish between sensitive information and the introduction of appropriate safeguards against unauthorized disclosure of such information
	development of the plan for securing radioactive sources	a plan for securing radioactive sources defining how to respond to particular emergency(s) and how to minimize the hazards
	introduction of a system for notification of incidents that involve violations of the principles of radioactive source security	procedures for immediately informing the competent services about incidents violating radioactive source security rules; ensuring immediate communication with the sender and receiver of the consignment

Table 6.

**Basic level of security**

Radioactive source security functions	Purposes of securing radioactive sources	Organizational and technical arrangements for securing radioactive sources
Detecting	detection of attempted unauthorized access to the radioactive source	visual inspection of the means of transport and the consignment during transport, also after its delivery (in particular checking safety seals, carrying out dosimetric measurements)
	detection of the loss by verification	physical inspection, dosimetric measurements, safety seals
Delaying	delay to reduce the probability of unauthorized access to the radioactive source	one barrier (means of transport or transport packaging of the radioactive source), devices to prevent loss of the means of transport
Reacting	immediately alert to reaction personnel or competent services	fast, reliable and various means of communication, such as mobile phones, radios
	implementation of the measures provided for in the on-site emergency plan in the event of loss, damage, theft of a radioactive source or fall of it into the hands of unauthorized persons	procedures specifying the necessary actions under the on-site emergency plan

Security management	identification of a sender and receiver of the radioactive source	identification of personnel responsible for the transport, checking the authorization of the radioactive source sender and receiver
	granting authorization for independent access to a radioactive source	procedures specifying how and under what conditions authorizations for access to a radioactive source are granted and withdrawn, training courses on securing radioactive sources, documentation of such trainings as well as the granting and withdrawal of authorizations
	identification and protection of information subject to special protection	procedures to distinguish between sensitive information and the introduction of appropriate safeguards against unauthorized disclosure of such information
	development of the plan for securing radioactive sources	a plan for securing radioactive sources defining how to respond to particular emergency(-ies) and how to minimize the hazards
	introduction of a system for notification of incidents that involve violations of the principles of radioactive source security	procedures for immediately informing the competent services about incidents violating radioactive source security rules; ensuring immediate communication with the sender and receiver of the consignment

**Annex 4**

**THE MINIMUM CONTENT OF THE PLAN FOR SECURING RADIOACTIVE SOURCES**

1. The plan for securing radioactive sources in the case of activities with radioactive sources classified as Category 1, 2 or 3, without activities involving the transport of radioactive sources, shall include at least:
  - 1.1. description of the radioactive source, its categorization and identification of the activity performed with the radioactive source;
  - 1.2. description of the environment, building or facility in which the radioactive source is used or stored and, if necessary, a diagram of the facility and its security system;
  - 1.3. indication of the location of the building or facility in relation to areas accessible to the public;
  - 1.4. description of the events threatening the achievement of the planned level of protection;
  - 1.5. procedures describing the actions to be taken by staff or reaction personnel in response to scenarios of events threatening the maintenance of a given level of protection;
  - 1.6. objectives of the security plan for a particular building or facility considering the planned security level of radioactive sources, including:
    - 1.6.1. actions to prevent the loss, damage, theft of the radioactive source or fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons;
    - 1.6.2. type of required inspection or attestation of auxiliary equipment;
    - 1.6.3. description of the equipment and area to be secured;
  - 1.7. indication of applied organizational and technical security arrangements, including those ensuring surveillance, access control, detection, delay, response and communication;
  - 1.8. descriptions of the arrangements referred to in point 1.7, allowing evaluation of the quality and effectiveness of these arrangements against the potential threat;
  - 1.9. procedures for protecting mobile radioactive sources used during field work, if such work is carried out;
  - 1.10. identification of applied administrative measures, including:
    - 1.10.1. security roles and responsibilities assigned to the head of the organizational entity, staff and other persons;
    - 1.10.2. routine and non-routine activities, especially concerning recording of radioactive sources, or reference to a document providing information on these activities and the recording system;
    - 1.10.3. adopted methods of maintenance and checking of the equipment;
    - 1.10.4. practices used to protect sensitive information;
    - 1.10.5. information protection measures contained in the plan for securing radioactive sources;
    - 1.10.6. methods of granting the access;
    - 1.10.7. staff training courses in the basic principles of securing radioactive sources;
    - 1.10.8. procedures for securing keys;
  - 1.11. procedures relating to the higher level of hazard;
  - 1.12. method for periodic evaluation of the effectiveness of the plan and its appropriate updating.
2. The plan for securing radioactive sources in the case of operations with radioactive sources classified as Category 4 or 5, without activities involving the transport of radioactive sources, shall include at least:
  - 2.1. description of the radioactive source, its categorization and identification of the activity performed with the radioactive source;
  - 2.2. description of the environment, building or facility in which the radioactive source is used or stored and, if necessary, a diagram of the facility and its security system;
  - 2.3. indication of the location of the building or facility in relation to areas accessible to the public;
  - 2.4. description of the events threatening the achievement of the planned level of protection;
  - 2.5. procedures describing the actions to be taken by staff or reaction personnel in response to scenarios of events threatening the maintenance of a given level of protection;
  - 2.6. objectives of the security plan for the specific building or facility;
  - 2.7. indication of the organizational and technical security arrangements;
  - 2.8. identification of applied administrative measures, including:
    - 2.8.1. security roles and responsibilities assigned to the head of the organizational entity, staff and other persons;
    - 2.8.2. routine and non-routine activities, especially concerning recording of radioactive sources, or reference to a document providing information on these activities and the recording system;

