



**Information of the Minister of Foreign Affairs**  
**on Polish foreign policy tasks in 2025**

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*Mr President,*

*Mr Speaker,*

*Madam Speaker,*

*Mr Prime Minister,*

*Honourable Members,*

*Your Excellencies, Members of the Diplomatic Corps,*

*Honourable Guests,*

## **INTRODUCTION—INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**

This is the second time since this Government was formed and the ninth time altogether that I have the honour of presenting to the House information on Poland's foreign policy priorities. Thus far, today's is the most difficult of all my addresses. The reason is simple: the international situation is at its most difficult in decades.

On 18 April, as I have just noted, we celebrated a millennium of the coronation of Bolesław the Brave, an event which symbolises the birth of Poland as a rightful entity in the international arena. Let us look at this anniversary as a lesson in diplomacy and making strategic alliances. The coronation of Bolesław the Brave was, after all, the outcome of a deliberate foreign policy—starting with the Congress of Gniezno and building relations with the then German emperor. Just like our ancestors of the Piast dynasty, we need to have the wisdom of choosing the right partners and striking effective alliances. And be prepared for the return on this investment to come only after many years.

Today, we emphasise the importance of the continuity of Poland's statehood. We remember our history full of glorious moments and tribulations, which we have overcome thanks to the determination of citizens, thanks to our culture, the ability to draw conclusions, and make smart adjustments to the changing world.

Nowadays, the world is getting increasingly less predictable: a war on our doorstep and shifting international power balances alongside global economic and political crises all make stability, which we used to take for granted in Europe, strain under the load of new challenges. In Polish homes, people are anxiously asking: “What happens next?” Should we, too, be afraid of Russian aggression? Are Europe’s relations with the United States on a crisis course? Will Europe be able to quickly boost its defence capabilities?

The picture on Ukraine’s eastern and southern frontline is not clear-cut. Small gains made by Russian forces are just local victories indeed at the cost of heavy losses. Russia is gradually ramping up the number of its troops by offering them handsome pay-outs, introducing conscription, and using thousands of soldiers from North Korea. And yet, despite the three years of war—let me remind you, originally planned by Putin to last three days—the Russian troops control just around 20% of Ukraine’s territory and remain stuck in the country’s east. Russia’s costs of the war are estimated at USD 200 billion or more, with almost a million Russian troops eliminated from the battlefield. Losses of the Ukrainians are smaller and they have not allowed their capital to fall or a puppet government to be installed. At sea, they defeated the Black Sea fleet and reopened the shipping route through the Bosphorus, while in the air, they are putting up a tit-for-tat battle.

We do not know how this war will play out, whose troops will lose the will to fight, or who will run out of resources first. What we do know today is that Ukraine is bravely defending itself and has no reason to surrender. And Europe declares its continued financial and military support for Ukraine. What is at stake about this war is for Ukraine to be able to decide what is in its best interest, what compromises it can accept, and which foreign troops it might want on its territory.

Please allow me a moment of personal and emotional reflection. Between February 2022 and October 2023, I privately visited Ukraine several times, delivering SUVs to frontline units. I remember driving through a very poor-looking village: destroyed homes, crooked windows, leaning fences. And in this poor village, there it is: one beautiful, well-kept building: a school. A hundred metres away stands a monument to Yaroslav the Wise, gleaming white, surrounded by flowers. The residents of that village had themselves decided how to spend their local taxes. A school and a monument. Knowledge and

memory. The past and the future. People who think this way—such people cannot be defeated.

Honourable Members,

The purpose of every Polish government is to improve state security, to ensure Poles' well-being, and to enhance our country's position on the international stage. It is obvious. The international environment is less predictable than 20 years ago but Poland is stronger.

We are strong by being part of the NATO alliance and a member of the European Union. Let me repeat: our membership of both organisations does not constrain Poland's sovereignty but helps defend it. We can enjoy access to cooperation mechanisms that enable better coordinated action. We are better prepared for the difficult times ahead than we would be as a solitary island, outside a network of military, political, and economic alliances.

Measured as defence spending, the current potential of all NATO member states is close to USD 1.5 trillion, that is USD 1,500 billion. Russia's corresponding figure: USD 145 billion.

Following Poland's example, European allies have been increasing their defence spending. Since 2016, that is just before Donald Trump became US president, NATO members, excluding America, have boosted their spending from USD 255 to 506 billion, or by 98%. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this trend has picked up even more pace.

Let us run a calculation. Let us assume that all NATO members spend 3.5% of their GDP on defence, just like the US. That would fetch USD 1.9 trillion, or thirteen times more than Russia. Going further, let us run the same simulation based on the assumption that each member spends the same as Poland right now, 4.7% of the GDP, a likely scenario with a heightened threat. That would yield USD 2.5 trillion—or seventeen times more than Russia! These figures show the scale of our potential. And they also show that, as long as NATO remains an effective alliance, Russia will not prevail against us.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

To build defence potential requires economic potential. That is why we are strengthening Poland's economy—not only one of the largest but also one of the fastest-growing in Europe now. The International Monetary Fund forecasts that we will rank among fastest growing countries in Europe. In the next two years, the rate of Poland's economic growth will exceed the global GDP growth rate and be nearly twice as high as the growth of other developed economies.

