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Minister Zbigniew Rau's interview to Rzeczpospolita

11.06.2021

2018.08.03 Warszawa . Budynek MSZ , ilustracje .
Fot. Tymon Markowski / MSZ

Jędrzej Bielecki: Poland has been strongly committed to blocking the construction of Nord Stream 2. However, on 19 May, US President Joe Biden decided not to impose sanctions on the consortium that is building the gas pipeline. There are now no impediments to the project’s completion. How did you learn about this? 

Prof. Zbigniew Rau: From the media. Our American allies did not find time to consult with the region most exposed to the consequences of that decision.

Did you feel the same as on 17 September 2009, when, on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland, Barack Obama announced—without tipping off the Polish authorities—that elements of an anti-missile shield would not be built in our country? 

 I spoke with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken for the first time in January. He assured me that “nothing will be decided about you without you”. We agreed that the Polish-American strategic dialogue should be resumed urgently. In February and March, when rumours appeared about confidential US-German talks on NS2, we heard reassurances that no such discussions were taking place. We took note of these statements despite the fact that they contradicted what we knew from other sources. And here I am, reading the news about this week’s talks in Washington between Chancellor Merkel’s close associates and advisers to President Biden on the completion of Nord Stream 2. Such a format for American-Russian-German dialogue is no substitute for consultations between America and its allies on NATO’s eastern flank, who will be particularly affected by these decisions. After all, this gas pipeline will radically reinforce the common interests of Germany and Russia and will pose a direct threat to peace in Europe. The military threat to Ukraine, as well as to Poland and other NATO countries in Central Europe, will intensify.

How?

President Putin himself said in St. Petersburg that once Nord Stream 2 is completed, Ukraine would have to “show good will and behave itself”. We all know what it means when a Russian leader speaks this way. It is a threat. Politics should be based on today’s realities and not on wishful thinking. Russia is pursuing an aggressive policy towards its neighbours, a policy which resorts to armed assault, blackmail and threats. This decision will only reinforce its posture. As for the North Atlantic Alliance, it will come out weaker. That was Russia’s objective from the start with Nord Stream 1 and 2. These were projects aimed at disrupting Western unity. The German government got caught in this Russian trap and now the same is happening to the Biden administration. It will only lead to an escalation of Russia’s aggressive behaviour. In a few months, we will see the next round of the Russian military’s “Zapad” manoeuvres. They will give Russia an early opportunity to test the United States’ and Germany’s response. Who will then foot the bill for German and American errors? You don’t solve crises by refusing to pick up the phone...      

Why did Biden make such a concession to the Kremlin and why did he not wait for the September Bundestag elections, which could install the Greens – a party much more sceptical of Nord Stream 2 than Chancellor Merkel – in the German government?

 I think some of the assumptions behind that decision came from thinking which began to develop during the Bill Clinton administration. The overthrow of the Iron Curtain and the reunification of Germany was the biggest foreign policy success in US history. This success led America to believe that not the United Kingdom but a united Germany would be its main partner in Europe. The US reckoned that, together with the Federal Republic of Germany, it would now be “building a free world”. This is still a point of reference for the Democratic Party. Biden equates Europe with Germany. The problem is that in the case of Nord Stream 2, Germany has sacrificed the values and security interests of the free world for cooperation with Russia and its policy of aggression. And Russia wants to see the “free world” fail. Russia’s neighbours so far have not been mistaken about its intentions. Sadly. On the other hand, the Americans, Germans and French have been wrong on numerous occasions. Let me recall the historic speech of President Lech Kaczyński, who, together with other leaders of our region, warned the world against Russia’s aggression at Tbilisi’s Independence Square in August 2008. He said that Georgia would be followed by Ukraine, then the Baltic States, and finally perhaps Poland. The Obama administration ignored these warnings in 2009, and the Biden administration is turning a deaf ear today. It is easier for the Americans to talk to the Germans and the French, who won’t ask awkward questions and are willing to give the Americans the nod on Russia. The countries on NATO’s eastern flank would certainly be ready to give our American allies the benefit of their experience to help prevent further mistakes. And we would put it to them frankly: you’ve walked into a trap.

The Americans are not going to hold consultations with Poland ahead of the Biden-Putin Summit in Geneva on 16 June, are they?

