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Nonproliferation: Supporting the Non-proliferation Treaty ahead of the 2020 Review Conference

02.04.2019

A speech at the UN Security Council forum.

Nuclear affairs are back on top of the agenda of international politics and every day brings news on nuclear issues. Politicians attach the utmost importance to topics like the denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the further implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the erosion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. They have dominated international political discourse in recent months. In the past year alone, the President of Poland has twice had the occasion to speak on nuclear non-proliferation in this forum (see S/PV.8160 and S/PV.8362).

There is no doubt that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been a fundamental document and remains the only global, legally binding instrument that commits the nuclear-weapon States to continuing negotiations towards nuclear disarmament. It also requires all its States parties to pursue general and complete disarmament and to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. Since its adoption, the NPT has become an important part of international law and a universal standard. Over the years, the NPT has proved its value in containing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, setting standards of responsible behaviour in that domain and providing a platform for cooperation between nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States.

The NPT has adapted successfully to the changing circumstances. That has been possible thanks to the existing instruments that have enabled consistent improvements, in the form of the preparatory committees and the review conferences, which have made it possible to air ideas and to test various solutions. Next year, we will celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of NPT’s entry into force. The NPT regime has unfolded along three main pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. All are mutually enabling, reinforcing and balancing elements. The first two aspects could be described as a work in progress, at best. Despite the achievements in reducing nuclear warheads and their means of delivery, further progress remains a serious challenge. The main reason for that is a very complicated and unpredictable international security environment, which is not conducive to pursuing further disarmament efforts.

Non-compliance is the most serious challenge that the NPT is facing today. The failure of some States to comply with the NPT’s provisions and their safeguards obligations — the case in point was the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — erodes confidence and undermines the goals of the Treaty.

The last pillar — the peaceful use of nuclear energy — has, however, been the least controversial and largely successful. Under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, technical support has been created. It offers a wide array of programmes to support nuclear-related research and development, national legislative frameworks, and international cooperative efforts.

The NPT’s efficiency must be strengthened, in our opinion. It is the only comprehensive instrument aimed at stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, while preserving the right of States to pursue civil nuclear energy. Thanks to the NPT regime, transparency has immensely increased. The verification instruments are becoming more and more effective. That would not be possible without the consistent support of institutions, including the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

We should focus on closing the gaps in the NPT system. That includes working towards the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices — the fissile material cut-off treaty — and the establishment of a robust and credible verification regime of nuclear disarmament measures.

In that regard, we welcome the work of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament, in which Poland is actively engaged. Let me address the challenges to the NPT regime arising from East Asia, the Middle East and Europe.

First, the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea still presents a challenge to the NPT. Despite encouraging diplomatic developments on the Korean peninsula, a lasting peace will not be achieved without the denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, in accordance with several Security Council resolutions.

Secondly, it is in our common interest to stabilize the situation in the Middle East, reduce tensions in the region and, most importantly, to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. In order to address those concerns, Poland, together with the United States, organized in Warsaw the Ministerial Conference to Promote a Future of Peace and Security in the Middle East. One of its deliverables was the decision to establish a working group on curbing missile development and proliferation.

Thirdly, we are firm in our conviction that Iran must continue to fulfil all of its nuclear-related commitments under the NPT, as well as the JCPOA. In that regard, we welcome the International Atomic Energy Agency’s efforts to strictly monitor and verify Iran’s commitments. We should find a way forward on the operationalization of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. New, creative ideas based on a realistic evaluation of regional needs are needed.

Fourthly, in Europe, a return to full compliance by the Russian Federation is the only way to save the INF Treaty. Unless the Russian Federation destroys in a verifiable way all of its 9M729 missile systems, it will bear the sole responsibility for the end of the INF Treaty. That will have a significant impact on the strategic stability of Europe and, as such, on the current NPT review cycle.

Upholding the rules-based order reflects the long-term objectives of the Polish security policy. My country has been a committed and pragmatic supporter of strengthening non-proliferation norms. Our priorities focus on securing widespread and credible verification mechanisms, better implementation of safeguards, stronger risk-reduction measures and tighter international cooperation in nuclear safety and security.

During Poland’s chairmanship last year of the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT review conference, we outlined paths to a successful outcome of the upcoming review conference by presenting the Chair’s summary and reflection on the state of the NPT. We hope they will constitute a point of departure for our successors in upholding the integrity and credibility of the NPT and securing its effective implementation.

Close cooperation between the Polish and Dutch Chairs of the Preparatory Committees remains fundamental in that respect. New mechanisms of cooperation among the consecutive Chairs have contributed to strengthening the review cycle. They include regular consultations, an exchange of know-how, the organization of regional conferences and experts’ support.

The NPT is not a perfect instrument, nor has its implementation been perfect. However, without the NPT, the world would have been much less stable and secure. It is our collective duty to ensure its viability in the years to come. The 2020 review conference must be a collective success. To that end, we must focus on common interests, build bridges where differences persist and take bold steps where we see opportunities for deeper and wider cooperation. Only then can we live up to our common obligations.

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