After the centuries of turmoil, partitions, wars, and decades of communism, Poland has managed to catch up with developed countries at a record pace over the past 35 years. Our GDP per capita has doubled since joining the EU, reaching close to 80% of the EU's average. The year 2025 will be record-breaking in terms of investment. Hard power augments soft power and makes a diplomat's work easier. The voice of a country that can successfully manage its own affairs is more readily heard on the international stage.

After nearly fifteen months since the change of government, we have managed to restore order in our international relations. Poland's foreign policy does not seek to incite disputes where they serve no purpose. We are guided by a lucid assessment of reality, proposing ambitious yet realistic solutions. And to achieve them, we work together with like-minded countries. We do that—like a well-known native of Gdańsk who is with us here once said, quoting his city's motto, *nec temere, nec timide*—without fear, but with deliberation.

These are the goals we pursue during our Presidency of the Council of the European Union. And that is Poland's brand today: security, sovereignty, and leadership. The security of our state, the sovereignty in our decisions, and the leadership in our community.

Leadership involves the ability to persuade others of your goals and to earn trust and support for your policies. Without leadership—as Henry Kissinger pointed out—“institutions drift, and nations court growing irrelevance and, ultimately, disaster. [...] Leadership is most essential during periods of transition, when values and institutions are losing their relevance, and the outlines of a worthy future are in controversy.”

A leader's duty is to understand their nation's aspirations, to dispel uncertainty and fear, and to look towards the future grounded in knowledge. And to communicate with society in a trustworthy manner: without fear mongering but also without embellishing reality.

## **GOALS OF POLAND'S FOREIGN POLICY**

Members of the House, Honourable Guests,

The war in Ukraine is the cause of the growing uncertainty but also the result of changes that have been taking place for a long time. In the European debate on foreign policy, an assessment comes up regularly of the end of a "peace dividend," which—to the benefit of Poland—we have enjoyed for the past decades. The new revisionism and the old appeasement lead to the undermining of the law-based international order, which is the basis for Poland's development. They raise questions about the durability of the foundations of our security, that is the European community and transatlantic cooperation.

For Poland, the greatest threat would be a collapse of Western community. That is why we cannot afford to nourish illusions or stay inactive. We cannot afford to go it alone. We are striving for alliances that are credible; we want to be involved in designing them, and yes, we can do that.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

For our Homeland—a country with a great past, a great culture, but also a difficult geography—the following four trends are most undesirable:

- the world's becoming divided into spheres of influence instead of spheres of alliances;
- departure from the important, if imperfect, global norms—above all, respect for sovereignty—towards a revival of the law of the strongest;
- the weakening of international organisations in favour of bilateral relations based on a transactional approach;
- disinformation that equates truth and falsehood in public debate.

It is not without reason that I have spoken so openly about the challenges to European security and to the stability of the international environment. These define and inform the most important goals that Poland pursues in its foreign policy:

**First**, to strengthen the defence capabilities—above all, of European states and the European Union—and for Europe to take greater responsibility for the security of its immediate neighbourhood. We view our security through a multidimensional lens: from military security to energy, food, and industrial supply chain security to cybersecurity.

**Second**, to maintain transatlantic unity and cooperation, obviously including close ties with the United States. In our contacts with the US administration, we have been persistently showing arguments to evidence Washington's benefits of maintaining its strong presence in Europe, especially in Poland.

**Third**, to protect and uphold the global order based on respecting the UN Charter.

**Fourth**, to keep Poland's constructive engagement in the dialogue with the Global South countries, respecting their sovereignty and diverse interests.

## **EUROPEAN DEFENCE**

Members of the House,

With nearly 5% of the GDP spent on the military, we spearhead all NATO members. Today, our defence budget amounts to almost USD 50 billion and it exceeds the military budgets of Spain, Canada, and Türkiye.

We will receive additional billions of euro under the EU's so-called SAFE (Security Action for Europe). This money will be available from a pool of EUR 150 billion in low-interest EU loans. In this facility's first year, at our request, not only groups of countries but also individual member states will be able to apply for support. It is beneficial from the point of view of Polish military needs and the development of the Polish defence industry.

Last year, in my information on Polish foreign policy tasks, I declared that we will enhance our defence potential and act to strengthen Europe. We are delivering on this promise. It

is no accident that the motto of our Presidency of the Council of the European Union goes: “Security, Europe!”

As regards EU funding opportunities for arms purchases, there is one more thing which still needs to be clarified. Opposition politicians have been misleading the public when explaining why they voted against the resolution, which is after all non-binding, on European defence in the European Parliament.

Jarosław Kaczyński—absent again—claims that “it would give back Polish money for armaments and control over the Polish army to Brussels and Berlin”. Mateusz Morawiecki says he would not allow “tampering with our relations with NATO”. And others threaten that the new regulations can “abolish the unanimity rule as regards defence”.

Why are you scaring our nation?

**First**, the Resolution does not say anything about handing over the command of the Polish army or the defence budget. Not a single word.

**Second**, its provisions are intended to streamline and improve profitability of the military equipment procurement for the member states’ armies. It is about the economies of scale—by buying together, we will be buying more, and cheaper.