- 2.8.3. adopted methods of maintenance and checking of the equipment;
- 2.9. procedures relating to the higher level of hazard;
- 2.10. method for periodic evaluation of the effectiveness of the plan and its appropriate updating.
3. The plan for securing radioactive sources in the case of an activity involving the transport of radioactive sources classified as Category 1, 2 or 3 shall include at least:
  - 3.1. description of the radioactive source and its categorization;
  - 3.2. allocation of responsibilities when securing transported radioactive sources;
  - 3.3. description of the operations performed during transport and their assessment from the point of view of the possibility of loss, damage, theft of the radioactive source or fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons;
  - 3.4. description of activities for:
    - 3.4.1. avoiding fixed transport schedules;
    - 3.4.2. planning of transport routes so as to avoid areas of natural disaster, state of emergency or other hazards, including scheduling of alternative routes;
    - 3.4.3. minimizing to the extent necessary the time during which the radioactive source is transported;
    - 3.4.4. reducing to the necessary minimum the number of persons having detailed information about the transport and the security measures used during it;
    - 3.4.5. excluding situations where radioactive sources are left unattended for longer time than it is absolutely necessary;
    - 3.4.6. applying organizational and technical protection measures for the temporary storage of radioactive sources in transport and during planned and unplanned stops;
    - 3.4.7. controlling the protection of the means of transport and ensuring that these means are operational during transport;
    - 3.4.8. monitoring the location of the means of transport;
    - 3.4.9. notifying the recipient of the consignment well in advance of the mode of transport and the expected date of receipt, and confirming the recipient's ability and readiness to receive the consignment on the expected date;
    - 3.4.10. determining consignment transfer locations and responsibility for its security;
    - 3.4.11. determining the status of consignments that have not been delivered to the designated receiver by the agreed date;
    - 3.4.12. ensuring immediate communication with the sender, receiver, relevant services or reaction personnel;
  - 3.5. procedures describing the actions to be taken by the staff of the organizational entity (or other unit to which security tasks have been delegated) in response to scenarios of events that threaten the maintenance of a given level of security and the equipment necessary for such actions;
  - 3.6. identification of applied administrative measures, including:
    - 3.6.1. written instructions to the personnel responsible for a given transport about the organizational and technical arrangements required for securing radioactive sources and handling any incident during transport;
    - 3.6.2. methods for authorising access to the radioactive source;
    - 3.6.3. practices used to protect sensitive information;
    - 3.6.4. information protection measures contained in the plan for securing radioactive sources;
    - 3.6.5. staff training courses in the basic principles of securing radioactive sources;
  - 3.7. procedure for periodic evaluation of the effectiveness of the plan and its appropriate updating.
4. The plan for securing radioactive sources in the case of an activity involving the transport of radioactive sources classified as Category 4 or 5 shall include at least:
  - 4.1. description of the radioactive source and its categorization;
  - 4.2. allocation of responsibilities when securing transported radioactive sources;
  - 4.3. description of the operations performed during transport and their assessment from the point of view of the possibility of damage, theft of the radioactive source or fall of the radioactive source into the hands of unauthorized persons;
  - 4.4. description of the events threatening the achievement of the planned level of protection;
  - 4.5. procedures describing the actions to be taken by staff in response to scenarios of events threatening the maintenance of a given level of protection;
  - 4.6. objectives of the security plan;
  - 4.7. indication of the organizational and technical security arrangements;

- 4.8. identification of applied administrative measures, including:
  - 4.8.1. written instructions to the personnel responsible for a given transport about the organizational and technical arrangements required for securing radioactive sources and handling any incident during transport;
  - 4.8.2. methods for authorizing access to the radioactive source;
  - 4.8.3. practices used to protect sensitive information;
  - 4.8.4. information protection measures contained in the plan for securing radioactive sources;
  - 4.8.5. staff training courses in the basic principles of securing radioactive sources;
- 4.9. procedures relating to the higher level of hazard;
- 4.10. indication of the procedure for periodic evaluation of the effectiveness of the plan and its appropriate updating.