 But before that happens, we will have a NATO summit and a meeting between President Biden and EU leaders. This will be an opportunity to discuss how to offset the security deficit for NATO members that has been created by the Nord Stream 2 decision. However, routine Polish-American communications at an official level cannot be regarded as an appropriate format for discussing issues of fundamental importance to the region. Especially given the current provisional status of American representation in Warsaw and the continuing lack of a new US ambassador. We are talking about strategic issues that require consultations on a much higher level. Unfortunately, the US delegation traveling to Europe with President Biden has been so preoccupied with his meeting with Putin that they have not found time to arrange a meeting with their eastern flank allies. So there will be no Biden meeting with President Duda, either.

But there is more. Please recall that when we hosted the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw, we arranged for Ukraine – a victim of Russian aggression – to attend as a special guest. This time, Ukraine’s president has not been invited. A few days ago, in an effort to save the day, President Biden invited President Zelenskyy to Washington. Even so, this visit will take place after the meeting with Putin. However, the proper sequence should be the reverse and result from a well-considered policy, not a mere face-saving operation.  So here we have yet another mistake. In fact, we are dealing with a cascade of errors. All of which could have been avoided if consultations with allies had been taken seriously.

This week, you met with Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis. Is this part of a plan to strengthen cooperation between countries that will be the most heavily affected by the completion of Nord Stream 2?

 In the face of such a serious security threat as Nord Stream 2, countries in a similar position will naturally take action to mitigate the adverse effects of other allies’ mistakes. We cannot wait for the Americans to exhaust all possible options before they arrive at the one effective policy. It will surely happen at some point, but we need to act now. Russia will not wait for the US, either. Poland and the Baltic states have the most in common in this respect. Let me repeat: for Moscow, the completion of Nord Stream 2 is an immense political triumph, which the Kremlin will read as an incentive to take further aggressive actions. Many years ago, President Putin announced that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest tragedy of the 20th century, and he has never backed down from this claim. Both the Baltic states and Ukraine were part of the USSR. Ukrainians, therefore, have every reason to feel threatened. Under the United Nations Charter, they have the right to defend themselves and demand help from other UN members – arms supplies, at least – to repel attack. President Zelenskyy has made such requests many times, because the threat his country faces is not some surreal vision; it is analytically grounded in Ukraine’s experience with Russia to date.

Poland wasn’t part of the USSR. Does that mean our country is exempt from Russia’s ambitions to reimpose their sphere of influence?

Geographically speaking, Poland is probably beyond the scope of Russia’s revisionist aspirations, but there is a political dimension as well. Poland is pivotal in NATO’s deterrence and defence system. Without Poland, a successful military defence of the Baltic states is impossible. For the same reason, it would not be possible without Polish participation to provide effective support to Ukraine in fending off Russian aggression. That is why Poland has a particular interest in keeping the peace in Europe. If the people in Washington who manage European affairs haven’t yet pinned up a map of Europe on their office walls, they may have hard time setting priorities. Every country in our region has its own lengthy experience with Russian imperialism. We also share a common political heritage, which is still very much alive in Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states. Examples include President Zelenskyy’s decision to attend anniversary celebrations of the Constitution of 3 May or the poll commissioned by the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) which showed that 38 percent of Belarusians identify with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but only 28 percent with the Soviet legacy. For centuries, our region has a fault line between two systems of political values. One was based – as the Union of Lublin that formally established the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth put it – on the bond of “the free with the free, the equal with the equal”. From this comes the ethos of the elected executive, royal power accountable to elected parliament. The other system was based on autocracy, uncontrolled and unrestricted power, which, from the time of Ivan Kalita to Vladimir Putin, measures its political success by territorial expansion. The pursuit of Russia’s imperial idea collides with the democratic tradition of the Commonwealth, the natural heartland of which is Poland. By the way, I would like to stress that the slogan “nothing about us without us”, which US politicians and diplomats enjoy using so much, is older than the United States of America. It became a constitutional principle in the Commonwealth of Poles, Lithuanians and Ruthenians as early as 1505. It is a part of our common democratic tradition. 

 But isn’t the failure to consult Poland also the result of our own mistakes, particularly controversies over the rule of law and the presidential chancellery’s delay in sending a congratulatory letter to President-elect Biden?