**Third**, the unanimity rule, which nationalists love so much, prevents for example our Armed Forces Modernisation Fund from receiving EUR 450 million to refund the supplies we have sent to Ukraine—under your government. The decision is blocked by the Hungarian friends of today’s opposition. Are you happy?

Many of our initiatives—in various areas—are successful because we manage to convince other EU players of our ideas. At the same time, we have the potential to set up a blocking minority to ideas we consider bad. The EU’s decision-making system should be both efficient and fair.

**Fourth**, increasing the European Union’s defence capabilities does not weaken but strengthens the North Atlantic Alliance. After all, as many as 23 out of the 27 EU member states belong to NATO as well! A stronger Europe is a more credible ally for the United States.



Regarding the defence of Poland and Europe, any disinformation attempt must be forcefully combatted. Any good idea deserves attention, though, irrespective of its author's political affiliation. It was interesting to note the suggestions made by Sejm member Michał Dworczyk for simplifying the regulations for the procurement of ammunition, lowering energy costs for munitions plants, and perhaps even making it easier to grant concessions for such production to smaller private companies. Such are the lessons learned from Ukraine. Not only in the context of production of ammunition but also, obviously, drones, which have become a key element of the battlefield. Kyiv's capacity in this area is impressive. Ukrainians have the potential to produce up to five million drones a year. More than the rest of Europe combined.

As a united Europe and the North Atlantic Alliance, we must draw conclusions from the ongoing war as regards purchasing policy, defence doctrine, and training.

## **SUPPORTING UKRAINE**

Diplomacy is the first line of defence of our Republic, but even the most skilled diplomacy must be backed by power. We, Poles, know it from our own experience.

According to a survey carried out in early March, more than 80% of Polish respondents, whatever their political affiliation, admitted to be concerned with the impact the war in Ukraine has on Poland's security.

I give my heartfelt thanks to my compatriots for the support they lent to Ukrainians especially in the first months of the war. And I ask you to persevere, as long as Putin is bombing Ukrainian hospitals, schools, and houses.

We perfectly know who the aggressor is and who the victim is. We provide the victim with comprehensive support. Until this day, we have provided our Ukrainian allies with 45 assistance packages worth around EUR 4 billion, and supplies under the 46<sup>th</sup> package are underway. Poland also bears the burden and the risk of ensuring training and logistics facilities for the military assistance transferred across our eastern border.

We have been the driving force behind the establishment of a NATO command for combat training, support, and assistance for the armed forces in Ukraine, headquartered in Wiesbaden. We have trained nearly 30 thousand Ukrainian soldiers ourselves, a third of

all who have attended training organised by EU countries under the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM). In Bydgoszcz, a Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre NATO–Ukraine (JATEC) was established, which will draw on the Ukrainian armed forces' experience.

Some countries are considering sending their own troops to Ukraine. We will not send our troops but we will provide support for such possible mission. Without Poland, it would be impossible to support Ukraine.

Since the outbreak of the war, at least 80% of the aid sent to Ukraine has passed through Jasionka airport, which has been integrated into the allied mission. It is worth emphasising that the change in the composition of the NATO forces overseeing the security of the Jasionka hub had been planned for months. Tasks formerly carried out by the US troops are being taken over by other allies. Since January, the airport has been protected by Norwegian NASAMS systems and German Patriot batteries. The sky over Rzeszów is guarded by Norwegian F-35s, Swedish Gripens, and British Eurofighters.

Members of the House,

Our army and the Border Guard have been patrolling the 650-kilometre-long border with Russia and Belarus. Poland's first and foremost task in NATO is to protect the Alliance's eastern flank, that is its own territory. Our European and US partners understand it perfectly.

## **RUSSIA POLICY**

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Kremlin's principal ideologist, Alexander Dugin, stated many years ago: "There is no place for Poland on the Eurasian continent. Russia, in its geopolitical and sacral-geographical development, is not interested in the existence of an independent Polish state in any form, nor is it interested in the existence of Ukraine."

The Kremlin usually starts with words and proceeds to fill the streets with prisoner carriages the Chekists, and tanks. Let us think for a moment. On what grounds can Russia usurp the right to the territories of its neighbouring countries?

Let us remember that the first mention of Moscow dates back to 1147 and describes it as a fortified settlement in the provinces of Kyivan Rus'. And even though the successive centuries saw the Muscovites subdue the lands once governed from Kyiv, let alone steal Kyiv's identity, brutal conquest does not legitimise proprietorship. In turn, Russia is roughly just as entitled to claim Warsaw as we are to demand back Smolensk based on the fact that we also ruled there for about a hundred years. The difference is that almost none of us in Poland has such an anachronistic mindset. We invest in the patrimony granted us by history; we do not feel the urge to make up for civilisational complexes by fantasising about dominance over others. There are other things we can be proud of as a nation. During the Soviet era, the Russians built an embassy in Warsaw that was designed to resemble a governor's mansion. But the times have changed. I have a message for Mr Dugin's patrons: you will never rule here again. Neither here nor in Kyiv, Vilnius, Riga, Tallinn, or Chişinău. Don't you have enough land? It spans eleven time zones, what more do you want? You should rather focus on better governance of what is within your perimeter as recognised by international law. Stop fantasising about another conquest of Warsaw and focus your concerns on keeping Haishenwai.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The greatest challenge in pursuing our foreign policy, one that has direct implications for our country's security, is obviously in the settlement of the war against Ukraine. We have been seeking the European Union's lasting political, military, and financial support for Ukraine and its reconstruction. We are among the countries that want continued pressure on Russia and its allies in order for the ongoing aggression to end as soon as possible.

