National Institute of Telecommunications

In northern and north-eastern Poland, as well as in the Baltic Sea region, the phenomenon of interference in satellite navigation systems (GNSS) is clearly intensifying. These disruptions are deliberately generated and form part of the ongoing struggle between Russia and the West supporting Ukraine. And although one might assume these actions are aimed at military capabilities—ours and, more broadly, NATO’s—the problems are appearing in everyday life, far removed from military contexts.

Before 2022, GNSS disruptions in Europe were rather incidental—short-lived, local, and difficult to detect outside specialized measurements. The turning point was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Electronic warfare, including jamming and spoofing GPS signals, has become a permanent feature of modern military operations.

Importantly, it is increasingly not about a complete loss of signal, but about its falsification (spoofing). A device “sees” a signal—but an incorrect one, indicating a different location or time. This is the most insidious form of interference because applications continue to function “normally,” only based on false data.

One of the first sectors to truly feel the effects of GNSS disruptions was road transport. Truck drivers began reporting problems with tachographs—devices that record drivers’ working time and form the basis for transport control across the European Union.

Tachographs rely on GNSS signals not only to determine position but, above all, for precise time synchronization. When the signal is disrupted or falsified, the device cannot correctly record data. In practice, this means:

• blocking further driving,
• risk of administrative penalties,
• paralysis of transport operations.

Tachograph service centers in northern Poland reported increased activity, especially after nighttime waves of interference. Transport came to a halt—not due to engine failures, but because time no longer matched.

GNSS disruptions are also increasingly affecting urban mobility. Scooter and bike rental systems rely on so-called geofencing—virtual zones defined based on satellite location. These determine where you can ride faster, slower, or not at all—and where you can park the scooter.

When the GNSS signal is disrupted:

• the scooter may “assume” it has entered a restricted zone,
• it automatically limits speed or brakes abruptly,
• the user does not understand what happened because they are physically in a permitted area.

Another problem is the inability to end a ride. The app “sees” the vehicle several or even a dozen meters away, so it continues charging time and fees. For the user, it’s frustration; for the operator, operational chaos.

Even more serious consequences of GNSS disruption occur in carsharing. In 2025, the media reported cases where apps showed cars in the Tricity area as being in the middle of Puck Bay or… on Russian territory.

In practice, this meant:

• inability to unlock the car (“you are not near the vehicle”),
• inability to end the rental,
• incorrect billing.

Most “cars by the minute” do not have physical keys. Keyless systems rely on precise time and location. When GNSS fails, the service simply does not work.

GNSS disruptions also hit personal devices particularly hard, such as location-enabled smartwatches for children. Parents set so-called safe zones—home, school, after-school care. During signal interference, however, the watch may “move” the child elsewhere.

A parent receives an alert that the child has left school and is several kilometers away. This is not just a technological error, but real, unjustified stress—showing how fragile digital certainty can be.

In smartphones, GNSS is used not only for navigation. It is increasingly part of security systems—for example, in mobile banking. If the phone “believes” the user is in another country, the banking app may block access to the account.

Location disruptions can also make it difficult to collect a parcel from a parcel locker or use services that require location verification. These are minor inconveniences that nevertheless reveal the scale of dependence on a single signal.

Experts emphasize that GNSS disruptions have consequences that go beyond user comfort. They can destabilize:

• mobile networks (which use GNSS for synchronization),
• specialized communication systems,
• the operations of emergency and public safety services.

For this reason, they are now treated as an element of cybersecurity threats and hybrid warfare.

Counteracting such interference is very difficult. Therefore, monitoring and early warning become crucial. In Poland, the RTGMS system is already in operation, analyzing the situation in GNSS bands, and in the coming years it is expected to cover the entire country. At the same time, the European Union is working on a pan-European GNSS interference monitoring system.

Because today, GNSS is not just about convenience. It is critical infrastructure upon which transport, communication, public services, and citizen safety depend. And when someone begins to deliberately disrupt it, the consequences extend from geopolitics—down to where it hurts most: the everyday lives of ordinary people.