 Let me reply with a question. What did Ukraine do to deserve being locked out of consultations on Nord Stream 2 by the Biden administration? Why did the Americans block a NATO-Ukraine summit ahead of the Biden-Putin meeting? What mistakes were made by other American allies on NATO’s eastern flank that would justify Washington’s prioritizing communication with its adversaries over talks with its allies?  We are facing policymaking based on false premises that stem from a condemnation and rejection of policies conducted by the previous administration. This is nothing new. We saw a similar attitude from the US administration towards Central Europe, including Poland, at the beginning of Barack Obama’s presidency. You’ve already mentioned it, but let me remind younger readers that in 2009, the Obama administration refused to take part in commemorations of the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War – an event of great importance for Poland and Europe. Poland had a different government then, its foreign minister could not get the Americans to agree to consultations, and on 17 September 2009, he learnt from the press that the Obama administration had decided to abandon the idea of building an anti-missile shield system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Poland was treated in such a manner because a couple of years earlier, when yet another Polish government was in power, in response to a plea from then US President George W. Bush, a Republican, it sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan as a solid US ally. Thus, I consider it infantile to attempt to explicate American policy by some intricacies in diplomatic protocol. We are an important and loyal ally of the US, and a key partner to ensure peace in Europe. As for our internal political processes, Poland is a democratic state under the rule of law. President Andrzej Duda’s mandate to speak on behalf of Polish nation is indisputable and carries the same weight as the mandate of President Joe Biden. Each democracy is a system capable of self-regulation. I have studied the American political system and am quite aware of its faults – some of which would be unacceptable in a democratic Poland, where they would be considered discriminatory or even rather undemocratic. As a politician, however, I will not dwell on this subject. These are matters for Americans to decide and no external intervention can improve the situation or speed up the process of regulating American democracy. Moreover, anyone daring to undertake such an intervention would need a democratic mandate to reform American democracy. I possess no such mandate. What I do have is a mandate to improve the Polish political system and institutions, and to carry out the policymaking tasks that have been entrusted to me.

 Is the new US administration implementing arrangements made with Donald Trump on enhancing the American military presence in our country – that is, Fort Trump?

Of course. Poland is a reliable ally who stands by the US, regardless of whom American citizens entrust with power. The arrangements are being implemented.  

Thirty-six years ago, also in Geneva, Mikhail Gorbachev met with Ronald Reagan for the first time. That meeting initiated the period of détente, which, among other things, led to Poland’s regaining its sovereignty. Could the 16 June meeting mark a similar breakthrough?

 Putin is no Gorbachev, and Biden is certainly no Reagan. Today’s Russia is not the USSR in its declining years, and the US is not the same country that was soon to assert its supremacy over the world as “a lonely superpower”. Therefore, I do not expect the upcoming summit to bring radical changes. America will not lift or even ease the sanctions imposed on Russia, and Putin will not change his aggressive behaviour.

Then why did Biden agree to the meeting? Out of gullibility?

No. Diplomacy strives to nurture even the very remote possibility that one day Russia will become a member of the international community seeking to preserve peace and pursuing peaceful policies to this end. We should always look for ways of encouraging Russia, even under Vladimir Putin’s rule, to adopt such policies.

Biden’s priorities are to rebuild the American economy and contain China. For the sake of these aims, will he not make concessions to Putin?

Given the experience of our part of the world over the past few decades, this question seems pertinent. Moreover, you are asking it on behalf of many Polish citizens. I also raised the issue in conversations with Antony Blinken. Every so often, somebody in Washington suggests that it’s worth considering a “reverse Kissinger manoeuvre” – an analogy to the US attempt to draw China away from the USSR in the 1970s. Only now the goal would be to draw Russia away from China. I discussed this idea with the US secretary of state and got the impression that he is unconvinced, perceiving the concept as totally academic and hence impractical.  Nevertheless, the question arises about whether Russia itself would find such a manoeuvre attractive. Unlike Washington, Moscow has no economic conflict with Beijing – it plays in a different league. Russia and China also share a common vision of international relations, based on a multi-vectoral approach and opposed to the order Biden is trying to construct. As a matter of fact, Russia’s brutal policy towards the West has gotten results. There is no reason for Moscow to renounce it. And why should China behave differently, when aggression is demonstrably effective?  

Will Turkey – which is becoming more and more authoritarian and buying weapons from Russia – become a catalyst for NATO’s break-up?

Turkey is a key ally for both the US and Poland. If you need any evidence, note that President Biden’s only bilateral meeting planned for the upcoming NATO summit in Brussels is with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. As the US pulls its troops out of Afghanistan, the Turkish army is covering the withdrawal. One should also remember that Turkey today is a much more democratic country than it was under military rule in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, when there were no doubts about Turkey’s reliability as an ally and NATO member essential to the free world’s defence. The situation today is no different. NATO and Europe need their Turkish ally.    