Our goal should not be to forge a shaky ceasefire but a lasting and just peace in line with the principles of the UN Charter. This has to be "peace through strength," as it will be the only one Russia will respect. Any arrangement with the Kremlin will only last so long as the Russian elite dreads the consequences of its breach.

Such has been the goal of the democratic West, and it should continue to be so in the coming years: to do everything to end the current war, and to make it unprofitable for Russia to start another one.

The consequences of the Russian aggression do not just affect our region alone. These consequences extend far beyond Ukraine's borders. They have been felt on the global food and energy markets, bringing about a rise in prices and a growing sense of uncertainty in many parts of the world. This applies to countries in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia. The war has also shaken the global circulation of knowledge, ideas, and cultural property.

It is worth remembering that the Russians themselves suffer the consequences of the mistakes made by their leader. The Russian government is estimated to have already spent an equivalent of at least USD 200 billion on its military activities. The invasion may cost over a trillion dollars more based on economic growth loss. In spite of such massive human and capital investments, with Russia now spending on arms anything between 30% and 40% of its budget, the war today continues in the same region where it started more than three—but in reality eleven— years ago! Putin is still fighting in Donbas. Russian propaganda is lying. Ukraine is not losing!

The sanctions against Russia and Belarus remain an important tool to deter Russia. The MFA's agenda for 2024 included the continuation of sanctions regime; through our efforts, the 13<sup>th</sup>, the 14<sup>th</sup>, and the 15<sup>th</sup> round of sanctions were adopted in Brussels. The 16<sup>th</sup> round was passed this February. Russia's exhausted economy has been grappling with ever-higher inflation, the consequences of losing access to European markets, and shortages in qualified workforce after young Russians had fled the country in their hundreds of thousands and Western companies had withdrawn from the Russian market. The sanctions are working! They have consistently weakened Russia's war machine, as best evidenced by Russian demands for a relief made since day one of negotiations with United States. The European Union's adoption of the sixteen rounds of sanctions is a success and testifies to its strength despite diverging national interests. The consequent slack in economic relations with Moscow is also good for Europe in the long run, making European countries independent of an incalculable partner.

Russia should be held legally and financially liable for its aggression against Ukraine, for the committed and documented war crimes and crimes against humanity, including for abducting of thousands of children, torture, and regular attacks on civilians and on energy infrastructure. That is why Poland has consistently advocated a full and prompt use of the frozen assets of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation to support Ukraine. The

money will either be used by the victim or by the aggressor. This is not even a matter of choice but of fundamental justice.

The world wants the conflict to end. Nonetheless, it is on the aggressor to make the first step towards rebuilding trust. Unless it happens, we should carry on with the policy of “no business as usual.”

The result of Russia’s war against Ukraine will define our region’s security level for years to come. It will determine for example whether Belarus will sink into the *Russkiy mir* for good, or whether it will manage to preserve the last shreds of its autonomy. It will constitute a point of reference for the European aspirations of Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia. It will also affect the foreign policy of important partners in Central Asia who look to both Moscow and Beijing, but who are also seeking closer ties with Europe.

Russia will be an invader until it abandons its conquest agenda. Head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service Sergey Naryshkin accuses Poland, while it strengthens its eastern border, and secures its territory, of being “highly aggressive” towards Russia and of “constantly rattling our sabre”.

This is the narrative of Russian imperialism—and Russian imperialism is our enemy. Such is our present policy towards Putin’s regime. **And that policy is the only one there is.**

## **MIGRATION POLICY**

The borders of Poland, NATO, the European Union, and the Schengen area must be defended against both Putin’s army and illegal migration, which is part of the Russian and the Belarusian dictators’ hybrid war against the West. The rule of the United Right left migration policy in a shambles, which culminated in the visa scandal. We had to act immediately.

As early as January 2024, I suspended the Poland Business Harbour programme, which had been launched in 2020 to facilitate access to the Polish labour market for IT employees from Belarus and, at a later stage, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Last autumn, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs drafted a bill for the Sejm on eliminating irregularities in the visa system. I increased visa fees and tightened up the

student visa system. We support arrivals of genuine students for genuine studies, but we will not allow the devaluation of Polish diplomas or using fake studies to extort EU work permits.

Migration management must not be considered in isolation from Poland's economic objectives. We must build our economic advantage on knowledge and specialisation. We need experts to support us in the areas of digitalisation, automation, and artificial intelligence. We put a stop to uncontrolled inflow of unqualified migrants. Less qualified non-EU workers may apply for seasonal work in Poland for up to nine months.

Our migration policy rules are simple: we admit people who will not infringe on our social cohesion and are likely to enhance our economy. We deport those who break the law or may pose a threat.