Belarus is in a tragic situation, and yet the deputy speaker of the Polish Sejm, Ryszard Terlecki, advised Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya to look to Moscow for help after she incautiously allowed herself to get drawn into internal Polish disputes. How badly will this undermine Poland’s position in Belarus? 

 The cause of democracy in Belarus and the struggle of Belarusian democratic activists is immensely popular in the whole democratic world, including Poland. This is evidenced by the invitations that have been showered upon Mrs. Tsikhanouskaya from Europe, including Poland, and on the other side of the Atlantic. Our opposition wanted to use Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and her cause in Poland’s domestic political struggle, to create the impression that her popularity in Poland is also their popularity. I think that Speaker Terlecki’s Twitter post expressed his indignation at this attempt at political manipulation, which seeks to bask in the reflected glory of somebody locked in battle with a ruthless, brutal regime. And his indignation was understandable, since the Polish opposition has countless opportunities to seek popularity at home: through party programmes, publicity campaigns, voter mobilization – whatever it takes to oust the Law and Justice party from power. Instead of that, it decided to take a short cut and hijack the acclaim won by a woman fighting for freedom and democracy in an authoritarian country, taking the credit for her achievements. Instead of offering Poles their own programme, the opposition has tried to wave a flag with Mrs. Tsikhanouskaya's face on it. That’s why I understand the Speaker’s irritation. This was, after all, an obvious foul. Moreover, I am pleased with Mr. Terlecki’s acknowledgement that the form in which he expressed his outrage was inappropriate.  That’s why he sent a personal letter to Mrs. Tsikhanouskaya and I suggest that we should now consider the case closed. Poles should be united in supporting Belarusian democracy and the brave Belarusians who risk their own lives and those of their loved ones so that their nation can win the right to democracy. 

Is it inevitable that Russia will absorb Belarus?

This process is already under way. The more society rejects Alexander Lukashenko, the more his room for manoeuvre shrinks. He already knows that he will not regain his people’s esteem and lacks a mandate to decide the country’s future. That is why he has had to borrow this mandate from Russia. Loans must be repaid and the time is approaching when the debt will fall due. It follows that Lukashenko’s bankruptcy as a ruler may change the fate of Belarus. Every day brings us closer to that moment. In our part of Europe, the desire for freedom – whenever it arises – is always fulfilled. We simply do not know when. Young Belarusians will not resign themselves to living the rest of their days under a ruler with no legitimacy to decide about their future.

Is Poland keeping open the channels of communication with the Belarusian authorities? 

 Yes. These contacts allowed us to secure the release of three women directors of Polish schools who had been detained. As for the fate of other Poles who have been imprisoned, it will depend on a combination of factors, including their willingness to leave Belarus. 

Are Belarusian activists safe in Poland?

The Ryanair hijacking was an act of state terrorism aimed at intimidating Belarusians who live abroad and do not accept the situation in their homeland. We will not let them be intimidated in Poland. 

What are the chances of resolving the dispute with the Czech Republic over the Turów coal mine? 

I strongly believe we can find a resolution. The government has assembled a negotiating team drawn from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and several other ministries. They have received a negotiating brief and provisions for a draft agreement. If these matters are agreed with the Czech side, the lawsuit will be withdrawn. The Czechs know that Poland is ready to sign an agreement as soon as possible. However, on the Czech side the dispute has become something of a political football among the various parties ahead of this autumn’s parliamentary elections. We hope that together we will be able to overcome this snag in Polish-Czech relations. Short-term goals should not obscure the bigger picture and thwart chances for close cooperation in the future. I am an optimist and believe we will reach an agreement. 

The Law and Justice party is trying to organize a new club in the European Parliament. Is it possible that Marine Le Pen’s National Rally and the Alternative for Germany will join it?

 Anything is possible in politics. To quote Montesquieu, no two states are alike, because local conditions always differ. For example, the French Right is utterly different from its British counterpart, and Hungarian Catholicism, with its linkages to the Habsburgs, is dissimilar to Catholicism in Poland. You can search for historical roots, but only within individual countries. All the more so because politics is arithmetic. If there are sufficient common interests, alliances can be built between the most unlikely partners. This is a universal fact of political life.

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