The government adopted a migration strategy for 2025–2030 and a strategy for cooperation with the Polish community and Poles abroad. Our migrant compatriots and their descendants abroad have been Poland's key demographic resources. We support returns. We sincerely invite every individual of Polish descent to have their share in Poland's success story. I will deal with this issue in more detail in my speech before the Senate, addressed directly to the Polish community abroad.

## **CONVERGENCE OF EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN INTERESTS**

Members of the House,

We must not turn a blind eye to the conduct of the countries that have been supporting Russia's war, combined into what has been known as the Axis of Chaos. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has not only been supplying Russia with weapons but also sending its troops to the frontline. Iran has provided Russia with the technology to produce the Shahed loitering munitions. After one such drone had been shot down over Ukraine, we transported it to Washington, D.C., through the joint effort of the Ukrainian army, the Polish special services, and Poland's foreign ministry, as a display of close collaboration between Russia and other Asian dictatorships.

Russian–Chinese cooperation is alarming. Over the last three years, China has exported to Russia copious amounts of dual-use goods, such as navigation equipment, drones, or

technologies jamming radio-electronic communications. Without this support, the aggression would have wreaked less havoc, claimed fewer lives, and could have already led to a total collapse of Russia's economy.

We respect the Chinese nation and its great culture. We may differ in our approach to human rights, but we admire the leap in modernisation the People's Republic of China has made over the last decades. However, we believe that China would create new value in the global order if, and it is in a position to do so, it put an end to Putin's colonial war in Ukraine. Instead of a "wolf warrior," we would rather see China as a peace envoy.

The history of Europe shows clearly that systems based on rivalry of great powers pose a risk of reducing small and medium-sized countries to mere pawns on the geopolitical chessboard. Poland has experienced this first hand. Last February marked the 80<sup>th</sup> anniversary of one of such experiences—the Yalta Conference.

Today's order, with organisations like the EU and NATO as its integral part, gives us something of which we were deprived in the past—agency, or a real impact on shaping the European and global policy, one that naturally matches our potential. This is why Polish diplomacy is tasked with working towards strengthening these organisations, not undermining their legitimacy. The rule is simple: a lonely Poland is a weak Poland. In community lies our strength. And in strength lies security.

Europe is faced with an existential choice: to either enter the game united, as a heavyweight competitor, or condemn itself to marginalisation. As Prime Minister Donald Tusk said, it is a grim paradox that "500 million Europeans are asking 300 million Americans to defend them against 140 million Russians."

As Europeans, we must be aware of our own resources, believe in our own possibilities, and act. Since what shapes the reality is not numbers but actions.

In an international survey, carried out earlier this year, respondents were asked if "the EU is a power that can deal on equal terms with global powers, such as the US or China." More than a half of those polled from such countries as Brazil, China, Indonesia, or India agreed with this statement. At the same time, in 11 surveyed EU countries the average affirmative response amounted to as little as 43%. So, others value us higher than we do!

According to the European Commission's data, 71% of European Union residents believe that it must strengthen its ability to produce military equipment, while 77% support a common defence and security policy. This gives us a mandate to think and act boldly.

It would be now appropriate to ask the opposition: do you really want the European Union to become a customs union only? This is what you say. Thank you for your confirmation. Your allies from Hungary and Ordo Iuris are already allocating money for an American think tank's programme aimed at mobilising the US's clout to deprive the European Commission and the European Court of Justice of their competence. Is this what you want? Do you really think that Poland will be stronger without a strong EU?

This government, together with other member states and the European Commission, wants to build a Europe that is capable of facing the threats to its security, especially those that come from the East. President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen sees the possibility to earmark as much as EUR 800 billion in the next years to strengthen the member states' defence capabilities. You really don't want this money? Naturally, a significant portion of this contribution will be contingent on the willingness and the determination of national governments. We believe this is a good start.

We will make use of EU support instruments to create defence infrastructure projects, such as the East Shield. This is good for Poland, not bad. We have been working to deepen the EU-NATO cooperation and enhance the complementarity of EU actions with those taken by the Alliance. Even if America's and Europe's interests are not identical, there is no doubt they are convergent.

The year we joined the European Union, an eminent American statesman, a Polish patriot, and my mentor, Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote: "an essentially multilateralist Europe and a somewhat unilateralist America make for a perfect global marriage of convenience." I would simply like to remind our American friends of the title of the book this quote comes from—*The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*. Some titles do not get old.

In response to steps taken by Washington, which undermine the economic interests of the member states, the European Union's actions must be smart and unambiguous. The response should be proportionate, and Europe should always be open to talks and ready to lift barriers. Such an approach is promoted by the Polish Presidency of the Council of



the European Union. We do not need a trade war; we need to work together in our transatlantic family.

## **VISION OF EUROPE AND RELATIONS WITH EUROPEAN PARTNERS**

Members of the House,

The European Union is the elemental vehicle for extending the area of peace, growth, and prosperity on our continent. The idea of creating “a European superstate” in which our states and nations would “melt away,” brought up so readily and with outrage by the opposition, is but a populist phobia. Such a concept is not in Poland’s interest, nor is it in the interest of any other member state, and there are no intergovernmental talks to this end. It is, however, in the interest of Poland and of the entire Union to reinforce the defence pillar, complete the integration of the single market, establish a real energy union, enhance the efficiency of foreign and security policy, and consolidate the common system of external border management. And obviously to rectify mistakes, which happen to every single institution known to humanity.

Let me reiterate: Poland’s goal is to maximally leverage the European Union membership to advance our national interests.

Our vision of the European Union’s future boils down to three slogans: “geopolitical union,” “union of values,” and “union of growth.”

A strong **geopolitical union**, taking advantage of its economic potential to pursue an active foreign policy, is indispensable to Poland. It is a union of states that recognise unprecedented threats to our continent’s security, and on this account are willing to dedicate equally unprecedented funds to make up for years of negligence related to defence spending. It is also a union that takes in new European countries.

A **union of values** is an association of states where human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law are among the factors that cement and shape our common European identity.

A **union of growth and competitiveness** presents Poland with an opportunity to take action on a European level in order to keep the position of its economy. And to strengthen

it. We will give priority to reducing bureaucratic burdens and supporting innovation—both technological and social. These changes are essential for the European Union to hold out against the competition with non-European countries.

In the context of Polish security policy, an important part is played by bilateral and multilateral cooperation with our most important partners from Western Europe. That is the purpose of the Weimar Triangle we reinvigorated. To a similar end, we launched in Warsaw a format which has since become very active, bringing together the Big Five European Union member states and the United Kingdom, with the participation of the High Representative.

We are negotiating a new treaty with France, which will hopefully be signed in the coming weeks.

In our relations with Germany, we remember the tragic history. We highlight the need to properly commemorate the Polish victims of the Second World War in the centre of Berlin, and the still unresolved issue of redress for war damage.

But while recalling that war, we need to remember that nowadays the most important measure of the quality of the Polish–German partnership are our joint actions to prevent a war in the future. Poland and Germany bear special responsibility for Europe’s security.

For the past eight years, the United Right government pursued Cold-War-like politics with respect to Germany. In reality, it was mobilising its voters at the expense of foreign policy. I have one request: please name at least one way that it benefitted Poland. You cannot.

When in 2011, at the peak of the eurozone crisis, I said that I feared German inactivity more than German power, this Chamber voted on a motion to have me removed from office. Also today, even now in this Chamber some are insinuating that the Polish government represents some foreign interests. Opposition members, be serious! Today, I would say the same, only more bluntly: as long as Germany is a member of the EU and NATO, I fear Germany’s aversion to armaments more than the German army.

We acknowledge the announcement by the coalition emerging now in Berlin of a new approach to security threats. Germany has been an exporting power for decades. Nowadays, it should be exporting security in all forms: political, economic, and military. This may be an area of our close cooperation.

However, to avoid fear and take full advantage of the opportunities created by the current challenges, we need to act together, among friends, at the neighbourhood and European levels. The authors of the German defence strategy wrote that “maintaining and strengthening a robust, innovative, effective, and globally competitive security and defence industry in Germany and the EU is achievable only through close collaboration with our European partners.” We expect political leaders of the new German governing coalition to abide by this statement.

With London, we share interests and values. Under the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, we are taking actions to mitigate the negative impact of Brexit and set a framework for future cooperation between the EU and the United Kingdom. On the level of bilateral relations, we are negotiating a new defence and security treaty.

Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO added momentum to cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. In 2024, we signed a comprehensive Agreement on Strategic Cooperation in the Field of Security with Sweden. In this area, an important role is played by the Nordic–Baltic Eight—here, it is worth mentioning a historic summit of prime ministers of the group attended by Prime Minister Tusk in November last year. On 1 July 2025, Poland is taking over the annual rotating presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States—an extremely useful format of cooperation in the region, in particular since the Russian Federation withdrew from the organisation.

Russia’s activity in the Baltic Sea is an increasing threat to communication and energy security of other countries of the region. A particular challenge is posed by the so-called shadow fleet—vessels used to evade sanctions imposed on Moscow. In this context, Prime Minister Donald Tusk presented the concept of Navy Policing in December 2024, while at the beginning of this year, NATO increased the presence of warships, aircraft, and undersea drones in the Baltic Sea. They will monitor threats to critical infrastructure and carry out preventive actions.

No less important is our further cooperation with all NATO’s eastern flank countries, such as Romania or Bulgaria. We are also counting on Türkiye, which plays a strategic role in the Black Sea region and the eastern part of the Mediterranean. It is in the interest of the Polish state for Türkiye, which has the second-largest number of military personnel in NATO, to take greater part in European support for Ukraine after ceasefire.

We are not losing hope when it comes to the fate of Belarus. Although, of course, we are not naive—we have a realistic view of the rule of Alaksandr Lukashenka, who made his country dependent on the Kremlin. Belarusian society, including thousands of our compatriots, deserves a better life and a better future. We are demanding that political prisoners, including Andrzej Poczobut, be released. I would like to remind you that Andrzej Poczobut has been incarcerated in a Belarusian prison for already three years, also under your government. We are making sure that the support for Belarusian civil society is as high as possible on the EU agenda. Belarusians belong in a united Europe.

Democratic countries in Central and Southern Europe care about expanding the area of prosperity and security that is the European Union. We believe that the time has come for concrete progress in negotiations with at least four EU candidate countries: Ukraine, Moldova, Albania, and Montenegro. We are also hoping to resolve the impasse in negotiations with North Macedonia. We are not grateful to the Hungarian government for delaying these processes.

We are saddened to see Georgia moving away from its European path. We are not blaming Georgian society for the decisions of its government. We imposed sanctions on those responsible for repression. However, being a member of the Community is a privilege, not an obligation. It is a conscious choice made by both a country and its free citizens.

Members of the House,

We treat the non-military dimension of security and resilience in the EU and its Eastern Neighbourhood with utmost care. We are focusing on:

- carrying out the digital transition of the institutions and processes of critical importance to the country's security;
- building up resilience and reacting to cybersecurity, terrorist and hybrid threats;
- fostering cooperation in the area of crisis management;
- increasing the EU's capabilities in strategic communication and countering disinformation.

We are no longer defenceless in this respect. We have successfully rebuilt the model of media targeted at audiences abroad. The Polish Television recently launched the International Media Centre, comprised of Belsat TV, Vot Tak, Slawa TV, and TVP World—

an outlet presenting the Polish point of view, and broadcasting objective information instead of Russian propaganda. The reach of the media financed by the MFA, amounting to millions of views, proves that there is demand for fact-checked news in the former USSR countries. We are striving to convince our EU partners of these channels' potential in order to secure increased funds and extend their operations.

We are and will be seeking the House's generosity to secure funds for bringing free media to the nations who are finding themselves in a worse position than ours.

We also advocate the strengthening of the institution brought to life during the previous Polish Presidency of the EU Council, that is the European Endowment for Democracy.

## **THE GLOBAL SOUTH**

Members of the House,

We propose a more active approach to the countries of the Global South—for the lack of a better name. Russia is trying to expand its influence in this region, seeking to consolidate an anti-Western bloc. It draws on a post-colonial narrative, blaming the Western countries for underdevelopment; it supports local despots and tries to undermine democratic mechanisms. It offers a blurry vision of an allegedly more just international order, in which the role of the West is reduced.

We, the Polish People, understand post-colonial trauma. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century we were among the colonised ourselves—not the colonisers. Based on our experience we warn others that the Russian vision is not underpinned by the willingness to redress injury, but the intention to wield control.

Poland listens carefully and respectfully to the voices of non-European countries and regions, which do not always, or do not fully, share our perspective on key threats to the world order. We engage in dialogue underpinned by mutual understanding and pursuit of shared interests.

We can see a growing interest in this form of relations, ones that are based on partnership and not hierarchy. I firmly believe that many of these countries, just like Poland, have an interest in keeping a stable international order which brings them tangible benefits.

In this area of foreign policy, we will foster good relations with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. We would also like to strengthen economic cooperation with this region.

Security in the EU's Southern Neighbourhood is in turn fundamentally influenced by the situation in Africa. Such was the message I delivered as I represented the European Union at a meeting of the Ministerial Political Dialogue with the Southern African Development Community. Supporting security in Africa is about enabling better lives for hundreds of millions of people. The young populations of African societies are rapidly developing in many fields—not only as regards agriculture but also telecommunications, logistics, and banking services. Urbanisation is advancing and outlays on clean energy are on the rise. Where possible and mutually beneficial, we will support Africa's potential in collaboration with EU partners.

At the same time, we are aware that ethnic conflicts and the lack of political stability lead to the exacerbation of the migration crisis and create fertile ground for criminal groups. This, too, clearly shows the hand of the Kremlin. Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group, now rebranded as Africa Corps, get compensated for their service with access to precious metals and minerals, which poses a threat not only to the countries of the Mediterranean but also to the entire Europe.

Energised by a potential success in Europe, the Kremlin would step up its destructive activities in other regions of the world, from South America to Africa to the Middle East, where Russia may collaborate with Iran to torpedo the efforts to bring stability to Syria or normalise relations between Israel and Palestine.

We consistently wish for both nations of the Holy Land to find a way for peaceful coexistence in two safe countries.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Russia and China have undertaken to make many emerging countries dependent on them through critical investments. What we can offer, apart from trade cooperation, is such development cooperation which will help those states remain independent. Fostering entrepreneurship and education, both locally and through scholarships in Poland, pays mutual, long-lasting dividends.

We have drawn conclusions from the fact that women's activity is often key to building up local communities. Education, healthcare, together with ensuring good conditions for professional activity and public participation translate into improved living conditions, thus reducing the incentive to leave the country. This benefits everyone, because strong societies are ones where women are given room to grow. This year marks the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the UN Security Council's adopting Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Poland promotes and implements its principles.

We are taking part in a worldwide race for resources, technologies, and capitals. There is a choice for us to make: either Europe, Poland included, will have a smart and strategic presence in Africa, or we will waste our chance to further mutually beneficial social and economic ties in the region, which would be tantamount to losing the ongoing pivotal stage of the global race.

China will remain a significant trading partner for European countries, including Poland. It is still a challenge to arrange our relations so that evident differences in one field do not stand in the way of mutual gain elsewhere.

I should obviously mention our relations with India. Last year, we celebrated the seventieth anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's August visit was the first visit of the head of India's government to Warsaw in 45 years and culminated in elevating Poland-India bilateral relations to the level of a strategic partnership.

We also perceive great potential in tightening relations with the countries of Southeast Asia. Last year, I travelled to Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The latter country has not been visited by a Polish foreign minister for almost three decades.

Moreover, our security cooperation with the countries of the Indo-Pacific Four—Japan, which I visited earlier this year, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—is gaining importance.

## **THE UNITED NATIONS**

Members of the House,

The United Nations is outdated and dysfunctional, with its principles violated even by permanent members of the Security Council. But it is the only global political forum we have. We endorse the reform of the organisation's principal bodies, including the Security Council. It should be restored to its basic mission, which is to maintain peace. We believe that it also has to better represent the current global balance of powers. The time may have come to find a place for the European Union in the seat of a permanent member of the Security Council.

We wish to avoid deepening the polarisation between emerging and wealthy countries within international fora. We are open to sharing our successful transition experience with other countries in the spirit of partnership and solidarity, to build bridges of understanding in an unstable world. Poland's joining of the G20 would contribute to these goals. We are already at the threshold of the world's twenty largest economies.

We understand that there is no single, universal political system appropriate for each country. However, in order to create conditions for peace and prosperity for all, every actor in international relations must adhere to some basic principles. International policy is like sport—it would be simply impossible to organise interstate events without universally accepted rules of the game.

## **FOREIGN SERVICE**

Ladies and Gentlemen,

A professional foreign service equipped with modern tools is crucial for an effective foreign policy.

In my last year's address to the House, I promised to reform the Polish diplomacy and to restore the foreign minister's role, as provided for in the Constitution and in statutes.

It is the minister of foreign affairs, in consultation with the prime minister, who is responsible for the ministry's work. I have seen no reason why the foreign minister would be denied impact on deciding who should implement our policy as a head of diplomatic mission. I am pleased that the recent weeks have been marked by pragmatism and



willingness to reach a compromise. I would like to thank Mr President for all the nominations he is now signing.

We are rebuilding the prestige of the Polish diplomat and increasing the attractiveness of employment at the MFA. We hope for higher numbers of candidates, coming from different circles and regions of Poland. We offer them an ambitious work for our country, but also exceptional professional growth and training opportunities.

We are also improving Ministry premises. Since the start of this year, the Polish Embassy in Berlin finally operates in a new building. Let me remind you that I published the results of the architectural competition for this building back in 2012. I would suggest that we all draw a lesson from this painful example that it is not always worth destroying or abandoning the achievements of one's predecessors.

We are finalising the construction of a new embassy in Minsk. The Polish Institutes in Stockholm and Paris will be moving to their renovated seats.

By the end of this decade, we are going to:

- convert the property purchased in 2024 into a new seat for the Embassy in Washington;
- build a new building for the Embassy in Kyiv;
- create a fully professional infrastructure for the MFA Archives;
- build a meeting and conference centre, with office space, in Bagatela Street in Warsaw;
- erect a modern office building behind the MFA headquarters in Aleja Szucha in Warsaw.

On top of these great ventures, there will be several dozen investments and refurbishments in other locations. We have 160 diplomatic posts worldwide, which are increasingly better equipped. They should guarantee appropriate working conditions, reflect well on today's Poland.

We will optimally manage our property abroad. We will sell what is redundant, ineffective, or expensive. And we will buy what we need. In a responsible and sustainable manner. If Polish political, economic, or social interests so require, we will always be willing and able to open new missions. Never the other way around!

Apart from knowledge, skills, and financing, such an approach also requires boldness and responsibility. I am asking the House for your understanding and support for this attitude. None of us is doing this for ourselves. We are talking about projects which will need to be continued by our successors, whom they will serve.

## CONCLUSION

Members of the House,

Modern challenges—from security threats to economic instability—are non-partisan. An efficient foreign policy requires us to see beyond divisions and think in terms of *raison d'État*, not in terms of temporary petty political interests. Over the millennium since Bolesław I the Brave's coronation, we have been at our peak: we built a country which became a European power, only to lose it all due to internal conflicts, inability to reform, and the rapacious neighbours. As was the case in the past, also today our future global standing depends on our ability to cooperate.

The world of European and transatlantic cooperation, a source of both inspiration and aspiration for the “Solidarity” movement's generation, offered Poland the best 35 years of its millennial history. Now autocrats and populists are trying to destroy it, offering nothing better in replacement. It is a dangerous, yet solemn moment, as a lot depends on ourselves.

Poland should not be fooled that it will benefit from a world once again ruled by the law of the fist. Or that Poland will be better off while the rest of Europe is worse off. It is the other way round—it should mobilise all its resources to protect democracy, the rule of law, international order, and a just and empowered European Union. At stake is whether Europe, our home, can remain one of the world's centres or will be divided up into several dozen impoverished outlets. Whether it will be a power or a pushover. Whether it will co-rule the world or be turned into a backwater. Poland's security, prosperity, and clout depends on this. Full ahead, Poland!

I would like to ask the House to approve the presented policy and accept this statement. Thank you for your attention.